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2 
Abstract  
This thesis seeks to contribute to the Chinese taxation literature by researching 
effective tax rate (ETR), marginal tax rate (MTR) and implicit tax in particular.  
These areas have been addressed for a number of years within the developed market 
context, whereas the same research for companies in developing countries is largely 
non-existent in Western literature. 
 
The first topic is the ETR and MTR analysis. The ETR analysis offers an overview of 
the actual tax burden for listed companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
together with the Statutory Tax Rate (STR) analysis, which incorporates the tax 
structure aspect of tax preferences from 1994 to 2006. In 2002, the State Council 
stopped unauthorised corporate tax rebate from local government and 2002 became a 
breaking point of the corporate tax analysis. The ETR and STR analyses reveal that 
companies benefitted widely from tax preferences before 2002 regardless of their 
industry or region. However, after 2002, the ETRs increased significantly overall and 
the industrial and regional ETR differences are much more significant. The tax 
preferential industries and regions’ companies are still in the lower ETR and STR 
range, but the non-tax preferential companies’ ETRs and STR increased significantly 
after 2002. This evidences the effectiveness of Chinese tax preference policies. The 
MTR estimations are the first Chinese company specific MTR estimations. The MTRs 
were estimated from 1995 to 2002 and the MTRs results are generally consistent with 
ETR results, except that the MTR estimations jointly depend on the company Net 
Operating Loss (NOL) occurrences, income and STR.  
 
The second topic is the determinants of ETR. An alternative view of ETR 
determinants is proposed. It incorporates the accounting-tax conformity theory and 
identifies a tax rate preference as the new ETR determinant variable to fit the Chinese 
taxation context. Five explanatory variables are hypothesized in associating company 
characteristics after controlling the company location, industry and sample period 
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dummy variables. These explanatory variables are tax rate preference, non-operating 
expenses, investment gain, provision for impairment and government ownership. The 
ETR determinants model is also examined by OLS regression (cross-sectional), and 
fixed-effects and random effects regression (panel data analysis). The results show 
that all of the explanatory variables are statistically significant coefficients with 
expected signs. The results also demonstrate that the proposed ETR determinant 
model is superior to previous determinant models. 
 
The third topic is implicit tax research. The results are evidence of the existence of 
implicit tax at the corporate level. The relationships between the company Pre-tax 
Return of Equity (PTROE) and tax preference variables and other control variables 
are also examined. The results demonstrate that there is a negative relationship 
between PTROE and tax rate preference when considering the companies aggregately 
in a large scale; and there is a positive relationship between PTROE and income 
related tax preference when considering the companies individually. The 
contradictory results indicate that in reality, the imperfect market conditions impede 
the realisation of implicit tax at the individual company level. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Background to the Study 
For a corporation, the most direct tax is corporate tax, which is charged on the profit 
of the corporation. The corporate tax is levied in many countries, such as the USA, the 
UK and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Company income is subject to 
corporate tax and the tax is payable according to the Statutory Tax Rate (STR) and 
taxable income. The STR is an objective measurement of the corporate tax burden 
since it normally applies to companies with a positive taxable income. However, there 
are many tax incentives available to the company to reduce the taxable income, which 
results in a lower corporate tax payable. This makes the corporate tax expenses less 
comparable among companies and industries within a country. Therefore, there has to 
be another way to measure and compare corporate tax burdens among companies and 
industries. 
 
There are two common types of corporate tax burden measures in the literature. They 
are the effective tax rate (ETR) and the marginal tax rate (MTR). The ETR is used to 
measure the overall corporate tax burden retrospectively. The MTR is used to measure 
the corporate tax burden for an extra one unit of income earned, which has a forward 
looking perspective. The ETR has received considerable attention in Western 
countries for decades and an analysis of the ETR is important to both tax policy 
makers and accounting researchers. The Citizen for Tax Justices (1985) and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (1984) compared the tax burden among companies and 
industries by calculating their ETRs and questioned the equity of the USA tax system, 
especially with respect to large USA companies. Spooner (1986) and the General 
Accounting Office (1990) suggested that the Citizen for Tax Justices and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation studies series significantly influenced the changes made in the 
US Tax Reform Act of 1986 (100 Stat. 2085, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 47, 1042). The MTR 
research drew less attention from academic researchers, compared with the ETR 
research. Because the tax return data are confidential, the actual estimation of the 
MTR is impossible. However, Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a) developed an 
14 
MTR simulation model based on financial statements, which provide a possible way 
to estimate the company specific MTR.    
Along with the ETR research, the ETR determinants studies began to emerge. This 
initially started from the ETR non-neutrality issue. The early determinants of ETR 
studies are univariate relationship analysis and mainly focus on the company size 
effect, such as Zimmerman’s (1983) political cost theory. Later, the ETR determinant 
studies moved to multi-variant relationships analysis using multiple regression to 
provide empirical evidence. The earliest studies are from Gupta and Newberry (1997) 
and Kim and Limpaphayom (1998). The common corporate ETR determinants 
identified in the review of prior literature in Chapter Three include company size, 
leverage, profitability, capital intensity and R&D intensity. However, most of the 
determinants are tax deductible expenses and have a negative relationship with ETR 
assumption, such as leverage, capital intensity and R&D intensity. The choices of 
determinants are on an ad hoc basis and the empirical results are sometimes 
inconsistent, as shown in the Chapter Three literature review.   
 
Another important development in corporate tax research is implicit tax. Scholes et al. 
(2009) developed a total tax burden framework integrating implicit tax into the tax 
research consideration. The total tax burden is the sum of the explicit tax and implicit 
tax. The implicit tax is defined as the difference between the pre-tax rate of return for 
the tax favoured investment and the benchmark investment under the perfectly 
competitive and frictionless economy. The classic example is that a non-taxable bond 
has a lower pre-tax rate of return but the same after tax rate of return compared with 
the same risk level fully taxed bond. Corporate implicit tax was first measured by 
Callihan and White (1999) using financial statements. The existence of implicit tax 
was also evidenced in a less perfect competitive market (Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006; 
Chen and Hung 2010). However, there are debates about the real measure of implicit 
tax. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) argue that existing corporate implicit tax 
measures in the literature are merely the variations in company’s effective tax rates.   
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1.2 Issues and Motivation  
The PRC has initiated economic reform since 1978 and was the second largest GDP 
country in the world in 2011 (BBC News 2011). After the taxation reform in 1994, the 
PRC established a modern taxation system. The corporate tax revenue was 877.925 
billion yuan and this raised 19.24% of the total tax revenue in 2007 (PRC. National 
Bureau of Statistics of China [NBSC] 2008). Corporate tax is now an important 
source of revenue for the Chinese government. The new Enterprise Income Tax Law 
(equivalent to corporate tax in the UK; PRC. Enterprise Income Law 2008) was 
introduced on 1st January 2008, replacing the previous Enterprise Income Tax 
Regulation (PRC. State Council 1993). Meanwhile, the Chinese government had seen 
successes in corporate tax incentive policies to promote business growth and attract 
investment into the tax favoured regions and industries. The corporate tax incentives 
in the PRC are various and include lower tax rate preferences, corporate tax rebates or 
even corporate tax exemptions. One of the most significant tax preference policies is 
that the tax favoured company may have a lower tax rate than the STR.  
 
Given that most tax research is conducted in a Western context, the relevant questions 
for international tax research are related to whether Western tax research findings can 
be generalised to the Chinese tax context, which is significantly different from 
Western countries. Since the new Enterprise Income Tax Law has been effective from 
2008, it is a good time to conduct an analysis of the ETRs, MTRs and STR from 1994 
to 2007 under the Enterprise Tax Regulation 1994 (PRC. State Council 1993) period. 
The research aims and objectives 1 to 3 are raised from here. 
 
After an examination of ETRs, the question of the determinants of ETR variations is 
raised. The ETR determinants research needs to incorporate the Chinese context in 
which there are different STR among companies. This provides an alternative insight 
on ETR determinants based on accounting-tax conformity theory, which is used to 
explain the differences between accounting rules and tax regulations on financial 
16 
statements. This links with the research aims and objectives 4 to 6 (see below). 
 
After the explicit tax analysis, the corporate tax analysis moves to implicit tax 
analysis to form a complete analysis of corporate tax in the PRC. In the prior implicit 
tax research, the tax preference measurement is a significant problem. However, the 
different STRs for different companies provide an opportunity to calculate the 
corporate tax preference in the PRC. Therefore, the tax research in the PRC using its 
unique corporate tax rate incentives will provide an interesting contribution to the 
existing implicit tax literature. Based on this opportunity, the research aims and 
objectives 7 and 8 are raised (see below). 
 
1.3  Aims and Objectives of the Study  
Against the research background and issues and motivations, the overall aim of the 
study is to investigate the explicit and implicit corporate tax burdens in the PRC. In 
order to achieve this aim, a number of objectives and specific research questions are 
formulated as follows. 
 
1. To investigate the ETRs and MTRs in the PRC.  
2. To examine the ETR and MTR differences between different industries and 
regions in the light of tax preference policies.  
3. To assess the effectiveness of the national tax preference policies. 
4. To provide an alternative ETR determinant analysis model and compare the model 
with previous ETR determinant analysis models. 
5. To identify which characteristics distinguish a company’s ETR variations and to 
examine the relationships of the following potential ETR determinants with the 
ETR in the Chinese corporate tax setting. They are tax rate preference, 
non-operating expenses, investment gain, provision for impairment and 
government ownership equity. 
6. To examine the influences of the following control variables with ETR variations. 
17 
They are time period, industry and region. 
7. To investigate the existence of implicit tax in the PRC. 
8. To examine the relationship between tax preferences and pre-tax return on equity 
after controlling for the macro economic factors, market structure factors, and 
government equity ownership. 
 
From the above objectives, three main research questions are formulated and the 
thesis has three foci: 
1. What have been the patterns of ETRs and MTRs from 1994 to 2006? 
2. What are the main determinants of the ETR in the PRC? 
3. Does implicit tax exist at the corporate level? 
The thesis is divided into three topics according to the three research questions above. 
They are ETR and MTR analysis, determinants of ETR and implicit tax, which 
correspond to Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six. The detailed research 
hypotheses are developed in each chapter’s methodology.  
 
The thesis seeks to explain the actual corporate tax practices and is defined as 
positivist research. The detailed research design will be discussed later in Chapter 
Four (4.2 Research design). The study uses a quantitative approach, with the research 
data based on Chinese listed company financial statements. The quantitative data are 
analysed through the use of basic statistics, statistic tests, and multiple regressions to 
conduct the research. The detailed research methodology for each will be discussed in 
each chapter. 
 
1.4  Contribution to Knowledge   
The first ETR and MTR study seeks to provide the most comprehensive analysis to 
date of corporate ETRs and MTRs in the PRC. This study is believed by the author to 
be the first ETR analysis subject of Chinese corporate tax in the Western literature. 
Furthermore, as far as the author is aware, this study conducts the first estimation of 
18 
Chinese company specific MTRs. The ETR and MTR study offers time trends, 
industrial and regional analysis together with STR comparisons. The results 
demonstrate that there was a significant increase in ETRs and MTRs in 2001 and 
significant industrial and regional ETR and MTR differences, which are in line with 
the tax preference policies. This reflects the effectiveness of the government tax 
policies. 
 
The ETR determinants study provides an alternative view of ETR determinants, 
which incorporates the accounting-tax conformity theory (accounting-tax 
reconciliation). This study proposes accounting-tax difference variables and tax rate 
preference variables to fit the Chinese corporate tax context. These determinant 
variables are tax rate preference, non-operating expenses, investment gain, provision 
for impairment and government equity ownership. In examining the company 
characteristics that affect the company’s ETR, the regression model controls for the 
industry effects, region effects and time effects on the ETR variations. The results 
show that the tax rate preference is the most influential determinant on the ETR 
variations. In addition, the regression results show that all the determinants are 
significant with expected signs.  
 
The implicit tax study has the advantage of the Chinese corporate tax rate preferences 
to measure the corporate tax preference and evidences the existence of implicit tax at 
the corporate level. Furthermore, in examining the relationship between Pre-Tax 
Return on Equity (PTROE) and tax preferences, the results show that implicit tax only 
exists when considering the companies aggregately in a large scale in imperfect 
market conditions. In such conditions, an individual company can keep the tax 
preference within the company itself.  
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1.5  Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis comprises eight chapters including the introduction. The aim of this 
section is to describe the organisation of the chapters for the rest of the thesis.  
Chapter Two: 
Chapter Two is the background information for the research. It offers an historical 
development of Chinese corporate tax from an economic development perspective. It 
also introduces the corporate tax regulations and incentives for the sample period. The 
capital market and Chinese listed company accounting system evolution are also 
briefly discussed. The introduction of the capital market and the accounting system 
helps people understand the Chinese financial statements and the sample companies, 
because the research sample is from the listed companies in the PRC.  
 
Chapter Three: 
Chapter Three is the literature review chapter. It presents the literature review on the 
ETR and MTR, the determinants of ETR and implicit tax. It gives the research 
development of each topic and summary of the prior research. Having explored the 
literature, the review helps to develop the research methodology for this thesis.  
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six: 
The three research topics are separately discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
Each chapter has its own research methodology, data and analysis section. The 
research methodology section discusses the rationale for the particular research 
method chosen and develops the research model for the thesis. The data section 
illustrates the sampling procedure for each research topic. The analysis section is the 
results report section.  
Chapter Four is the ETR and MTR chapter and it attempts to answer the first research 
question.  
What have been the patterns of ETRs and MTRs from 1994 to 2006?  
Chapter Five explores the determinants of the ETRs and attempts to answer the 
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second research question. 
  What are the main determinants of the ETR in the PRC? 
Chapter Six is the implicit tax chapter and tries to answer the third research question. 
  Does implicit tax exist at the corporate level? 
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Chapter Seven is a summary chapter, which identifies the main conclusions drawn 
from each chapter. It also discusses a number of limitations of the study and 
possibilities of further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A BACKGROUND TO 
THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
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2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides background information regarding the corporate tax research in 
relation to the PRC. It provides a brief overview of corporate tax development from 
an economic perspective. The economic background helps explain corporate tax 
changes and how corporate taxation has developed from the planned economic period 
to the socialist market economic period. The chapter then proceeds to introduce the 
Enterprise Income Tax (EIT)1 regulations and its incentives. The discussion of the 
EIT incentives is particularly important for non-Chinese tax experts to understand the 
reasons for the Statutory Tax Rate (STR) variations and later the ETR research 
hypotheses. The research sample is from Chinese listed companies’ financial 
statements and the research involved accounting-tax reconciliations. The discussions 
of the stock market and accounting systems for listed companies are essential to 
understand the sample companies’ characteristics, because they have unique features 
which are different from Western countries.  
 
2.2 Brief History of Corporate Tax Development  
The development of Chinese taxation can be divided into two time periods. The first 
period was from 1949 to 1978, when the PRC was in the socialist economy taxation 
period, also called Mao’s period. The second period was from 1978 to the present, 
when the PRC was in the socialist market economy taxation period. In both periods, 
the taxation systems present significant national economic and political features. In 
Mao’s period, the PRC was in socialist transformation and experienced political 
movements. In the second period, the PRC stopped its political struggle to concentrate 
on economic development and to convert the planned economy to a socialist market 
economy.  
 
2.2.1 The Socialist Economy Taxation Period 
The PRC was established on 1st October 1949 after the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) gained control of the mainland of China. The initial task for the CPC was to 
                                                              
1 It is the same meaning as corporate tax in the UK and corporate income tax in the USA.  
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rehabilitate the country from the devastation of the Second World War and the civil 
war. Because of the international communist parties’ close allied relationship at that 
time, the PRC turned to Soviet assistance and embraced the Soviet model of socialism 
to build the country. The PRC followed Soviet economic model to establish a 
centralised political system socialist country with a centrally planned and controlled 
economic system.  
 
For the tax system, the initial task was to unify taxation jurisdictions which had been 
inherited from the Chinese civil war to one national tax jurisdiction and set up a 
national taxation administration system. The tax system was basically inherited from 
the Republic of China tax system. The corporate tax at that time was called 
Industrial-Commercial Tax. 2  The Industrial-Commercial Tax covered all profit 
motivated enterprises in the PRC and was applied to both turnover and income. In 
1952, the biggest tax revenue contribution was from Agriculture Tax. It contributed 27% 
of the total tax revenue (2.7 billion yuan). The Industrial-Commercial Tax (Business 
Tax) and Industrial-Commercial Tax (Income Tax) were the third and fourth biggest tax 
revenue contribution sources, and contributed 17% and 10.6% respectively (Liu 2001). 
This reflected the fact that the PRC was an agricultural country in the early 1950s.  
 
The CPC also began a programme of nationalisation and socialism reform of the 
economy under the socialism doctrine in the early 1950s. The ultimate goal was to 
establish a socialist nation with increasing social and economic equality. The 
socialism transformation converted private ownership enterprises to public ownership 
enterprises, called State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) and Collective Owned Enterprises 
(COE).3 They completely dominated industrial output in Mao’s period after the 
                                                              
2 Industrial-Commercial Tax was regulated by Provisional Regulations for Industrial-Commercial Tax issued in 
1950. The turnover tax rates ranged from 1% to 3% and the income tax rates were progressive taxes with 14 rates 
from 5% to 30%. Sometimes Industrial-Commercial Tax translates into Business Tax and Industrial-Commercial 
Income Tax separately, because it had both turnover and income tax figures. However, Industrial-Commercial Tax 
is a more appropriate translation. 
3 The SOEs were not corporate entities, but more like an extension of the government agency. SOEs did not have 
much managerial and production freedom. A worker’s salary was also determined by government. The profits of 
the SOEs were remitted to the government as part of the fiscal revenue and the government granted funds to the 
SOEs according to the state budget. COEs were owned and managed by the workers of the enterprise, which were 
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socialism transformation. The SOE industrial output increased from 42% of the total 
output in 1952 to 90% of the total output in 1965 (see Appendix 1 Total Industrial 
Output classified by Ownership for details). By 1956, the socialist transformation of 
private ownership had been largely completed and basically completed the 
transformation of capitalist industry and commerce.4  
 
After the completion of socialist transformation, China became a centrally planned 
and centrally controlled economic system dominated by SOEs and COEs. The SOEs 
implemented the government macro economic policy and took social welfare 
functions instead of the government. It was considered not fair to continue to levy 
heavy taxes on SOEs. The tax and the after tax profit from SOEs were all required to 
be handed over to the government. From the government revenue point of view, the 
tax was not necessary as a source of revenue because the tax expenses had to be 
calculated separately and had to have a separate department to collect them. This was 
considered too complicated and unnecessary. In the 1960s and 1970s, the tax revenue 
only contributed less than half of the total government revenue. The most government 
revenue came from SOE revenue. (see Appendix 2 for annual government revenues). 
The usefulness of taxation was doubted at that time. From the government revenue 
point of view, the tax revenue collected from the SOE and the revenue withdrew from 
SOE revenue were the same. Therefore, the tax system was considered too 
complicated for the SOEs and it was not suitable within the planned economy system. 
The SOE taxes were simplified in 1958 and further simplified in 1973.  
 
The most significant reform was to introduce Unified Industrial-Commercial Tax5 to 
unify all the turnover taxes into one tax for SOEs in 1958. The main purposes were to 
simplify the enterprise tax administration, to unify the tax rate and taxable income, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
de jure publicly owned. They were predominantly small enterprises under local government control.  
4 At the 8th National Party Congress, the Congress declared that the socialist system had been basically established 
in the PRC. 
5 It is also translated as Industrial-Commercial Unified Tax or Consolidated Industrial-Commercial Tax. The 
Unified Industrial-Commercial Tax combined the former Goods Tax, Commodity Circulation Tax, 
Industrial-Commercial Tax (Business Tax) and Stamp Duty into one tax. 
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and to equalize the SOE profits among industries. In 1973, the SOE taxes were further 
simplified. The new Industrial Commercial Tax was introduced to consolidate Unified 
Industrial Commercial Tax and five other taxes.6 The tax rates were designed to 
implement one tax rate in one industry. The new Industrial-Commercial Tax embraced 
too many different types of taxes. It over-emphasized simplification and ignored the 
tax leverage function in the economy. The SOEs only had to pay 
Industrial-Commercial Tax for all their business activities. Because SOEs had to remit 
all their profit to the government, there was no need to levy income tax on SOEs. 
However, COEs were required to pay Industrial-Commercial Tax and 
Industrial-Commercial Income Tax. In 1978, the Industrial-Commercial Tax revenue 
dominated the tax revenue at 76% (39.47 billlion yuan), followed by the Industrial 
-Commercial Income Tax which contributed 10.4% (5.4 billion yuan) of the total tax 
revenue. The Agriculture Tax was 2.84 billion yuan, and only contributed 5.5% of the 
total tax revenue (Liu 2001). It became the least significant tax revenue source during 
the planned economic period. 
 
2.2.2 The Socialist Transitional Economy Period  
2.2.2.1 Economic Reform  
After Mao’s death, the CPC stopped the Cultural Revolution and moved to economic 
development and modernisation as its central task, abandoning the class struggle 
strategy. In 1978, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee,7 a 
resolution was made to condemn the Cultural Revolution and to clear the ideological 
issues concerning the nature of Marxism and socialism. More importantly, a decision 
was made to focus on economic development and modernisation instead of class 
struggle as the central task for the CPC. In addition, the CPC decided to open trade 
with the outside world and promote foreign trade and economic investment.  
 
                                                              
6 They are the Unified Industrial Commercial Tax Surcharge, Salt Tax, Enterprise Urban Real Estate Tax, Vehicle 
and Vessel Usage License Plate Tax and Slaughter Tax. 
7 The Central Committee takes over the National Party Congress’s powers when it is not in session. It meets more 
frequently, usually once a year in plenary session, to approve the Party draft document and to discuss and make 
national decisions. 
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Economic reform was followed by experimental implementations based on a gradual 
development approach. The experimental implementations meant the reform was a 
trial and error method. It started with less important areas such as rural areas. Also, 
there were no reform guidelines for the PRC and therefore, the development of the 
corporate tax system was  not coherent in the 1980s. The corporate tax system was 
based on the entity ownership to cope with the different business forms. The gradual 
development approach meant the reform took 14 years from 1978, when the PRC was 
a centrally planned economy, to 1992 when the PRC determined the goal of the 
economic system as being a socialist market economy. In between, it was called a 
planned commodity economy based on public ownership.8 
 
Economic reform started in the rural areas. The People’s Commune system was 
abolished and markets for agricultural products trading were permitted if the 
production exceeded the government planned production quota. As a result of this 
rural economic reform, the increased productivity and capital boosted the 
development of COE and Township Village Enterprises in rural areas. The rural areas 
economic reform provides a free market to trade and also frees the excess labour to 
urban areas. In urban areas, the most important was SOE reform. Under the planned 
economy, the SOE did not have any production and managerial freedom and the 
performance assessment did not relate to the profit of the enterprise. The SOEs had to 
remit all the profit to the government and the revenue distribution was absolute 
equalitarianism irrespective of an enterprise’s performance. The lack of motivation 
caused SOEs production inefficiency and resulted in serious loss making, especially 
after the market economy was initiated. After 1985, the government had to subsidise 
SOEs around 32 to 60 billon yuan each year which is about 15%-25% of the total 
government revenue (Appendix 2 Annual GDP and Government Revenue for detailed 
annual SOEs subsidies).  
                                                              
8 At the 12th National Party Congress in 1982, the CPC stated its intention to maintain the planned economy as 
the mainstay, and market regulation as a supplement (Hu 1982). Two years later, in 1984, CPC decided that China's 
socialist economy was a planned commodity economy based on public ownership (Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China 1984). 
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The inefficient production and loss making SOEs meant the government had to 
transform the SOE into an independent corporation with a separate legal personality. 
The initial reform of SOEs was to give them more management autonomy by 
allowing them limited production, and sale and profit retaining autonomy. The 
retained profit could be used either to finance their investment or to improve 
employee benefits. In the 1980s, China established a double-track price system to 
coordinate the economic and SOE reform in the transition period.9 The state fund 
allocation was replaced by a bank loan with corresponding banking reforms. The 
profit remittance was replaced by the conversion of profits into tax reforms10. 
 
2.2.2.2 Establishment of Corporate Income Tax  
The SOE only need to pay the turnover tax which was Industrial-Commercial Tax. 
The taxation system was too simple and did not link with enterprise profits, resources 
used, production output and operational costs. Also, the government could not use 
taxation to provide incentives for business growth or investment direction. The 
government adopted the conversion of profits into tax reforms for SOEs in the 1980s. 
 
In 1983, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) decreed Provisional Regulations of SOE 
Conversion of Profits into Taxes. The aim of the reform was to transform SOEs into 
taxpayers instead of profit sharing with the government and to transform SOEs into 
truly independent enterprises by separating government involvements from enterprise 
management and ultimately restructuring the SOEs into shareholding enterprises. 
After the 6th National People’s Congress (NPC) authorizing the State Council to 
reform the industrial and commercial taxation system, the State Council promulgated 
the SOE Income Tax Regulations (draft) and SOE Regulatory Tax in 1984 (PRC State 
                                                              
9 It allowed enterprise trade extra production on the market price if they completed their planned production. 
There were two complete different systems in the transition period, one was planned production with a fixed 
planned price, and the other was self motivated production with a market price. This system was abolished in 1992. 
The National Price Bureau announced that the central government released 571 kinds of product price control. The 
National Price Bureau only controlled the remaining 89 kinds of product price and decentralized 22 products 
pricing right up to the provincial government in 1992. 
10 Conversion of profits into tax reforms is the translation of the Chinese political slogan. It means that the transfer 
of profits to the government will be replaced by taxes.  
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Council 1984a, b). Middle and large SOEs had to pay 55% income tax and had to 
remit a certain portion of the after-tax profits under the SOE Regulatory Tax.11 
Alternatively, they had to sign a tax settlement contract with the government, but this 
allowed SOEs to retain a certain portion of their profits to help enterprise growth. 
Small SOEs had to pay income tax which had eight progressive tax rates from 10% to 
55%, and they were responsible for their own profit and loss without any government 
subsidies. However, the new income tax system was not fully implemented. It was 
supplanted by the Contract Management Responsibility System in practice12 which 
was a kind of tax settlement contract between SOEs and the government.  
 
To balance the tax burden between SOEs and COEs, in 1985, the 
Industrial-Commercial Income Tax was superseded by the Collective Owned 
Enterprise Income Tax (PRC. State Council 1985) which has eight progressive tax 
rates from 10% to 55%. To cope with the emerging private enterprises, the 
government decreed separate tax regulations for private enterprises. In 1988, Private 
Owned Enterprise Tax (PRC. State Council 1988), which taxed at 30%, was 
introduced. The PRC had established an income tax category in the 1980s. This 
contained different types of income tax based on different types of ownership with 
different tax rates.  
 
2.2.2.3 Open Door Policy 
As the first step, in May 1980 the CPC Central Committee and the State Council 
decided to create four special economic zones (SEZ) giving preferential tax and 
administrative treatments to foreign firms, in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen. 
Meanwhile, a landmark foreign direct investment (FDI) legislation was the Equity 
Joint Venture Law promulgated by the NPC in 1979. It laid down the foundation for 
                                                              
11 This tax was intended to offset the advantages given to certain enterprises by the government, such as 
preferential prices for input material or output products. It varied from enterprise to enterprise. 
12 Since 1987, the PRC adopted the Contract Management Responsibility System to mobilize the SOEs to 
improve efficiency and increase competition. This used a contract to set a fixed tax payment for a period. It went 
back to the time when SOE income tax was not taxed but profits were remitted to the government. By 1990, about 
85% of industrial SOEs were covered by contracts (Brean 1998). This made SOE Income Tax and SOE Regulatory 
Tax largely exist in name only.   
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the following laws and regulations on foreign investments. By the end of the 1980s, 
China had developed a legal infrastructure governing the three main forms of 
FIEs-equity joint ventures, cooperative joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned 
subsidiaries.13 In 1984, 14 additional areas, Economic Development Zones or Open 
Coastal Cities, were granted similar tax preferences and simpler administrative 
procedures to attract FDI. In 1986, the State Council decreed Regulations to 
Encourage Foreign Investment which changed China’s attitude about FDI from 
permitting to encouraging. The super-national tax favored treatments promote the FDI 
influx into the PRC and helped the PRC become a very popular FDI destination 
among developing countries.   
 
A separate foreign taxation system was established to coordinate the FDI in the PRC. 
The State Council did not have the legislative delegation from the NPC over the 
foreign related tax regulations. The foreign related taxation system initially inherited 
the 1950s’ PRC taxation system. The corporate tax for foreign related enterprises was 
Industrial-Commercial Enterprise Tax. In 1980, the Income Tax Joint Ventures with 
Chinese and Foreign Investments was introduced by the NPC Standing Committee. 
The Income Tax on Foreign Enterprises was promulgated in 1981. In 1991, at the 7th 
NPC, the Income Tax Law of the PRC for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises was approved and superseded two foreign enterprise tax laws. 
The tax rate was set at 33%. 
 
2.2.3 The Socialist Market Economy Taxation Period 
After 14 years of economic reform, the PRC managed to shake off the old central 
planned economic system and continue to further reform. In 1992, at the 14th 
National Party Congress, the CPC determined that the goal of China's economic 
system was to establish a socialist market economy (Jiang 1992). It described the PRC 
as a socialist regime country with a market-oriented economy and government 
                                                              
13 These three forms of FDI were regulated by the Equity Joint Venture Law 1979, the Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprise Law 1986 and the Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law 1988. 
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intervention. The CPC Central Committee and the State Council made a series of 
decisions to speed up economic reform and open to the outside world. Many 
economic and financial reforms were launched around this time. The Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange officially opened for trading in equities 
and bonds in December 1990 and July 1991 respectively. The first Western style 
financial accounting conceptual framework was promulgated in 1992. The price 
control system was abolished in 1992 and comprehensive taxation reforms were made 
in 1994. Also, in the same year, the Company Law (PRC. Company Law 1993) was 
promulgated. This gave legal grounds for the SOE shareholding mechanism and 
limited liability conversion. 
 
2.2.3.1 Taxation Reform 
After the CPC established a socialist market economy in 1992, the PRC started a 
series of reforms in many different areas which are briefly mentioned above. The 
taxation system was also included in the reforms. In 1994, the PRC radically and 
comprehensively reformed its taxation system. Because the previous taxation system 
was developed in the economic transition periods which was based on a planned 
economic background, it was no longer suitable for the socialist market economy. The 
1994 taxation reform was the largest change in fiscal and taxation reform since 1978. 
In late 1993, the State Council promulgated various provisional tax regulations that 
became effective from 1st January 1994. The significance of these changes was 
summarised as putting stress on both income and turnover taxes, harmonization of 
taxes and tax base, equalization of tax burdens for all taxpayers, and the 
implementation of a tax sharing system between central and local government (Lin 
2001). The State Council abolished or combined several old taxes and introduced new 
taxes in the light of the changed economic system.  
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Enterprise Income Tax Reform  
Before the reform, the domestic enterprise income tax system was categorised by 
ownership. There were three different enterprise income tax regulations.14 Different 
ownership enterprises were governed by the different tax regulations with different 
tax burdens. Definitions of taxable income and allowable deductions under the 
various sets of tax acts were also different in that they were very complicated and did 
not promote fair competition. The State Council unified various domestic enterprise 
tax regulations into one Enterprise Income Tax (PRC. State Council 1993), which was 
a tax of 33%. Meanwhile, the SOE Regulatory Tax and other SOE obligations were 
abolished.15 The Contract System was also stopped making SOE enterprises pay the 
EIT according to the regulations. In the detailed implementation of the regulations, 
the government standardized the taxable income and tax deductible expenses. The 
government also realized the importance of tax incentives in the market economy and 
implemented various tax incentives and tax rate deduction preferences for encouraged 
industries or regions. The detailed EIT regulations and incentives will be discussed in 
section 2.3, Enterprise Income Tax and Its Incentives. The 1994 income tax reform 
did not involve FIE income tax. The government wanted to maintain the FDI friendly 
environment and keep FIE tax regulations separate.  
 
2.2.3.2 Unifying Domestic and Foreign Corporate Taxes 
On 11th December 2001, China officially became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and was required to follow WTO principles. One of the most 
important principles is the non-discrimination principle. This requires the home nation 
to treat other nations the same as the home nation. However, China’s taxation system 
                                                              
14 They are the State Owned Enterprise Income Tax (PRC. State Council 1984), the Collective Owned Enterprise 
Income Tax (PRC. State Council 1985), the Private Enterprise Tax (PRC. State Council 1988). The foreign related 
income taxes were regulated by separate statutes. 
15 In the previous SOE income tax regulations, the taxable profit was defined as the difference between gross sales 
and allowable costs. It had notable departures from the conventional approach: repayment of loan principal was an 
allowable deduction. The depreciation deduction was an actual cash expense, paid into a depreciation fund. Wage 
bonus payments and fringe benefits provided to workers were not allowable labour cost deductions. In addition to 
the SOE income tax, SOEs had to pay 15% to the Energy and Transportation Construction Fund and 10% to the 
National Budgetary Adjustment Fund, which was levied on the basis of after-tax earnings plus depreciation fund 
contributions. After the 1994 reforms, the SOEs were treated as independent enterprises and the same as other 
enterprises without any extra taxes or surcharges. The government receives dividends from SOEs if there are 
sufficient funds after taxes.   
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was formulated to encourage foreign investments which give foreign enterprises tax 
favourable treatment. It violated the WTO non-discrimination principle. Therefore, 
the segregation of different tax treatment between FIEs and domestic enterprises had 
to be changed in order to be in line with WTO requirements.  On 16th March 2007, 
the PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law was passed at the 10th NPC and came into effect 
on 1st January 2008. It unified both the previous Enterprise Income Tax and the 
Foreign Enterprise Income Tax which gave tax favourable treatment to the FIEs. The 
new Enterprise Income Tax rate was reduced to 25% from 33% previously. From 1st 
January 2008, the new EIT applied to all the enterprises, regardless of the enterprise 
forms in the PRC.  
 
2.2.3.3. Enterprise Income Tax Sharing System 
In the 1994 tax reforms, the State Council also implemented a tax sharing system 
between central and local governments. In accordance with the principle of matching 
responsibilities with revenues and administrative affairs with financial expenditure 
level, taxes are divided into central government taxes, local government taxes and 
shared taxes between the central and local governments. The central taxes are those 
necessary to protect national interests and undertake macroeconomic control. The 
shared taxes are those directly related to economic development. Local taxes are those 
suitable for collection and administration by local governments. 
 
In 1994, the EIT revenue was local revenue, with local governments gaining tax 
revenue from investments in their own jurisdictions. This gave incentive to local 
governments to build highly profitable industry chains in their own jurisdictions and 
resulted in local protectionism and inefficient allocation of investment and resources. 
The local governments gave companies unauthorized tax preferences and authorised 
rebates widely. The economic development of less developed provinces worsened, 
because of a lack of revenues within their jurisdictions. Meanwhile, the developed 
provinces benefited from their economy boom.  
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In 2000, the State Council tried to rectify the unauthorised local government corporate 
tax preferences and rebates to companies within its jurisdiction. The State Council 
ordered local government to terminate the unauthorized tax refunds from 1st January 
2000 and stipulated that only the State Council had the right to approve tax refunds to 
companies (PRC. State Council 2000a). On 12th October 2000, the MoF issued a further 
administrative rule on this issue. To promote SOE reform and development, maintain a 
stable stock market, and protect the interest of investors, upon the State Council’s 
approval, the listed companies’ EIT refund preferential policy was allowed until 21th 
December 2001. Since 1st January 2002, all the EIT has been collected according to the 
Statutory Tax Rate (STR) 33%, unless other laws or regulations grant a preferential tax 
rate (PRC. Ministry of Finance [MoF] 2000b). The State Council effectively stopped 
the local government unauthorizing EIT refunds and enforcing the top STR on 
companies from 1st January 2002.  
 
The unbalanced regional economic development was very serious in the Western 
Region of China. The Western Region occupies about 70% of the Chinese territory 
and 28% of the population live there. However, the GDP is only about a third of that 
of the Eastern Region, and industrial output is only about 13% of the Eastern Region 
(see Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 
Regional GDP and Gross Value Industrial Output Statistics in 2000  (billion yuan)
Region GDP % Gross Value Industrial Output   % 
National Total 8940 100% 8487 100% 
Eastern Region 5753 64% 5991 70% 
Central Region 2625 29% 1706 20% 
Western Region 1309 15% 790 9 % 
Source: PRC. National Bureau of Statistics of China (2001)
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In order to boost the Western Region’s development, the State Council launched 
China’s Western Development Strategy 16  in 1999. The strategy involved 
infrastructure development, education development, tax preferences and other 
measures. The detailed EIT regulations will be discussed in section 2.3, Enterprise 
Income Tax and its Incentives. 
 
In order to establish a fair tax revenue sharing system and reduce the economic gap 
between the regions and to support the Great Western Region Development, the State 
Council reformed the EIT revenue from local revenue to shared tax revenue between 
central and local governments in 2001 (PRC. State Council 2001).17 The reform tried 
to formulate a unified national market and balanced economic development. The new 
legislation uses the revenue raised from the reforms in order to support the less 
developed regions’ economic development.   
 
2.3 Enterprise Income Tax and its Incentives 
2.3.1 Enterprise Income Tax  
After the discussion of the Chinese corporate tax development in the previous section, 
the thesis moves to a discussion of the corporate tax regulations and practices for the 
research sample period from 1994 to 2006. Corporate tax is called Enterprise Income 
Tax (EIT) in the PRC. The Enterprise Income Tax was introduced in 1994. The State 
Council decreed Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
Enterprise Income Tax on 13th December 1993 and this became effective as of 1st 
January 1994. The annual revenue from EIT is presented in Table 2.2. It accounts for 
19% of the total tax revenue of the PRC in 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
16 It covers 6 provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan), five autonomous regions 
(Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xingjiang), and one municipality, Chongqing. 
17 In the reforms, the State Council stipulates that the Enterprise Income Tax is shared tax. This was divided 50-50 
initially in 2002, and then 60 percent for Central Government and 40 percent for local governments in 2003. 
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Table 2.2 
Annual Enterprise Income Tax Statistics (billion yuan) 
Year Total Tax Revenue Enterprise Income Tax Enterprise Income Tax /Total Tax Revenue (%) 
1994 512.688 70.849 13.82 
1995 603.804 87.844 14.55 
1996 690.982 96.848 14.02 
1997 823.404 96.318 11.70 
1998 926.28 92.554 9.99 
1999 1068.258 81.141 7.60 
2000 1258.151 99.963 7.95 
2001 1530.138 263.087 17.19 
2002 1763.645 308.279 17.48 
2003 2001.731 291.951 14.58 
2004 2416.568 395.733 16.38 
2005 2877.854 534.392 18.57 
2006 3480.435 703.960 20.23 
2007 4562.197 877.925 19.24 
a) Before 2001, the corporate income tax only included SOE and COE income tax. Since 2001, the EIT has also 
included the income tax levied on other enterprises except for SOEs and COEs. The figures are not comparable 
with the previous years. It has also included the income tax levied on finance institutions. 
b) Source: PRC. National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008). 
 
The taxpayers are various domestic enterprises, and include any SOEs, COEs, private 
enterprises, joint operation enterprises, joint equity enterprises, and other 
organisations within China (excluding FIEs). The total taxable income is worldwide 
income from production and business operations, gains from property transfer, 
interest income, rental income, royalty income, dividend income and from other 
sources subject to EIT. The EIT is computed on the basis of taxable income, that is 
equal to the total taxable income earned by the taxpayers in a tax year minus the tax 
deductible costs, expenses and losses for the same tax year (PRC. State Council 1993, 
Article 1 and 5). It also stipulates that the taxable income should be computed in 
accordance with relevant tax provisions if the accounting practice contradicts the 
relevant tax provisions (PRC. State Council 1993, Article 9).  
 
The deductible costs are the direct costs and indirect costs incurred during the 
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production and business operations. The expenses are the sale cost, operating cost, 
management fees, administration cost and financial charges incurred during the 
production and business operations. Losses are operating losses incurred, 
non-operating expenses, investment losses and other losses incurred during the he 
production and business operations (PRC. MoF 1994a, Article 8).  
 
Tax Deductible Items  
When computing the EIT, the following tax deductible items are different from 
common corporate tax practice in the PRC. 
 
The interest on borrowings incurred by taxpayers in relation to production and 
business operation from financial institutions may be deductible. The loan interest 
payments from non-financial institutions are only tax deductible to the extent of 
similar financial institutions’ borrowing interest rate.  
 
The wages paid by the taxpayers to their employees may be deductible upon approval 
by tax offices. The tax deductible employee wage was limited by the government 
(PRC. State Council 1993, Article 6.2). In 1994, the tax deductible employee wage 
was 500 yuan per person per month with a 20% increase upon provincial government 
approval and this gradually increased to 1600 yuan per person per month in 2006.18 
From 1st January 2008, the new Enterprise Income Tax Law has been implemented. It 
stipulates that all the reasonable employee wage expenses are tax deductible (PRC. 
Enterprise Income Tax Law 2008, Article 37).  
 
The tax deductible trade union expenses, staff benefit expenses, and staff education 
expenses shall not exceed 2%, 14% and 1.5% of the taxpayers’ total wage expenses 
                                                              
18 The tax deductible employee wage is determined jointly by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT). From 1994 to 1995, this was 500 yuan per person per month (PRC. MoF 
1994b). From 1996 to 1999, it was 550 yuan per person per month (PRC. MoF 1996). From 2000 to 30th June, 
2006, it was 800 yuan per person per month (PRC. MoF 1999). From 1st July, 2006 to 31st December 2007, it was 
1600 yuan per person per month (PRC. MoF 2006). The limitation shall increase 20% upon provincial government 
approval. 
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respectively (PRC. State Council 1993, Article 6.3). The tax deductible donation shall 
not exceed 3% of the taxpayers’ total taxable income (PRC. State Council 1993, 
Article 6.4). Also, for tax deductible purposes, it is permissible to donate to listed 
charities or NGOs (PRC. MoF 1994a, Article 12).    
 
The tax deductible advertising expenses may be not be in excess of 2% of sales or 
business revenue for a tax year, but the expenses in excess of this sum may be carried 
over indefinitely to subsequent tax years (PRC. State Administration of Taxation [SAT] 
2000, Article 40). 
 
The tax deductible entertainment expenses on public relations incurred by the 
taxpayers which are related to production and business operations may be limited 
within the 0.5% of its sales for a tax year (PRC SAT 2000, Article 42).   
 
The depreciation method of fixed assets is the straight line method with the exception 
of other regulations. The detailed fixed assets’ depreciation periods are subject to the 
industrial Enterprise Financial Management Rules, which are issued by the MoF to 
regulate a company’s financial behaviour (PRC. MoF 1992b). If an asset is not 
covered by the Enterprise Financial Management Rules, the MoF determines the 
minimum depreciation periods for fixed assets. The minimum depreciation period for 
buildings is 20 years; for train, ship, machine and equipment it is 10 years; for 
electronic equipment, tools and furniture it is 5 years (PRC. SAT 2000, Article 25).    
 
Non-Tax Deductible Items and Losses  
In computing the taxable income of the enterprise tax, the following spending items 
are not allowed for deductions: spending on the acquisition or construction of fixed 
assets (covered by depreciation); spending on transfer or development of intangible 
assts (covered by amortization or expenses); fines on unlawful operations and losses 
sustained from confiscated property; various interest on late payment of taxes and 
fines; donations and contributions to other than listed charities or NGOs; 
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non-advertising sponsor expenses; other spending items not related to production or 
business operations (PRC. State Council 1993, Article 7). 
 
The annual losses incurred by enterprises may be carried forward to offset the income 
of the next tax year. If the income of the next tax year is not enough to offset the 
losses, the losses may be carried forward to subsequent years with a maximum period 
of five years (PRC. State Council 1993, Article 11). 
 
Tax Rate and Computation of Tax Payable  
Normally, the amount of EIT payable is computed on the basis of the taxable income 
and by applying the STR of 33%. 
The formula for computing the tax payable is:  
Enterprise Income Tax Payable=Taxable Incomeൈ33% 
Besides the statutory rate, two lower tax rates of 18% and 27% are designed for some 
less profitable enterprises. If a company taxable profit is between 0 and 29999 yuan, 
then the 18% STR applies to the company. If a company’s taxable profit is between 
30000 and 99999 yuan, then the 27% STR applies to the company.  The sample 
companies are listed companies which are large companies and tend to be more 
profitable. The lower STR bracket is not taken into consideration for this research.    
 
Income tax is not simply total accounting income multiplied by the tax rate. The total 
accounting income has to be adjusted to obtain taxable income according to the tax 
regulations. Accounting income can be reconciled with taxable income (the detailed 
accounting provisions will be discussed in section 2.5 Evolution of accounting 
systems for the listed companies and Table 2.7 which shows the reconciled items with 
relevant profit and loss entries). The procedures are shown in Table 2.3 below. 
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Table 2.3 Accounting Income and Taxable Income Reconciliation 
Total income 
Plus: Positive taxable adjustment items  
e.g. provisions for impairments, overpaid salary, entertainment,  
advertising and fines  
Minus: Negative taxable adjustment items 
     e.g. inter-temporal tax allowance transfer  
Minus: loss carried forward 
Minus: tax exempt income e.g. interest income from bonds  
Plus: difference in investment gain which is taxed at a lower tax rate  
Minus: tax allowable donations  
= Taxable income 
× Applicable Statutory Tax Rate  
= income tax 
 
Tax Payment and Collection 
The EIT is a self-assessment system in computation, disclosure and payment of taxes. 
Under the self-assessment system, taxpayers assess their own tax liability and pay 
taxes based on their disclosed figures. The income tax on enterprises is computed on 
an annual basis and paid in advance to the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) or 
local tax offices in quarterly instalments. Enterprises should file quarterly tax returns 
for pre-payment of tax and prepay the tax by self-assessment within 15 days of the 
end of each quarter. The quarterly pre-payment of the enterprise income tax should be 
based on the actual amount of profits in each quarter. The annual tax returns and the 
final accounting statements should be filed within 45 days from the end of the tax 
year and the final settlement should be made within 4 months of the end of each tax 
year. Any overpayment should be refunded and any deficiency should be paid.  
 
2.3.2 Enterprise Income Tax Incentives 
There are many enterprise income tax (EIT hereafter) exemption and reduction rules 
for companies in the PRC. For example, there are EIT deductions for hospitals, 
nursing homes, universities or school founding companies, and companies with 
disabled employees. This thesis focuses on the listed company EIT, and thus, the EIT 
incentives for social welfare business, small and medium companies are not 
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considered. The main listed company EIT incentives are categorized into tax 
preferential locations, tax preferential industries and other tax incentives. 
 
Tax Preferential Locations  
High-tech Industrial Development Zone  
The establishment of High-Tech Industrial Development Zones (HTIZ hereafter) was 
approved by the State Council. It provides favourable policies, which include tax 
preferences to attract advanced science and technology companies. The qualifying 
companies in the HTIZ are taxed at 15% STR. Currently there are 88 national HTIZs. 
A newly established company in the national HTIZs is entitled to have its first two 
years EIT free and is taxed at 15% STR thereafter (PRC. State Council 1991; and 
PRC. MoF and SAT 1994a). However, there are some exceptions, which are more 
favourable rules. For example, Beijing HTIZ has its first profitable three years EIT 
tax free and the following three years half EIT tax rate discount, which is taxed at 7.5% 
STR and 15% STR thereafter. Shanghai Zhangjiang HTIZ has a 14% STR refund 
policy for certain companies which are only taxed at 1% STR effectively. The 
municipality of Chongqing has a 10% STR policy for high-tech companies which 
export 70% of their product value overseas. By 2010, there were 88 national HTIZs 
throughout major cities in the PRC. There are also 131 Economic and Technological 
Development Zones which have similar tax preference policies to attract investment 
(Ministry of Commerce 2010).  
 
  Ethnic Autonomous Regions 
The companies operating in the ethnic autonomous regions requesting tax preferential 
treatment and incentives may be given tax reductions or exemptions for a specified 
period based on the approval by the provincial level government (PRC. State Council 
1993, Article 8; PRC. MoF 1994a, Article 36 and 37). For example, the Ningxia 
Autonomous Region granted listed companies 15% STR for five years after 2001 to 
support listed companies’ business prosperity in the region (PRC. Ningxia 
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Autonomous Region Department of Finance Taxation Bureau 2001). 
 
 Special Economic Zones 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were the places used to attract FDI in the early 1980s. 
They are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Hainan Province, Shantou, and Xiamen, a total of five 
SEZs.  All the companies established in SEZ are taxed at 15% STR (PRC. MoF 
1986).  
 
Western Region  
In order to boost the less developed Western Region of the PRC, the State Council has 
issued a series of Western Region economic development plans since 2000. One of 
these plans is to grant company EIT incentives to the encouraged industries or 
projects. The companies operating in these industries or projects enjoyed 15% STR 
from 2001 to 2010 (PRC. State Council 2000a; PRC. MoF, SAT and General 
Administration of Customs [GAC] 2001). The provincial or autonomous regional 
governments have the right to grant company tax exemptions and reductions.  
 
Tax Preferential Industries  
  High-tech Industry  
The PRC like many other countries encourages high-tech industrial development. A 
qualified high-tech company is entitled to 15% ETI (PRC. MoF and SAT 1994a). 
Qualified software companies and integrated circuit design companies enjoy 10% 
STR. The newly registered companies enjoy their first two years EIT free and then the 
following three years are at half EIT tax rate discount. The qualified software 
companies and integrated circuit design companies also enjoy VAT refunds, 
accelerated deprecation, deductible full employee training expenses and deductible 
full employee wage expenses deductible (PRC. MoF, SAT and GAC 2000). 
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Agriculture Industry 
A company operating in the agricultural production sector enjoys EIT exemption 
according to the regulation (PRC. MoF and SAT 1994a). In 2000, 8 ministries and 
commissions jointly worked on supporting the agricultural industrialization 
companies and the State Administration of Taxation promulgated an EIT free policy 
for these companies (PRC. SAT 2001). There are around 15 listed companies which 
benefit from this policy.  
 
 Others 
 Technology Promotion  
In order to promote technological development, the Chinese government grants tax 
credits for R&D expenses for companies. If a company increases its annual R&D 
expenses by least 10% per year, it will get 50% extra tax credit off its actual R&D 
expenses. There is no tax deductible quota or ceiling limit for R&D expenses. A 
company operating in the advanced technology sectors is granted accelerated 
depreciation methods (double declining balance and sum of the years’ digits) to 
reduce taxable income and encourage the company to purchase new assets (PRC. 
MoF and SAT 1996).  
 
  Sino-Foreign Joint Venture  
The Sino-Foreign Joint Venture is another way to obtain tax exemption and reductions. 
In order to obtain tax preferences, a company can set up a subsidiary with foreign 
capital or invite foreign capital to form a joint venture. This is a legitimate tax 
avoidance method. Tax preferences are regulated by the Foreign Enterprise Income 
Tax Law 1991. There are many detailed foreign investment tax preference regulations 
and rules and they will not be discussed here in detail. Generally, a joint venture is 
taxed at 15% STR if it is located in the Economic Development Zones or SEZs or 24% 
STR outside these zones but within the cities. Joint venture income will be taxed at 10% 
STR, if its sales from export product exceed its total sales of 70%. The joint venture is 
granted its first profitable two years EIT free and the following three years at half EIT 
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tax rate discount. For the joint venture which invests in the government promoted 
projects or industries, the government also grants tax favourable treatments.  
 
Special Cases  
In 1994, the State Council considered that the 1994 taxation reform might have 
negative impacts on the newly listed Chinese companies on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. The State Council granted 15% STR to 9 SOEs which were the first group 
of companies listed on the foreign stock exchange (PRC. MoF and SAT 1994b).  
 
2.4 Development and Features of Stock Market  
The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were officially 
opened for trading in December, 1990 and July, 1991 respectively. The stock market 
has developed rapidly since its establishment. By the end of 2008, the PRC’s total 
market capitalization was approximately 12136.6 billion yuan. The number of listed 
companies increased from 14 companies at the beginning of 1991 to 1625 companies 
by the end of 2008 (PRC. China Securities Regulatory Commission [CSRC] 2008). 
Table 2.4 summaries some important features of the development of the Chinese 
stock market.  
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Table 2.4 
Summary for Stock Market Statistics from 1991 to 2008 (billion yuan) 
Year No. of listed companies 
No. of A-shares 
stock companies 
Total market 
capitalization 
Negotiable market 
capitalization 
1991 14 14   
1992 53 35 104.8  
1993 183 140 353.1 86.2 
1994 291 227 369.1 96.9 
1995 323 242 347.4 93.8 
1996 530 431 984.2 286.7 
1997 745 627 1752.9 520.4 
1998 851 727 1950.6 574.6 
1999 949 822 2647.1 821.396 
2000 1088 955 4809.1 1608.8 
2001 1160 1025 4352.2 1446.3 
2002 1224 1085 3832.9 1248.5 
2003 1287 1146 4245.8 1317.9 
2004 1377 1236 3705.6 1168.9 
2005 1381 1240 3243 1063.1 
2006 1434 1287 8940.4 2500.4 
2007 1550 1396 32714.1 9306.4 
2008 1625 1459 12136.6 4521.4 
Source: CSRC 2008 
 
The regulatory bodies of the securities markets were the State Council Securities 
Commission (SCSC) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The 
SCSC was the State authority responsible for centralized market regulation work and 
the CSRC was the executive body of the SCSC. The two regulatory bodies were 
merged in April1998 to form the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to 
conduct supervision and regulation of the securities markets in accordance with the 
Securities Law.19 The CSRC promulgated a series of regulations about public listed 
companies’ information disclosure to standardize company reports (PRC. CSRC 1993, 
1994a, b, 1997, 2007). A company’s annual report should contain the following 
sections according to the CSRC regulations: the company’s background information, 
                                                              
19 Securities Law of the PRC (passed December 1998, effective 1st July 1999 Revised in 2005) is the first 
comprehensive securities legislation in the PRC. It grants CSRC "authority to implement a centralized and unified 
regulation of the nationwide securities market in order to ensure their lawful operation. (Article 7) 
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abstracts of key accounting data, the Chairman’s report, the Board of Directors’ report, 
financial statements, disclosure of significant events and related companies. The 
CSRC also formulated corporate governance regulations to improve the quality of 
corporate governance such as the audit committee and non-executive director matters 
(PRC. CSRC 2002).  
 
The IPO requirements for companies are very strict. They have to be approved by the 
CSRC and the candidate company has to have a minimum 50 million yuan share 
capital and three consecutive profitable years and a net profit above 30 million yuan 
before the IPO. A company which wants to issue new shares has to achieve an average 
10% return on equity for three consecutive years before issuing the new shares. If a 
listed company experiences three consecutive years’ losses, the company will be 
de-listed. Therefore, listed companies in the PRC are normally large and profitable. 
The sample inevitably has a positive profit bias, because loss making companies will 
be de-listed from the market and excluded from the sample.  
 
There are some special features of the Chinese stock market due to the Chinese 
specific context. The Chinese stock market is segmented into A-share and B-share 
markets. The A-share stock is designated for domestic investors and trade in yuan. 
The B-share stock is initially designated for foreign investors, and trade in USA 
dollars and Hong Kong dollars. The A-share stock market is segmented further into 
tradable (negotiable) and non-tradable shares. The non-tradable shares are normally 
dominated by State Owned Shares which account for about two thirds of total share 
issues.20 Because many listed companies are SOEs and the government wants to 
maintain control over the companies, the negotiable shares are the only class of 
A-share that can be traded publicly. 
  
 
                                                              
20 There are other non-tradable shares which are Domestic Legal Persons’ Shares, Designated Legal Subscribers’ 
Shares, and Employees’ Shares.  
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2.5 Evolution of Accounting Systems for Listed Companies   
Due to the segmentation of the stock market in the PRC, the financial reporting 
systems are also segmented. A-share companies are required to comply with Chinese 
accounting regulations, but B-share companies are required to comply with IFRS and 
are audited by foreign auditors. If a company issues both A- and B-shares, two sets of 
annual reports should be issued, one based on Chinese accounting regulations and the 
other based on IFRS. This thesis focuses on A-share listed companies in the stock 
market and Chinese accounting regulations and taxation. It will therefore not discuss 
B-share companies’ reporting and regulations in detail. Nevertheless, the dual 
reporting system provides an interesting opportunity to compare Chinese financial 
reporting with IFRS financial reporting.  
 
There have been four stages in the evolution of accounting regulations affecting 
A-share listed companies. The first stage was from 1992 to 1997. In this stage, the 
A-share listed companies were required to comply with the Accounting System of 
Experimental Joint Stock Companies (PRC. MoF and Economic Reform Committee 
[ERC] 1992) which was issued on 23rd May 1992 to correspond with the emerging of 
the securities market. This legislation regulated the listed companies’ financial 
statements. The objective of the regulation was to improve the accounting of joint 
stock companies and to protect the legal rights and interests of the investors and 
creditors (PRC. MoF and ERC 1992, Article 1). This regulation provided a guideline 
for joint stock companies to prepare financial statements in the stock market by 
determining the required external financial reporting statements and their formats and 
contents. The financial statements were the balance sheet, income statement, 
statement of changes in financial positions and other related statements required by 
regulatory body.  
 
The MoF promulgated the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises-Basic 
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Standards21 (referred as the Basic Standards; RPC. MoF 1992a) on 30th November 
1992, which became effective on 1st July 1993. The MoF issued supplementary 
regulations regarding joint stock companies in 1993. The joint stock companies had to 
comply with the Basic Standards and implement them in accordance with the industry 
specific accounting standards for its own industries if there were inconsistencies with 
the joint stock company standards (PRC. MoF 1993). The general principles of the 
Basic Standards were very similar to Western approaches and discrepancies between 
the Chinese accounting concepts and Western approach were due to the Chinese 
specific culture, and political and economic context (Liu and Turley 1995; Davidson 
et al. 1996, Chow et al. 1995). From 1994 to 1997, Chen et al. (1999) found that the 
reported accounting earnings based on Chinese accounting standards were 
significantly different from those based on International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
On average, the reported earnings determined under the Chinese GAAP were 20 to 30 
percent higher than earnings reported under IAS. The differences were mainly due to 
accounting standards. Lin and Wang (2001) also conclude that over the period of 
1995-1998, there were significant discrepancies between financial information 
disclosed under the Chinese accounting standards and IAS.  
 
The second stage of accounting regulatory development was from 1998 to 2000. In 
this stage, the listed companies’ accounting system was governed by the detailed 
accounting standards which were issued in 1997 by the MoF (Appendix 3 Accounting 
standard promulgated by MoF from 1997 to 2001). The listed companies had to 
comply with all of them. In addition, on 27th January 1998, the MoF promulgated the 
Joint Stock Company Accounting System: Accounting Items and Accounting 
Statements (PRC. MoF 1998). This replaced the previous Accounting System of 
Experimental Joint Stock Companies and applied to the listed companies from 1st 
January 1998 onwards. The new system inherited the previous general objectives and 
                                                              
21 It was the most important accounting standard in Chinese accounting development history. It was considered as 
the first accounting conceptual framework in the PRC. The motivations which drove this dramatic change were 
summarised as: 1) the changing government roles in macroeconomic management; 2) the increasing complexity of 
business transactions; 3) diversification of business ownership and operation; 4) the open-door policy and FDI; and 
5) the expansion of the securities market (Liu and Zhang 1996; Winkle et al. 1994; Davidson et al. 1996).  
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the standard principles but it standardized the listed company financial reporting with 
much more detailed account definitions and disclosure requirements in line with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The most significant feature of 
this regulation was that the Cash Flow Statement replaced the Statement of Changes 
in Financial Position and the impairment provisions increased to four accounts. They 
were provision for bad debt, provision for inventory write-down and provisions for 
impairment of short-term and for long-term investments. In the previous system, the 
only provision allowed was provision for bad debt and this was determined at 0.3 to 
0.5% of the debt amount. Chen et al. (1999) summarised this reform significantly 
reduced discrepancies between Chinese accounting standards and IFRS and 
harmonized the accounting standards with IFRS (see Table 2.5 for Summary and 
Comparison of the Differences between Accounting Methods). However, Chen et al. 
(2002) found the earning gap still existed and concluded that the harmonization of 
Chinese accounting standards with IFRS was not sufficient to harmonise the 
accounting practices.  
 
Table 2.5 
Summary and Comparison of the Differences Between Accounting Methods 
Method 1992 Regulation IFRS 1998 Regulation 
Bad Debt 
Allowance 
Maximum ceiling 
was imposed by 
government, varies 
from 0.3% to 0.5% 
of accounts 
receivable. 
No maximum 
requirement; 
determined based 
on management 
judgments with 
prudence concept 
Same as IFRS 
Inventory Valuation Reported at historical cost 
Reported at the 
lower cost or net 
realizable value 
Same as IFRS 
Short-term 
Investment 
Valuation Method 
Reported at 
historical cost 
Reported at the 
lower of cost or 
market 
Same as IFRS 
Depreciation for 
Fixed Assets 
Estimated residual 
value and useful 
life determined by 
the government 
Estimated residual 
value and useful 
life determined by 
the management 
Same as IFRS 
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Deferred tax and 
other tax related 
items 
No regulation 
Deferred taxes 
are recognized and 
reported 
Same as IFRS 
Long-term 
Investment Method
No provision for 
permanent 
diminution in 
value 
Equity method 
used for more than 
50% ownership. 
Stated at cost less 
provision for 
permanent 
diminution in value
Equity method 
required for 
20-50% ownership 
Same as IFRS 
Consolidation 
Consolidation 
when more than 
50% ownership 
Consolidation 
when more than 
50% ownership or 
control over an 
enterprise including 
joint ventures 
Same as IFRS 
Open-up 
Organization costs 
Amortized over 
more than 5 years 
Amortized over 
less than 5 years Same as IFRS 
Intangible Assets 
Minimum 
amortization period 
is determined by 
government for IA 
with unclear 
benefit period 
Amortization 
period is 
determined by 
estimated benefit 
period. Annual 
revaluation for the 
IA with unclear 
benefit period. 
Amortization 
period is 
determined by 
estimated benefit 
period. Maximum 
amortization period 
is determined by 
government 
Intangible Assets 
Amortization 
Accounted for in 
different 
circumstances, 
either at cost or 
under equity 
method 
Equity method is 
required for 
20-50% ownership.
Same as IFRS 
Revenue 
Recognition 
Revenue 
recognized when 
goods shipped and 
payments or 
promises of 
payments received.
Revenue 
recognized when 
risks and rewards 
of ownership of 
goods transferred 
to buyer, no 
continuing 
managerial 
involvement and 
control over the 
goods, payments or 
promises of 
Same as IFRS 
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payments received, 
and costs are 
reliably 
measureable. 
Source: revised from Chen et al. (1999)  and  Chen et al. (2002)
 
The third stage of accounting regulatory development was from 2001 to 2006 and 
represented by the Enterprise Accounting System (PRC. MoF 2000a). It was issued by 
the MoF on 29th December 2000 and effective from 1st January 2001. The Enterprise 
Accounting System was based on the experience of the MoF in implementing the 
Joint Stock Company Accounting System and existing individual Chinese accounting 
standards issued in the previous few years and other related accounting regulations. It 
contained detailed accounting principles and defined some basic concepts elements of 
financial statements, recognition and measurement principles, permissible accounting 
methods, structures and content of the main financial statements. It was more like a 
comprehensive financial reporting framework and more in line with IFRS than before 
(Pacter and Yuen 2001). 
 
The new Enterprise Accounting System stipulated the important of ‘true and complete’ 
accounting information (PRC. MoF 2000a, Article 1) and introduced substance over 
form into accounting principles. It also gave companies more freedom on their 
accounting policy regarding asset impairments. It allowed eight types of provisions 
for impairments of assets under the prudence principle. They were provision for bad 
debt, provision for inventory write-down, provisions for the impairment of short-term 
and long-term investments, provisions for impairment of fixed assets, provisions for 
impairment of intangible assets, provisions for the impairment of under construction 
projects, and provisions for the impairment of loans. The details of the impairment 
provisions were required to be disclosed in the Statement of Provisions for 
Impairment of Assets as the supplementary statement. Overall, it brought Chinese 
financial and accounting systems more in line with international practice. But the 
accounting regulations and practices were more divergent from tax regulations.  
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In 2001, the MoF issued a further three accounting standards and revised five 
previous accounting standards with a total of 16 detailed accounting standards issued 
(see Appendix 3 for details). The accounting standards and Enterprise Accounting 
System were both applied to the A-share listed companies in the PRC. Researchers 
have found that the earning gap between Chinese accounting standards and IFRS 
decreased after 2001 and there were no significant variances between them (Chen and 
Cheng 2007; Kuan and Noronha 2007; Peng et al. 2008).    
 
The fourth stage was from 2007 up to 2009 and was unveiled by the MoF’s 38 
accounting standards and the Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises-Basic 
Standard. This replaced the previous accounting standards and the new standards 
applied to listed companies from 1st January 2007. It brought about a substantial 
convergence between Chinese standards and IFRS (see Appendix 5 for the detailed 
standards and comparisons). The most important feature was to introduce the fair 
value concept into the standards, but the standards have more restrictions on the use 
of fair value than IFRS does. Also, the impairment loss is not reversible in the new 
standards. The discrepancies between the Chinese accounting standards and IFRS are 
due to the Chinese specific culture and context (Ezzamel and Xiao 2007). 
 
2.5.1 Basic Format of Financial Statements  
The financial statements of the listed companies are regulated by the accounting 
standards and regulations discussed above. The format of the financial statements is 
very similar to that of Western counties. The most important financial statements are 
the profit and loss statement, balance sheet statement and cash flow statement. 
Regarding ETR research and calculation, the profit and loss statement is the most 
important financial statement. Table 2.6 shows the basic format of the profit and loss 
statement. Appendix 4 shows the basic format of balance sheet statement and cash 
flow statement according to the Joint Stock Company Accounting System. 
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Table 2.6 Basic Format of Profit and Loss Statement 
Primary Operating Revenue 
Less: Cost of operating revenue 
Less: Turnover tax and surcharge on operating revenue 
Primary Operating Profit (Gross Profit) 
Plus: Other operating profit 
Less: Operating expenses 
Business and administration expenses 
Financial expenses 
Operating Income 
Plus: Investment gain 
      Subsidy income  
Non-operating income 
Less: Non-operating expenses 
Total Profit Before Tax 
Less: Income tax 
Minority interest 
Net Profit  
Source: PRC. MoF (1998) 
 
The profit and loss statement starts from primary operating revenue i.e. sales. After 
deducting the cost of operating revenue and the turnover tax and surcharge on the 
revenue, it comes to a sub-total primary operating profit, which is equivalent to gross 
profit. This is followed by other operating profit, which is other than primary 
operating net profit and which is calculated as other operating income minus other 
operating cost. After this comes operating expenses, business and administration 
expenses, and financial expenses.  
 
All the operating expenses in the Chinese income statement are aggregated into these 
three expense accounts. Operating expenses are the costs incurred by a company in 
selling products or providing services in the ordinary course of business and the 
expenses from its selling agency. It includes distribution costs, handling and packing 
costs, insurance costs, advertising costs, leasing costs, and sales and marketing staff 
costs and the depreciation from the selling agency assets. Business and administration 
expenses are costs incurred from company administration and management for 
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production and operation. It includes salary, trade union funds, staff education 
expenses, deprecation, entertainment expenses, and amortization of start-up costs. 
Financial expenses are the costs incurred when a company raises funds for its 
production and operation. They include interest expenses/income, exchange losses 
and charges from financial institutions. After the expenses is derived an important 
sub-total of operating income. This represents all the income earned from a 
company’s ordinary operations.   
 
The next section is investment gain, subsidy income, and non-operating 
income/expenses. The investment gain represents the net revenue from long-term 
investment in equities and bonds. The subsidy income is the income from government 
VAT refunds, subsidies or grants. The non-operating income/expenses are the gains or 
costs incurred by a company not directly involved in its production or selling 
activities, which are both infrequent and unusual in nature. The non-operating income 
is also taxable income and includes gains from the disposal of fixed assets, intangible 
assets, and government subsidies and the receipt of donations. The non-operating 
expenses, however, are non-tax deductible expenses which include losses from the 
disposal of fixed assets, intangible assets, donations, impairment provisions, and loss 
from debt restructuring. This comes to another sub-total – the total profit before tax. 
Deduction of the income tax and minority interest deduction results in the bottom 
line-net profit. 
 
The most important component of the ETR calculation is income tax expenses. There 
are two tax accounting methods. One is called the Tax Payable Accounting Method or 
Flow through Method, and the other is the deferred tax method. The deferred tax 
adjustment was only an option for listed companies until 2007 when the new GAAP 
made it compulsory for listed companies. The majority of listed companies did not 
adopt the deferred tax method before 2007.22 The listed companies only counted 
income tax payable as an income tax expense which is the Tax Payable Accounting 
                                                              
22 Less than 10% of listed companies in the sample population adopted the deferred tax method. 
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Method or Flow through Method. This is a simpler method if compared with the 
deferred tax method. The deferred tax method recognises deferred tax assets or 
liability in the balance sheet and the change in deferred tax in the profit and loss 
statement. The drawback of the method is that it is does not follow the accounting 
matching principle.   
 
Without deferred tax, the accounting-tax reconciliations are very difficult. To obtain 
taxable income from the accounting income, the simplest way is to add back (deduct) 
the non-tax deductible expenses (income). The provisions for impairment are non-tax 
deductible expenses and can be used to reconcile the accounting income and taxable 
income. There are a total of eight provisions for impairments and the corresponding 
accounting entries in the profit and loss statement are shown in Table 2.7. The detailed 
taxable income estimation method will be discussed later in the ETR methodology 
section (4.3.1).  
 
Table 2.7 Summary of Profit and Loss Statement Entries  
for Provision for Impairment 
Provision for impairment Profit and loss statement entry 
Provision for bad debt allowance Administration expenses 
Provision for write-downs to NRV of 
inventories Administration expenses 
Provision for impairment of short-term 
investment Investment gain 
Provision for impairment of long-term 
investments Investment gain 
Provision for loan impairment Investment gain 
Provision for fixed asset impairment Non-operating expenses 
Provision for intangible asset impairment Non-operating expenses 
Provision for impairment of construction 
in progress 
Non-operating expenses 
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2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter gives the research background information concerning corporate tax 
relating to the context of PRC, the stock market and the accounting systems. It 
presents a brief corporate tax history of the PRC from 1949 to 2008 with its economic 
background. Corporate tax has changed dramatically in line with economic 
transformation. In the central planned economic period, corporate tax was considered 
too complicated and the government simplified all the corporate related taxes into one 
tax which was not associated with corporate income. Then, in the socialist market 
economy period, corporate tax was restructured and the government realised the 
importance of the corporate tax incentive function in the market economy. The 
government used corporate tax STRs as an incentive to give encouraged industries or 
regions a lower STR. This non-uniform STR created difficulties in comparing the 
ETRs in the PRC. The ETR analysis has to take the non-uniform STR into 
consideration. This will be discussed in detail in the Effective Tax Rate section of 
Chapter Four. This thesis focuses on the socialist market economy taxation period 
which is from 1994 to 2006. Therefore, the Enterprise Income Tax is discussed in 
detail with its incentives. The new Enterprise Income Tax was introduced in 2008. 
Since the research sample is financial statements-based and is from Chinese listed 
companies, it is worth outlining the stock market and the accounting system. The 
stock market listing requirements directly define the sample companies and the 
number of listed companies also limits the sample size. The accounting system for the 
listed companies has been changed three times between 1992 and 2007. Given the 
consideration of the Enterprise Income Tax and the accounting systems changes, the 
overlapping time period is from 1994 to 2006 which is the research sample time 
period. During the sample period, the changes of accounting system will also be 
considered in the research methodology and analysis considerations. 
 
The next chapter is Chapter Three, the Literature Review chapter. It will present the 
literature review for the three corporate tax research topics of the thesis, which are the 
effective tax rate and marginal tax rate, the determinants of ETR and implicit tax.  
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a literature review on the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) and 
Marginal Tax Rate (MTR), the determinants of the ETR and implicit tax research 
which corresponds with the author’s three PhD research topics. The ETR and MTR 
section starts with the development of the ETR and MTR respectively, and is followed 
by discussions of prior computation methodologies of the ETR and MTR which 
outline the advantages and disadvantages of each method. The discussion helps the 
reader to understand the computation methods employed later in Chapter Four - ETR 
and MTR. The second section concerns the determinants of the corporate ETR. It 
provides a review of the prior ETR determinants and relevant Chinese ETR 
determinant studies. The aim of the review is to discuss the theory or framework of 
existing ETR determinant studies and to reveal the problems of the existing literature. 
This discussion leads to a new proposed ETR determinants’ research method and 
comparisons between the new proposed model and prior studies in Chapter Five - 
determinants of ETR. The last part is the implicit tax section. It starts with an 
explanation of implicit tax and a brief discussion of its development. This is followed 
by a review of corporate implicit tax studies. The questions raised regarding implicit 
tax measures then lead to further discussion in the methodology section of Chapter 
Six- implicit tax.      
 
3.2 Company Effective Tax Rate and Marginal Tax Rate Research 
3.2.1 ETR Research 
The main purpose of the ETR is to assess the actual tax burden retrospectively. It can be 
used to provide information to policy makers to assist them in the formation of 
corporate tax policy and to evaluate the fairness of the tax system. In addition, the 
ETR can also be used to investigate a number of other topics for accounting researchers. 
For example, ETRs have been used to explain pension funding strategy (Francis and 
Reiter 1987), accounting choices and management compensation (Ronen and Aharoni 
1989), the choice of R&D funding decisions (Shevlin 1987), effect on capital structure 
(Huang and Song 2006), proving political cost theory (Zimmerman 1983), prediction of 
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future earnings (Bauman and Shaw 2005) and measurement of the long-term corporate 
tax avoidance (Dyreng and Hanlon 2008). However, this study focuses on corporate 
ETR research. The historical development of ETR research will be reviewed and is 
followed by an analysis of ETR estimation. The last part is a brief review of Chinese 
ETR research. 
 
3.2.1.1The Development of ETR Research  
The early studies of ETRs focused on the equity issue of the tax system. The studies 
examine ETR differences across industries and over a certain time period. The ETR 
was also found useful to analyse tax rate trends and capture the impact of changing 
tax provisions. Siegfried (1974) examined effective tax rates for 110 minor industries 
within the mining and manufacturing sectors for 1963. He observed significant 
differences in ETRs across industries. He argued that industrial ETR differences were 
caused by special tax provisions which did not have a uniform relative impact on all 
industries. Weiss (1979) used the tax return data to estimate the average ETR and MTR 
for 1979 and similar ETR variations across industries results were also found. Hulten 
and Robertson (1984) investigated the ETR and MTR of high technology sectors and 
traditional heavy industry sectors from 1952 to 1987 in the USA. The results showed 
that the ETR decreased over the time. This was because of accelerated depreciation 
allowances and investment tax credits and these tax preferences also explain the two 
industry sectors’ ETR differences. 
 
The early studies were aggregated analysis of industries. However, the weaknesses of 
aggregated industry analysis are obvious, after the perception of inequalities among 
companies within an industry. The companies may not be engaged in only a single 
industry and the individual company characteristic differences may be submerged into 
aggregated industry results. Therefore, the perception of inequalities among 
companies makes the measurement of ETRs for individual corporations important. 
The Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) (1985) studied 275 major American corporations’ 
annual reports from 1981 to 1984 to analyse their individual tax burden. The tax 
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equity among USA companies was questioned. CTJ found: 
 
“In fact, 129 of the companies- or almost half- managed to pay absolutely nothing 
in federal income taxes, or to receive outright tax rebates, in at least one of the four 
years from 1981 to 1984.” (CTJ 1985, p.2) 
 
The overall four year sample companies’ ETR was less than one-third of the Statutory 
Tax Rate (STR). The accelerated depreciation, investment tax credit and the special 
industry tax preference were the main reasons for the divergence of statutory and 
effective tax rates. This unexpected result, together with other studies (e.g. Joint 
Committee on Taxation 1984) encouraged politicians to enact the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 which aimed at increasing corporate tax in the USA. The General Accounting 
Office (GAO) (1990) examined ETRs within industries and individual Fortune 500 
firms before and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and found that ETRs increased 
from 1986 to 1987 as an expected change from introducing the Tax Reform Act in 
1986. The main suggested reasons in the GAO study for the ETR differences were 
recognition timing differences between tax and accounting rules, such as accelerated 
depreciation, investment tax credits, pension costs and state and local income taxes. 
 
As the single country corporate ETR analysis developed, researchers also used ETR 
analysis to perform a multi-country comparative study. One advantage of comparing 
ETRs across countries instead of STRs is that ETRs reveal the actual corporate tax 
burden differences of the companies domiciled in different countries. This provides an 
opportunity to compare actual company tax burdens for different countries or regions.  
Collins and Shackelford (1995) did the first inter-country ETR comparison study. 
They used financial statement data to calculate and compare the worldwide tax burden 
for companies domiciled in Canada, Japan, and the UK and the USA from 1982 to 
1991. They also compared domestic-only companies and multinational companies 
domiciled in the same jurisdictions. The reason for the differences was attributed to 
the different national tax systems.  Molloy (1998) compared the USA and Japanese 
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corporate ETR from 1989 to 1991 and concluded that low compliance costs and 
international tax incentives benefited the Japanese companies and resulted in a lower 
corporate ETR. Gaetan (2001) used financial statements to compute ETRs for eleven 
European countries and the USA and Japan. He compared the ETR among countries 
and found that European countries’ ETR was not higher than that in the USA or Japan. 
The dispersions of ETRs and STRs, countries’ ETR rank. And sectors and size effects 
were also analyzed respectively. Buijink et al. (2002) used financial statements to 
estimate and compare worldwide corporate average ETRs for companies domiciled in 
EU member states from 1990 to 1996 and found out there were significant differences 
among EU member states. The differences and variations were explained by different 
tax incentives between EU member states.  
 
In most of the ETR studies, the research results found there are large variations of 
ETRs among companies, industries, regions and years. The researchers often held tax 
preference hypothesis which variations of ETRs have been explained in terms of tax 
preference only.23 Wilkie (1988) questioned the completeness and reliability of the tax 
preference hypothesis. In his study, the standard ETR definition (tax burden over 
pre-tax income) was decomposed into: 
RateTax 
IncomeTax -Pre
sPreferenceTax 1ETR ×⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=                                  (3.1) 
 
Equation 3.1 shows that the ETR is a function of the ratio of tax preferences to 
income and the tax rate. It demonstrated that ETR variations can be caused by 
variations in both income and tax preferences when income and tax preference are not 
perfectly correlated. The ETR is the function of tax preferences only when income 
and tax preference are perfectly correlated. The empirical results also suggested the 
company ETR cross-sectional, inter-temporal and intra-industry differences are 
caused by both income and tax preference variations. Wilkie suggested that 
researchers should adjust for differences in income when analysing tax burdens. This 
                                                              
23 The variations in ETRs are due to the divergence between taxable income and accounting book income caused 
by tax preference treatments. 
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income and tax preference correlation problem is based on the implicit assumption 
that researchers try to estimate and reconcile pre-tax income with taxable income. 
However, the ETR purpose is to estimate the actual tax burden of the company 
estimated. 
 
Wilkie and Limberg (1993) developed an alternative explicit tax burden measure 
which was defined as tax subsidy24 divided by shareholders’ equity. This avoids the 
problems of negative income and the income differs across companies or time in the 
traditional income denominator ETR definition by using shareholder equity as 
denominator. This was suggested as a more reliable and direct measure of tax 
(dis)advantage. However, Shevlin and Porter (1992) argued that the alternative 
measure was not able to solve the income problem completely because shareholder 
equity is generally very positively associated with accounting income.  
 
Gradually, ETR research moved on to the neutrality of the corporate tax system with 
respect to companies’ particular characteristics, such as size. Zimmerman (1983) 
examined the relationships between company size, industry classification and ETR. 
The sample was collected from Compustat with 50454 company year observations 
covering the years 1946 to 1981. The time series was from 1947 to 1981. 
Cross-section analysis of industry was conducted and company size differences were 
analysed. Company size was measured by total sales. The overall results support the 
political cost hypothesis. Large companies are subject to greater government scrutiny 
and have to pay more political cost, with the result being more taxes. This is assuming 
that tax is an explicit partial measure of company political cost.  Zimmerman found 
that roughly the 50 largest USA companies were in the highest ETR category but not 
for all industries. The oil and gas industry had the strongest positive relationship 
between company size and tax rates and manufacturing had a weaker relationship. 
The possible explanations for this relationship were fixed tax shields, diversification 
                                                              
24 The tax subsidy is defined as the difference between the tax a company actually paid and the tax it would pay if 
its financial statement pre-tax income was its tax base. The tax subsidies are the differences between accounting 
and tax treatments. 
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and foreign taxes. The wholesale and retail industry had an opposite relationship in 
the study without any appropriate explanation. The positive relationship between 
company size and ETR is not consistent, with the relationship only existing in the top 
50 companies category.  Omer et al. (1993) used five ETR measures which were used 
in prior research to investigate the relations between company size and corporate tax 
burdens on a yearly (1980-1986) and an industry basis. The results suggest that the 
associations between size and the five effective tax rate measures are fairly robust 
across measures and support Zimmerman’s political theory hypothesis. 
 
However, Porcano (1986) found a contrary result, the structure of the ETR being 
regressive with the largest companies having the smallest ETR. The sample was 
collected from Value Line with more than 1300 companies for 1982 and 1983 and the 
ETR measured the federal income taxes only. Company size was measured by the size 
of sales, net income, total assets, and yearly capital expenditure and the sample was 
categorised into quartiles to examine the effect of each size proxy. The possible 
explanation for this regressive relationship was suggested in the study. The larger 
companies were able to use accelerated depreciation allowances and foreign tax 
credits more effectively than smaller companies.  
 
Wilkie and Limberg (1990) replicated the Zimmerman (1983) and Porcano (1986) 
studies and reconciled the conflicting results. The results indicated that differences in 
empirical procedures had a significant effect on the results. The empirical procedures 
causing these differences included sample selection procedures, alternative ETR 
definitions, company size measurement, and data aggregation techniques. They 
suggested that the empirical test on the relationship between company size and ETR 
needed to be further refined. Kern and Morris (1992) replicated and extended the 
Zimmerman (1983) and Porcano (1986) studies. The ETRs were analysed from 1971 
to 1989, which covered both of the Zimmerman (1983) and Porcano (1986) sample 
periods and extended the analysis of the structure of ETR changes after the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. The results suggested that the size effect on ETRs that had been 
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found prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had largely dissipated across and within 
one-digit SIC industries by the end of the 1980s and the Zimmerman’s size effect may 
be just an industry effect because the top 50 company category was constituted by 
mainly oil industry companies. This size effect on ETR research development shows 
people’s great interest and concern about the fairness of the effective tax burden 
across companies of different size in the USA. Similar research was also conducted 
across the world, including in the UK (Holland 1998), Pacific Basin countries (Kim 
and Limpaphayom 1998) and the European Union (Gaetan 2002).  
  
3.2.1.2 Measurement of ETR 
ETR is a very ambiguous term in the literature. It could mean the average or marginal 
ETR depending on the context. Weiss (1979) defined the most useful characteristics to 
measure ETR, namely that tax liability should match income and income should be 
close to economic income. Economic income is the broad measurement and is not 
influenced by tax provisions, which cause the equity measurement problem. Fullerton 
(1984) developed a taxonomy of ETRs and classified ETRs into a marginal and 
average effective tax rate (see Table 3.1). The average effective tax rates were better 
measures of actual tax burdens over the income, and the marginal rates were more 
appropriate for measuring investment incentives as it was decision-making oriented. 
Gaetan (2001, 2002) summarized the advantages of the ETR, saying it is relatively 
easy to construct and its use not only reflects a country’s tax incentives embedded in 
the law but also reflects a country’s enforcement policy. The disadvantages are that it 
cannot isolate tax characteristics individually, such as foreign tax influences. 
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 Table 3.1 Taxonomy of Effective Tax Rates 
 Type of Effective Tax Rate Definition 
 
1. 
 
Average Effective Corporate Tax Tate
Observed corporate taxes divided by 
“correctly measured” corporate income, 
and current cash flows, ignoring future 
consequences.  
 
2. 
 
Average Effective Total Tax Rate 
Observed corporate taxes plus property 
taxes plus personal taxes on interest and 
dividends, divided by total capital 
income. 
 
 
 
3. 
 
Marginal Effective Corporate Tax  
 
 
 
Marginal Effective Corporate Tax 
Rate 
The expected real pre-tax rate of return on 
a marginal investment, minus the real 
after-tax return to the corporation. 
 
The marginal effective corporate tax 
wedge divided by the pre-tax return or by 
the corporation’s post-tax return. 
 
 
 
 
4. 
 
Marginal Effective Total Tax Wedge 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal Effective Total Tax Rate 
The expected real pre-rate of return on a 
marginal investment, minus the real 
after-tax return to the saver who provides 
the finance. 
 
 
The marginal effective total tax wedge 
divided by the pre-tax return or by the 
saver’s post-tax return. 
Source: Fullerton (1984)
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According to Fullerton’s (1984) definition, the ETR is simply the tax expense over the 
income. This definition provides a great deal of latitude in the measurement of these 
two components and leads to various ETR estimates. The ‘right’ definition of the ETR 
was the biggest issue in past research. Different scholars use different definitions of 
ETR to estimate the corporate tax burden. The research results exhibit high sensitivity 
to the different ETR definitions. Sometimes the results from different estimations 
were even contrary, such as those of Zimmerman (1983) and Porcano (1986). The 
variations of what constitutes tax and income respectively in this context with 
definitions tend to vary with the research purpose (for example, Shevlin and Porter 
1992; Wilkie and Limberg 1993; Plesko 2003).   
  
The Numerator Measurement of ETR 
The income tax expense in the profit and loss accounting is for financial reporting 
purposes. It consists of the current tax expense and deferred tax expense. The current 
tax expense recognises the current amount of tax liability (i.e. applicable tax rate 
multiplied by the current accounting period taxable income).  The deferred tax 
expense recognises future tax liability or assets and results from the temporary 
differences and the timing differences of the asset and liability recognitions between 
financial reporting purposes and tax purposes.  The most controversial issue of which 
tax to include in the numerator of the definition is deferred tax. Deferred tax also has 
systematic effects on the estimation of ETRs (Omer et al. 1991). There are two contrary 
treatments of deferred tax in the ETR estimation - unadjusted or adjusted.  
 
Deferred tax adjustment 
Most researchers choose to adjust the deferred tax in the tax definition of their ETR 
estimations. There are two methods of adjustments based on two different assumptions. 
One method is deferred tax exclusion by subtracting the deferred tax from the income 
tax expense to get the current income tax expense. For example the Joint Committee 
(1984), Porcano (1986), Derashid and Zhang (2003), Gupta and Newberry (1997) and 
Holland (1998) adopted this method.  They assume that deferred taxes often roll over 
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from one year to another as the company is in a growth or inflationary period and may 
not be paid for a long time. Effectively, they assume that the present value of deferred 
taxes is zero.  
 
However, only net deferred taxes can be considered to remain unchanged and roll 
over from one year to another. Each year the timing differences offset each other as 
the company expands (constantly making new capital purchases) and the net deferred 
tax remains unchanged. Therefore, the second adjustment method is to subtract the 
change in deferred tax liability or expenses. It is an approximate adjustment for the 
temporary timing differences between tax and book accrual accounting as outlined by 
Zimmerman (1983) and Shevlin (1987). In addition, Omer et al. (1991) suggested that 
researchers should choose the deferred tax expense (profit and loss item) rather than 
changes in deferred tax liability (balance sheet item) because it is not subject to the 
required current/long-term classification and removes one source of systematic 
difference across firms under the USA GAAP. 
 
Some researchers use the corporate income tax expense, and ignore the deferred tax 
adjustment for their ETR estimations. The reasons for this are because of a lack of data 
(Buijink et al. 1999) or use as sensitivity analysis (Derashid and Zhang 2003). Another 
reason for using the deferred tax exclusion method is because deferred tax is not 
widely used in practice (Kim and Limpaphayom 1998).  
 
Tax definition 
Tax can also be categorised by the different definitions of tax, which vary according to 
the research objectives. There are broad definitions of tax which include domestic and 
foreign taxes from all income (e.g. Stickney and McGee 1982; Joint Committee 1984). 
This represents the actual overall tax liability to all authorities and it is a meaningful 
indication of the overall tax burden. This is because within a country, income taxes 
paid to one unit of government body can often be offset against other taxes payable to 
other government bodies, and for foreign income. There is an international double 
67 
taxation agreement to avoid double taxes. On the other hand, the narrow definition 
would be just domestic corporate income tax or current tax income tax as the research is 
focused on domestic tax liability or specific corporate income tax (e.g. Porcano 1986 
and Buijink et al. 1999).  
 
The Denominator Measurement of ETR 
The issue of how income should be measured in the denominator of the definition arises 
from different research purposes. There is more diversity in the definition of 
denominator measurement and it can be divided into three categories.  They are 
accounting book income, operating cash flow and mimic taxable income.  
 
Accounting book income 
The accounting book income category uses pre-tax income or a derivation of pre-tax 
income (e.g. book income before interest and taxes, and operations income) from the 
Profit and Loss account as the measure of income. This category consists of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (1984), Porcano (1986) and Gupta and Newberry (1997). The 
accounting book income category normally includes tax preference items such as the 
differences between accounting and tax treatments. Therefore, it has the advantage of 
capturing the effects of tax preferences on a company. However, the detailed 
adjustments of accounting income are very complicated since the income statement’s 
purpose is to represent the financial performance of a company and the company’s 
financial and operational transactions are very complicated nowadays. Another 
disadvantage is the lack of comparability across companies, due to the different 
accounting methods or policies adopted by companies. The possible income 
adjustments from prior research include the income or loss attributable to minority 
interests and the parent company’s equity in net income or loss of an affiliate or joint 
venture. They are based on the economic entity definition used by the research. The 
non-operational or irregular items’ (extraordinary items or discounted operations) 
adjustments need to be given more attention. Because of the non-operational nature, 
when non-operational activity occurs, it may be a very substantial amount and 
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typically reported net of taxes. This can distort the ETR calculation and causes 
extreme value. The choices are varied according to the research purposes and the 
financial reporting rules. 
 
Operating cash flow  
The operating cash flow category is represented by Zimmerman (1983). Income is 
defined as operating cash flow and is estimated as the difference between sales and the 
cost of goods sold. The operating cash flow is generally much greater than the income 
of the other two categories. Therefore, the operating cash flow category ETR tends to 
be much smaller and less sensitive to reflect the changes in the taxes paid compared 
with other categories. The advantage of using operating cash flow as the income is that 
it excludes the effects of accrual accounting procedures and differences in accounting 
policies across companies. The corresponding disadvantage is that operating cash flow 
might have large fluctuations since it is cash flow based.  
 
Mimic taxable income 
The third category is mimic taxable income and is put forward by Stickney and McGee 
(1982), Shevlin (1987) and Derashid and Zhang (2003). The mimic taxable income is 
defined as the pre-tax accounting book income adjusted for deferred tax, i.e. timing 
differences. Shevlin (1987) used the change in the deferred tax liability from the 
balance sheet to derive mimic taxable income, while Stickney and McGee (1982) used 
the deferred tax expense reported on the income statement to derive mimic taxable 
income (see Table 3.2 for the definition). The purpose of this adjustment is to eliminate 
the effects of using different accounting methods. However, deferred tax liabilities 
exhibited a systematic effect on the estimation of ETRs and the systematic differences 
in the financial reporting of deferred tax liabilities also related to company size. 
Regarding the deferred tax adjustment, deferred tax expense is the preferable way to 
adjust ETRs over change in deferred tax liability (Omer et al. 1991). The mimic taxable 
income is more comparable across the companies and provides a more uniform tax base 
as the denominator.  However, the taxable income should not be used if the research 
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purpose is to capture the impact of tax incentives on ETRs since it will eliminate the tax 
preference impact on income.  
 
 
Table 3.2 Examples of ETR measures from previous research 
Accounting book income denominator  
InterestsMinority  from (Loss) Income
esSubsidiari  dated Unconsolifrom (Loss) IncomeEquity -
IncomeBook tax -Pre
Tax IncomeCurrent 
+
  
Porcano (1986)
TaxesandInterest  before IncomeBook 
ExpenseTax  IncomeCurrent 
  
Gupta and Newberry (1997)
ProfitTax -Pre
Tax  Overseas ReliefTax  Double-Taxn Corporatio +
 
Holland  (1998)
Tax andInterest  beforeProfit 
ExpensesTax  Deferred-ExpenseTax 
  
Derashid and Zhang (2003)
 
Operating cash flow denominator 
Income Operating
LiabilityTax  Deferrred Δ-ExepenseTax  Total  
Zimmerman (1983)
Taxes andInterest  before FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeCurrent 
 
Gupta and Newberry (1997)
FlowsCash  Operating
ExpensesTax  Deferred-ExpenseTax 
  
Derashid and Zhang (2003)
Mimic taxable income denominator 
TRExpense/SMTax  Deferred -IncomeBook tax -Pre
Payable Taxes Income Local and State, Foreign,Federal, Total  
Stickney and McGee (1982)
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InterestsMinority  from (Loss) Income
Operations Discounted andary Extraordin from (Loss) Income -
esSubsidiari idated  Unconsolfrom (Loss) IncomeEquity -
IncomeBook tax -Pre
ExpenseTax Foreign  plus Federal
+  
Joint Committee (1984)
TRExpense/SMTax  Deferred -Incometax  -Pre
LiabilityTax  Deferrred Δ-ExpenseTax  Total
Δ  
Shevlin (1987)
Rate)Tax ory Tax/Statut Deferred(-ProfitPretax 
ExpensesTax  Deferred-ExpenseTax 
Δ  
Derashid and Zhang (2003)
SMTR = Statutory Marginal Tax Rate = 0.46 
Current Income Tax Expense = Total Income Tax – Deferred Tax 
 
Sample Selection of ETR Estimation 
Sample selection is the third important dimension of ETR estimation besides tax and 
income dimensions. There are three main data sources generally used for empirical 
effective tax rate research. They are publicly available financial statements, such as 
information from listed public company financial reports (e.g. Omer 1991), tax return 
data collected by the tax authorities (e.g. Weiss 1979; Plesko 2003) and 
macroeconomic data published by government statistic departments (e.g. Mendoza et 
al. 1994). However, tax return data are not generally available to the public and the 
macro economic data hardly reveal any details of individual company or industry tax 
burdens. The most popular and most common research data source is company 
financial statements. When estimating the ETR, researchers should select the sample 
data in line with their research questions or purposes. For example, if the research 
question is only about domestic tax burdens, then the most appropriate sample 
companies should be companies which do not engage in any foreign operations. 
Wilkie and Limberg (1990) also point out the important of sample selection in 
explaining the disparate results between Zimmerman (1983) and Porcano (1986). 
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3.2.1.3 Disadvantages of Computing ETR from Financial Statements 
There is a number of disadvantages of computing ETR from financial statements, 
because the purposes and measurements between the financial reporting and the tax 
return are different. Fiekowsky (1977) used hypothetic examples to illustrate how the 
ETR estimation from financial statements misrepresents the taxability of a company’s 
income. He emphasised the importance of ETR interpretation based on accounting 
and tax rules reconciliation. The ETR ranges from 10 percent to 47.3 percent, 
depending on the choice of the tax and the income. The main problems of using 
financial statements to estimate tax burdens are the differences between financial 
reporting and tax rules purposes, such as different consolidation rules of corporate 
entities; different allowances for capital consumption; depreciation and depletion used; 
and corporate current tax accounts being ambiguous measures of tax borne by the 
income of the year (potential tax loss carried backward or forward effect). 
 
Spooner (1986) discussed the methodological and technical flaws associated with the 
ETR calculation from company financial statements and identified eight potential 
problems. They are sample selection, point estimates versus trends, industry 
classification, other taxes not shown in the financial statement tax provision, income 
allocation methods used for separate USA and foreign ETR, identifying reasons for 
differing ETRs and inclusion of loss companies. Dworin (1985) addressed another 
problem associated with using financial statement data. He found that a company’s 
current tax expense, as reported in its financial statement, and its tax liability reported 
on its tax return, are not perfectly correlated.  The suggested reasons are different 
treatment in the financial accounting consolidation and tax affiliated rules and 
intra-period tax allocation in the financial statements. 
 
Wang (1991) examined the Net Operating Loss (NOL) effects on the overall 
relationship of company size and tax rates using the path analysis model. He argued 
that the ETR is not the appropriate measure of political influence on tax burden, 
because the ETR may be influenced by NOL, which is the company’s operating 
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results rather than political influence and the smaller companies tend to have more 
NOL relative to their income compared with large companies. His research 
demonstrated that tests for the relationship of company size and political success may 
be biased and can lead to improper conclusions if NOL were ignored.  
 
Wilkie and Limberg (1993) questioned the availability and reliability of the average 
ETR as a measure of tax burden. The negative income companies have to be omitted 
from samples, because they will result in a negative ETR which is not interpretable. 
The failure to take net operating loss, the relationship between tax preferences and 
pre-tax income (Wilkie 1988) and implicit tax effect into consideration makes the 
ETR an unreliable measure of tax burden.   
 
Plesko (2003) compared five commonly used financial statements’ oriented ETR 
measures25 with statutory tax burden measures which are defined as tax after credits 
over taxable income. He assumed the statutory tax burden as the benchmark to 
examine the financial statements oriented ETR measures. He concluded that the ETRs 
have a very low ability to explain the statutory tax burden and cause substantial bias 
in analyses of tax incidence. The mismeasurement in the ETRs also leads to erroneous 
conclusions about the previous ETR factors analysis results. However, Shevlin (1999) 
had objections to Plesko’s (2003) propositions. He argued that researchers did not 
attempt to estimate statutory tax burdens but rather examined a more general concept of 
corporate tax burdens. The financial statements based ETR measures can reveal more 
information depending on the research questions. For example, the effectiveness of 
tax planning can be assessed using accounting income as the denominator. Shevlin 
argued that the appropriate measurement of ETR depends on the context and the 
research question being examined and he supported the view that accounting income is 
a better measure of a company’s operating performance and the financial statement 
based measures of ETRs are better measures of company tax burdens. 
                                                              
25 Joint Committee on Taxation (1984), Porcano (1986), Shevlin (1990), Stickney and McGee (1982) and 
Zimmerman (1983) 
73 
3.2.1.4 ETR Research in the PRC 
The corporate ETR research in the PRC only started in the late 1990s because the 
Chinese stock market only opened in the early 1990s and there was not a sufficiently 
large number of years of public listed company data to conduct the research.  The 
studies mainly concerned ETR estimation and an analysis of the differences across 
industries, regions and time to evaluate the effectiveness of national tax policies. 
There was no theory contribution in the corporate ETR field from Chinese academia. 
The literature is mainly ETR results analysis.  
 
Wang (1999) used a simple ETR definition (average tax expenses/average pre-tax 
income) to compute 525 companies’ average ETR from 1993 to 1997. Because the 
NOL can only carry-forward five years’ maximum, the five years’ average is to 
mitigate the possible NOL effects on the taxable income. The results showed that the 
average ETR was only 16.07 percent which is significantly below the top Statutory 
Tax Rate of 33 percent. The industrial and regional differences were also 
demonstrated. The tax favoured industries and coastal region enjoyed a lower ETR 
compared with others. 
 
Qian and Li (2003) analysed the listed companies’ ETR industrial and regional 
differences for 2001 and 2002. They found the industrial and regional differences 
were clear and there was a general increase in the ETR from 2001 to 2002, because 
the State Council restricted unauthorised local government tax preferences. 
 
Wang and Li (2003) demonstrated that there were significant regional ETR 
differences from 1994 to 2000, and concluded that the listed companies’ tax burden 
was very low and Special Economic Zones’ ETR is significant lower than for other 
regions. Wang (2003a, b) further evidenced the size and industry influences on the 
ETRs from 1994 to 2000. He found that the large companies paid a higher ETR after 
1998. 
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Li (2004) randomly selected 159 listed companies to analyse the industrial ETR 
differences from 2000 to 2002. However, he found the results were different from 
those of other researchers. His results demonstrated that the industrial ETRs in 2002 
were not significantly different from previous years, and the industry differences were 
only significant in 2001, and not in the other two years. Ma (2007) analysed the trend 
of the listed companies’ ETR from 1994 to 2005. He found that the annual ETRs were 
stable and the trends of ETRs showed a decrease, with the exception of 2001. 
 
The previous Chinese ETR studies show three results overall:  
1) The ETRs are significantly lower than the STR, i.e. 33%.  
2) The tax favoured industries and regions have a significantly lower tax burden 
compared with others. 
3) The time series analyses of ETRs show that the ETR changed significantly in 
2001 and 2002 when the Central Government regulated unauthorized local 
government tax rebates.  
 
3.2.2 MTR Research  
Marginal tax rates (MTR hereafter; in some literature referred to as Marginal ETR) 
are defined as the actual tax rate paid over an additional one dollar income earned. 
Callihan (1994) categorised MTRs into investment specific and company specific 
MTRs. The investment specific MTRs can be estimated by taking the difference 
between the pre-tax and post-tax rates of return divided by the pre-tax rate of return 
on the marginal investment. Fullerton (1986) concluded that investment specific MTR 
provides the forward-looking measure of tax provisions incentives and is the best 
available measure for economic decisions. The estimation of investment specific 
MTR has to take investment tax credit, depreciation, tax allowances, the expected 
inflation rate and the interest rate for discounting into consideration. The estimation is 
very complex and based on many strict assumptions. One example is from Fullerton 
and Henderson (1985), who measured 37 different assets and 18 different industries’ 
MTR on investments. The availability of the investment specific data is limited, and 
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the investment specific MTR results are hard to generalise. There are not many 
researchers focusing on this topic and it is also not a research focus of this thesis. The 
focus of this thesis is company specific MTR, which is discussed below.  
 
3.2.2.1 Company Specific MTR 
The company specific MTR considers the company as a whole, instead of individual 
investments of which a company may have many. The company specific MTR 
estimation normally assumes the STR as the top MTR and the zero tax rate as the 
bottom MTR. The MTR variation between the top STR and zero tax rate is the result 
of variations in the taxable income and net operating loss (NOL hereafter).  
 
Shevlin (1990) pointed out the simple NOL binary variable as a proxy for a company 
MTR may result in misclassification of company MTR. Shevlin used four scenarios to 
illustrate the potential misclassification and highlighted the important impact of the 
NOL and future taxable income on the MTR, which drives the MTR deviation from 
the STR or zero tax rate. Shevlin also developed a simulation approach to estimate the 
company specific MTR. The simulated MTR has the advantage of capturing the 
dynamic NOL effect on the MTR estimation. The simulated MTRs were also found to 
be quite similar to the MTRs estimated using company actual ex-post taxable income 
realisations. Shevlin advocated the simulation approach over the ex-post realization 
method because a company’s true MTR is unobservable due to endogenous (specific 
actions of a company) and exogenous (macroeconomic occurrences beyond a 
company’s control). For example, a high MTR company may build its tax shield today, 
in order to lower future taxable income and MTR; and the macroeconomic condition 
or the government regulation factors influence the company MTR. This simulation 
MTR approach provides a more reliable measure of company specific MTRs and has 
been adopted by many researchers. 
 
Mazon (1994) examined the relationship between company specific MTR and 
company debt retirement in the capital structure decision. He developed a simple 
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MTR estimation method to capture the effect of NOL, using the market based 
expected return to estimate the number of years that a company will utilise the NOL 
and discount the top STR. 
  
Graham (1996a) developed an MTR simulation model based on Shevlin (1990) to 
examine the relationship between debt and the MTR. Graham (1996a) found that high 
tax rate companies issue more debt than their low tax rate counterparts. The results 
suggest the NOL dummy variable is a reasonable tax status proxy, but the simulated 
MTR has more explanatory power in the regression analysis.   
 
Graham (1996b) compared the proxies for the MTRs against the ‘perfect foresight’ 
MTR benchmark, which was calculated using actual taxable income realization 
(ex-post data). The results show that the simulated MTR was a superior proxy and the 
trichotomous proxy or statutory marginal tax rate were reasonable alternatives. 
However, Graham (1996b) noted that the true MTR was not observable. The ‘perfect 
foresight’ MTR is just one realisation of taxation income rather than considering all 
possible realization paths of future taxable income. Pattenden (2002) re-examined 
Graham’s (1996b) work. He assumed a true MTR exists in the simulation process and 
uses it as the MTR benchmark against other proxies. Pattenden (2002) concluded that 
different proxies will perform better under different conditions. Manzon’s (1994) 
proxy outperformed the other proxies and the simulated MTR was particularly good 
when there was a volatile income and greater variability in the MTRs.  
 
Plesko (2003) examined the financial statement based MTR proxies against the tax 
return based MTR as a benchmark. Plesko (2003) used a small sample of 
homogeneous, single-entity companies to eliminate the accounting and tax differences 
and the benchmark MTR was defined as the current year last dollar tax rate. The 
results showed that the Graham (1996b) simulated MTR was highly correlated with 
the benchmark and were suggested as the reliable proxies. Shevlin (1999), however,  
questioned the Plesko (2003) MTR benchmark definition. He suggested that Plesko’s 
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(2003) single period static MTR benchmark failed to take into account the effects of 
NOL carry-back and carry-forward.    
 
Graham and Mills (2008) used tax return data to simulate company MTR and 
compared it with financial statement based simulated MTRs and other MTR proxies. 
This tax return based simulated MTR is defined as the benchmark and is the opposite 
of Plesko’s (2003) single period static MTR benchmark. They found that financial 
statement based simulated MTRs were highly correlated with tax return based 
simulated MTRs and concluded that financial statement based simulated MTRs 
provide a reasonable measure of tax incentives. This result provided additional 
evidence on the usefulness of simulated company MTRs. 
 
3.2.2.2 Company Specific MTR Proxies 
There are two types of MTR estimation methods, the static method and the dynamic 
method. The differences between them are the treatments of NOL in the estimation. 
The following discusses the company specific MTR proxies, and Table 3.3, Summary 
of MTR Proxies, provides a brief summary of company specific MTR measurements. 
 
Static method 
The static method MTR measure is to estimate the MTR without considering the 
effect of utilising NOL carry-forward or backward against taxable income. It is an 
arbitrary way to estimate company specific MTR. The most common measures are 
binary (dichotomous), trichotomous and any other even spaced segments between 
zero and the top STR. The simplest company specific static MTR estimation method 
is the binary method. The binary method uses taxable income and NOL as the dummy 
variables to estimate MTR. For example, assuming NOL is the binary variable, MTR 
is equal to the STR if there is no NOL carry forward and if MTR is equal to zero 
otherwise. Thomas (1988), Scholes et al. (1990), Graham (1996b) and Plesko (2003) 
use this approach to estimate the MTR. A similar approach is the trichotomous 
method. The MTR is equal to the STR for companies with positive taxable income 
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and non-NOL, one half of the STR if a company either has negative taxable income or 
an NOL carry-forward, and zero otherwise (Shevlin 1990; Graham 1996b and Plesko 
2003). Under a similar principle, MTR can be mapped into evenly spaced increments 
four segments between zero and the statutory rate which is called the uniform and 
statutory method in Plesko (2003) and Graham and Mills (2008).  
 
Dynamic Method 
The dynamic method MTR measure is to estimate MTR considering the effect of 
utilising NOL carry-forward or backward against taxable income. Shevlin (1987, 
1990) defines corporate MTR based on the change in taxes payable as a result of 
earning an additional dollar of taxable income in the current period. Shevlin 
developed a simulation approach to capture the effect of NOL carry-forward and 
backward (asymmetric tax treatment). The estimation uses company financial 
statements to infer taxable income and simulates a series of future taxable incomes by 
assuming that taxable income follows a random walk with drift. The MTR is defined 
as the present value of current and expected future taxes paid on current income 
increased by one dollar. Graham (1996 a, b) built on Shevlin (1990)’s model and 
extended the model to capture investment tax credits and alternative minimum tax 
effects. The greatest advantage of simulating MTR is capturing important dynamic 
features of the tax.  
  
Manzon (1994) developed another approach to estimate the MTR with NOL 
carry-forward. Manzon’s (1994) measure discounts the top STR for n periods. The n 
is defined as NOL carry-forward divided by a market based expected annual return. 
The market value is assumed to be the best estimate of future income. This method is 
much simpler to compute than Shevlin’s (1990) MTR estimation method. By using 
the market based expected return to estimate the MTR, the Manzon (1994) measure is 
supposed to incorporate more market information than Shevlin (1990)’s simulated 
MTR based on historical estimated taxable income. 
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Table 3.3 Summary of MTR Proxies 
Static method 
Variable Measure of MTR Study 
Binary  Binary variable equal to STR if there are no 
NOL carry-forwards or adjust with pre-tax 
income. 
Thomas (1988) 
Scholes, et al. (1990)
Shevlin (1990) 
Graham (1996b) 
Plesko (2003) 
Pattenden (2002) 
Graham and 
Mills(2008) 
Trichotomous Trichotomous variable equal to STR for 
companies reporting positive pre-tax book 
income and no NOL carry-forwards, half of 
STR for companies reporting either 
negative pre-tax book income or an NOL 
carry-forward, and zero for companies with 
negative pre-tax book income and NOL 
carry-forwards 
Shevlin (1990) 
Graham (1996b) 
Pattenden (2002) 
Plesko (2003) 
Graham and  
Mills (2008) 
Uniform Equal to zero if the company has no pre-tax 
book income and NOL carry-forward, one 
third of STR if the firm has no pre-tax book 
income and no net operating loss 
carry-forward, two third of STR if the 
company has positive pre-tax book income 
and a NOL carry-forward, and STR if the 
firm has positive pre-tax book income and 
no net operating loss carry-forward.  
Alternatively, the MTR is mapped into four 
arbitrary spaced increments between zero 
and STR, such as 0, 0.15 0.25 0.34. 
Plesko (2003) 
Graham and  
Mills (2008) 
Dynamic method 
Variable Measure of MTR Study 
Manzon(1994) Equal to STR for companies with positive 
income, discounted to reflect the 
expectation of the time to become taxable 
for NOL 
Manzon (1994) 
Graham (1996b) 
Pattenden (2002) 
Plesko (2003) 
Shevlin (1990) 
 
Assuming income follows random walk 
with drift and simulating the taxable 
income to calculate MTR 
Shevlin (1990) 
Graham (1996b) 
Plesko (2003) 
Pattenden (2002) 
Graham and  
Mills (2008) 
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3.3 Determinants of Company ETR  
Early ETR studies on non-neutrality issues have focused on the univariate relationship 
between ETRs and company size or industry differences, as seen in for example, 
Zimmerman (1983), Porcano (1986) and Siegfired (1974). The analysis results 
ignored the effects of other determinants’ influence on ETRs, which could be biased 
and misleading. As corporate ETR research developed to multivariant analysis, it is 
possible to take into account the control variables’ influences. The first attempt was 
made by Stickney and McGee (1982). They used cluster analysis to analyse 
relationships between ETR and five determinants. Then, Gupta and Newberry (1997) 
and Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) improved the methodology by using multivariate 
regression analysis. They employed regression analysis to examine the relationships 
between ETRs and their determinants. This multivariate regression methodology was 
followed and developed by many other researchers. Table 3.4 provides a summary of 
studies examining the relationships between ETRs and their determinants. It covers 
the ETR determinants’ research methodology, sample data, ETR determinants with 
expected signs and major outcomes. The methodologies of the ETR determinants 
studies are very similar and most of the researchers choose the OLS regression 
method. The ETR determinants are mainly the company specific characteristics, such 
as size, industry and capital structure. There is no theoretical framework for the 
determinants. The logical reason behind the ETR determinants is that tax deductible 
expenses, such as depreciation, interest expenses and R&D expenses reduce the tax 
liability. This induces negative relationships between ETR and the tax deductible 
proxies.   
 
This historical review on the determinants of ETR identified more than 20 different 
determinants from the previous literature (a detailed summary of determinants was 
prepared and is shown in Table 3.5, The Category of Determinants). They are divided 
into the company specific characteristic category and the company management 
decision category. Each determinant will be analyzed in detail. The current problem of 
a lack of theory or framework to facilitate analysis will also be discussed.  
 
Table 3.4 Summary of Studies Examining the Relationships Between ETR and Its Determinants 
Study Methodology Country/Sample data 
ETR determinants 
(Expected sign) Major outcomes 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) Fixed effects regression 
Random effects regression 
OLS regression 
USA   
Sample year: 1982-1985 and 
 1987-1990  
Population:12992 
Final sample:1738 
Size (?) 
Leverage (?) 
Capital intensity (-) 
Inventory intensity(+) 
R&D intensity(-) 
Profitability (+). 
ETRs are not associated with company size. 
ETRs are associated with company capital 
structure, asset mix and performance.  
Kim and Limpaphayom 
 (1998) 
OLS regression 
Pacific-Basin economies  
Sample year:1975-1992 
Population:N/A 
Final sample: 1831 
Size (?) 
Leverage (-) 
Market to book (-) 
Profitability (+) 
There is a negative relationship between 
company size and ETRs. However, the results 
are sensitive to the choice of ETR measures 
and study period. Profitability is also found to 
be  associated with ETRs 
Buijink et al. (1999) OLS regression 
European Union (15 member 
states) 
Sample year:1990-1996 
Population: 5180 
Final sample: 2958 
Size (-) 
Employee(-) 
R&D intensity(-) 
Capital intensity (-) 
Foreign operation (-) 
Leverage (?) 
Industry incentive (-) 
Overall the corporate tax is levied in a neutral 
manner. A few countries there are systematic 
links between company characteristics and 
ETRs, but the results are sensitive to the model 
specifications.  
Feeny et al. (2002) Fixed effects regression 
Random effects regression 
Size (-) 
Depreciation (-) 
ETRs are significantly associated with interest 
payments, R&D intensity, foreign ownership, 
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Australian 
Sample year:1993-1996 
Final sample: 1508 
Interest payments (-) 
R&D intensity (-) 
Foreign operation (-) 
No.of subsidiaries  (-) 
Earnings volatility (-) 
Ownership dummies (-) 
Listed dummy (?) 
Time 
stock-market listing and the No. of subsidiaries. 
Results from fixed and random effects 
specifications indicated that unobserved firm 
heterogeneity plays a significant role. 
Derashid and Zhang (2003) OLS regression 
Malaysia 
Sample year:1990-1999 
Final sample: 2072 
Size (?) 
Leverage (-) 
Capital intensity (-) 
Inventory intensity (+) 
Profitability (+) 
Market to book (+) 
Government Ownership (-) 
Year  
Industry (?) 
ETRs are negatively associated with company 
size, and profitability. Industry plays an 
important role in the ETR analysis. 
 
Harris and Feeny (2003) OLS regression 
Fixed effects regression  
Random effects regression 
Australian  
Tax return data 
Sample year:1993-1997 
Population: app. 500,000 each 
year 
Final sample: 28,683 
Size (?) 
Capital intensity (-) 
Leverage (+) 
Foreign operation (-) 
R&D intensity (-) 
Profitability (+) 
ETRs are negatively associated with company 
size, foreign income, R&D intensity and capital 
intensive. 
Results from fixed and random effects 
specifications indicated that unobserved 
heterogeneity appears to be important.  
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Rego (2003) OLS regression 
USA 
Sample year:1990-1997 
Population:52125 
Final sample: 19737 
Size (-) 
Foreign operation (-) 
Profitability (-) 
Industry  
Location 
Year 
ETRs are positively associated with company 
size; negatively associated with foreign 
operation and profitability.  The results 
provide substantial evidence of economies of 
scale to tax planning. 
Vandenbussche et al. (2004) OLS regression 
Belgium 
Sample year: 1993-2002 
Final sample: 27290 
Size (?) 
Capital intensity (-) 
Leverage (-) 
R&D intensity (-) 
Co-ordination center (-) 
Region 
Industry 
The empirical model explains company level 
heterogeneity in ETRs. Regional tax 
competition was evidenced.  
Janssen (2005) OLS regression 
Netherlands 
Sample year 1994-1999 
Final sample: 4097 
Size (?) 
Capital intensity (-)  
Foreign operation (?)  
Profitability (?) 
Leverage (-)  
Public (-)   
ETRs are negatively associated with capital 
intensity, but ETRs do not differ much from 
STRs and only a small portion of the ETR 
variations can be explained. It is suggested that 
the actual size of tax incentives granted to 
companies in the Netherlands is quite small. 
Liu and Cao (2007) OLS regression 
Fixed effects regression  
Random effects regression 
PRC 
Sample year:1998-2004 
Sample: 2975 
Size (?) 
Leverage (-)  
Capital intensity (-)  
Profitability (+) 
Government ownership (+) 
Employment (-) 
Year 
ETRs are negatively associated with leverage, 
employment; positively associated with 
profitability and government ownership; no 
significant relationship with company size. The 
sub-sample period results indicate that the 
relationships may vary with external tax 
environments.  
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Richardson and Lanis 
(2007) 
OLS regression 
Australia 
Sample year: 1997-1999 and 
2001-2003 
Sample population:1529 
Final sample: 552 
Size (-) 
Leverage (-) 
Capital intensity (-) 
Inventory intensity (+) 
R&D intensity (-) 
Profitability (+) 
Industry 
Time period 
ETRs are associated with major firm specific 
characteristics. ETRs are negatively associated 
with company size, leverage, capital intensity, 
R&D intensity; positively associated with 
inventory intensity.  
+ positive relationship prediction  
- negative relationship prediction 
? no sign prediction 
Sample is counted in company years (not number of companies) 
OLS = Ordinary Least Squares 
3.3.1 Company Specific Characteristic Category  
As discussed in the corporate ETR review above, the early ETR studies on the equity 
issue have focused on the univariate relationship between ETRs and company size or 
industry differences. Prior accounting studies support the view that ETR differences 
occur across industrial sectors and with respect to company size (see the above 
company ETR review). As the ETR research methodology has advanced, many other 
company specific characteristics have been identified and will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
Company Size 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) concluded that large companies tend to choose income 
reducing accounting methods more frequently than small companies in their 
positivism accounting study. This provides a possible explanation for Zimmerman’s 
political cost theory, because there are very few tax preference provisions that depend 
on company size. However, there are two contradictive empirically proved 
propositions related to company size. One is Zimmerman’s (1983) political cost 
hypothesis, in which large companies are subject to greater public scrutiny, which 
results in a higher ETR. The other point of view is Porcano’s (1986) political power 
hypothesis which posits that large companies have more resources to do tax planning 
and political lobbying (Above ‘The development of ETR research’ has detailed 
Zimmerman (1983), Porcano (1986), CTJ (1985) and Omer et al.’s (1993) review). 
However, Wilkie and Limberg (1990) and Kern and Morris (1992) reconciled the 
differences and demonstrated that the differences were mainly caused by empirical 
procedure and industrial effect. These differences disappeared after the 1986 Taxation 
Reform in the USA. In the later multivariate framework studies, Gupta and Newbery 
(1997) observed an inconclusive relationship between company size and the ETR 
under the multivariate regression analysis, and the results were sensitive to the 
methodologies. This is generally consistent with Stickney and McGee’s (1982) 
findings that size did not explain the differences in ETRs. However, Rego (2003) 
evidenced a positive relationship between company size and ETRs. 
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There is a number of non-USA ETR studies which investigate the size effect in the 
previous research. Holland (1998) found that the results for British companies were 
mixed and depended on the sample time period. Buijink et al. (1999) and Gaetan 
(2001) found the results for EU countries varied amongst countries. Janssen (2005) 
found a negative relationship in the Netherlands and Vandenbussche et al. (2004) 
found an ambiguous result in Belgium. Gaetan (2002), however, observed a negative 
relationship in all the EU companies in a pooled sample. Kim and Limpaphayom 
(1998) observed a negative relationship between company size and the ETRs in 
Pacific-Basin emerging economies and Derashid and Zhang (2003) found similar 
results in Malaysia, which support Porcano’s (1986) political power proposition. The 
large companies have the economic power to influence the legislation and the national 
government introduces tax preference policies to promote some areas or industries. 
This negative relationship was also found in an Australian ETR study (Richardson and 
Lanis 2007; Harris and Feeny 2003), but in Feeny et al.’s (2002) study, the size was 
not a significant determinant of ETRs in Australia. Overall, the results of the effect of 
size tend to be sensitive to the empirical procedure, proxy choices, sample choices 
and the country context.   
 
Industry  
The discovery of ETR differences across industries occurred very early in the USA 
(Siegfried 1974; Weiss 1979; Hulten and Robertson 1984). In the studies, the reason 
for the ETR differences was the different degrees of utilising tax preferences, for 
example, the accelerated depreciation allowance only benefited fixed asset intensive 
companies. In later studies, Derashid and Zhang (2003) proposed the ‘industrial policy’ 
hypothesis. This is based on the developing country context in which governments have 
the industrial policy to support and promote certain industries26 by tax preferences such 
as a lower tax rate or tax rebates. They found that the results supported the ‘industrial 
policy’ hypothesis in the Malaysian context. Similar results were also found in Buijink 
et al. (1999), Gaetan (2002), Derashid and Zhang (2003) and Vandenbussche et al. 
                                                              
26 Normally they are high-tech, or export orientated industries in developing countries.  
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(2004). The industry determinant is also used as a control variable to isolate the 
industrial ETR differences in the regression analysis (Feeny et al. 2002; Rego 2003; 
Richardson and Lanis 2007).  The extent of natural resource involvement is another 
determinant variable used to control the industrial effect (Stickney and McGee 1982). 
Companies involved in the search for, extraction and development of natural 
resources have been granted special tax preference treatments in the USA, such as 
depletion allowances. It was defined as sale from natural resource activities over total 
sales and has an inverse relationship with ETRs.  
 
Market Value of Equity  
The market value of equity is defined as the market value of equity to book value of 
equity and it is a proxy for future growth and investment opportunity. A high market 
value company is assumed to receive more government tax preferences or benefits and 
implies high investment expenditure in the future, which results in high tax deductible 
expenses and a lower ETR. Therefore it is expected that there is a negativity 
relationship between the market value of equity and ETR. However, Kim and 
Limpaphayom (1998) found that the relationships were insignificant, and concluded 
the proxy could not effectively isolate the relationships from the complex real business 
world. Surprisingly, Derashid and Zhang (2003) found a significant positive 
relationship but could not give any explanation for it.  
 
Extent of Foreign Operation  
Foreign operation determinants are defined as foreign sales over total sales or net 
sales (Stickney and McGee 1982; Harris and Feeny 2003; Buijink et al. 1999) or 
foreign assets over total assets (Rego 2003) or as a foreign income dummy variable 
(Feeny et al. 2002; Rego 2003). The foreign sale and revenue are often assumed as 
already taxed abroad. If the foreign tax rate is higher than the domestic tax rate, the 
foreign income will be tax exempt or granted tax credit under the international double 
taxation agreement, it the agreement exists. Otherwise, the company will be required to 
make up the differences to the domestic tax level. The foreign subsidiary’s income is 
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not subject to domestic income tax until dividends are paid to the parent company. 
Thus, the subsidiary company engaging in foreign operations in lower tax rate 
countries may enjoy a temporary or indefinite postponement of tax saving, which 
could result in lower parent company ETRs. Therefore it is assumed that the greater 
the extent of foreign operations, the greater the tax savings from these operations and 
the lower the effective tax rates. However, the effect of foreign operations on the ETR 
is not significant in prior studies (Stickney and McGee 1982; Harris and Feeny 2003; 
Buijink et al. 1999; Feeny et al. 2002). This is maybe because a foreign subsidiary 
only provides a possible tax saving to the parent company to reduce the effective tax 
burden. The extent of foreign sales measure is too simple to isolate the effect tax 
saving from a foreign subsidiary.   
 
Government Ownership  
There are two contradictory views on ETR concerning government ownership in a 
company. One is Derashid and Zhang’s (2003) political power hypothesis. They 
proposed that government ownership helps a company lobbying to reduce the ETR of 
the company. The other view is that of Liu and Cao (2007). They proposed that SOEs 
have no incentive to obtain tax preferences as they are not profit maximization 
companies.  Both of them found empirical evidence to support their views. The 
effect of government ownership seems to depend on the country context. 
 
3.3.2 Other Specific Characteristics Determinants  
Except for the company specific characteristic determinants, there are many other 
characteristic proxies which are used by researchers to examine their relationship with 
the ETR. However, there is no systematic analysis or theory framework for the analysis. 
The determinants identified are on an ad hoc basis and included company size and 
government ownership, for example. As long as the determinant has a reasonable 
explanation, the researchers put it into a regression model to test whether it is 
statistically significant or not. However, the lack of theoretical support is also the major 
disadvantage of ETR determinant research.  
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Time 
To control the effect of time on the ETR variation, a time period dummy or annual 
dummy variable are used as ETR determinants in the multi-variant regression model. 
The time period dummy variable is used to compare and contrast the time period before 
and after a tax reform (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Feeny et al. 2002; Richardson and 
Lanis 2007). Another approach is the annual dummy variable which takes annual 
effects into account. The determinant variables are assumed time variants. The annual 
dummy variable is used to control the possible influences in aspect of economic growth, 
financial crisis and the business cycle (Derashid and Zhang 2003; Rego 2003; 
Vandenbussche et al. 2004).   
 
Others 
There are a number of other determinant variables which are very creative and ad hoc. 
The most typical papers are from Feeny et al. (2002) and Vandenbussche et al. (2004).  
In the studies, other potential ETR determinants are examined that have never been 
considered empirically by previous studies, such as earning volatility, ownership and a 
dummy variable. Earning volatility is defined as a company’s standard deviation of its 
sales over the sample period and is used to proxy the management earning 
manipulation as the earning fluctuates. However, this idea contradicts earning 
smoothing manipulation which is often assumed in the research. The log of number of 
subsidiaries is used to capture the scope of possible related party translations within 
the group, which might reduce its ETRs. The ownership dummy variable (foreign 
versus local) was used to capture any transfer payments which could influence the 
ETRs. The listed company dummy is used to investigate whether listed companies pay 
lower ETRs than non-listed companies. The results were not significant and did not 
support the above hypotheses. The co-ordination centre dummy variable was used to 
control for statutory tax concessions, because the co-ordination centre has tax 
advantages. Here, the results were also significantly negative. The location/region 
dummy variable is used to control for the regional differences in ETRs and represents 
the regional tax competition which is a very doubtful proxy for tax competition. 
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Although the results showed that there were clear regional ETR differences, it does not 
mean that regional tax competition exists. Regional ETR differences are caused by 
regional industrial differences or different stages of business growth.  
 
3.3.3 Company Management Decisions’ Category 
The company management decisions’ category includes all the operations and 
financial and investment decisions from management. The company management 
decisions are often assumed to have profit maximization objectives and there are 
different tax treatments for different investment decisions or financial planning, for 
example, the choice between accelerated depreciation or straight line depreciation; 
FIFO or LIFO; and lease or purchase. Wilkie (1988) also demonstrated that ETRs are a 
function of tax preferences and book income (Equation 3.1). Tax preferences are the 
differences between taxable income and accounting income. Therefore, the operations, 
financial and investment decisions are closely associated with ETR variations. 
 
Leverage 
Debt is an essential part of company capital structure and almost every company has 
debt in its capital structure. Interest expenses from the company’s liability are tax 
deductible. Therefore, the debt in capital structure is often assumed to have a negative 
relationship with ETRs generally. On the other hand, if a company has a high 
marginal tax rate, the company is more likely to use a greater proportion of debt in its 
capital structure to reduce its overall cost of capital. The equilibrium capital structure 
is when the marginal cost of debt and equity financing are the same in theory. Gupta 
and Newberry (1997) and Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) found mixed results 
regarding the leverage effects on ETRs in the USA and Pacific-Basin countries. The 
results were sensitive to the ETR definition and the time period. This made it difficult 
for them to draw conclusions about the impact of a company’s leverage on its ETR. 
Harris and Feeny (2003) and Janssen (2005) observed a significant positive 
relationship with the ETR in their studies. They suggested that there was no direct tax 
incentive for highly leveraged companies and tax expenses reduce both the income 
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and tax expense disproportionally.27 On the other hand, Stickney and McGee (1982) 
used cluster analysis to prove this negative relationship. Also other later studies 
observed the negative relationship predominantly (Derashid and Zhang 2003; 
Vandenbussche 2004; Feeny 2002; Liu and Cao 2007; Richardson and Lanis 2007). 
However, the most important issue in ETR determinant research concerns how much 
the variability in ETR variations across companies can be explained by the 
determinants.  
 
Profitability 
Profitability is another important ETR determinant variable. Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) derived a new ETR equation (Equation 3.2) from Wilkie (1988) demonstrated 
the ETR equation (see Equation 3.1). 
RateTax 
Assets TotalAssetson Return 
sPreferenceTax 1ETR ×⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
×−=  
                  (3.2) 
This demonstrated a clear positive relationship between return on assets (ROA) and the 
ETR after holding tax preferences, total assets and tax rate constant. Gupta and 
Newberry (1997) and later studies (Kim and Limpaphayom 1998; Harris and Feeny 
2002; Richardson and Lanis 2007) used ROA to control for the changes in company 
operating results and confirmed the positive relationship. However, Derashid and 
Zhang (2003) observed a significant negative relationship and suggested that more 
efficient companies (high ROA) have a lower ETR in Malaysia.  
 
Asset Mix Variables  
Asset mixed variables are used to capture a company’s investment and financial 
decisions, such as capital intensity, inventory intensity and R&D intensity. There are 
many tax provisions which aimed at stimulating investments in depreciable assets and 
R&D expenditure. These tax provisions give companies accelerated depreciation from 
depreciable assets and immediate tax deductions from R&D expenditures. Therefore, 
                                                              
27 For example, £1 interest expense reduced £1 pre-tax income and only reduced £0.3 tax expenses, assuming tax 
rate is 30%. 
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the more investment in depreciable assets or R&D expenditure there is, the more the 
tax saving from the investment and the lower the ETRs. Gupta and Newberry (1997) 
argue that the inventory intensity is negatively correlated with capital intensity and 
can be used to substitute for capital intensity. The inventory intensity is expected to 
have a positive relationship with ETRs as opposites to capital intensity. These three 
asset mixed variables (capital intensity, inventory intensity and R&D intensity) can 
also be used to capture the company asset mix characteristic differences, for example, 
an asset intensive company, an inventory intensive company and an R&D intensive 
company. There is a number of studies which used these three asset mix variables as 
control variables and have the expected results (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Harris and 
Feeny 2003; Derashid and Zhang 2003; Vandenbussche et al. 2004; Richardson and 
Lanis 2007). 
 
Table 3.5 The Category of ETR Determinants 
Category of 
Determinants Definition Reference: 
Size 
Total Sale 
Zimmerman (1983) 
Porcano (1986) 
Omer et al. (1993) 
Holland (1998) 
Natural log of sales 
Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
Kim and 
Limpaphayom 
(1998) 
Buijink et al. (1999) 
Rego (2003) 
Natural log of assets 
Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) 
Buijink et al. (1999) 
Feeny et al. (2002) 
Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) 
Harris and Feeny 
(2003) 
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Vandenbussche et al. 
(2004) 
Janssen (2005) 
Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) 
Liu and Cao (2007) 
No. of employees Buijink et al. (1999) 
Net income Porcano (1986) 
Total assets Porcano (1986) Holland (1998) 
Yearly capital expenditure Porcano (1986) 
Labour dummy Liu and Cao (2007) 
Vandenbussche et al. 
(2004) Natural log of total employment 
Market value of 
equity BookValue
ValueMarket  
Kim and 
Limpaphayom 
(1998) 
Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) 
Extent of foreign 
operations (Sales) 
salesTotal
saleForeign 
 
Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
Harris and Feeny 
(2003) 
salesNet 
salesForeign 
 Buijink et al. (1999) 
Janssen (2005) 
assetsTotal
asstesForeign 
 
Rego (2003) 
Natural resource 
involvement 
(Industrial effect) salesTotal
activities resource natural from Sales
 
Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
Ownership 
Percentage of government equity 
ownership 
Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) 
Proportion of the biggest shareholder Liu and Cao (2007) 
Earnings volatility Sd (revenue) Feeny et al. (2002) 
Subsidiaries Ln ( subsidiaries) Feeny et al. (2002) 
Dummy variable 
Overseas income variable Feeny et al. (2002) Rego (2003) 
Foreign owned company Feeny et al. (2002) 
Non-listed company Feeny et al. (2002) Janssen (2005) 
Period dummy variable or year dummy 
variable 
Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) 
94 
Feeny et al. (2002) 
Gaetan (2002) 
Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) 
Rego (2003) 
Vandenbussche et al. 
(2004) 
Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) 
Industry-sector dummy variables 
(include: industrial variable) 
Buijink et al. (1999) 
Feeny et al. (2002) 
Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) 
Rego (2003) 
Vandenbussche et al. 
(2004) 
Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) 
Location/Region 
Rego (2003) 
Vandenbussche et al. 
(2004) 
Vandenbussche et al. 
(2004) Co-ordination centre 
 
Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) 
Kim and 
Limpaphayom 
(1998) 
Vandenbussche 
(2004) 
Janssen (2005) 
Leverage 
 
assets Total
debt term-Long
Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) 
equity rs'Stockholde
debtLong-term 
 Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
equities Total
debtLong-term 
 Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
 
assetsTotal
debt Total
 
Buijink et al. (1999) 
Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) 
Liu and Cao (2007) 
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Harris and Feeny 
(2003) 
incomeTotal
expensesInterest 
 
Feeny et al. (2002) 
Sale
expensesInterest 
 
Kim and 
Limpaphayom 
(1998) 
Profitability 
Sale
income Operating
 
 
Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) 
Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) 
Harris and Feeny 
(2003) 
Rego (2003) 
Janssen (2005) 
Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) 
 
 
tsTotal asse
me e-tax incoPr
Liu and Cao (2007) 
Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
Capital intensity 
assetsTotal
assetsplant  Gross
 
Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
assetsTotal
assetsplant Net 
 
Harris and Feeny 
(2003) 
income Total
deductedon Depreciati  
Sale
deductedon Depreciati
 
Feeny et al. (2002) 
employees ofNumber 
expenseon amortizati andon Depreciati Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
employees ofNumber 
assetsplant  Gross
 
Stickney and McGee 
(1982) 
 
 
 
assetsTotal
equipment  andplant  property,Net 
 
Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) 
Buijink et al. (1999) 
Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) 
Janssen (2005) 
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Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) 
salesNet 
eExpenditur Capital
 
Buijink et al. (1999)
AssetsTotal
Assets Fixed
 
Vandenbussche 
(2004) 
Liu and Cao (2007) 
Inventory intensity 
 
assetsTotal
Inventory 
 
Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) 
Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) 
Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) 
R&D intensity 
 
Net sales
 eexpenditurR&D 
 
Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) 
Buijink et al. (1999) 
Feeny et al. (2002) 
Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) 
Harris and Feeny 
(2003) 
income Total
expense R&D
 
Vandenbussche 
(2004) 
assestsTotal
assets fixed Intangible
 
 
3.3.4 ETR Determinant Studies in the PRC 
The Chinese ETR determinant studies followed Western ETR determinant studies to 
analyse the relationships between company size, leverage, capital intensity, ROA and 
other company characteristics’ determinants with ETRs.  
 
Wang (2003a, b) analysed Chinese listed companies’ ETR determinants from 1994 to 
2001. His research model includes actual STR, size, leverage, ROA, inventory intensity, 
investment gain, nature log of profit before tax, foreign operation dummy variable as 
explanatory variables and  industry dummy variable and regional dummy variable as 
control variables. He found the actual STR, size and capital intensity are positively 
associated with ETRs and investment gain and leverage are negatively associated with 
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ETRs. The annual analysis results suggested that the tax and accounting income 
differences increased in 1998 when the accounting system changed.  
 
Liu and Cao (2007) analysed 425 listed companies from 1998 to 2004. They examined 
the company size, leverage, capital intensity, ROA, ownership structure and the 
employment’s influences on ETRs after controlling for time effects. The results showed 
that the size and capital intensity do not influence the ETRs statistics significantly. The 
leverage and labour are negatively associated with ETRs, and the ROA and ownership 
structure are positively associated with ETRs. The year dummy variables also indicated 
that the ETRs from 2002 to 2004 were significantly higher than the ETRs from 1998 to 
2001. 
 
Wu and Li (2007) tested the impacts of stopping unauthorised tax rebates from local 
government in 2002 on ETRs. They used year (2000 or 2001) and tax rebate as dummy 
variables and size, leverage, capital intensity, inventory intensity, ROA, market to book 
and government equity ownership as control variables. They evidenced that the 
company ETR significantly increased in 2002. The leverage is significantly negative 
associated with ETR and the inventory intensity is significantly positively related with 
ETRs. 
 
3.4 Implicit Tax Research 
Early corporate tax studies such as ETR studies, focused almost exclusively on explicit 
tax liability owed to the tax authorities. Another tax incidence which arises as a result of 
preferences, is called implicit tax. It is the decreasing in the pre-tax return of the tax 
favoured investment under a perfectly competitive and frictionless economy. Miller 
(1977) implied that in the equilibrium assumption of a perfectly competitive and 
frictionless economy, all investments are expected to have equal risk-adjusted after-tax 
returns. Therefore, implicit tax cost will reduce the pre-tax return of the tax favoured 
investment to the equal risk adjusted after tax return in a perfectly competitive and 
frictionless economy. Efficiency theorists also support the view that “an increase of tax 
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favoured behaviour at the expense of its unfavoured alternative until the after tax 
benefits of the two are equalized” (Bittker 1980, p. 22). Scholes et al. (2009) developed 
this into a theoretical total tax theory linking implicit and explicit taxes in a perfectly 
competitive environment. This provides a complete picture of the total tax burden. 
Under this model, sum of the implicit and explicit taxes is the STR. 
 
The Scholes and Wolfson (Scholes et al. 2009) model defines the total tax burden as 
follows : 
TaxExplicit  Tax Implicit BurdenTax  Total +=                             (3.3) 
)r(R)R(R *aab −+−=                                              (3.4) 
*
b rR −=                                                          (3.5) 
bR = the risk adjusted before tax return on a fully taxable investment
28  
aR = the risk adjusted before tax return on an alternative investment  
*r = the common after tax return.  
 
Explicit and implicit tax rates can be calculated using the above definition of total tax 
burden, as follows: 
b
ab
R
RRrateax Implicit t −=                                              (3.6) 
b
*
a
R
rRrateax Explicit t −=                                              (3.7) 
By definition, the total tax rate equals the STR and also the sum of implicit tax and 
explicit tax. If  equals , which means that the alternative investment is fully 
taxable, implicit tax is zero and the total tax burden is explicit tax. The explicit and 
implicit tax rates are perfectly inversely related as shown from the definition. This 
aR bR
                                                              
28 Risk adjusted returns are used when comparing returns across investments with different levels of risk because 
investors require a greater expected pre-tax return on riskier investments relative to returns from less risky 
investments. This risk element of the pre-tax return must be factored out before it can be assumed that different in 
returns are due to tax differences. 
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theoretical relationship is very important to horizontal equity tax research. The early 
studies focused almost exclusively on explicit taxes without consideration of implicit 
taxes and therefore, the tax burden study results may be biased without consideration of 
implicit tax. After consideration, the horizontal inequity disappeared and the remaining 
variation is the due to market imperfections (Anderson et al. 1995). 
 
The classic example of implicit tax is the differences in the pre-tax returns between tax 
exempt bonds and taxable bonds assuming they are of equal risk. Holding risk equal, 
tax exempt bonds will be more attractive and lead to the price being bid up until they 
have the same risk adjusted after-tax return. This make the pre-tax rate return of tax 
exempt bonds lower than the taxable bonds. The difference in the pre-tax rate of return 
between tax exempt bonds and taxable bonds reflects the cost of implicit tax (Scholes et 
al. 2009). Atwood (2003) investigated the implicit tax resulting from different tax 
treatments for USA state and local government bonds (SALG bonds). There are three 
types of tax treatments: fully taxable bonds, tax-exempt but subject to alternative 
minimum tax (AMT) bonds, and fully tax exempt bonds. Atwood (2003) identified a 
sample of taxable SALG bonds to use as a benchmark to measure the implicit taxes of 
fully tax exempt and AMT bonds, after controlling for differences in the bonds’ 
characters. The empirical results show that after risk adjustment, the average 
risk-adjusted pre-tax yield of AMT bonds is higher than that of the fully tax-exempt 
bonds but lower than that of the fully taxable bonds. On average, the implicit taxes on 
AMT bonds range from 25.23% to 29.68%, while the implicit taxes on fully tax exempt 
bonds range from 33.87% to 35.27%, which is consistent with the implicit hypothesis. 
The evidence of implicit taxes on tax favoured bonds reflects that the USA bond market 
is very competitive and that tax subsidies were capitalised to reflect the implicit tax 
cost.  
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3.4.1 Corporate Implicit Tax Research Development 
The existence of implicit tax incurred by companies can also be empirically proved in 
the real world (i.e. a less competitive economic environment). The early studies 
examined the ability of companies to capture the benefits of explicit tax savings rather 
than incurring an offsetting of implicit tax costs. Shackelford (1991) investigated the 
shifting of tax benefits under financial institutions’ lending to employee stock 
ownership plans. Stickney et al. (1983) investigated the costs and benefits of the tax 
transfer leasing rules for General Electric and its leasing subsidiary.  
 
Wilkie (1992) empirically proved an inverse relationship between pre-tax returns and 
tax subsidies among companies, using a sample of 818 companies during 1968-1985 
and based on financial accounting data. The tax subsidy was defined as the difference 
between company explicit tax liability and the product of the book PTI and the highest 
STR. The regression analysis results were consistent with the implicit tax hypothesis. 
However, the relationship was weaker than predicted and the negative relationship was 
not consistent across all the sample years, which may be due to market frictions in an 
imperfect economy or to systematic measurement error. Wilkie also discussed the 
limitations of using financial accounting data, namely the recognition of differences 
between financial accounting and the actual economic value. 
 
Berger (1993) used the event study method to examine how share prices react 
differently for different types of company group utilising R&D tax credit (winner, 
losers and no effects) at the event dates. The results indicated there was an existence of 
implicit tax and the implicit tax cost was significantly reflected in the share prices but 
was not fully reflected.  
 
Callihan and White (1999) were the first to attempt to measure the company implicit 
tax rate from financial statements. In their study, Callihan and White derived Scholes 
and Wolfson’s model and estimate implicit tax and implicit tax rate as follows: 
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Equityr Shareholde
PTI-STR)-CTE)/(1-(PTITax Implicit =                                                               (3.8) 
STR)-CTE)/(1-(PTI
PTI-STR)-CTE)/(1-(PTIRateTax Implicit =                                                       (3.9) 
PTI = pre-tax income  CTE = current tax expense  STR=statutory tax rate 
 
In the original Scholes and Wolfson’s model, the implicit tax is derived from comparing 
the risk adjusted pre-tax return on the investment with the risk adjusted pre-tax return 
on a fully taxed investment. In order to do this, the risk adjusted valuation model has to 
be employed, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Fama-French three factor 
model (Fama and French 1993).  Callihan and White’s method has the advantage of 
avoiding this risk adjustment problem. Callihan and White defined the pre-tax return of 
the benchmark investment on a fully taxable investment as the after tax return grossed 
up by the net of STR (1-STR). It artificially creates an equivalent risk fully taxed 
investment with the same after tax return. The Callihan and White’s method is 
effectively comparing the actual company pre-tax return with an artificial pre-tax return 
which the company would be fully taxed (Equation 3.8). Callihan and White also 
observed that implicit tax has negative relationships with pre-tax return and market 
power proxies. The results were consistent with the implicit tax hypothesis and 
indicated that a company with market power can shift implicit tax burdens to earn a 
higher after-tax return. The empirical results indicated that company market 
concentration and company market share can weaken the implicit tax negative 
relationship with pre-tax returns.  
 
Wright (2001) doubted Callihan and White (1999)’s methodology. He argued that the 
measure of implicit tax in Callihan and White (1999) was based on perfect competitive 
market assumption. Therefore, it cannot be used to analyse the actual implicit tax for a 
company operating in the less perfect competitive market. Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001) also doubted the Callihan and White’s (1999) implicit tax measure. Shackelford 
and Shevlin argued that the Callihan and White (1999)’s implicit tax definition 
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effectively was   where X is the difference between taxable and 
accounting income.
STR)-STR)/(1(X ⋅
29 It was to measure the tax preferences rather than implicit taxes 
and was equivalent to the tax subsidy measure derived by Wilkie and Limberg (1993).  
 
The existence of implicit tax in a less perfect competitive market was demonstrated in 
Salbador and Vendrzyk’s (2006) USA defence industry study. Salbador and Vendrzyk 
(2006) analysed the changes in tax preferences and the changes of the pre-tax returns 
three years before and after the Tax Reform Act 1986. This methodology avoided the 
pitfall of Callihan and White’s direct measure of implicit tax. The negative relationship 
between changes in tax preferences and changes in pre-tax returns was observed. The 
results were consistent with the implicit tax hypothesis and previous implicit tax studies. 
The weak negative relationship between changes in tax preferences and changes in 
pre-tax returns for top defence companies was evidenced. Salbador and Vendrzyk 
concluded that market power is positively related to a company’s ability to retain a tax 
preferences benefit, which was consistent with Callihan and White’s (1999) study. 
 
Implicit tax can be observed not only in developed countries such as USA The 
existence was also found in the emerging economy of the PRC by Chen and Hung 
(2010), despite the market structure eroding the realization of implicit taxes. Chen and 
Hung (2010) observed that macroeconomic factors influence the realization of implicit 
taxes. Chen and Hung (2010) empirically proved that economic growth weakens the 
negative relationship of the tax preferences and the company pre-tax return, and capital 
investment growth strengthens the negative relationship between tax subsidies and a 
company’s pre-tax return. This was because Chen and Hung assumed that rapid 
economic growth provides more profitable investment opportunities and this prevents 
company bidding up the investment price. However, high capital investment growth 
will intensify market competition for tax favoured investments. Table 3.6 provides a 
                                                              
29In Callihan and White (1999), the implicit tax was measured as PTI-STR)-CTE)/(1-(PTITax Implicit = , substituting 
, where X is the difference between taxable and accounting income. STRX)-(PTI CTE ⋅=
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summary of studies examining the relationship between profitability and implicit tax. It 
covers the research methodology, sample data, implicit tax criteria, regression model 
variables and major outcomes. 
Table 3. 6 Summary of Studies Examining the Relationship Between Profitability and Implicit Tax 
Study Methodology Sample Implicit tax criteria 
Regression model 
variables Major outcomes 
Wilkie (1992) OLS regression 
USA 
Sample year: 1968-1985 
Population: 2484  
Final sample: 818  
(No. of companies) 
 
the negative relationship 
between pre-tax return and 
tax preference  
Dependent variable: 
PTROE 
 
Independent variable:  
Pre-tax equivalent of tax 
subsidy on shareholder 
equity =(TS/SE)/(1-STR) 
  
NOL Dummy variable 
Interaction variables 
Provides empirical evidence on the 
existence of implicit tax at company 
level. The PTROE is significantly 
negatively associated with tax 
preference. However, the relationship 
is weaker than predicted for a perfectly 
competitive and frictionless economy, 
which suggests the presence of 
nontrivial market frictions or 
systematic measurement error.  
Callihan and 
White (1999) 
Monotonic regression  
USA 
Sample year: 1982, 1987, 
1988. 
Population: 7851 
Final sample: 675 
(No. of company years) 
 
SE
PTI-STR)-CTE)/(1-(PTI
 
Dependent variable:  
Implicit tax rate 
 
Independent variable: 
PTROE 
Market concentration ratio
Market share 
Year 
Interaction variables 
First direct estimate of implicit tax 
based on financial statements. The 
results proved that implicit tax are 
significantly negatively associated to 
the PTROE and market power. The 
market power may weaken the 
negative relationship between implicit 
tax and PTROE. 
Salbador and 
Vendrzyk 
(2006) 
OLS regression 
USA 
Sample year: 1984-1990 
Population: 261 
The negative relationship 
between changes in tax 
preferences and changes in 
pre-tax returns 
Dependent variable: 
Change in average pre-tax 
returns 
 
Proved existence of implicit tax in the 
non-competitive market. Evidence that 
market power is positively associated 
with a company’s ability to retain the 
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Final sample: 65 
(No. of company) 
 
Independent variable: 
Change in average tax 
preferences  
Dummy variable in size 
Dummy variable in 
accounting treatment 
Interaction variables 
tax preferences benefit.  
Chen and Hung 
(2010) 
OLS regression 
the PRC 
Sample year: 1996-2005 
Population: 11556 
Final sample: 8169 
(No. of company years) 
 
 
The negative relationship 
between PTROE and tax 
preference 
Dependent variable:  
PTROE 
 
Independent variable: 
Tax preference (top 
Statutory Tax Rate minus 
the actual STR) 
Economic growth rates 
Capital investment growth 
rates 
Market concentration ratio
Market share 
Size (log of total assets) 
Growth opportunities 
(market value/book value) 
Interaction variables 
The study evidenced the existence of 
implicit tax in PRC and introduced the 
macroeconomic factors into the 
implicit tax analysis. The results 
indicated that economic growth 
reduces the inverse relationship 
between PTROE and tax preferences 
and conversely, capital investment 
growth enhances the negative 
relationship.  
OLS = Ordinary Least Squares; PTROE = Pre-Tax Return on Equity; TS = PTI*STR-CTE; SE = Shareholder Equity ;STR = Statutory Tax Rate;  
PTI = Pre-tax income; CTE = Current Tax Expense  
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter presents a literature review of corporate ETR and MTR, the determinants 
of ETR, and implicit tax research. The ETR and MTR research section discussed the 
development of the ETR and ETR research in the past. In particular, the ETR 
measurements are fully discussed from its numerator and denominator measurements’ 
aspects. The advantages and disadvantages of computing the ETR from financial 
statements are also reviewed from prior studies’ findings. These discussions combined 
with previous chapter’s Chinese tax and accounting background discussion are 
essential to understand the methodology of the Chinese ETRs estimation which will 
be discussed in Chapter Four. The MTR section follows a similar approach to the ETR 
section. It starts with a general discussion, moves to the company specific MTR 
research development and ends with the company specific MTR calculations. The 
discussion of the MTR calculations illustrates the background of the MTR 
methodology in Chapter Four - MTR.  
 
The determinants of the corporate ETR section reviews the recent ETR determinant 
studies with a summary of the research methodology and identifies three ETR 
determinants’ categories. Each ETR determinant within the categories is discussed in 
detail. The discussion of the prior ETR determinants demonstrates that the prior ETR 
determinants’ research methods lack the theory or framework to support it and result 
in conflicting findings between studies. This problem leads to the later Chapter Five - 
Determinants of ETR, and the proposed new ETR determinant model will 
demonstrate its superiority over the prior research model.  Comparisons between the 
new model and the prior ETR determinants’ study model will also be presented in the 
results section.  
 
The implicit tax section explained implicit tax, firstly, with Scholes and Wolfson’s 
total tax framework and then discussed the recent corporate implicit tax research 
developments with a summary of the research methodology. It focused on the research 
methods which demonstrated the existence of implicit tax in prior studies. This 
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discussion combined with the Chinese Enterprise Income Tax rate preferences 
practice enlightens the formulation of the implicit tax methodology in Chapter Six - 
Implicit Tax.  
 
The next chapter is Chapter Four – Effective Tax Rate and Marginal Tax Rate. The 
research design for the thesis, methodology, data and results for ETR and MTR are 
presented separately.   
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4.1 Introduction   
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the research approach. The discussion 
explains why the quantitative approach is chosen for all three research topics. Then, it 
proceeds to the effective tax rate (ETR) and marginal tax rate (MTR) analysis section 
They correspond with the first research question—the patterns of ETRs and MTRs 
from 1994 to 2006. To answer this question, the measures of the ETRs and MTRs 
need to be defined first. The methodology sections discuss the possible definitions of 
ETRs and MTRs based on the prior ETR and MTR literature review and Chinese tax 
and accounting practices background. The methodology section outlines the specific 
definitions of ETRs and MTRs and proposes the research detailed hypotheses based 
on Chinese corporate tax preferences. The following data section illustrates the 
sampling procedure, which excludes distortional data. This is followed by the results 
and analysis section. Based on Chinese corporate tax preferences and the research 
hypotheses, the analysis is based on time, industrial, and regional factors respectively. 
The ETR and MTR analysis are separated into two independent parts, because of their 
different computation methods and sampling procedures. The last section is the 
conclusion, which summarizes the findings.  
 
4.2 Research Design 
There are two research approaches, a qualitative research approach and a quantitative 
approach. Quantitative research is research in which the researcher primarily uses 
post-positivist claims for developing knowledge. A qualitative research approach is 
one in which the inquirer often makes knowledge claims based primarily on the 
multiple meanings of individual experiences and meanings socially and historically 
constructed, with an intent of developing a theory or pattern (Creswell 2003). 
Rudestam and Newton (2007) provide very good summary comparisons between 
quantitative and qualitative research approaches with respect to data, use of theory, 
research philosophy, and analysis which is shown in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 
Common Differences Between Quantitative and Qualitative Research Approaches 
Quantitative approach Qualitative approach  
1. Data expressed in numbers 1. Data expressed in words 
2. Hypothetico-deductive 2. Inductive 
3. Controlled research situations 3. Naturally occurring and contextual 
4. Isolation of operationally defined 
variables 
4. Holistic view of phenomena 
5. Seeks objectivity 5. Interested in subjectivity 
6. Emphasis on prediction and explanation 6. Emphasis on description, exploration, 
search for meaning 
7. Researcher directs, manipulates, 
controls 
7. Researcher participates and 
collaborates 
8. Statistical analysis 8. Text analysis 
Source: Rudestam and Newton (2007)
 
The quantitative approach is based on positivism. It is a deductive approach and 
involves the development of a theory that is subjected to a test. It often assumes a 
cause and effect relationship between variables of interest. Quantitative research uses 
statistical methods in describing patterns of behaviour and generalising findings from 
samples to populations of interest (Saunders, et al. 2003). The advantages of the 
quantitative research approach is that it is able to make generalisations and replication 
of the findings from samples if the quantitative research methods follow standardised 
statistical procedures.  
 
A qualitative research approach, on the other hand, is based on interpretivism. It is an 
inductive approach and is not intended to prove or test a theory. It intends to 
understand the research nature and context and formulate a theory to explain the 
results focusing on context and seeing the social world holistically. The data 
collection is usually from interviews, observations and documentary evidence. The 
advantages of the qualitative research approach are flexibility and that it allows 
research to understand phenomena holistically.  
 
The choice of research approach depends on the nature of the research problem. This 
111 
research focuses on corporate tax in the PRC and the research questions are:  
1. What have been the patterns of ETRs and MTRs from 1994 to 1996? 
2. What are the main determinants of ETR in PRC? 
3. Does implicit tax exist at the corporate level in the PRC? 
The prior literature all uses the quantitative research approach to investigate similar 
corporate tax topics. The research implicitly assumes that companies pay taxes in 
compliance with tax regulations. The relationship between income and tax is a simple 
cause and effect relationship according to the tax regulations. There are also specific 
research hypotheses for the research questions.30 The tax return data are confidential 
and the only possible public data source is financial statements. Therefore, data 
collection is from financial statements. Given the consideration of the research 
questions, the previous literature research method and the data availability, the 
qualitative research methods are not considered possible and relevant. The best 
research approach is therefore a quantitative approach and empirical study.  
 
The types of analysis software used in the thesis are Excel, SPSS, MATLAB and 
Stata. The Excel is used to process the data selection procedures. The SPSS is used to 
conduct data description and OLS regression analysis. The MATLAB is used to 
conduct MTR simulation process. The Stata is used to conduct panel data analysis. 
 
4.3 ETR 
4.3.1 Methodology  
The methodology begins with discussing the main ETR measure definitions available 
and moves to define the ETR measures that will be used in this research based on 
Chinese accounting and tax practices. There are numerous different methods of 
calculating ETRs in the prior research, as discussed in the literature review chapter 
Three (3.2.1.2 Measurement of ETR). In each method, the numerator is some measure 
of company tax liability and the denominator is some measure of company income. 
There are many options for the choices of ETR definition and the most controversial 
                                                              
30 The specific research hypotheses will be discussed in detail in each methodology section. 
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aspect is deferred tax treatments as discussed in the literature review. The implicit 
assumption here and in other ETR studies is that the ETR variations are caused by tax 
preference differences.  
 
Before starting out with the listing of the ETR definitions, it is important to discuss 
the ETR measurements’ options in the PRC context. Due to the restricted financial 
information disclosure in the PRC, the available or possible taxable adjustments are 
limited, especially without the deferred tax method adoption. For the numerator, the 
corporate tax expense in the income statement without any deferred tax adjustment is 
the only choice. Because the deferred tax method was not common practice in PRC 
before 2007, there are less than 10% sample company years that use the deferred tax 
method. The adoption of deferred tax adjustment in the calculation would not represent 
the tax accounting practice in Chinese listed companies. There is no multinational listed 
company which is actively involved in foreign operations as yet in the PRC. Therefore, 
the domestic and foreign tax issue is not a problem in Chinese tax research. This 
prevents many problems which are caused by deferred tax and foreign tax adjustments, 
such as the adjustments in the USA or other Western countries’ tax studies.  
 
ETR Definition 
The ETRs are measured using four different ETR definitions over the sample period 
(1994-2006). This follows Omer et al. (1991) suggestion that using more than one ETR 
measure can improve the robustness of results. Four different definitions result from 
different types of income used as denominators, and they are accounting book income 
(including two different accounting book incomes), operating cash flow and mimic 
taxable income. The detailed ETR research methods are reviewed in the Literature 
Review Chapter 3.2.1.2. The different denominators are used to capture the overall tax 
burdens on different company financial performance and operating activity.  
 
Accounting book income ETR measure is defined as: 
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 Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1 =                                           (4.1)
 
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 =                                               (4.2)
 
The first ETR definition (ETR1) is income tax expense over the total profit before tax. 
This is the most common definition of the ETR and it is used to reflect the income tax 
burden over a company’s overall financial performance. A second definition (ETR2) 
is income tax expense over the operating income and it excludes the non-operating 
income and expenses. Because these items are infrequent and unusual in nature, they 
do not relate to a company’s operating performance. The investment gain and 
non-operating expenses are often non-taxable or not tax deductible, therefore, the 
ETR2 is used to reflect the overall income tax expense over operating results only. 
The difference between total profits before tax and operating income is the investment 
gain, subsidy income and net of non-operating income and expenses. It is expected that 
the ETR2 will be higher than the ETR1 since the total profit before tax is normally 
greater than operating income. 
 
Operating cash flow ETR measure is defined as:  
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 =                                                  (4.3)
 
The ETR3 uses operating cash flow as the denominator. The operating cash flow is used 
to avoid any accounting policy influences on the ETR measures in prior studies 
(Zimmerman 1983). The operating cash flow is defined as the primary operating 
revenue less the cost of operating revenue, which is the same as the definition from 
Zimmerman (1983).  
 
Mimic taxable income ETR measure is defined as: 
Gain Investment-Impairment for theProvision +
esing ExpensNon-Operat+Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4
Δ
                     (4.4) 
Because there is not deferred tax, the mimic taxable income denominator only can be 
114 
mimicked by accounting-tax reconciliation (see Table 2.3 Accounting Income and 
Taxable Income Reconciliation for details). The seven provisions for impairments are 
considered as the main differences between accounting and tax income. Most of the 
impairments are recognised under the non-operating expenses or investment gain (see 
Table 2.7, Summary of Profit and Loss Statement Entries for Provision for 
Impairment for details). The non-operating expenses are not tax deductible expenses 
and the investment gain is also assumed to be non-taxable income because the 
dividend received from investment and the appreciation of investment value are not 
taxable items. The provision for write-downs to NRV of inventories is added back as 
it is not a tax deductible expense. The bad debt provision is allowed for tax deduction 
purposes, but only limited to 0.5% of the account receivable year end closing balance 
or the actual amount written off. However, all the bad debt provision is assumed to be 
tax deductible for simplicity. 
 
Therefore ETR4- mimic taxable income denominator is defined as: 
Gain Investment  
sinventorie of NRV  towrite-downfor  sΔProvision  + 
Expenses peratingNon-O  + 
Tax  BeforeProfit  Total
                                                             
 
 
Statutory Tax Rate Analysis 
The top Statutory Tax Rate (STR hereafter) is 33% during the sample period (changed 
to 25% in 2008). However, the national tax preference policies give lower tax rate 
privileges to qualified companies such as a company residing in the Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ) or High-Tech Industrial Development Zone (HTIZ) or operating in the 
encouraged industries (see section 2.3.2 Enterprise Income Tax Incentives for details). 
The listed company STR is used as the STR for the group of companies for simplicity.31 
The reported listed company STR analysis is used to analyse a company’s tax 
 
31 The company subsidiary’s tax preference is shown in the sub-note of the annual financial report. However,  it 
does not report the extent of each subsidiary’s earning or income and the extent of the subsidiary’s tax preference 
separately. This makes it impossible to measure the accurate STR of the group. Another important reason is that 
the database which is used does not have the subsidiary tax preference information.  
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preference from a tax structure perspective and the ETR analysis is the actual company 
tax burden analysis. The ETR measures will be compared with the STR to reveal the 
real differences instead of the top statutory tax 33% in the prior studies.  
 
The main research question for this section is to find out the patterns of ETRs from 
1994 to 1996. The research analysis and hypotheses are based on the Chinese 
corporate tax backgrounds. In 2001, the Central Government stopped the unauthorised 
tax rate preferences or tax rebates for companies and changed the EIT revenue from 
local revenue to shared tax revenue between the local governments and the Central 
Government. Therefore, an increase in ETRs after 2001 is expected. Based on the 
industrial and regional tax preferences discussed in Chapter Two, industrial and 
regional differences are expected and the tax favoured industries and regions are 
expected to be lower than the other industries and regions. Following from the above 
discussion, the specific research hypothesis are developed as: 
  
Hypothesis 1.1: annual ETRs and STR are different between Period 1 (1994-2001) 
and Period 2 (2002-2006) and the Period 2 is expected to have higher ETRs and STR. 
Hypothesis 1.2: industrial ETRs and STR are different among industries and tax 
favoured industries are expected to have lower ETRs and STR. 
Hypothesis 1.3: regional ETRs and STR are different among regions and tax favoured 
regions are expected to have lower ETRs and STR. 
 
In the results and analysis section, the ETR and STR results and analysis will also be 
divided into annual, industrial and regional ETRs and STR analysis. 
 
4.3.2 Sample and Data 
The data used in this thesis are gathered from the China Stock Market Financial 
Statements Database V3.1 which is provided by CSMAR and the Wind Information 
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Terminal (Wind).32 The CSMAR V 3.1 provides the PRC listed company financial 
statements from 1994 to 2006, and Wind provides company information, corporate 
governance and shareholder information. The sample only consists of listed companies, 
which tend to be bigger and more mature companies. It is unlikely that any new, small 
companies are included in the sample. The sample companies are inevitably influenced 
by stock exchange regulations, such as size and profitability requirements. Therefore, 
the results of this research have a limited ability to be generalised to the unlisted 
companies which are outside of the sample. However, the results do reflect all the 
significant features of the PRC’s modern taxation. No foreign company is listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and no listed company is exposed to material 
foreign taxation, which leaves the sample companies exclusively exposed to the PRC 
taxation. All the listed companies are regulated by the same contemporaneous Chinese 
accounting system with the same financial year ending at 31st December. To avoid the 
effects of unique government regulations which are applicable to certain industries, 
only general industrial listed companies are considered. Financial institutions are 
governed by separate accounting regulations and tax rules, and are not included in the 
sample.  
 
ETR Sample 
The final sample consists of 668 companies or 4188 company years, excluding 
companies that fall into the following categories: 
 
1. Companies that incur any operating loss or negative total income before tax in any 
of the sample years, because the effect of operating losses may significantly 
understate the income tax burden after the losses are carried forward. Also, the 
negative denominator results in a negative ETR, which would be difficult to 
interpret (Wang 1991). Effectively the step excludes sample companies with at least 
one single loss-making sample year. Around half of the sample companies are 
                                                              
32 CSMAR stands for China Securities Market and Accounting Research and is provided by GTA Information 
Technology Company Limited. The Wind Information Terminal is provided by Shanghai Wind Information Co Ltd. 
Both companies are leading financial data and information services providers in the PRC.  
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excluded from the population, because of this strict profitability condition. The 
exclusion of these loss-making companies is inevitable for ETR research. The loss 
making companies have a NOL, which they can carry forward against future 
taxable profit. The NOL carry forward will lower the future corporate income tax 
burden and distort the results of tax preference effects. This approach is also 
consistent with previous studies (Omer et al. 1993; Porcano 1986; Zimmerman 
1983; Wilkie and Limberg 1990; Derashid and Zhang 2003).   
2. Companies that have negative tax payments in any of the sample year. Negative tax 
payments come from government income tax refunds and this negative numerator 
would also make interpretation difficult. This approach is consistent with previous 
studies (Omer et al. 1993; Porcano 1986; Zimmerman 1983; Wilkie and Limberg 
1990; Derashid and Zhang 2003).   
3. Companies with missing values from the merger of the two databases (CSMAR and 
WIND). Only company years containing complete data for calculating all ETR 
measures in a given year are included in the analysis. 
4. A company’s ETR exceeds one (100 percent). This could be caused by different 
purposes of financial reporting and tax regulations, for example, the accounting 
process of consolidation of the group companies’ tax expenses and earnings is not 
allowed under the tax regulation. One group of companies may have loss making 
subsidiaries and profit making subsidiaries, but the tax expenses are rarely negative 
for the loss making subsidiaries. The consolidated financial statements of the group 
companies results in a sum of consolidated income and taxes which may cause ETR 
exceeds STR or even one.  This elimination is consistent with previous studies 
(Stickney and McGee 1982; Zimmerman 1983; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Kim 
and Limpaphayom 1998; Derashid and Zhang 2003).  
 
Table 4.2 provides details about the sample selection procedures with the number of 
company years and company losses in each step. The initial population comprised 1447 
companies (11374 company years) that were listed on the CSMAR from 1994 to 2006. 
This final population was reduced to 668 companies (4188 company years) after 
118 
eliminating companies falling into the above four categories.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Sample Selection Procedure 
 Number of Company Years Number of Companies 
All company years on the 
2007 CSMAR General 
Industrial File from 1994 to 
2006 
11374 1447 
Less:   
Losses incurred in any 
company years (both 
operating income loss and 
total income before tax) 
6803 734 
Negative tax payments 
incurred in any sample 
company years 
236 32 
Missing Values 95 14 
ETRs are greater than 1  52 44 
   
Final full sample from 
1994 to 2006 
4188 668 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows the number of sample companies per year from 1994 to 2006. The 
sample size in early years may be smaller because the stock market was only 
established in 1990 and the number of listed companies in the PRC stock market has 
been increasing rapidly since then. 
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Table 4.3 Number of Sample Companies per Year a  
Year No. of companies Percentage of total sample 
1994 30 0.72% 
1995 47 1.12% 
1996 82 1.96% 
1997 126 3.01% 
1998 179 4.27% 
1999 243 5.80% 
2000 310 7.40% 
2001 404 9.65% 
2002 454 10.84% 
2003 500 11.94% 
2004 566 13.51% 
2005 595 14.21% 
2006 652 15.57% 
Total 4188 100.00% 
a The table shows the number of sample companies per year from 1994 to 2006. It includes the actual 
numbers of the companies and the percentage of the total sample every year from 1994 to 2006.  
b The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample companies with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding 
one, it leaves 4188 company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. 
 
4.3.3 Results and Analysis  
4.3.3.1 Statutory Tax Rate Analysis  
The top STR is 33% in the PRC, according to the Provisional Regulations on Enterprise 
Income Tax (PRC. State Council 1993). However, a company can be granted a lower 
STR in many legitimate ways, for example, a company operating in tax preference 
locations or industries is taxed at 15% EIT. The STR analysis will give an overall tax 
picture of the structure of government tax incentive policies and the following ETR 
analysis will provide evidence on the effectiveness of the tax incentives’ 
implementations in the PRC.  
 
To analyse the STR, the listed companies’ STRs are divided into five categories, which 
are 0%, 1%-14%, 15%, 16-32% and 33% STR. The 0%, 15% and 33% are the most 
reasonable rang break boundaries because they are legitimate STRs which are 
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stipulated in the tax regulations (see section 2.3, Enterprise Income Tax Incentives, for 
details). The all samples listed companies reported STRs are very mess with a total of 
26 STRs from 0% to 33% (see Appendix 6 for details).  
Table 4.4 provides the categorized STR results. The majority of listed companies’ 
STRs fall into the 15% and 33% categories. The 15% STR category sample company 
years dominates the sample with 55.3% of the total sample of company years. The 
following category is the 33% category with 36.7% of the total sample company years. 
The results provide firm evidence that 63.3% of the sample company years are granted 
STR reductions or exemptions. 
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aTable 4.4 Relative Frequency of Sample Companies in Each STR Category  
STR category b  No. of company years Percentage 
0% 90 2.1% 
1%-14% 182 4.3% 
15% 2318 55.3% 
16%-32% 62 1.5% 
33% 1536 36.7% 
Total 4188 100% 
a The table shows the number of company years falling into each of the five STR categories (0%, 
1%-14%, 15%, 16-32% and 33%) and the proportion of each category to the total sample company years. 
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample companies with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding 
one, it leaves 4188 company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR 
data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
b  SRT = Statutory Tax Rate. 
Table 4.5 
Annual Relative Frequency of Sample Companies in Each STR Category (No. of companies per year)  a
STR 
Category 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
0% 1 1 0 3 9 10 10 13 7 6 8 8 14 
1%-14% 0 1 5 9 13 16 22 21 15 21 21 17 21 
15% 28 43 71 112 150 205 239 326 201 202 227 248 266 
16%-32% 0 0 1 0 2 3 2 7 8 8 8 10 13 
33% 1 2 5 2 5 9 37 37 223 263 302 312 338 
Total 30 47 82 126 179 243 310 404 454 500 566 595 652 
a  The table shows the number of companies falling into each of the five actual STR categories (0%, 1%-14%, 15%, 16-32% and 33%) every year from 1994 to 2006. The initial 
data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, 
and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information 
Terminal to match the final sample companies. SRT = Statutory Tax Rate.  
Table 4.6 
Annual Relative Frequency of Sample Companies in Each STR Category (percentage)  a
STR 
Category 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
0% 3.3% 2.1% 0.0% 2.4% 5.0% 4.1% 3.2% 3.2% 1.5% 1.2% 1.4% 1.3% 2.2% 
1%-14% 0.0% 2.1% 6.1% 7.1% 7.3% 6.6% 7.1% 5.2% 3.3% 4.2% 3.7% 2.9% 3.2% 
15% 93.3% 91.5% 86.6% 88.9% 83.8% 84.4% 77.1% 80.7% 44.3% 40.4% 40.1% 41.7% 40.8% 
16%-32% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 1.1% 1.2% 0.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.6% 1.4% 1.7% 2.0% 
33% 3.3% 4.3% 6.1% 1.6% 2.8% 3.7% 11.9% 9.2% 49.1% 52.6% 53.4% 52.4% 51.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a  The table shows the proportion of each of the five STR categories (0%, 1%-14%, 15%, 16-32% and 33%) to the annual total sample company each year from 1994 to 2006. 
The data are from Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 provide annual categorized STR results to give more details of 
the listed companies’ STR changes from 1994 to 2006. From Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 
results, it can be seen that in the early years (from 1994 to 2001), the 15% STR category 
dominated the company STR categories with over 80% occupancy of the sample each 
year. The 33% STR category jumped from 9.2% occupancy of the sample in 2001 to 
49.1% of the sample in 2002. In the later years (from 2002 to 2006) the 33% STR 
category maintained over 50% occupancy of the sample each year, compared with less 
than 11.9% occupancy in the early years. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 results are generally 
consistent with prior findings that in the early years only a limited number of listed 
companies were taxed at a top STR of 33% (Wang 1999; Wang and Li 2003; Wang 
2003a, b). However, their STR study stopped at 2001, whereas this thesis extends the 
STR analysis time span and provides a more complete picture of STR by capturing the 
maximum number of listed companies.  
 
A key point for the listed company is 2001/2002. In 2000, the State Council tried to 
rectify local governments’ granting of unauthorized tax refunds to companies within 
their jurisdiction. The State Council ordered the local governments to terminate the 
unauthorized tax refunds from 1st January 2000 and stipulated that only the State 
Council had the right of approval of a tax refund to companies (State Council Order 
No.2/2000). Meanwhile, the State Council changed the Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) 
from local government revenue to shared government revenue (see section 2.2.3.3, 
Enterprise income tax sharing system, for details).  On 12th October 2000, the MoF 
issued a further administrative rule on this issue. To promote the SOE reform and 
development, maintain a stable stock market, and protect the interest of investors, upon 
the State Council’s approval, the listed companies’ EIT refund preferential policies 
were allowed until 21th December 2001. From 1st January 2002, all the EIT was 
collected according to the Statutory Tax Rate (33%), unless other laws or regulations 
granted a preferential tax rate (MoF No.99/2000). The State Council effectively 
stopped the local governments’ unauthorized EIT refunds and the top STR was 
enforced from 1st January 2002.  
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It is reasonable to divide the sample period into Period 1 (from 1994 to 2001) and 
Period 2 (from 2002 to 2006). Table 4.7 provides a comparison of STR categories 
between Period 1 and Period 2. Many companies enjoyed preferential tax rates in the 
PRC, especially in Period 1. Even in Period 2 nearly half of the company years were 
granted preferential tax rates. This is evidence that the State Council effectively 
stopped the local governments’ unauthorized EIT refunds and enforced the top STR 
within listed companies in Period 2. 
 
Table 4.7 Statutory Tax Rate Category  a
                                       1994-2001                  2002-2006      
STR category Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
0% 47 3.31% 43 1.55% 
1%-14% 87 6.12% 95 3.43% 
15% 1174 82.62% 1144 41.34% 
16%-32% 15 1.06% 47 1.70% 
33% 98 6.90% 1438 51.97% 
Total 1421 100.00% 2767 100.00% 
a The table shows the number of company years falling into 0%, 1%-14%, 15%, 16-32% and 33%, five 
categories and the proportion of each category to the total number of company years. The initial data are 
from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating income, negative 
total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 
company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected 
from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
 
4.3.3.2 Effective Tax Rates’ Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.8 provides the descriptive statistics on the ETRs and STRs, which includes the 
mean, median, standard deviation, the first quartile, third quartile and the inter-quartile 
range is used, because this range is less influenced by extreme observations. ETR1 and 
ETR2 are accounting book income based ETR measures. ETR3 is an operating cash 
flow based ETR measure and ETR4 is a mimic taxable income based ETR measure. 
 
From the results in Table 4.8, it is clear that the ETRs are significantly below the top 
STR 33%. These results were also found in the prior research (Wang 1999; Wang and 
Li 2003; Wang 2003a, b; Li 2004 and Ma 2007). However, none of them compared 
ETRs with average STRs. This is a more appropriate way to analyze the Chinese ETR 
124 
as the PRC is not a uniform STR tax regime. By comparing the ETRs and average STRs, 
the differences between the ETRs and average STRs are much less than the differences 
between ETRs and the top STR.   
 
The ETR1 is smaller than the ETR2, which is an expected result. Because the ETR1’s 
denominator is total profit before tax and the ETR2’s denominator is operating income. 
The differences between these two are investment gain, subsidy income and net 
non-operating income. As the operating income tends to be smaller than total profit 
before tax, the average ETR2 is greater than the average ETR1. The ETR3 is the 
smallest ETR and is around 10% because it is deflated by operating cash flow. The 
operating cash flow is defined as the net sale minus the cost of sale and the tax and 
surcharge associated with sale, which is much larger than the accounting profit. ETR3 
also has the smallest standard deviation, which indicates that ETR3 is a relatively stable 
measure and not influenced by accounting methods. However, it is also less sensitive to 
tax changes because of the relatively large denominator (operating cash flow). ETR4’s 
denominator is defined as mimic taxable income. In theory, ETR4 is supposed to be 
close to the STR. However, by definition, it is very similar to the ETR2 denominator 
definition, as the differences are only the non-operating expenses, subsidy income and 
the change in provisions for write-down to NRV of inventories.  
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Table 4.8 Descriptive Statistics of the ETRs and STR    a
Panel A b : All Samples 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Max. Q1 Q3 Q3-Q1 Skew. Kurts.
ETR1 0.207  0.177  0.117 0.957 0.133 0.288 0.155 1.050 2.365
ETR2 0.231  0.200  0.132 0.984 0.147 0.315 0.168 1.280 3.285
ETR3 0.099  0.083  0.069 0.491 0.050 0.132 0.082 1.271 2.122
ETR4 0.211  0.183  0.116 0.985 0.137 0.292 0.155 1.067 2.731
STR 0.212  0.150  0.094 0.330 0.150 0.330 0.18 0.237 -1.305
Panel B: Period 1 (1994-2001)  
  Mean Median Std.dev. Max. Q1 Q3 Q3-Q1 Skew. Kurts.
ETR1 0.160 0.150 0.088 0.835 0.113 0.186 0.073 1.482 5.796
ETR2 0.190 0.166 0.110 0.984 0.134 0.229 0.094 1.850 7.467
ETR3 0.094 0.082 0.064 0.472 0.051 0.124 0.073 1.512 4.058
ETR4 0.172 0.156 0.092 0.761 0.124 0.208 0.084 1.326 4.193
STR 0.155 0.150 0.057 0.330 0.150 0.150 0.000 1.266 5.228
Panel C: Period 2 (2002-2006) 
  Mean Median Std.dev. Max. Q1 Q3 Q3-Q1 Skew. Kurts.
ETR1 0.231  0.212  0.122 0.957 0.145 0.318 0.173 0.837 1.839
ETR2 0.252  0.234  0.137 0.984 0.155 0.331 0.176 1.081 2.515
ETR3 0.102  0.085  0.071 0.491 0.049 0.137 0.088 1.163 1.417
ETR4 0.231  0.214  0.121 0.985 0.146 0.317 0.171 0.909 2.392
STR 0.242  0.330  0.095 0.330 0.150 0.330 0.18 -0.311 -1.463
a The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (Std.dev.), maximum, first quartile (Q1), third 
quartile (Q3), inter-quartile range (Q3-Q1), skewness (Skew.) and kurtosis (Kurts.) for the ETRs and 
STRs. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative 
operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR 
exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. 
The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; STR = Statutory Tax Rate.  
b  Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the entire sample (total 4188 company years). Panel B 
shows the descriptive statistics of Period 1 (from 1994 to 2001, with a total of 1421 company years). 
Panel C shows the descriptive statistics of Period 2 (from 2002 to 2006, with a total of 2767 company 
years). 
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aTable 4.9 Correlation of the ETRs and STR (Entire sample)  b
Pearson Correlation 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
ETR1 1     
ETR2 0.815** 1    
ETR3 0.526** 0.489** 1   
ETR4 0.864** 0.918** 0.562** 1  
STR 0.537** 0.465** 0.380** 0.519** 1 
Spearman Correlation (Non-parametric correlation) 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
ETR1 1     
ETR2 0.892** 1    
ETR3 0.615** 0.600** 1   
ETR4 0.921** 0.957** 0.653** 1  
STR 0.565** 0.522** 0.373** 0.553** 1 
a The table shows the Pearson correlation and Spearman correlation of the ETRs and STRs. The initial 
data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating income, 
negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it 
leaves 4188 company years, or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were 
collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
  GainInvestment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
b ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 show the correlations of the ETRs and STR. Table 4.9 shows 
the Pearson and Spearman correlations of the entire sample. Table 4.10 shows the 
Pearson and Spearman correlations using comparisons of Period 1 (1994-2001) and 
Period 2 (2002-2006). The correlation results show that ETR1, ETR2 and ETR4 are 
significantly correlated with over 0.80 in both the Pearson and Spearman correlations. 
Compared with others, the ETR3 and STR have less correlation with other ETRs. Table 
4.10 shows a remarkable increase in the correlations between STR and ETRs from 
Period 1 to Period 2. This demonstrates the increasing effectiveness of the unauthorized 
tax refunds’ implementation from Period 1 to Period 2.
Table 4.10 Correlation of the ETRs and STR (By sample period) b  a
Pearson Correlation 
Period 1(1994-2001) Period 2 (2002-2006) 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR  ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
ETR1 1     ETR1 1     
ETR2 0.793** 1    ETR2 0.808** 1    
ETR3 0.567** 0.550** 1   ETR3 0.527** 0.470** 1   
ETR4 0.843** 0.934** 0.599** 1  ETR4 0.859** 0.908** 0.558** 1  
STR 0.351** 0.303** 0.292** 0.354** 1 STR 0.507** 0.452** 0.436** 0.504** 1 
Spearman Correlation (Non-parametric correlation)       
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR  ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
ETR1 1     ETR1 1     
ETR2 0.845** 1    ETR2 0.890** 1    
ETR3 0.617** 0.625** 1   ETR3 0.634** 0.593** 1   
ETR4 0.884** 0.951** 0.656** 1  ETR4 0.922** 0.951** 0.663** 1  
STR 0.352** 0.336** 0.259** 0.355** 1 STR 0.560** 0.527** 0.448** 0.557** 1 
a The table shows Pearson correlations and Spearman correlations of the ETRs and STR for Period 1 and Period 2. Period 1 is from 1994 to 2001 with a total 1421 company 
years and Period 2 is from 2002 to 2006 with a total 2767 company years. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 
as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies.  
b
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ; 
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ; 
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ;  
STR = Statutory Tax Rate. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).b
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4.3.3.3 Annual ETR Analysis  
The mean and median descriptive statistics are applied to the average ETRs and STR 
for the period 1994 to 2006 and are shown in Table 4.11 with Figure 4.1. The annual 
mean and median of the ETRs and STR are significantly below the top STR and are 
very close to each other in terms of mean or median, except for ETR3. The ETR1, 
ETR2, ETR4 and STR have very similar trends but the median is generally smaller than 
the mean, which suggests there are some big positive value outliers in the ETRs. Both 
mean and median of the ETRs and STR are very stable in Period 1 and stay at the low 
tax rate level. In 2002, there was a significant jump in the ETRs and STR and from 2002, 
the ETRs and STR stay at a relatively high tax level. It can be seen in Figure 4.1 that the 
tax rates are significantly higher during Period 1 compared with Period 2. The average 
ETR1, ETR2, ETR4 and STR are below 20% in Period 1 (1994-2000). ETR4 is similar 
with the STR at around 15% in Period 1 (1994-2000) and increased to above 20% in 
later sample years (2003-2006). The big ETRs and STR increases in 2001 and 2002 
have been observed in previous research (Wang and Li 2003; Qian and Li 2003; Ma 
2007). However, in Ma’s (2007) research after 2002 the average ETRs show a 
downward trend and the ETR median decreases. This result does not make sense and 
contradicts the fact that after 2002 the majority of listed companies are subject to the 
top STR of 33%. 
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Table 4.11 Annual Mean and Median of ETRs and STR   a
Year 
ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 SRT 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1994 0.126 0.149 0.146 0.156 0.057 0.026 0.142 0.153 0.151 0.15 
1995 0.136 0.149 0.161 0.153 0.087 0.075 0.152 0.151 0.153 0.15 
1996 0.135 0.143 0.182 0.162 0.089 0.083 0.162 0.151 0.157 0.15 
1997 0.144 0.148 0.181 0.163 0.098 0.086 0.166 0.152 0.144 0.15 
1998 0.156 0.150 0.185 0.166 0.102 0.086 0.165 0.151 0.144 0.15 
1999 0.165 0.150 0.195 0.164 0.101 0.092 0.168 0.153 0.148 0.15 
2000 0.165 0.151 0.194 0.173 0.097 0.088 0.178 0.162 0.164 0.15 
2001 0.171 0.153 0.198 0.171 0.089 0.075 0.181 0.162 0.161 0.15 
2002 0.222 0.203 0.239 0.220 0.105 0.093 0.220 0.204 0.237 0.27 
2003 0.234 0.216 0.254 0.239 0.106 0.088 0.233 0.222 0.243 0.33 
2004 0.230 0.214 0.245 0.226 0.102 0.081 0.227 0.206 0.244 0.33 
2005 0.238 0.213 0.257 0.237 0.099 0.081 0.234 0.215 0.243 0.33 
2006 0.229 0.211 0.261 0.243 0.099 0.082 0.238 0.221 0.241 0.33 
Total 0.207 0.177 0.231 0.200 0.099 0.083 0.211 0.183 0.212 0.15 
a The table shows the mean (average) and median for the ETRs and STR from 1994 to 2006. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with 
negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 668 companies 
from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies.  
b
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operatingn-No +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ;  
STR = Statutory Tax Rate.
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Figure 4.1 Annual Mean of the ETRs and STR  a
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
Year
Ta
x 
Ra
te ETR1
ETR2
ETR3
ETR4
STR
 
Annual Median of the ETRs and STR  a
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a  The figure shows the annual median of the ETRs and STR trends from 1994 to 2006. The data are 
from Table 4.11. 
TaxBeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ;  
STR = Statutory Tax Rate
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aTable 4.12 Statistic of Tests Results for Annual ETRs and STR Differences
Panel A: Single factor analysis of variance 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
 F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
Period 1 3.971 0.000 1.878 0.070 2.934 0.005 1.915 0.064 4.161 0.000 
Period 2 1.238 0.293 2.320 0.055 1.125 0.343 1.843 0.118 0.399 0.810 
1994-2006 33.217 0.000 19.724 0.000 2.770 0.001 23.291 0.000 84.381 0.000 
           
Panel B: Kruskal-Wallis test results 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
 2χ  Sig. 2χ  Sig. 2χ  Sig. 2χ  Sig. 2χ  Sig. 
Period 1 24.694 0.001 11.158 0.132 36.037 0.000 10.777 0.149 17.851 0.013 
Period 2 3.549 0.470 7.289 0.121 5.850 0.211 6.668 0.154 1.673 0.796 
1994-2006 407.920 0.000 258.183 0.000 44.139 0.000 282.566 0.000 773.805 0.000 
 The table shows the statistic of tests results for annual ETRs and STR differences. Panel A shows the single factor analysis of variance (One-Way ANOVA), and panel B 
shows Kruskal-Wallis test (Non-parametric test) results for Period 1 (1994-2001), Period 2 (2002-2006), and the entire sample years (1994-2006). The initial data are from 
CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR 
exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to 
match the final sample companies. Period 1 is from 1994 to 2001 with a total 1421 company years. Period 2 is from 2002 to 2006 with a total 2767 company years. 
a
b
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ;  
STR = Statutory Tax Rate. F = F-statistic value. Sig. = significant level.  
c The hypothesis for Period 1 is that 2001199519940 ETRETRETR:H === L . 
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  The hypothesis for 1994-2006 is that 2006199519940 ETRETRETR:H === L  . 
  The hypothesis for Period 2 is that 2006200320020 ETRETRETR:H === L  
 
Table 4.12 shows the annual ETRs and STR differences in statistic of tests results for 
Period 1, Period 2 and the entire sample. The statistical tests are a one-way ANOVA 
single factor analysis of variance and the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test. The test 
hypotheses are to examine whether or not the annual average of the ETRs is the same 
within Period 1, Period 2 and the entire sample time such as 
and 200119951994 ETRETRETR === L 200619951994 ETRETRETR === L . The test 
results show that for the entire sample years, at least one ETR or STR is different from 
the other years. Also for Period 2, the results failed to reject the hypotheses in both tests. 
Therefore, the annual ETRs and STR are the same as each other within Period 2 
statistically. For sample Period 1, only ETR2 and ETR4 failed to reject the hypotheses, 
which suggest that the annual ETR2 and ETR4 are the same as each other within Period 
1 statistically. The results indicate that the ETRs and STR are more stable in Period 2 
(2002-2006) and more volatile in Period 1 (1994-2001). The reason for unstable ETRs 
in Period 1 is probably because of the small sample size and rapid increase in early 
years. From 1994 to 2001, the sample company numbers increased from 30 to 310 and 
increased further to 652 in 2006 (Table 4.3).  Another reason is the change of the 
accounting system in 1998, which inevitably changed the accounting income and the 
ETRs.  Based on this result and the change in tax policy in 2001, the analysis of the 
sample will be divided into two periods.  
 
4.3.3.4 Industry Tax Preference Analysis  
Industry Classification System 
On 3 April 2001, the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) issued 
Guidelines on the Industry Classification of Listed Companies to give the suggested 
industry classifications. 33  The classification divides the listed companies into 13 
industry sectors. The classification criteria are based on a company’s primary business 
                                                              
33 The classification is based on the National Bureau of Statistics of China’s National Economic Industry 
Classification and Code (GB/T4754-94). The code system is a one letter with four digit number hierarchical 
classification system, offering 3 levels of detail. The first letter designates the industry sector. The following two 
digit number designates the sub-sector. The last two digit number designates the industry group. For example, 
B0951, B represent mining industry sector. 09 means heavy non-ferrous  metals mining and 51 means gold 
mining 
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operating income. If one segment of a company’s business income is greater than 50% 
of its total income, then the company is assigned to the corresponding industry sector. If 
there is no segment of business income over 50% and the highest segment of company 
business income is greater than 30% of its total income, then, that segment is treated as 
primary activity and the company is classified in the corresponding industry sector. 
Otherwise, the company will be classified in the miscellaneous sector. There is no 
high-tech industry in the classification. The CSRC considers that high-tech is a process 
rather than a particular industry. The government encourages companies to adopt new 
techniques in the production process and also manufacture high-tech products. 
Therefore, any industry can have high-tech companies within it. 
 
Table 4.13 CSRC Industry Sector Classification  a
Industry Sector Code No. of Obs. Percentage 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery A 62 1.48%
Mining B 86 2.05%
Manufacturing C 2434 58.12%
Electricity, gas and water production and supply D 258 6.16%
Construction E 98 2.34%
Transportation and warehousing F 278 6.64%
Information technology G 170 4.06%
Wholesale and retail H 346 8.26%
Finance and insurance I 0 0.00%
Real estate industry J 223 5.32%
Public services K 90 2.15%
Broadcasting, media and culture L 9 0.21%
Miscellaneous M 134 3.20%
Total  4188 100.00%
a The table shows the CSRC Industry Sector Classification with corresponding code, number of the 
sample company and its proportion over the total sample. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After 
excluding any sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and 
negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 668 
companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample.  
 
Table 4.13 shows the 13 industry names, code letters, number of the sample companies 
and the proportion of the total sample companies. Clearly, the biggest industry sector is 
the manufacturing sector, which constitutes about 58% of the total sample company 
years. The next largest industry sectors are wholesale and retail, transportation and 
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warehousing, electricity, gas and water production and supply, and real estate industry 
with over 5% of the total sample. Because the manufacturing sector dominates the list 
companies, the CSRC divides the manufacturing sector into a further 10 sub-sectors to 
spread the proportion of the listed companies evenly among the industry classifications. 
Table 4.14 shows the ten manufacturing sub-sectors, the corresponding code, the 
number of the sample companies and the proportion of the total manufacturing 
company years. The largest proportion of the sub sector is occupied by the machinery, 
equipment and instrument industries at over 26% of the sample, followed by petroleum, 
chemical and materials, metal and non-metal and medicine and biological products 
sub-sectors.  
 
Table 4.14 CSRC Manufacturing Sub-sector Classification  a
Manufacturing industry sub-sector Code No. of obs. Percentage 
Food and beverages C0 212 8.71%
Textiles and apparel C1 142 5.83%
Wood and furniture C2 20 0.82%
Paper and printing C3 68 2.79%
Petroleum, chemical, and materials C4 448 18.41%
Electronics C5 98 4.03%
Metal and non-metal C6 396 16.27%
Machinery, equipment and instruments C7 651 26.75%
Medicine and biological products C8 339 13.93%
Other manufacturing C9 60 2.47%
Total  2434 100.00%
a The table shows the CSRC manufacturing sub-sector classification with corresponding code, number 
of the sample companies and its proportion of the total manufacturing company years. The initial data are 
from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating income, negative 
total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 
company years, or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample.  
 
In prior research, some industry analyses adopt their own classifications (Wang 1999; 
Qian and Li 2003; Wang 2003a, b). This method may create an analysis bias and 
difficulty in the replication of the research for future studies. It also makes it more 
difficult to compare the results with other studies. Therefore, in this thesis, the industry 
ETR and STR analysis is according to the CSRC industry classification and the 
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separate manufacturing sub-sectors classification. It is an objective and official 
industry classification. It will also have advantages for research replication and 
comparison with other studies. 
 
The Industry ETR and STR Analysis 
Because the detailed industry and manufacturing sub-sector descriptive statistic table 
would be too large, it is shown in Appendices 7 and 8 respectively.34 Only the industry 
mean and median results are presented here. The mean and median are the most direct 
and simple statistical techniques to measure and compare the industry ETR and STR 
differences.   
 
Table 4.15 shows the overall mean and median of the ETRs and STR for all 12 industry 
sectors (excluding the finance and insurance sectors). The different industries have 
different ETRs and STR. Most industry sectors’ STR medians are 15%, except for the 
broadcasting, median and culture and mining sectors, which are 33%. The mining 
industry is not an encouraged industry and does not enjoy any tax preference. The 
results of broadcasting, median and culture might be influenced by the limited number 
of the sample company years. There are only nine company years in broadcasting, 
median and culture and it is not enough to represent the industry sector. Also, the two 
sectors’ STR mean are also the highest and second highest among the sectors. The 
bottom STR mean industry sectors include information technology and agriculture, 
forestry, animal husbandry and fishery sectors. The overall top ETR mean industry 
sectors include mining, wholesale and retail, broadcasting, median and culture and real 
estate industry sectors. The bottom ETR mean industry sectors include agriculture, 
forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and information technology industry sectors. The 
overall industry sector ETR mean and median results are consistent with the STR 
results, which are high STR results in high ETR and low STR results in low ETR. The 
bottom ETRs and STR mean and median industry sectors represent the government 
                                                              
34 It includes each industry sector ETR and STR mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 
skewness and kurtosis results for Period 1 (1994-2001), Period 2 (2002-2006), and also total sample results. 
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industrial tax incentives on agricultural industry and high-tech companies. Overall, the 
national industrial tax preference policies do reduce the tax burden of the targeted 
industries effectively. 
 
Table 4.16 shows the overall mean and median of the ETRs and STR for ten 
manufacturing sub-sectors. The average manufacturing industry ETRs are around 20%, 
which are among the lower ETR level compared with other industry sectors. Within the 
manufacturing industry, the top STR mean and median group includes textiles, apparel 
and paper, printing industry, but their ETRs are not significantly different from other 
industries in the manufacturing sub-sectors. The bottom ETRs and STR mean group are 
electronics, machinery, equipment, instruments, wood and furniture; and other 
manufacturing sectors. Only the electronic industry ETR means are significantly lower 
than others. The possible explanation is that these bottom ETR industries are more 
likely to adopt high-technology or to produce high-tech products. Textiles, apparel and 
paper and the printing industry, which are in the top STR group, are relatively 
traditional industries and are much less likely to have high-tech to improve their 
manufacturing process.   
 
The results are consistent with prior Chinese ETR research that an encouraged 
industry has lower ETRs. However, most of the previous researchers chose their own 
industry classifications, hence results are hard to compare directly to each other. In 
Wang’s (1999) study, the listed companies are categorized into seven categories. The 
real estate industry and commercial industry are in the highest ETR range and 
high-tech industry is the lowest ETR. Qian and Li (2003) categorized the listed 
companies into 22 industries and 75 sub-industries for 2001 and 2002. They found the 
industrial ETR differences are significant. The finance and insurance, metal and 
non-metal, real estate and mining industries are in the top range of the ETR. The 
agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, and electronics are in the bottom 
range of ETR. Li (2004) adopted the CSRC industry classification and analysis of the 
12 industry sectors from 2000 to 2002. The wholesale and retail, and finance and 
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insurance industires were found among the highest level of ETR. In Li’s results, the 
industry ETRs in 2001 were generally lower than the industry ETRs in 2000, and the 
industry ETRs in 2002 were generally the same as in previous years. This result 
contradicts most other findings that ETRs in 2002 increased significantly. This is 
probably because the random sample selection methodology caused unexpected results.  
Wang (2003) used the CSRC industry classification, but mixed industry sectors with 
selected manufacturing sub sectors. He found that the industry ETR differences were 
not statistically significant before 1998. The agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishery, electronics, transportation and warehousing, wood and furniture 
industries are in the bottom ETR level. In the top level ETR are the mining, petroleum, 
chemical and materials, construction, and real estate industries.     
 
Table 4.15 Industry Sector Mean and Median of ETRs and STR  a
Industry Sector ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Agriculture, forestry,  
Animal husbandry and fishery 0.099 0.088 0.109 0.092 0.053 0.032 0.095 0.088 0.169 0.150 
Mining 0.268 0.291 0.263 0.282 0.141 0.131 0.258 0.279 0.262 0.330 
Manufacturing 0.203 0.174 0.221 0.190 0.087 0.074 0.202 0.175 0.214 0.150 
Electricity, gas and water production and supply 0.206 0.177 0.234 0.197 0.148 0.139 0.219 0.193 0.214 0.150 
Construction 0.212 0.718 0.256 0.229 0.086 0.076 0.229 0.188 0.225 0.150 
Transportation and warehousing 0.197 0.167 0.224 0.198 0.156 0.131 0.207 0.182 0.213 0.150 
Information technology 0.179 0.151 0.219 0.175 0.065 0.054 0.180 0.147 0.16 0.150 
Wholesale and retail 0.241 0.223 0.275 0.231 0.088 0.079 0.253 0.237 0.228 0.150 
Real estate industry 0.231 0.197 0.267 0.233 0.134 0.118 0.245 0.223 0.196 0.150 
Public services 0.213 0.193 0.244 0.217 0.114 0.085 0.221 0.205 0.226 0.150 
Broadcasting, media and culture 0.240 0.359 0.225 0.300 0.144 0.188 0.219 0.300 0.29 0.330 
Miscellaneous 0.213 0.159 0.278 0.215 0.118 0.103 0.249 0.191 0.196 0.150 
Total 0.207 0.177 0.231 0.200 0.099 0.083 0.211 0.183 0.212 0.150 
a The table shows the mean and median of ETRs and STR for each industry sector. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative 
operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 668 companies from 
1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ; 
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
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Table 4.16 Manufacturing Sub-sector Mean and Median of ETRs and STR  
Manufacturing 
Sub-Sector ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Food and beverages 0.237 0.211 0.262 0.225 0.088 0.063 0.235 0.197 0.214 0.150 
Textiles and apparel 0.213 0.207 0.229 0.228 0.108 0.098 0.210 0.203 0.261 0.330 
Wood and furniture 0.200 0.175 0.218 0.192 0.092 0.076 0.196 0.170 0.187 0.149 
Paper and printing 0.200 0.166 0.202 0.184 0.078 0.074 0.188 0.172 0.244 0.330 
Petroleum, chemical, and materials 0.225 0.184 0.235 0.196 0.101 0.092 0.218 0.185 0.222 0.150 
Electronics 0.141 0.123 0.156 0.138 0.055 0.047 0.147 0.125 0.172 0.150 
Metal and non-metal 0.199 0.173 0.21 0.186 0.105 0.089 0.195 0.169 0.231 0.150 
Machinery, equipment and instruments 0.178 0.155 0.201 0.174 0.075 0.068 0.184 0.160 0.194 0.150 
Medicine and biological products 0.221 0.193 0.248 0.222 0.073 0.063 0.222 0.197 0.213 0.150 
0.150 
0.150 
Other manufacturing 0.178 0.144 0.209 0.162 0.075 0.070 0.175 0.152 0.194
Total 0.203 0.174 0.221 0.190 0.087 0.074 0.202 0.175 0.214
a The table shows the mean and median of ETRs and STR for each manufacturing industry sub sector. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample 
company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 
668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ; 
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ;  
STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
Table 4.17 and Table 4.18 show the industry sectors’ mean and median of ETRs and 
STR in Periods 1 and Period 2. The results are generally consistent with the previous 
annual ETRs and STR results that the ETRs and STR in Period 1 (1994-2001) is 
generally lower than the ETRs and STR in Period 2 (2002-2006). In Period 1, the 
industrial ETRs and STR differences are less than the industrial ETRs and STR 
differences in Period 2. There is a significant ETR and STR increase for most industry 
sectors, except for the agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery industries. 
The agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery industry ETRs decreased from 
Period 1 to Period 2, meanwhile the STR remained unchanged. This is attributed to the 
government’s effective agriculture tax preference policy from 2000.  
 
The extent of increase is also varied. The information technology sector is at the bottom 
group of the ETRs and STR mean and median in both periods, and only experienced a 
minor increase. On the other hand, the mining industry is at the top of the group of the 
ETRs and STR mean and median in both periods, and this industry also experienced 
minor increase. The biggest ETRs increase in industry sectors from Period 1 to Period 2 
are those in unencouraged industries with low ETRs and STR in the Period 1, such as 
the broadcasting, media and culture industries and the real estate industry.  The 
changes in industry ETRs and STR from Period 1 to Period 2 are seen to different 
extents for different industries. The encouraged industries experience no or minor 
increases, but the unencouraged industries had much bigger increases after the State 
Council termination of the unauthorised local government tax refunds. Similar results 
were also demonstrated by Qian and Li (2003). The manufacturing sub-sectors have 
similar results and are not going to be presented separately here. (The result tables are 
shown in Appendix 9 and Appendix 10.) 
 
Table 4.19 presents the annual, Period 1, Period 2 and total sample company years 
industry sector single factor analysis of variance (One-Way ANOVA) and 
Kruskal-Wallis test results. The test hypotheses are to examine whether or not the 
industry sector ETRs or STR are equal to each other. Both test results show that the 
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industry sector ETRs and STR are not statistically significantly different annually from 
1994 to 2000 and statistically significantly different annually from 2001 to 2006 at 1% 
significant level. The Period 1, Period 2 and the total sample test results show that the 
industry sector ETRs and STR are significantly different. However, the annual ETRs 
and STR results indicate that in the early years from 1994 to 2000, the listed companies 
enjoyed tax preferences similarly across the industries. After the State Council stopped 
the local government unauthorized tax refund, and implemented a series of industry tax 
preference policies from 2001, the industry sector ETR and STR differences became 
statistically significant. The manufacturing sub-sectors show similar features (detailed 
results are shown in Appendix 11). 
 
The industry preference analysis shows that tax preferential industries were similar to 
the other industries in the 1990s. The tax preferences were widely applied, because of 
the local governments’ unauthorised EIT refunds. After 2001, when the State Council 
stopped these refunds, the tax burden differences between industries were  much more 
significant. The changes in industry tax burden from Period 1 to Period 2 vary 
according to different industries. The encouraged industry experienced no or minor 
increases, but the unencouraged industries had much bigger increases. During Period 2, 
the tax preferential industries’ tax burden was significantly lower than the others. 
aTable 4.17 Industry Sector Mean ETRs and STR in Two Periods
 1994-2001 2002-2006 
Industry Sector ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 0.120 0.159 0.097 0.123 0.138 0.092 0.092 0.040 0.086 0.179 
Mining 0.210 0.218 0.112 0.208 0.183 0.278 0.271 0.147 0.267 0.276 
Manufacturing 0.161 0.183 0.087 0.166 0.155 0.221 0.238 0.087 0.218 0.240 
Electricity, gas and water production and supply 0.168 0.193 0.135 0.178 0.159 0.228 0.258 0.156 0.242 0.245 
Construction 0.146 0.165 0.075 0.152 0.166 0.232 0.284 0.090 0.252 0.244 
Transportation and warehousing 0.138 0.166 0.124 0.151 0.147 0.226 0.252 0.171 0.234 0.244 
Information technology 0.140 0.202 0.083 0.173 0.130 0.195 0.225 0.057 0.183 0.173 
Wholesale and retail 0.180 0.223 0.079 0.201 0.166 0.296 0.323 0.096 0.301 0.286 
Real estate industry 0.169 0.211 0.114 0.189 0.152 0.288 0.318 0.152 0.297 0.237 
Public services 0.139 0.156 0.078 0.146 0.161 0.262 0.303 0.138 0.271 0.269 
Broadcasting, media and culture 0.069 0.091 0.048 0.079 0.240 0.377 0.332 0.221 0.330 0.330 
Miscellaneous 0.141 0.211 0.109 0.189 0.142 0.290 0.349 0.128 0.312 0.253 
Total 0.160 0.190 0.094 0.172 0.155 0.231 0.252 0.102 0.231 0.242 
a  The table shows the mean of ETRs and STR for each industry sector in two periods (1994-2001 and 2002-2006). The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any 
sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company 
years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ;
 
 STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
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aTable 4.18 Industry Sector Median ETRs and STR in Two Periods
 1994-2001 2002-2006 
Industry Sector ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal husbandry and fishery 0.100 0.135 0.070 0.100 0.150 0.082 0.080 0.025 0.077 0.150 
Mining 0.191 0.203 0.115 0.200 0.150 0.299 0.290 0.133 0.287 0.330 
Manufacturing 0.150 0.163 0.077 0.152 0.150 0.200 0.213 0.073 0.199 0.330 
Electricity, gas and water production and supply 0.152 0.173 0.144 0.168 0.150 0.199 0.206 0.132 0.198 0.330 
Construction 0.150 0.156 0.066 0.152 0.150 0.225 0.253 0.077 0.226 0.330 
Transportation and warehousing 0.139 0.161 0.105 0.153 0.150 0.212 0.258 0.145 0.234 0.330 
Information technology 0.117 0.156 0.064 0.146 0.150 0.155 0.179 0.044 0.147 0.150 
Wholesale and retail 0.155 0.182 0.066 0.173 0.150 0.304 0.321 0.092 0.309 0.330 
Real estate industry 0.154 0.175 0.103 0.162 0.150 0.296 0.317 0.139 0.307 0.150 
Public services 0.147 0.154 0.073 0.146 0.150 0.257 0.302 0.097 0.274 0.330 
Broadcasting, media and culture 0.053 0.070 0.038 0.056 0.240 0.365 0.335 0.208 0.331 0.330 
Miscellaneous 0.144 0.167 0.099 0.158 0.150 0.276 0.321 0.119 0.302 0.330 
Total 0.150 0.166 0.082 0.156 0.150 0.212 0.234 0.085 0.214 0.330 
a  The table shows the median of ETRs and STR for each industry sector in two periods (1994-2001 and 2002-2006). The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding 
any sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 
company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies.  
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ; FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR3 ; 
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ;  
STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
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aTable 4.19 Statistic of Tests Results for Industry Sector ETRs and STR Differences
single factor analysis of variance 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Year F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
1994 1.261 0.314 1.704 0.165 2.670 0.041 1.707 0.164 0.688 0.661 
1995 0.378 0.926 0.940 0.496 0.420 0.902 0.873 0.547 1.215 0.317 
1996 0.960 0.474 1.034 0.419 1.400 0.211 1.191 0.316 0.732 0.662 
1997 0.557 0.829 0.842 0.579 0.676 0.730 0.649 0.753 0.455 0.902 
1998 2.574 0.006 2.736 0.04 2.578 0.006 3.243 0.001 2.548 0.007 
1999 1.222 0.273 1.500 0.132 1.432 0.159 1.846 0.048 0.252 0.993 
2000 0.847 0.593 1.175 0.304 2.914 0.001 0.943 0.499 1.253 0.252 
2001 2.144 0.017 3.051 0.001 5.853 0.000 3.255 0.000 1.386 0.176 
2002 3.109 0.000 5.189 0.000 8.629 0.000 4.830 0.000 2.169 0.015 
2003 3.846 0.000 3.664 0.000 11.821 0.000 4.138 0.000 3.382 0.000 
2004 3.191 0.000 3.409 0.000 12.241 0.000 3.662 0.000 2.587 0.003 
2005 4.448 0.000 5.157 0.000 15.417 0.000 7.158 0.000 2.581 0.003 
2006 6.583 0.000 6.531 0.000 18.554 0.000 7.676 0.000 4.168 0.000 
Period 1 3.338 0.000 3.660 0.000 9.412 0.000 4.119 0.000 3.308 0.000 
Period 2 19.126 0.000 20.618 0.000 63.180 0.000 24.731 0.000 13.676 0.000 
Total 12.335 0.000 14.413 0.000 61.324 0.000 17.743 0.000 11.296 0.000 
Kruskal-Wallis test results 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
2χ 2χ 2χ 2χ 2χ Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Year Sig. 
1994 6.380 0.382 8.756 0.188 9.236 0.161 9.091 0.169 4.488 0.611 
1995 5.703 0.680 7.328 0.502 4.280 0.831 6.596 0.581 9.669 0.289 
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1996 10.278 0.246 7.708 0.462 13.630 0.092 7.707 0.463 10.896 0.208 
1997 6.6517 0.687 11.574 0.238 9.984 0.352 9.703 0.375 12.411 0.191 
1998 26.564 0.003 29.022 0.001 21.248 0.019 30.597 0.001 30.389 0.001 
1999 15.576 0.158 23.629 0.014 19.507 0.053 21.892 0.025 6.477 0.840 
2000 12.453 0.331 10.792 0.461 30.4546 0.001 11.188 0.428 17.933 0.083 
2001 30.418 0.001 31.647 0.001 56.555 0.000 32.482 0.001 18.506 0.071 
2002 34.504 0.000 45.169 0.000 71.213 0.000 48.113 0.000 22.994 0.018 
2003 48.520 0.000 43.174 0.000 101.305 0.000 50.053 0.000 34.455 0.000 
2004 42.188 0.000 45.145 0.000 101.888 0.000 50.592 0.000 27.872 0.003 
2005 53.852 0.000 64.025 0.000 124.340 0.000 74.645 0.000 27.509 0.004 
2006 77.638 0.000 78.151 0.000 142.485 0.000 88.807 0.000 43.645 0.000 
Period 1 49.142 0.000 43.872 0.000 104.566 0.000 54.225 0.000 56.050 0.000 
Period 2 237.784 0.000 252.339 0.000 518.457 0.000 291.024 0.000 142.524 0.000 
Total 175.776 0.000 185.280 0.000 550.656 0.000 229.036 0.000 133.358 0.000 
a The table shows the industry sector ETRs and STR single factor analysis of variance (One-Way ANOVA) results and Kruskal-Wallis test (Non-parametric test) results 
annually from 1994 to 2006, Period 1 (1994-2001), Period 2 (2002-2006), and the entire sample years’ pool (Total). The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any 
sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company 
years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. Period 
1 is from 1994 to 2001 with a total 1421 company years. Period 2 is from 2002 to 2006 with a total 2767 company years. 
b
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 =
 
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ;  
c The hypothesis is : Industry sector’s ETR or STR is equals to each other.  
STR = Statutory Tax Rate. Sig. = significant level.  
0H
4.3.3.5 Regional Tax Preferences’ Analysis  
The Regional Division 
There are many different methods to divide the PRC into regions, such as by 
administration division, geographic division and economic division. In prior research, 
the regional division methods used the province division method (Wang 1999; Qian 
and Li 2003), and the method involving geographic region division with separate 
Special Economic Zones and the municipality of Shanghai (SEZ hereafter; Wang 
2003a, b; Wang and Li 2003). The province division is too simple as it does not match 
the characteristics of the variables examined in the thesis. Another disadvantage is that 
the province may not have a sufficient number of sample companies to represent it, if 
the sample is spread over the 33 provinces. The geographic region division with 
separate Special Economic Zones and municipality of Shanghai method is better than 
the province division, but separation of the municipality of Shanghai is unreasonable.  
 
In this thesis, the regional division method uses a mix of administration regional 
division, economic division and tax preference division. The PRC is divided into the 
Eastern Region, Middle Region, Western Region, SEZ and HTIDZ as shown in Figure 
4.2. The regional division extinguishes the tax preference region and non-preference 
region compared with prior simple administration division, geographic division or 
economic division methods. The tax preferential regions are the Western Region, SEZ, 
and HTIDZ. The Western Region benefits from the Great Western Region Economic 
Development Plan. The companies operating in encouraged industries or projects are 
taxed at 15% or benefit from other tax preferences. The SEZs have a 15% STR policy 
applied to all the companies within the SEZs. The HTIDZs also have a separate set of 
tax preferences policies to govern the companies within the HTIDZs. By separating 
HTIDZ from other cities or provinces the tax preferences effect on the non-tax 
preferences regions can be avoided, which lowers the average ETR of the regions and 
makes the regional analysis results misleading. Therefore, separate analyses of tax 
preferential regions are used to test the effectiveness of the tax preferences policies. 
The PRC is divided into Eastern Region, Middle Region, Western Region, SEZ and 
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HTIDZ as shown in Figure 4.2. The Eastern Region is mainly coastal belt, which is the 
most developed region in the PRC. The Western Region is a less developed region 
compare with the other regions. The Middle Region is the rest of the PRC excluding the 
SEZ and HTIDZ. Table 4.20 shows the sample company industry sectors’ distributions 
for each region.35 Manufacturing industry is the biggest sector in all regions and the top 
five industry sectors are similar. Although there is a significant economic development 
difference across the PRC, the listed company industry distributions within the PRC are 
similar across regions. This provides reasonable grounds to compare and analyze 
regional tax preferences across regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
35 The manufacturing sub-sector distributions for each region is shown in Appendix 12.  
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Figure 4.2 The PRC Region Division  a
 
a The figure shows the research regional division.  
The Eastern Region includes the Municipality of Beijing, the Municipality of Tianjin, Hebei Province, 
Liaoning Province, Shanghai Province, Jiangsu Province, Fujian Province, Shandong Province, 
Guangdong Province and Zhejiang Province. 
The Middle Region includes Shanxi Province, Jilin Province, Heilongjiang Province, Anhui Province, 
Jiangxi Province, Henan Province, Hubei Province and Hunan Province. 
The Western Region includes the Municipality of Chongqing, Sichuan Province, Guizhou Province, 
Yunnan Province, Tibet Autonomous Region, Shaanxi Province, Gansu Province, Qinghai Province, 
Ningxia Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Guangxi Autonomous Region, and Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region.  
The Special Economic Zone (SEZ) includes Shenzhen City (Guangdong Province), Zhuhai City 
(Guangdong Province), Shantou City (Guangdong Province), Xiamen City (Fujian Province), and 
Hainan Province.  
The High-Tech Industry Development Zones are omitted from the figure because they are all over the 
country and located within over 50 cities. It is impossible to identify them appropriately in the figure.  
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Table 4.20 Sample Companies Industry Sector Distribution for Each Region   a
Industry Sector E.Region M.Region W.Region SEZ HTIDZ 
 Obs. Pct Obs. Pct Obs. Pct Obs. Pct Obs. Pct 
Agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry and fishery 19 1.09% 7 1.11% 14 2.87% 0 0.00% 22 2.15% 
Mining 28 1.61% 43 6.81%  0.00% 0 0.00% 15 1.47% 
Manufacturing 982 56.37% 420 66.56% 357 73.16% 109 35.74% 566 55.38% 
Electricity, gas and water 
production and supply 128 7.35% 41 6.50% 26 5.33% 13 4.26% 50 4.89% 
Construction 24 1.38% 11 1.74% 11 2.25% 8 2.62% 44 4.31% 
Transportation and warehousing 76 4.36% 29 4.60% 12 2.46% 76 24.92% 85 8.32% 
Information technology 115 6.60% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 12 3.93% 43 4.21% 
Wholesale and retail 218 12.51% 50 7.92% 28 5.74% 19 6.23% 31 3.03% 
Real estate industry 65 3.73% 8 1.27% 0 0.00% 68 22.30% 82 8.02% 
Public services 38 2.18% 11 1.74% 31 6.35% 0 0.00% 10 0.98% 
Broadcasting, media and culture 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 9 1.84% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Miscellaneous 49 2.81% 11 1.74% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 74 7.24% 
Total 1742 100.00% 631 100.00% 488 100.00% 305 100.00% 1022 100.00% 
a The table shows the sample companies industry sectors distribution for each region. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with 
negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years or 668 companies 
from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
E.Region = Eastern Region; M.Region = Middle Region; W.Region = Western Region; SEZ = Special Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry Development Zone;  
Obs. = observations (number of the sample company observations); Pct = percentage.     
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Regional ETRs and STR Analysis  
The detailed regional ETR and STR descriptive statistic are shown in Appendix 13.36 
Only regional mean and median results are presented here. The mean and median are 
the most direct and simple statistical technique to measure and compare the regional 
ETR and STR differences.   
 
Table 4.21 shows the regional mean and median of the ETRs and STR for all samples, 
Period 1 (1994-2001) and Period 2 (2002-2006). The regional differences are clearly 
represented in the table. From the Panel A’s results, the Eastern and Middle Region tax 
burdens are very close, as neither of them are tax preferential regions. The Eastern and 
Middle Regions’ STR mean and median are the highest in the PRC, which are 0.24 and 
0.33, and the ETRs are also the highest among the regions. The Western Region has the 
lowest EIT tax burden region among the three big regions overall. The lowest ETRs and 
STR region is the SEZ, whose STR mean and median are 0.147 and 0.15 and ETR1 is 
0.147. 
 
In Panel B, the SEZ is also in the lowest EIT tax burden region for Period 1 
(1994-2001). Another important figure for Period 1 (1994-2001) is that the regional 
ETR and STR differences between the three big regions and HTIDZ are not as big as 
the all samples results (Panel A). The three big regions’ STR mean and median are 
around 0.16-0.19 and 0.15, and the ETR1 means are round 0.18-0.19. The HTIDZ 
ETR1 mean is lower, at about 0.165.  
 
In Panel C, the SEZ is the lowest EIT tax burden region for Period 2 (2002-2006), but 
increased to 0.173 from 0.125 for ETR1 mean and STR mean increased from 0.14 to 
0.156.37 The biggest ETR and STR increases are in the Eastern and Middle Regions, 
from Period 1 to Period 2. The highest EIT tax burden region is the Middle Region, 
                                                              
36 It includes each regional ETR and STR mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and 
kurtosis results for Period 1 (1994-2001), Period 2 (2002-2006) and also total sample results.    
37 In theory, the highest STR for SEZ is 15% but the regional division is used by a company registered address. It 
is changeable and the company data only has the latest company profile information. This can create 
misclassification in a rare situation.  
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with a mean and median of 0.287 and 0.33. This is followed by the Eastern Region with 
an STR mean of 0.276 and median of 0.33. The Western Region is significantly lower 
than the other two large regions in Period 2. Its STR mean and median are 0.186 and 
0.15 respectively. The ETRs are also significantly lower than the other big two regions. 
This shows the effectiveness of the Chinese government tax incentives in the Western 
Region and the termination of unauthorized local tax refunds. The HTIDZ, which is a 
tax preferential area, also has significantly lower EIT tax burdens if compared with the 
Eastern and Middle Regions. It is at a similar level with the Western Region. 
 
Compared with previous studies, Wang (1999) only identified five years’ average ETR 
differences between provinces from 1993 to 1997 and inferred that the coastal region’s 
ETR is lower than the inner region’s ETR. Qian and Li (2003) adopted a similar 
province based ETR analysis and found that ethnic autonomous regions (mainly the 
Western Region) and SEZ experienced lower ETRs. Wang (2003) and Wang and Li 
(2003) found that the SEZ was in the lowest ETR level and other regions were at a 
similar ETR level from 1994 to 2000. In earlier research, they did not distinguish the 
tax preference region or places which would produce misleading results. For example, 
the coastal region (Eastern Region) was concluded as having a lower ETR. However, if 
the region excludes the SEZ and HTIDZs, it is not much different from other inner 
regions.  
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Table 4.21 Regional Mean and Median of ETRs and STR a  
Panel A: All Samples        
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Region Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
E. Region 0.225 0.210 0.253 0.240 0.111 0.096 0.232 0.218 0.240 0.33 
M. Region 0.235 0.232 0.25 0.246 0.111 0.095 0.234 0.227 0.244 0.33 
W. Region 0.183 0.159 0.199 0.172 0.077 0.066 0.18 0.160 0.177 0.15 
SEZ 0.147 0.142 0.172 0.159 0.079 0.069 0.153 0.146 0.147 0.15 
HTIDZ 0.187 0.156 0.215 0.177 0.089 0.075 0.194 0.165 0.182 0.15 
Panel B: Period 1 (1994-2001)       
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Region Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
E. Region 0.187 0.162 0.216 0.189 0.104 0.092 0.197 0.177 0.192 0.15 
M. Region 0.190 0.155 0.211 0.178 0.107 0.093 0.195 0.164 0.187 0.15 
W. Region 0.176 0.152 0.192 0.171 0.086 0.076 0.173 0.159 0.165 0.15 
SEZ 0.125 0.127 0.154 0.147 0.072 0.065 0.137 0.133 0.140 0.15 
HTIDZ 0.165 0.149 0.197 0.166 0.095 0.080 0.177 0.157 0.157 0.15 
Panel C: Period 2 (2002-2006)       
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Region Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
E. Region 0.254 0.256 0.281 0.282 0.116 0.099 0.258 0.263 0.276 0.33 
M. Region 0.268 0.289 0.279 0.297 0.115 0.096 0.263 0.284 0.287 0.33 
W. Region 0.190 0.169 0.206 0.175 0.070 0.060 0.186 0.162 0.186 0.15 
SEZ 0.173 0.152 0.195 0.163 0.087 0.078 0.172 0.157 0.156 0.15 
HTIDZ 0.205 0.175 0.230 0.196 0.084 0.072 0.208 0.179 0.203 0.15 
a  The table shows the regional mean and median of ETRs and STR for All Samples (Panel A), 
1994-2001(Panel B) and 2002-2006 (Panel C). The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After 
excluding any sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and 
negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years or 668 
companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind 
Information Terminal to match the final sample companies.  
E.Region = Eastern Region; M.Region = Middle Region; W.Region = Western Region; SEZ = Special 
Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry Development Zone; 
Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
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In addition to the above regional ETRs and STR results for the two periods, Figure 4.3 
and Figure 4.4 show the annual regional average of the STR and ETR1 trends. Figure 
4.3 shows that the regional differences were not very clear before 2001 and the Eastern 
Region, Middle Region and HTIDZ Region average STR increased significantly in 
2002. The Western Region and SEZ were relatively stable throughout the sample years. 
The regional differences were much more significant after 2002. Figure 4.4 provides 
the regional annual average ETR1 and the results are similar with those of Figure 4.3.38   
 
Figure 4.3                Annual Regional STR Mean 
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a  The figure shows the regional STR from 1994 to 2006.The data are extracted from Appendix 15. 
E.Region = Eastern Region; M.Region = Middle Region; W.Region = Western Region; SEZ = Special 
Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry Development Zone; STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
38 The early years’ results, especially 1994 and 1995, are very volatile because there is not sufficient number of 
sample companies to compute a stable mean. There are less than three sample companies for the Western Region in 
1994 and 1995. The annual regional sample distribution is shown in Appendix 14.  
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Figure 4.4                  Annual Regional ETR1 Mean 
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a The figure shows the regional ETR1 from 1994 to 2006. The data are extracted from Appendix 16. 
E.Region = Eastern Region; M.Region = Middle Region; W.Region = Western Region; SEZ = Special 
Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry Development Zone; 
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= . 
 
Table 4.22 shows the regional ETRs and STR single factor analysis of variance and 
Kruskal-Wallis test results. The test hypotheses are to examine whether the regional 
ETRs and STR are equal to each other or not. Both test results show that the regional 
differences are statistically significant after 2001 when the State Council stopped the 
local governments’ unauthorised tax refunds. In the early years, especially before 1998, 
the differences between regions are statistically insignificant and the test failed to reject 
the hypothesis that regional ETRs and STR are equal to each other. Between 1998 and 
2001, the test results are mixed and tend to reject the hypothesis that regional ETRs and 
STR are equal to each other. This is probably because of the sample size in the early 
years, which could reduce the validity of two statistic of test. (The annual regional 
sample distribution is shown in Appendix 14.)  
 
The corporate tax incentives for certain industries and regions significantly mitigate a 
company’s EIT burden.  This causes tax equity issues and tax incidence. From the 
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horizontal tax equity point of view, similar companies should have similar tax burdens, 
which means that the same tax rate applies in the Chinese tax context. In the PRC, 
foreign related investment, tax favoured regions and industries are taxed at a lower tax 
rate. This creates a great unfairness between companies. From the perspective of tax 
incidence theory, the tax incentives fall to one party or are shared between parties 
depending on the elasticity of demand and supply. Within one industry, the tax 
incentives could be kept by the supplier, customer, or the company itself, depending on 
the market position of the party. However, regional tax incentives, such as SEZ, are 
granted to all companies regardless of the industry. This creates another point of 
conflict between companies, and makes the EIT analysis more difficult.  
 
Following the analysis of the ETRs and STR, the next section is the MTR section. This 
is structured as methodology, data and results and analysis, as with the ETR section 
structure. The analysis will follow the same time, industrial and regional analysis as the 
ETR analysis.   
 
 
 
Table 4.22 Statistic of Tests Results for Regional ETRs and STR Differences a
Single factor analysis of variance  
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Year F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
1994 0.988 0.432 1.360 0.276 0.857 0.503 1.175 0.346 0.684 0.609 
1995 2.424 0.063 2.553 0.053 1.835 0.140 1.714 0.165 1.045 0.395 
1996 1.929 0.114 0.333 0.855 0.277 0.892 0.653 0.626 1.750 0.148 
1997 1.699 0.155 1.717 0.151 1.991 0.100 1.640 0.259 1.242 0.297 
1998 2.864 0.025 1.734 0.145 0.917 0.455 2.237 0.067 2.370 0.054 
1999 2.734 0.030 2.024 0.092 1.846 0.121 2.941 0.021 1.681 0.155 
2000 2.004 0.094 2.935 0.021 3.224 0.013 2.933 0.021 3.265 0.012 
2001 2.406 0.049 1.194 0.313 1.943 0.102 1.439 0.220 5.461 0.000 
2002 5.856 0.000 4.895 0.001 5.051 0.001 5.902 0.000 25.168 0.000 
2003 10.439 0.000 6.087 0.000 7.614 0.000 7.202 0.000 38.961 0.000 
2004 10.090 0.000 9.151 0.000 9.877 0.000 11.899 0.000 39.419 0.000 
2005 10.536 0.000 7.809 0.000 11.197 0.000 12.094 0.000 41.739 0.000 
2006 10.680 0.000 9.796 0.000 10.360 0.000 11.526 0.000 40.686 0.000 
Period 1 16.401 0.000 11.281 0.000 11.095 0.000 15.078 0.000 28.664 0.000 
Period 2 41.116 0.000 32.584 0.000 38.689 0.000 42.461 0.000 160.382 0.000 
Total 55.483 0.000 43.228 0.000 43.143 0.000 56.925 0.000 157.871 0.000 
The regional ETRs and STR Kruskal-Wallis test results  
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Year 2χ 2χ 2χ 2χ 2χ Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
1994 6.094 0.192 4.087 0.394 4.194 0.380 3.259 0.515 2.929 0.570 
1995 4.707 0.319 8.253 0.083 4.314 0.365 2.977 0.562 4.513 0.341 
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1996 6.576 0.160 3.552 0.470 1.443 0.837 3.995 0.407 5.890 0.208 
1997 4.135 0.388 9.427 0.051 9.243 0.055 6.349 0.175 6.891 0.142 
1998 11.648 0.020 10.998 0.027 5.317 0.256 12.219 0.016 10.822 0.029 
1999 11.951 0.018 8.634 0.071 7.960 0.093 13.604 0.009 9.912 0.042 
2000 8.763 0.067 9.901 0.042 13.717 0.008 13.420 0.009 12.908 0.012 
2001 9.864 0.043 5.543 0.236 9.028 0.060 7.182 0.127 24.858 0.000 
2002 32.181 0.000 28.623 0.000 22.532 0.000 29.911 0.000 88.521 0.000 
2003 52.587 0.000 37.236 0.000 31.696 0.000 41.396 0.000 119.714 0.000 
2004 48.306 0.000 53.306 0.000 38.588 0.000 59.165 0.000 128.376 0.000 
2005 55.040 0.000 49.854 0.000 39.765 0.000 54.413 0.000 133.872 0.000 
2006 57.646 0.000 61.873 0.000 43.208 0.000 60.093 0.000 134.912 0.000 
Period 1 74.628 0.000 58.513 0.000 47.689 0.000 72.919 0.000 119.634 0.000 
Period 2 209.960 0.000 199.634 0.000 151.497 0.000 212.858 0.000 515.027 0.000 
Total 267.834 0.000 242.524 0.000 173.008 0.000 272.528 0.000 565.777 0.000 
a The table shows the regional ETR and STR single factor analysis of variance (One-Way ANOVA) and Kruskal-Wallis test (Non-parametric test) results annually from 1994 to 
2006, Period 1 (1994-2001), Period 2 (2002-2006), and the entire sample years’ pool (total). The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with 
negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years or 668 companies 
from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. The Period 1 is from 1994 to 
2001 with a total 1421 company years. The Period 2 is from 2002 to 2006 with a total 2767 company years. 
b
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1= ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ; 
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ;  
c The hypothesis is : Regional ETR or STR is equal to each other.  
STR = Statutory Tax Rate. Sig. = significant level.  
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4.4 MTR 
This section discusses the company specific MTRs in the PRC. It follows the same 
structure as the ETR section. The methodology section defines the MTR measures for 
the research based on the prior MTR measures and Chinese tax and accounting 
practices. The data section illustrates the sampling procedure.  The last section is the 
results and analysis section. The analysis is based on time and industrial and regional 
factors which are the same as the above ETR analysis and research hypotheses.   
 
4.4.1 Methodology  
Taxable Income 
Taxable income and net operating loss are not disclosed to the public in the PRC. The 
taxable income used in this research has to be the mimic taxable income, which 
derives from financial statements. To estimate the taxable income, the mimic taxable 
income ETR measure approach is adopted here.39 Taxable income is defined as:  
Total Profit Before Tax 
+ Non-Operating Expenses 
+ △Provisions for write-down to NRV of inventories 
- Investment Gain 
The detailed mimic taxable income discussion is in the ETR methodology section. In 
prior research (Shevlin 1990; Manzon 1994; Graham 1996a; Plesko 2003; Graham 
and Mills 2008), using financial statement based taxable income is a common 
alternative when the actual taxable income is not accessible.  
 
Static Measure  
In this research, three static MTR measures will be used to analyze MTRs in the PRC. 
The first two are binary proxies. The binary proxy assumes that company pays is at its 
STR if they do not have NOL carry forward and positive mimic taxable income. 
                                                              
39 The author tried another taxable income definition. This starts with net profit after tax with the tax adjustments 
and grosses-up according to the actual Statutory Tax Rate. Taxable income= 
Net profit after tax+Tax adjustments
1-Actual STR
 However, this 
taxable income is 99% correlated with the mimic taxable income ETR measure approach and the results are almost 
the same. The thesis is not going to show this separately.  
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Otherwise, it pays zero tax in the present or future. The first proxy is Binary_1 
measure, which is based on the beginning NOL carry-forward. If the beginning NOL 
carry-forward equals zero, then Binary_1 equals company reported STR. Otherwise, 
Binary_1 equals zero. The second proxy is the Binary_2 measure, which is based on 
the beginning NOL and the mimic taxable income. If the beginning NOL 
carry-forward equals zero and mimic taxable income is non-negative, then Binary_2 
equals company reported STR. Otherwise, Binary_2 equals zero. The third MTR 
proxy is the trichotomous measure which is based on beginning NOL and mimic 
taxable income. If the beginning NOL carry-forward equals zero and mimic taxable 
income is non-negative, then trichotomous equals company reported STR. If the 
beginning NOL carry-forward is positive and mimic taxable income is negative, then 
trichotomous equals zero. Otherwise, the trichotomous equals half of the company’s 
reported STR. The trichotomous proxy recognises the possibility that companies will 
utilise their NOL in the foreseeable future and go back to their STR by using half of 
their STR to approximate the present value of the future statutory tax payment. The 
static MTR proxy definitions above are generally consistent with prior research 
(Shevlin 1990; Graham 1996b; Pattenden 2002; Plesko 2003 and Graham and Mills 
2008).  
 
The statutory proxy and uniform proxy (Pattenden 2002; Plesko 2003 and Graham 
and Mills 2008) are not adopted in this research. The statutory proxy and uniform 
proxy need to divide the MTR from zero to the STR into four segments. This is easy 
for a country with a unitary STR but the PRC has 15% STR, 33% STR and many 
other STRs. It is impossible to have a reasonable and fair division to fit all the STRs. 
Therefore, the statutory proxy and uniform proxy are not considered as a suitable 
MTR proxy for the PRC. 
 
Dynamic Measure  
The MTR is defined the same as in prior research (Shevlin 1990; Graham 1996a, b, 
1999). The MTR is the present value of current and expected future taxes paid on an 
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additional dollar of income earned today. The MTR simulation method follows the 
approach developed by Shevlin (1987, 1990) and Graham (1996a, b, 1999) with 
adjustments to fit Chinese taxation regulations. 
 
The taxable income and NOL are not disclosed to the public in the PRC. The taxable 
income used in this research has to be the mimic taxable income, which derives from 
financial statements. Under the PRC tax regulations, the NOL can only carry forward 
to offset the future taxable income and can only carry-forward five years. Additional 
losses are added to any unused accumulated losses from previous years and carried 
forward to against future taxable incomes. Compared with USA marginal tax studies, 
Chinese tax rules are much easier and straight forward. Under the USA tax rules, the 
NOL can be carried back to claim a tax refund or carried forward to offset the future 
income for up to 20 years.  
 
To forecast future taxable income for year t + 1···5, the mean and variance of the 
change in mimic taxable income for a given company are needed according to 
Graham’s (1996a, b, 1999) simulation model. The simulation is designed to construct 
a series of taxable incomes for a company over the sample period. The model for 
constructing taxable income assumes that change in taxable income follows a random 
walk with drift model. The change of taxable income is assumed as having an average 
trend that is expected to continue in the future. The drift term is the mean of change in 
taxable income for a company and variance of the change in taxable income for a 
company and represents the dispersion of the change in taxable income around 0. To 
forecast the next year’s taxable income (t+1), the historical taxable income t is added 
to the change in taxable income which is from the random walk with drift model. The 
following year’s taxable income (t+2) is based on estimated taxable income t+1 plus 
the change in taxable income for t+2, and this procedure is repeated until year 5 (t+5).  
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It can be shown as: 
 ΔTI
giving                                   ΔTITITI 
it
it1itit
iti εμ +=
+= −  
Where: TI = taxable income; 
ΔTI = change in taxable income; 
μ = the mean of change in taxable income for company i; and  
ε = distributed N~ (0, ) where  is the variance of the change in taxable income 
for company i. 
2σ 2σ
it = company i at time t.  
The mean and the variance are calculated based on a company’s historic estimated 
mimic taxable income. A minimum five years’ restriction is defined to calculate a 
stable mean and variance of the mimic taxable income. For each company-year, five 
years’ taxable incomes are forecast to account for the five years carry-forward period 
and 50 different distinct five years forecast taxable income series are generated for the 
each sample company year from 1994 to 2006. The 50 repeated simulation procedure 
is consistent with Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a). Then the company income tax 
liabilities are calculated based on the reported STRs along forecast future five years 
for each of the 50 income series assuming a company knows its future STRs (the 
company STR is changeable according to the tax regulations). The negative mimic 
taxable income is treated as NOL and can be carried forward to offset future taxable 
income along each series, with additional losses being added to any accumulated 
NOL.  
 
The present value of the tax liabilities for each series is discounted at the Central Bank 
of China for one year at the benchmark loan rate.40 Theoretically, it would be ideal to 
use the corporate bond rate for each individual company (Modigliani and Miller 1963). 
In prior research, the industries’ corporate bonds (Shevlin 1990) or corporate bond 
                                                              
40 For each year, the corresponding discount rate is a time weighted average one year borrowing interest rate. See 
Appendix 17 for the details of Central Bank of China’s one year borrowing interest rate. 
163 
yield (Graham 1996a, b) were used as the discount rate for the present value of the 
future tax payments.  However, the bond market is not well developed and publicly 
traded in the PRC. The individual listed companies’ bond yields data are not available. 
The Central Bank of China’s loan interest rate benchmark is used instead in this 
research. The MRT calculation is according to the definition, which is the change of 
the present value of the income tax liability after company earns an additional yuan 
(PRC currency) today. The final step of the MTR simulation is to average the 50 
MTRs, which are generated from 50 taxable income series for each company, to 
determine the simulated MTR for each company year.    
 
The Manzon (1994) measure reflects the present value of explicit taxes payable on 
additional income. It assumes NOL will be utilised within the statutory allowed time. 
For company with NOL carry-forward, the length of time that utilises NOL is 
calculated based on the market value of equity.  
It is estimated as follows: 
nr)(1
Rate)Tax Statutory *($1MTR +=  
1-t
1-t
EFAI
NOLn =  
1-tNOL = Net operating loss available in Period t-1;  
1-tEFAI = Market value of equity multiplied by discount rate r in Period t-1; 
r = Non-firm specific discount rate. 
 
The Statutory Tax Rate is the company reported STR in year t. NOL is the negative 
mimic taxable income derived from the income statement and is the same as the 
above MTR measure NOL definition. The market value of the equity is the A-stock 
tradable total market capitalisation. The non-firm specific discount rate is defined as 
10% , which is consistent with Manzon (1994).41  
                                                              
41 The ideal discount rate should be the investor expected return rate. However, it is unobservable, and the 
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The research hypotheses are the same as those in the above ETR research hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 1.1-1.3). Based on the Chinese accounting and tax practices and the 
corporate tax preferences, an increase in MTRs after 2001 is expected. Industrial and 
regional differences are expected and the tax favoured industries and regions are 
expected to be lower than the other industries and regions. In the results and analysis 
section, the MTR results and analysis will be presented in an annual MTR analysis, 
industrial MTR analysis and regional MTR analysis.   
 
4.4.2 Data 
The data sources are the same as those in Chapter 4.3.2, ETR sample and data, which 
are from CSMAR and Wind. The final sample for MTR analysis consists of 769 
companies or 6706 company years after excluding companies that fall into the 
following categories: 
 
1. Companies listed after 2002. The simulation process requires at least five company 
years to calculate the mean and variance of a company mimic taxable income.  
2. Companies adopting the deferred tax method in any year. The deferred tax method 
is only the optional treatment method for the listed companies. The majority of 
companies adopt the tax payable accounting method and the mimic taxable income 
process assumes that a company adopts the tax payable accounting method. Therefore, 
to eliminate the effect of different accounting-tax treatments, the companies adopting 
deferred tax methods are excluded from sample. 
3. Companies that have negative tax payments in any of the sample years. The 
negative tax payments come from government income tax refunds and would also 
make interpretation difficult. This is also considered as an abnormal scenario. 
4. Companies with missing values from a merger of the two databases (CSMAR and 
WIND). Only companies containing complete data for calculating all the MTR 
measures in a given year are included in the analysis. The Manzon (1994) MTR 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
individualised discount rate does not have any material impact on the results. Discount rates of 5%, 10% and 15% 
are used to calculate the MTR, but they are highly correlated and similar. Therefore, the 10% discount rate results 
are used. 
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measure requires the market value of equity at t-1. Therefore, the first year of a listed 
company has to be excluded from the analysis, as does the 1994 sample company 
years (95 company years). Financial companies are also excluded, because they are 
regulated by separate rules (35 company years and 4 companies left at this stage). 
 
Table 4.23 provides details about the sample selection procedures with the number of 
company years and company losses in each step. The initial population comprised the 
1447 companies (11374 company years) that were listed on the CSMAR from 1994 to 
2006. This final population was reduced to 769 companies after eliminating 
companies falling into the five categories above.  
 
Table 4.23 MTR Sample Selection 
 Number of Company Years Number of Companies 
All company-years on 
the 2007 CSMAR 
General Industrial File 
 from 1994 to 2006 
11374 1447 
Less:   
Companies listed  
after 2002  649 243 
Companies adopt 
deferred tax method 2407 252 
Negative tax payments 
incurred in any sample 
company years 
1274 139 
Missing data from the 
merged database 775  44 
Full sample  
from 1995 to 2006 6174  769 
Final sample  
from 1995 to 2002  
3114 769 a
a  The 2002-2006 company years are used to simulate the 2002 company year taxable income. The 
company years from 2003 to 2006 are not in the analysis.  
 
Under the existing CSRC regulations, a listed company will be de-listed if it incurs 
losses for three consecutive years. For a company wanting to issue new shares, it has 
to achieve 10% return on equity for two consecutive years before the new issue. 
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Therefore, the listed company has a positive profitability bias for the results. Caution 
is required in order to interpret and generalise the results. The Chinese stock market 
listing condition requires at least three consecutive profitable years before the IPO. 
The MTR estimation needs the beginning NOL carry-forward of the year and the 
MTR estimation assumes that the NOL carry-forward is zero in 1994 and in the first 
year of listing.  
 
4.4.3 Results and Analysis 
The company specific MTR estimation mainly depends on the taxable income, NOL 
carry-forward and the STR. Before analysis of the MTR estimation, it is helpful to 
show the descriptive statistics of the mimic taxable income and NOL carry-forward. 
Table 4.24 shows the annual mean, standard deviation for the mimic taxable income 
and NOL carry-forward (beginning of the year) from 1995 to 2006. It also includes 
the annual number of companies and the NOL dummy from 1995 to 2006. From Table 
4.24, the average taxable income is smaller than the NOL carry-forward except in the 
earliest three sample years (1995-1997). The overall average taxable income is about 
70% of the overall average NOL carry-forward. This implies that the amount of NOL 
carry-forward is not enough to offset against the taxable income for two consecutive 
profitable years on average. The probability of the company NOL carry-forward 
increases from 2.26% in 1995 to 33.68% in 2006 as the sample number increased. 
This is because that the sample companies are more representative to the market as 
the sample number increased. The overall NOL occurrence probability for the whole 
sample years is only 19.73%. This was also probably influenced by the CSRC 
regulation that the company will be de-listed if it incurs losses for three consecutive 
years. The NOL carry-forward is the only factor to utilise against the taxable income 
in the dynamic method and the key factor in determining the MTR in the static 
method. The low probability of the company NOL may not reflect a true picture of the 
company profitability in general and could lead to high MTR bias results.  
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Table 4.24 
Annual Mimic Taxable Income and NOL Descriptive Statistics  a
 Mimic Taxable Income NOL Carry-forward NOL Dummy 
Year Mean SD NO. Mean SD No. % 
1995 60252741 9.114E7 129 -11913987 9.932E6 3 2.33% 
1996 54138103 1.212E8 142 -16916433 2.478E7 16 11.27%
1997 57334001 1.080E8 222 -42958246 6.740E7 33 14.86%
1998 55404196 1.197E8 336 -75636608 8.194E7 39 11.61%
1999 69747088 1.452E8 435 -107966606 1.524E8 60 13.79%
2000 84154093 1.604E8 502 -135911224 2.222E8 69 13.75%
2001 73409845 1.668E8 646 -129368556 2.130E8 91 14.09%
2002 92852199 2.799E8 702 -115603590 1.350E8 120 17.09%
2003 113580906 3.663E8 768 -156819289 2.039E8 152 19.79%
2004 141295796 4.589E8 755 -157406414 2.254E8 178 23.58%
2005 133079834 4.987E8 768 -179811576 2.326E8 198 25.78%
2006 173961387 6.619E8 769 -191195708 2.446E8 259 33.68%
Total 107205150 3.825E8 6174 -150371058 2.119E8 1218 19.73%
a The table shows the annual mean, standard deviation (SD), number of the sample (No.) for the mimic 
taxable income and NOL carry-forward (beginning of the year). The mimic taxable income includes 
both positive and negative taxable income. The NOL Dummy is the sample equal to 1 if there is a NOL 
carry-forward at beginning of the year. Otherwise, it equals zero. The percentage (%) represents the 
proportion of the NOL dummy over the total sample of the year. The initial data are from CSMAR 
V3.1. After excluding any sample company listed after 2002, adopting deferred tax method, negative 
tax payments and missing values, it leaves 6611 company years, 769 companies from 1995 to 2006 as 
the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final 
sample companies. 
 
The MTR estimation results are compared with the STR. The tax return data are 
confidential, which makes the actual ex-post tax return based MTR impossible to 
compute. The only objective benchmark option left is the STR. The MTR analysis 
begins with the descriptive statistics of the MTR estimation and is followed by brief 
annual, industrial and regional analyses and comparisons.  
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Table 4.25 Descriptive Statistics of MTRs and STR  a
 Mean Median Std. dev. Q1 Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
Binary1 0.148 0.150 0.090 0.150 0.150 0.367 0.398 
Binary2 0.135 0.150 0.094 0.099 0.150 0.360 0.098 
Trichotomous 0.148 0.150 0.082 0.150 0.150 0.624 0.969 
Simulated 0.148 0.150 0.074 0.150 0.150 0.755 1.689 
Manzon 0.170 0.150 0.075 0.150 0.150 0.960 1.017 
STR 0.174 0.150 0.077 0.150 0.150 0.968 0.888 
a The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (Std.dev.), first quartile (Q1), third quartile 
(Q3), skewness and kurtosis for the Binary1, Binary2, Trichotomous, Simulated MTR, Mazon MTR 
and STR. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company listed after 
2002, adopting deferred tax method, negative tax payments and missing values, it leaves 3114 
company years, or 769 companies from 1995 to 2002 as the final sample. The STR data were collected 
from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
b  Binary1, Binary2 and Trichotomous represent the static MTR proxy. Simulated represents the 
simulated marginal tax rate using mimic taxable income. Manzon represents the dynamic marginal tax 
rate which was developed by Manzon (1994). The detailed calculation methods are described in the 
methodology. STR is Statutory Tax Rate. 
 
Table 4.25 provides descriptive statistics of the MTRs and STR which includes the 
mean, median, standard deviation, the first quartile, third quartile, skewness and 
kurtosis. The minimum and maximum are ignored, because they are 0 and 0.33 for all 
the estimations. The table results show that the MTR estimations as expected are 
lower than the average STR, because the MTRs are lowered by the NOL against the 
following taxable income. The average Binary2 MTR proxy is the lowest average 
MTR estimation, because it has a strict definition. The Binary2 requires both 
non-negative taxable income and no NOL carry-forward to be STR. The Binary1 does 
not condition taxable income on the MTR estimation. The Manzon-MTR proxy 
estimation is very close to the STR, because of the small probability of NOL and over 
estimates the market based return. The NOL is utilised too soon by the inflated market 
expected return and lifts the MTR up to close to the STR. The simulated MTR is very 
close to the trichotomous MTR. The first quartile, median and third quartile are all 
0.15 with exception to Binary2’s first quartile. The results suggest that the majority of 
the MTR estimations are consistent with the STR, which is 0.15 (15%). Figure 4.5 
shows the MTR estimates and STR relative frequency of sample companies in each 
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tax rate segment. It is clear that most of the MTRs and STR are allocated in the 0.15 
tax rate segment, followed by 0 and 0.33 tax rate segments.  
 
Figure 4.5 Distributions of MTRs and STR  a
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a The figure shows the MTR estimates and STR’s relative frequency of sample companies in each tax 
rate segment. The MTRs include Binary1, Binary2, Trichotomous, Simulated MTR (Simulated), 
Manzon MTR (Manzon) and Statutory Tax Rate (STR). The detailed data table is shown in Appendix 
18. 
 
Table 4.26 shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations of the MTR estimates and 
STR. The Pearson correlation and Spearman results are very similar. The three static 
MTR estimates are highly correlated with over 0.815 correlations. The Manzon MTR 
is highly correlated with STR with 0.966 in Pearson’s correlation and 0.845 in 
Spearman’s correlation. It also confirms the previous finding that Manzon’s method 
inflated the MTR close to the STR. The simulated MTR does not highly correlate with 
any other MTR estimates.      
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Table 4.26 Correlation of MTRs and STR  a
Pearson Correlation 
 Binary1 Binary2 Trichotomous Simulated Manzon STR
Binary1 1      
Binary2 0.843** 1     
Trichotomous 0.903** 0.924** 1    
Simulated 0.502** 0.621** 0.696** 1   
Manzon 0.717** 0.591** 0.766** 0.539** 1  
STR 0.619** 0.506** 0.699** 0.526** 0.966** 1 
Spearman Correlation (Non-parametric correlation)  
 Binary1 Binary2 Trichotomous Simulated Manzon STR
Binary1 1      
Binary2 0.828** 1     
Trichotomous 0.815** 0.815** 1    
Simulated 0.474** 0.621** 0.646** 1   
Manzon 0.773** 0.626** 0.791** 0.481** 1  
STR 0.599** 0.462** 0.669** 0.457** 0.845** 1 
a The table shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations of the MTRs and STR. The initial data are 
from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company listed after 2002, adopting deferred tax 
method, negative tax payments and missing values, it leaves 3114 company years, or 769 companies 
from 1995 to 2002 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information 
Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
b ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
The annual, industrial and regional MTR estimates analyses ignore the medians of 
MTR estimates and STR, because they are all 15%. The MTR estimate results are 
similar with the ETR estimates analysis and will not be discussed in more detail here. 
However, instead of the driving factor STR in the ETR estimates analyses, the MTR 
estimates are influenced by both the STR and the NOL carry-forward. Therefore, 
there is one more consideration needed on the MTR analysis compared with the ETR 
analysis. The NOL carry-forward occurrence has a negative impact on the MTR, as 
the carry-forward is tax deductible losses. However, the occurrence of the NOL is 
infrequent. 
 
Table 4.27 shows the annual mean of MTR estimates and STR from 1995 to 2002 and 
Figure 4.6 shows the trends of the MTR estimates mean and STR mean from 1995 to 
2002. The MTR estimates were relatively stable at around 0.15 from 1995 to 2001 
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and rose dramatically to 0.23 (STR) in 2002. The sharp rise in 2002 was because the 
State Council terminated the unauthorised local government tax refund. The simulated 
MTR was also lifted by the increasing STR in the following five years after 2002. The 
differences between MTR estimates and STR are similar with the Table 4.25 
descriptive statistics that Binary2 is the smallest MTR estimate and Manzon MTR is 
the largest MTR estimate and all others are in a narrow range. The NOL 
carry-forward occurrence was around 14% from 1996 to 2001. In 1995 there was only 
2.33% of the NOL carry-forward occurrence; and in 2002 there was 17% of the NOL 
carry-forward occurrence. This is possibly because the number of the sample 
companies increased and had more representative power in achieving real company 
profitability.  
a
 
Table 4.27 Annual Mean of MTRs and STR  
Year Binary1 Binary2 Trichotomous Simulated Manzon STR NOL%
1995 0.148 0.134 0.143 0.144 0.152 0.152 2.33%
1996 0.140 0.121 0.132 0.137 0.153 0.155 11.27%
1997 0.122 0.117 0.124 0.138 0.140 0.144 14.86%
1998 0.124 0.112 0.122 0.133 0.137 0.140 11.61%
1999 0.127 0.116 0.127 0.136 0.142 0.147 13.79%
2000 0.140 0.130 0.142 0.144 0.160 0.165 13.75%
2001 0.140 0.126 0.140 0.146 0.164 0.167 14.09%
2002 0.194 0.177 0.196 0.172 0.231 0.236 17.09%
Total 0.148 0.135 0.148 0.148 0.170 0.174 13.84%
a The table shows the annual mean of MTR estimates and STR with the annual probability of the 
beginning NOL carry-forward occurrence (NOL %) from 1995 to 2002. The initial data are from 
CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company listed after 2002, adopting deferred tax method, 
negative tax payments and missing values, it leaves 3114 company years, or 769 companies from 1995 
to 2002 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to 
match the final sample companies. 
b Binary1, Binary2 and Trichotomous represent the static MTR proxy. Simulated represents simulated 
marginal tax rate using mimic taxable income. Manzon represents the dynamic marginal tax rate, 
which was developed by Manzon (1994). The detailed calculation methods are described in the 
methodology. STR is the Statutory Tax Rate. NOL% represents the probability of the beginning NOL 
carry-forward occurrence for each year.  
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Figure 4.6 Annual Trends of MTRs and STR  a
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a The figure shows the annual trends of MTRs and STR from 1995 to 2002. The data are from Table 
4.27.  
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Table 4.28 Industry Sector Mean of MTRs and STR  a
Industry Sector Binary1 Binary2 Trichotomous Simulated Manzon STR No. NOL% 
Agriculture, forestry,  
animal husbandry and fishery 0.136 0.118 0.136 0.133 0.152 0.153 28 7.14% 
Mining 0.175 0.161 0.170 0.188 0.198 0.198 34 8.82% 
Manufacturing 0.154 0.142 0.154 0.150 0.172 0.176 1583 11.62% 
Electricity, gas and water production and supply 0.155 0.149 0.152 0.143 0.162 0.162 136 4.41% 
Construction 0.168 0.147 0.162 0.148 0.184 0.185 36 11.11% 
Transportation and warehousing 0.154 0.143 0.151 0.139 0.160 0.161 113 4.42% 
Information technology 0.130 0.113 0.131 0.138 0.157 0.159 142 20.42% 
Wholesale and retail 0.157 0.146 0.155 0.158 0.180 0.184 330 10.91% 
Real estate industry 0.131 0.117 0.134 0.142 0.164 0.168 354 20.06% 
Public services 0.138 0.124 0.139 0.133 0.172 0.176 90 18.89% 
Broadcasting, media and culture 0.099 0.085 0.126 0.162 0.157 0.201 35 40.00% 
Miscellaneous 0.124 0.110 0.130 0.141 0.159 0.164 233 25.75% 
Total 0.148 0.135 0.148 0.148 0.170 0.174 13.84% 3114
a The table shows the industry sector mean of MTR estimates and STR with the number of the sample company years (No.) and probability of the beginning NOL 
carry-forward occurrence (NOL %) for each industry sector. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company listed after 2002, adopting 
deferred tax method, negative tax payments and missing values, it leaves 3114 company years, or 769 companies from 1995 to 2002 as the final sample. The STR data were 
collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
b Binary1, Binary2 and Trichotomous represent the static MTR proxy. Simulated represents the simulated marginal tax rate using mimic taxable income. Manzon represents 
the dynamic marginal tax rate, which was developed by Manzon (1994). The detailed calculation methods are described in the methodology. STR is the Statutory Tax Rate.  
c No. represents the number of the sample company years for each industry sector. NOL% represents the probability of the beginning NOL carry-forward occurrence for 
industry sectors.  
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aTable 4.29 Manufacturing Sub-sector Mean of MTRs and STR  
Manufacturing 
Sub-Sector 
Binary1 Binary2 Trichotomous Simulated Manzon STR No. % 
Food and beverages 0.172 0.165 0.173 0.169 0.189 0.193 109 11.01% 
Textiles and apparel 0.169 0.150 0.163 0.151 0.180 0.180 94 7.45% 
Wood and furniture 0.174 0.144 0.159 0.147 0.174 0.174 11 0.00% 
Paper and printing 0.151 0.142 0.149 0.143 0.165 0.165 34 5.88% 
Petroleum, chemical, and materials 0.161 0.149 0.160 0.155 0.174 0.176 261 6.51% 
Electronics 0.117 0.105 0.123 0.127 0.146 0.153 95 21.05% 
Metal and non-metal 0.163 0.150 0.163 0.154 0.185 0.190 243 11.93% 
Machinery, equipment and instruments 0.142 0.130 0.141 0.138 0.162 0.167 470 14.68% 
Medicine and biological products 0.159 0.148 0.160 0.164 0.179 0.183 238 11.76% 
Other manufacturing 0.177 0.162 0.169 0.146 0.177 0.177 22 0.00% 
Total 0.154 0.142 0.154 0.150 0.172 0.176 1577 11.67% 
c No. represents the number of the sample company years for each manufacturing sub-sector. NOL% represents the probability of the beginning NOL carry-forward 
occurrence for manufacturing sub-sectors.  
a The table shows the manufacturing sub-sector mean of MTR estimates and STR with the number of the sample company years (No.) and probability of the beginning NOL 
carry-forward occurrence (NOL %) for each industry sector. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company listed after 2002, adopting 
deferred tax method, negative tax payments and missing values, it leaves 3114 company years, 769 companies from 1995 to 2002 as the final sample. The STR data were 
collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
b Binary1, Binary2 and Trichotomous represent the static MTR proxy. Simulated represents the simulated marginal tax rate using mimic taxable income. Manzon represents 
the dynamic marginal tax rate, which was developed by Manzon (1994). The detailed calculation methods are described in the methodology. STR is the Statutory Tax Rate.  
 
 Table 4.30 Regional Mean of MTRs and STR  a
Region Binary1 Binary2 Trichotomous Simulated Manzon STR No. % 
E. Region 0.158 0.144 0.158 0.155 0.182 0.187 1118 14.85%
M. Region 0.172 0.158 0.170 0.165 0.187 0.191 526 7.79%
W. Region 0.140 0.125 0.138 0.139 0.162 0.164 432 11.57%
SEZ 0.101 0.088 0.105 0.117 0.134 0.140 424 28.54%
HTIDZ 0.145 0.136 0.146 0.146 0.162 0.165 614 8.63%
a The table shows the regional mean of MTR estimates and STR with the number of the sample 
company years (No.) and probability of the beginning NOL carry-forward occurrence (NOL %) for 
each region. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company listed after 
2002, adopting deferred tax method, negative tax payments and missing values, it leaves 3114 
company years, or 769 companies from 1995 to 2002 as the final sample. The STR data were collected 
from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
b Binary1, Binary2 and Trichotomous represent the static MTR proxy. Simulated represents the 
simulated marginal tax rate using mimic taxable income. Manzon represents the dynamic marginal tax 
rate, which was developed by Manzon (1994). The detailed calculation methods are described in the 
methodology. STR is the Statutory Tax Rate.  
c No. represents the number of the sample company years for each region. NOL% represents the 
probability of the beginning NOL carry-forward occurrence for each region.  
E.Region = Eastern Region; M.Region = Middle Region; W.Region = Western Region; SEZ = Special 
Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry Development Zone. 
 
The industry sectors and manufacturing sub-sectors MTR estimate analyses are 
shown in Table 4.28 and Table 4.29. The results are similar with the ETR analysis 
results as the different industry sectors had different STR and different MTR 
estimates. However, the MTRs were not just influenced by the STR, but also by the 
NOL carry-forward. The higher the probability of the NOL occurrences, the lower the 
MTRs were. For example, the broadcasting, media and culture sector had the highest 
STR, which was 0.201, but it had the lowest MTRs (except for simulated MTR). This 
is because the broadcasting, media and culture sector had the highest NOL 
carry-forward occurrence at 40%. The electronics industry, which is a manufacturing 
sub-sector, had the lowest STR and highest NOL carry-forward occurrence among the 
manufacturing sub-sectors, and led electronics to the lowest MTR. The previous MTR 
ranking also applies here with the Manzon MTR estimate being the highest and the 
Binary2 being the lowest MTR estimate.   
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The regional MTR results were also consistent with the ETR analysis results. The 
SEZ was the lowest MTR region and the Middle Region was the highest MTR region 
(Middle Region MTR>Eastern Region MTR>HTIDZ MTR>Western Region 
MTR>SEZ MTR). The most remarkable result was that the NOL carry-forward 
occurrence in SEZ was about 28%, which was significantly higher than in the other 
three regions.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter firstly discusses the research approach options and explained the 
rationale behind the choice of a quantitative research approach for the thesis. It then 
moves to ETRs and MTRs analysis sections. It tries to answer the first research 
question - what have been the patterns of ETRs and MTRs from 1994 to 2006? The 
ETR analysis offers an overview of the actual tax burden for listed companies in the 
PRC, together with an STR analysis which presents the tax structure aspect behind tax 
preferences. From the annual trend analysis, the ETR and STR analyses reveal that 
companies benefited widely from tax rate deduction incentives before 2002, 
regardless of the industry or region they belonged to. However, after the State Council 
stopped unauthorised corporate tax rebates from local government, the ETRs 
increased significantly overall and the industrial and regional ETRs differences were 
much more significant. The tax favoured industries and regions’ companies were still 
in the lower ETRs and STR range, but the tax unfavoured companies’ ETRs and STR 
increased significantly after 2002. This reflects the effectiveness of Chinese tax 
preference policies. The tax fairness and tax incidence issues were also addressed.  
 
The MTR estimations are the first Chinese company specific MTR estimations in the 
literature. The MTR estimations jointly depend on a company’s NOL occurrences, 
income and STR. Due to the listed companies’ requirements, the results may have an 
upwards bias i.e. high profitability bias. The MTRs were estimated from 1995 to 2002 
and the MTRs results are generally consistent with the ETR results. There was an 
increase in MTRs in 2002 due to the same reason and the industrial and regional 
177 
differences between companies were significant.  
 
This chapter contributes to the corporate ETR and MTR research in several ways. 
Firstly, the major contribution of ETR analysis is the discussion of the ETR and MTR 
measures based on Chinese accounting and tax practices. Secondly, the ETR analyses 
were introduced to compare with STR, which recognises the STR variations across 
the companies. Thirdly, the chapter developed a regional division method to 
distinguish tax favoured regions and ordinary taxed regions. The results enhanced the 
evidence of the effectiveness of tax preferences policy.  Fourthly, it is the most 
comprehensive analysis of the listed companies ETRs and MTRs so far. The chapter 
examines possible definitions of ETRs and MTRs in the literature and selects the most 
suitable definitions based on the Chinese accounting and tax regulations. Fifthly, this 
is the first attempt of the Chinese company specific MTR estimations in the literature.  
 
The next chapter is Chapter Five - Determinants of ETR. It develops a new ETR 
determinant model and identifies the appropriate ETR determinants according to the 
model and Chinese accounting and tax practices. Comparisons between the new ETR 
determinant model and the replications of prior ETR determinants research models 
will also be undertaken.  
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5.1 Introduction 
After an analysis of the ETRs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the thesis 
moves on to the determinants of the ETR. This chapter tries to answer the second 
research question—what are the main determinants of the ETR in the PRC? Through 
answering the question, the new ETR determinant model is proposed and the 
appropriate ETR determinants are identified in the methodology section. In order to 
link with the existing ETR determinant literature, the new ETR determinant model 
will be compared with previous typical ETR determinant models. Replications of the 
prior ETR determinant models will also be conducted. The structure of the chapter 
begins with the methodology for the research. In the methodology section, the prior 
disadvantages of the ETR determinant model are discussed and the new ETR 
determinant analysis model is demonstrated and the ETR determinants are identified 
according to the new model. The replications of prior ETR determinant studies are 
also conducted in order to compare the statistical results with the new model. This is 
followed by a data section which illustrates the sampling procedure and sections on 
results and analysis which present the regression and replication results. The final 
section is the conclusion. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
This section will introduce the methodology for corporate ETR determinants’ analysis 
for the PRC’s taxation. Firstly it will briefly review previous ETR determinants’ 
analysis methodology, and then, move to an exposition of the theoretical background 
to this research. The research model, regression dependent and explanatory variables 
will be explained respectively. Finally, the section will compare the model with prior 
ETR determinants’s models by replication of prior ETR determinants studies.  
 
5.2.1 Prior ETR Determinant Study Methodology 
The prior ETR determinants are classified into company specific characteristic category, 
other specific characteristics determinants’ and company management decisions’ 
category. Overall, there are three categories and 12 determinant variables, with 45 
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different definitions for the 12 determinant variables. All of these variables are 
discussed in the literature review chapter and Table 3.5 provides a summary of the 
ETR determinants with variable definitions and references. 
 
In the previous studies, there are two types of ETR determinants. One is taxable 
expenses’ determinants, the other one is company characteristic determinants. The 
taxable expenses’ determinants are assumed to have a negative relationship with ETRs. 
The basic logic behind this is that the tax expense is the product of the Statutory Tax 
Rate (STR) and the differences of taxable revenue and taxable expenses, i.e. taxable 
income (Equation 5.1). For example, the interest expenses, depreciation and R&D 
intensity are all assumed to have a negative relationship with ETRs in the prior 
research (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Liu and Cao 2007; Richardson and Lanis 2007 
and many more in the literature review). However, this negative relationship is very 
fragile. In order to obtain ETRs, the tax expense has to be divided by the income. The 
theoretical relationship will be Equation 5.2. Equation 5.2 shows that the negative 
relationship of the taxable expense variables with ETR conditions on the constant of 
taxable revenue, tax rate and pre-tax income. This strict constant condition can only 
be illustrated in theory. The pre-tax income and taxable income (taxable revenue – 
taxable expense) are often assumed as being independent from each other implicitly. 
Otherwise, there will not be any ETR variations. Therefore, the straight negative 
relationship from taxable expense variables is hard to prove. 
Tax = ൫Taxable Revenue-Taxable Expense൯×Tax Rate                        (5.1) 
ETR= ൫Taxable Revenue –Taxable Expense൯×Tax Rate
Pre-Tax Income
                                 (5.2) 
The company characteristic determinants are chosen on a relatively ad hoc basis, 
which is the major drawback of prior ETR determinant studies. For example, 
regarding the size effect on the ETRs, there are no tax incentives for company size 
and the research findings are still inclusive (see the literature review 3.3.1 company 
size and the ETR detailed discussion). In Feeny et al.’s (2002) research model, 
earning volatility, the number of subsidiaries, and their status as a listed company or 
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not were chosen as explanatory variables to test the impacts on the ETRs. Kim and 
Limpaphayom (1998) and Derashid and Zhang (2003) use market value of equity as 
an explanatory variable (because a high market value ratio company is expected to 
receive more government tax preference). These determinant variables lack theory to 
support the assumption. The ad hoc determinant variables may result in a 
mis-specified model, which generates misleading results and conceals the real 
relationships between determinants and ETRs. 
 
5.2.2 Research Theoretical Background 
The idea of the model proposed for this thesis is developed from Harris and Feeny 
(2003), who recognized the importance of the accounting and tax differences in the 
ETR determinant analysis. However, the main improvements offered by this thesis are 
the recognition of the tax rate preference and the accounting and tax differences’ 
reconciliation based on the Chinese accounting and tax regulations and practices.  
 
To analyse the ETR in the PRC, there is one big non-unified STR problem. Although 
the top STR is 33%, the actual company STR could be from 0% to 33% owing to the 
tax rate deduction preferences (see STR analysis in Chapter Four - 4.3.3.1 STR 
Analysis). This creates a great difficulty when analyzing companies’ ETR 
determinants with different STRs at the same time because they are at different 
marginal corporate tax rate levels and this results in different corporate income tax 
burden levels. The tax rate preferences have to be considered in the ETR determinants’ 
analysis.   
 
The following derivation explains how the research theory and research model are 
formed and derived from the basic equation.  
Assuming that a company i earns positive taxable income at time t, its income tax 
expenses (Taxit) will be the product of STR (t௦) and the taxable income (Iit
taxable). 
taxable
itsit ItTax ⋅=                                                      (5.3) 
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Assuming accounting book income and taxable income are statistically independent of 
each other. It assumes there is no correlation between accounting book income and 
taxable income. If there was a correlation between accounting book income and 
taxable income, there would have a proportional relationship between accounting 
book income and taxable income and there would not have any ETR variations. 
Another assumption is that there are positive tax preferences. The tax preferences are 
the differences between accounting book income and taxable income. This tax 
preferences’ definition was also adopted by prior researchers (Wilkie 1988; Wilkie 
and Limberg 1990; Shevlin and Porter 1992). The positive tax preferences assumption 
is not crucial in here. It is used to simplify the condition and equation derivations. The 
difference between positive and negative tax preferences assumption is the sign of the 
tax preferences variable in the equation. By replacing taxable income with accounting 
book income, the tax expenses (Equation 5.3) can be re-arranged to be the product of 
the accounting book income and STR minus the product of the tax preference and 
STR (Equation 5.4).  
Tax௜௧ ൌ t௦ · I௜௧
௕௢௢௞ െ Tax Preference௜௧ · ݐ௦                                 (5.4) 
Based on the Chinese corporate tax practice background, the tax preference can be 
broken down into tax rate preference and accounting-tax treatment differences. Unlike 
other countries, there is no uniform corporate tax rate for companies in the PRC.  
Therefore, the tax rate preference has to be isolated from the tax preference term in 
Equation 5.4. The tax rate preference is defined as the product of the taxable income 
and the differences between the top STR and the actual corporate tax rate. In other 
words, the corporate tax preference is the tax expenses saved from the tax rate 
deduction, assuming companies would be taxed at the top STR. If the actual tax rate is 
the top STR, then the tax rate preference is zero.  
 
From Equation 5.4 we derive the following equation where the income tax has been 
broken down into income effect and direct tax preference (tax rate deduction) and the 
indirect tax preference (accounting-tax differences) effect. 
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Tax௜௧ ൌ   t௦ · I௜௧௕௢௢௞ᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
Income effect
െ I௜௧௧௔௫௔௕௟௘ሺt௦ െ t௔ሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
Tax rate deduction effect
Direct tax preference
െ Tax Preferenceit·tsᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
Tax preferences effect
Indirect tax preference
                 (5.5) 
Taxit = tax expenses of company i at time t 
t tatutory tax rate (top); t௔ = actual statutory tax rate ௦ = s
Iit௕௢௢௞ = accounting book income of company i at time t 
Iittaxable = taxable income of company i at time t 
it = company i at time t. 
 
The income effect is the product of the STR and the accounting book income. It 
represents the positive effects of accounting book income on the tax expenses. The tax 
rate deduction effect is the product of taxable income and the difference between the 
top STR and the actual tax rate. This represents the tax expenses saved from the tax 
rate deduction, assuming company would be taxed at the top STR. The tax 
preferences effect is the same as that in the above definition. It is the product of the 
tax preference and the STR, which represents the tax expense saved as a result of the 
differences between accounting book income and taxable income. 
 
Then Equation 5.5 can be expressed as the ETR by dividing the accounting book 
income  . 
 
Tax೔೟
I೔೟
್೚೚ೖ ൌ
tೞ·I೔೟
್೚೚ೖ
I೔೟
್೚೚ೖ െ
I೔೟
೟ೌೣೌ್೗೐·TRP೔೟
I೔೟
್೚೚ೖ െ
TP౟౪·tೞ
I೔೟
್೚೚ೖ                                   (5.6) 
 
TRP = Tax Rate Preference = t௦ െ t௔ = Top STR- Actual STR;  
TP = Tax Preference = Accounting-tax treatment differences. 
it = company i at time t 
After rearranging Equation 5.6, the final ETR Equation 5.7 is 
ETR௜௧ ൌ  t௦ െ
I೔೟
೟ೌೣೌ್೗೐·TRP೔೟
I೔೟
್೚೚ೖ െ
TP౟౪·tೞ
I೔೟
್೚೚ೖ                                                                           (5.7) 
According to the Equation 5.7, the determinants of ETR consist of STR, tax rate 
preference, and accounting and tax differences. The income effect is cancelled out by 
the division of the accounting book income. This equation also recognizes the relation 
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between STR and ETRs. Compared with the earlier ETR determinants’ research model 
(taxable expenses’ determinant approach), this model recognises the tax rate 
preference and provides a way to compare company ETR determinants with different 
STRs and incorporates the book tax conformity theory (accounting-tax reconciliation) 
into ETR analysis, 42  which recognizes and reconciles the differences between 
accounting book income and taxable income. The ETR determinants also consider the 
income effects by dividing the accounting book income. 
 
The model provides a theoretical framework for exploring the determinants of ETR, 
and also an alternative way to look at the ETR determinants, compared with prior 
taxable expenses’ determinants’ approach. The taxable expenses variables reveal an 
identification problem. It is impossible to identify all of the taxable expenses, or even 
most of them. For example, the biggest tax deductible expenses normally are cost of 
sales and administration expense (salary). However, prior researchers were interested 
in using interest expenses, and depreciation expenses to represent company specific 
character. According to the Equation 5.2, without considering the effect of taxable 
revenue, the model may be mis-specified and lead to misleading results. The income 
effect in Equation 5.5 is cancelled out through the scaling arrangement. The model 
(Equation 5.7) recognizes the income effect and controls it by scaling income on the 
variables.  
 
The accounting-tax difference determinant variables are considerably easier to 
identify and proxy than the tax deductible expenses’ variables. Only a few 
accounting-tax reconciliation items can proxy most of the accounting-tax differences, 
which simplifies the research model. The tax rate preference is also very 
straightforward to identify. Therefore, the model provides an effective way to design 
an ETR determinant research model. The limitation is that it may be hard to identify all 
the accounting-tax differences and the differences are varied according to accounting 
                                                              
42 There are many articles which discuss book tax conformity issues, such as Guenther et al (1997), Manzon and 
Plesko (2002) and Mills and Plesko (2003) in the USA, Dai and Yao (2006) in China. 
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policy and accounting standards. Nevertheless, it is still relatively easy to identify the 
major causes of accounting-tax differences.  
 
5.2.3 Research empirical model  
The estimated regression equation which is
஺௖௖்௔௫஽௜௙௙௘௥௘௡௖௘
ܾ݋݋݇
 based on Equation (5.7) is as follows: 
ETR௜௧ ൌ  ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵTRP௜ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ · I݅ݐ
                                                                     (5.8) 
                        ൅Control Variables ൅  ߝ௜௧ 
 
The usual error term ߝ௜௧ is added, because the model prediction is unlikely to be 
perfect. The intercept ߙ௜௧ recognises a company’s individual effects (unobserved 
heterogeneity), such as company tax planning. The explanatory variables are identified 
according to Equation 5.8, which includes tax rate preference, accounting-tax 
differences (tax preferences) variables and control variables. The tax rate preference 
and accounting-tax differences terms are same with above definition. The control 
variables are used to capture the company specific characteristics that might distort 
these regression results. The model specific variable definitions for this thesis will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
5.2.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The ETR1 accounting book income ETR measure (Income tax expenses/Total profit 
before tax) is chosen as the dependent variable. The total profit before tax is the last 
accounting entry before company income tax, and it captures all the accounting-tax 
differences. It is the most suitable dependent variable for the model. Therefore, all the 
accounting and tax differences variables are also deflated by the total profit before tax 
according to Equation 5.8.    
 
The other ETR definitions are not considered as suitable for the regression model. The 
denominator of ETR2 is operating income. The operating income excludes the 
investment gain, subsidy income, non-operating income/expenses compared with the 
total profit before tax, which is the denominator of ETR1 (see Table 2.6 for basic 
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format of Profit and Loss Statements in the PRC). The exclusion of the investment 
gain and non-operating income/expenses in the ETR2 denominator are the important 
causes for the accounting and tax differences in the PRC. Therefore, the ETR2 is 
considered not relevant for explaining the variations of the accounting-tax differences. 
The same reason applies for not choosing ETR4 as a dependent variable. ETR4 is the 
mimic taxable income ETR and its denominator is mimic taxable income which does 
not capture the impact of tax preferences on ETRs at all. ETR3 is operating cash flow 
ETR and its denominator is operating cash flow. It is designed to avoid any 
accounting policy influences and is not sensitive to any accounting and tax differences. 
Therefore, the above ETR definitions (ETR2, ETR3 and ETR4) are excluded from 
dependent variable choices.  
 
5.2.3.2 Explanatory Variable   
The second main research question is to find out the main determinants of the ETR in 
the PRC. From the above discussion and research model (Equation 5.8), the following 
determinants are identified and hypothesized. 
 
Tax Rate Preference  
Hypothesis 2.1: ETR should be negatively related to its tax rate preference. 
 
The tax rate preference variable is defined as the difference of the top STR (33%) and a 
company’s actual STR which is shown in the annual report. This is used to capture the 
effect of direct tax rate deduction and is expected to be negative for the ETRs. In prior 
research, the researchers use a time dummy variable to control for the effect of STR 
changing in the sample period (Feeny et al. 2002; Derashid and Zhang 2003; 
Richardson and Lanis 2007). However, this only works when there is a uniform STR in 
one jurisdiction at one time. It cannot be adopted in the PRC, as Chinese taxation has a 
non-uniform STR for companies. 
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Accounting and Tax Difference Variables 
Hypothesis 2.2: ETR should be positively related to its non-operating expenses. 
Hypothesis 2.3: ETR should be negatively related to its investment gain. 
Hypothesis 2.4: ETR should be positively related to its provision for the impairment of 
asset. 
 
The easiest identifiable accounting and tax differences are non-taxable gains or 
expenses. There are three variables chosen to proxy the accounting and tax differences. 
They are non-operating expenses, investment gain and provision for the impairment of 
assets. These variables were discussed in the mimic taxable income ETR measure 
computation (Section 4.3.1). The reasons for choosing these variables are because 
they are non-taxable gain or expenses and they are easy to quantify from financial 
reports. They are also the most significant causes of accounting and tax treatment 
differences for Chinese listed company (Dai and Yao 2006). 
 
Harris and Feeny (2003) recognise the accounting-tax reconciliation item as the 
explanatory variable and they adopted depreciation expenses as one of the 
accounting-tax differences variables. However, this was not correct. The model 
implicitly assumed that the accounting deprecation is proxy for the tax preferences on 
deprecation. In fact, their relationship is unknown. The real deprecation tax preference 
variable should be the differences between accounting depreciation expenses and 
depreciation in a tax computation.  
 
The explanatory variables will be deflated by total profit before tax according to 
Equation 5.7 as follows: Non-operating expenses/Total profit before tax (NOpExp), 
Investment gain/Total profit before tax (InvGa) and Provision for the impairment of 
assets/Total profit before tax (ProImp). The non-operating expenses and provision for 
the impairment of assets are assumed as non-tax deductible accounting expenses and 
the relationship with ETRs are expected to be positive. Investment gain is assumed as 
a non-taxable income accounting gain and the relationship is expected to be negative 
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with ETRs.   
 
Control Variables  
Hypothesis 2.5: ETR should be influenced by the region which the company belong 
to. 
Hypothesis 2.6: ETR should be influenced by the industry which the company belong 
to. 
Hypothesis 2.7: ETR should be influenced by the government ownership. 
Hypothesis 2.8: ETR should be positively influenced by the time periods. 
 
The control variables are used to capture the company specific characteristics that 
might distort these regression results. The control variables, which are identified in this 
thesis, are the regional dummy variable, the industry sector dummy variable, the time 
period dummy variable, and the government ownership dummy variable, given that it 
is possible for ETRs to fluctuate across these control variables.  
 
In the ETR analysis chapter, the analyses show that the region, industry sector and 
time period have a significant impact on the ETRs. There are also tax preference 
policies across industries and regions. The regional dummy variables are defined in 
the same way as those in the ETR analysis chapter. It categorises the PRC into five 
regions which are Eastern Region, Western Region, SEZ, HTIDZ. The Middle Region 
is omitted in the dummy variable, because of the regression model specification. The 
industry sector dummy variable is defined according to the CSRC industry 
classification (excluding the finance and insurance sectors). The sectors are 
agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, mining, manufacturing, electricity, 
gas and water production and supply, construction, transportation and warehousing, 
information technology, wholesale and retail, real estate industry, public services, 
broadcasting, media and culture but miscellaneous is omitted in the industry sector 
dummy variable (12 dummy variables). In the prior research, the regional and 
industrial impacts on ETRs were found significant (Derashid and Zhang 2003; 
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Vandenbussche et al. 2004; Richardson and Lanis 2007).  
 
The Government equity ownership variable (Gov) is applicable to the PRC context. 
The Government equity ownership (Gov) is defined as the percentage of government 
equity ownership of the company, which includes both the government direct equity 
ownership and the SOE equity ownership. 43  Although there is no tax preference 
specific to the government owned company, the effectiveness of political lobbying is 
uncertain. Derashid and Zhang (2003) found a negative relationship between 
government ownership and ETRs in Malaysia. The effect of government ownership on 
ETRs in the PRC is uncertain. There is no expected sign of the government’s equity 
ownership parameter.  
 
In the nine year period from 1998 to 2006, it is unreasonable to assume that the 
underlying parameter remains constant throughout. In particular, there were 
accounting system changes and the stopping of the unauthorised tax rebate in 2001. 
The previous chapter on annual ETR analysis reveals there was a structure break for 
ETR trends in 2001 (Section 4.3.3.3). To adjust for these and other possible 
time-variant effects, a time dummy variable was created to test for a mean shift in 
ETR after 2001. Given the intent of the change to increase company STR, this time 
dummy variable is expected to be positive.   
 
5.2.3.3 Regression Model  
There are two approaches to the analysis of the sample data. They are cross sectional 
data analysis and panel data analysis. Panel data contains observations on a cross 
section of companies over time periods. The advantage of panel data is that they can 
account for individual companies’ heterogeneity and give more informative data, 
more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom and 
more efficiency (Baltagi 1995).  
                                                              
43 Many SOE listed companies are cave out from government owned SOE. This is why many SOE listed 
companies are not owned directly by the government.  
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For the cross sectional data analysis, OLS regression analysis will be performed, 
which is the most common and simple regression analysis. From Table 3.4, the most 
prior ETR determinants of studies were OLS regression studies. Because of the model 
specification, the OLS regression has the advantage of controlling the observable 
heterogeneity of the company, such as a location and industry dummy variable. The 
OLS regression model is used as the baseline for comparisons and analysis.  The 
final OLS regression model is as follows:  
itit22it21it2010
it95it4it3it2it10it
TimeGovIndustry               
RegionProImpInvGaNOpExpTRPETR
εβββ
βββββα
++++
+++++=
−
−      (5.9) 
For the panel data analysis, the fixed effects and random effects regression will be 
performed. In estimating Equation 5.8, a company’s individual effects can be treated 
as either fixed or random. The former approach entails splitting the constant into N 
where N is the number of the companies in the data. This assumes that individual 
effects (unobserved heterogeneity) are constant across time and correlated with the 
independent variables. The latter approach treats intercepts as random drawings from 
the population distribution of company intercepts. It assumes that the individual 
specific effects are the results of random variation and do not correlate with the 
independent variables. Because of the assumption, the fixed effects regression only 
draws inferences from the sample, but the random effects regression can generalize 
the inferences outside the sample. The fixed effects regression has to drop the regional 
dummy variable and industry sector dummy variable, because they are consistent 
values across the time periods, which are perfectly collinear with the individual effect. 
The random effects regression does not have this problem and the same is true of 
Equation 5.9.  
 
Each regression model has its own advantages and disadvantages. This thesis does not 
intend to discuss and compare which regression model is the best. In Gupta and 
Newberry’s (1997) study, they discussed statistics criteria and suggested the fixed 
effects regression out-performed both random effects’ regression and cross sectional 
OLS regression. The results are presented in all three models as a sensitivity analysis, 
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which examines the effects of changing regression models in the results.    
 
5.2.4 Replication of Prior ETR Determinant Studies 
In order to link with the existing literature, the model is compared with prior ETR 
determinant analysis models.  The replications of prior studies are also performed. 
Three typical ETR determinant research studies are selected, which are Gupta and 
Newberry (1997), Derashid and Zhang (2003) and Richardson and Lanis (2007). The 
three studies cover typical ETR determinants used in the ETR research, which are size, 
leverage, profitability, capital intensity, inventory intensity and typical regression 
models, such as OLS, fixed effects regression and random effects regression. The 
feasibility of the replication is also considered as studies have to be able to replicate 
using the Chinese listed company financial statement data. For example, foreign sales 
(Harris and Feeny 2003 and Janssen 2005) are not disclosed in the financial statements 
and the R&D expenses are not required to be disclosed in the sample period. Therefore, 
the R&D intensity has to be excluded from the model. The replications use the same 
sample data and the same dependent variables definitions to make the results 
comparable with the model. The purpose of the replication is to compare the prior ETR 
determinant analysis modes with the model which proposed here. The prior ETR 
determinants hypotheses are not directly relevant to the research question. Therefore, 
the determinants and its hypotheses will only be discussed briefly for the model 
illustration.  
 
Gupta and Newberry’s Model 
The Gupta and Newberry (1997) model (Equation 5.10) examines the association 
between ETR, and company size and company capital structure variables, while 
controlling for company profitability.   
itit6it5
it4it3it2it10it
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                  (5.10) 
Gupta and Newberry’s model (1997) is also the first fixed effects and random effects 
regression model in the literature, to the author’s knowledge. The replication of Gupta 
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and Newberry (1997) will also estimate the fixed effects and random effects regression 
with OLS regression to compare with the model (Equations 5.8 and 5.9). 
 
Size 
The size variable is defined as the natural logarithm of company assets. The natural 
logarithm conversion is used to get a less crooked distribution and avoid the potential 
non-linearity problem. Gupta and Newberry (1997) summarized the choice of the size 
variable definitions. The income based size measure can mislead the interpretation, 
because the larger companies tend to have higher profitability and lead to higher 
ETRs. Also, asset-based size measures facilitate comparison with prior ETR studies 
(e.g. Sickney and McGee 1982; Porcano 1986; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Liu and 
Cao 2007). The number of employees variable was also used in prior literature 
(Buijink et al. 1999 and Liu and Cao 2007). However, this measure is strongly 
influenced by a company’s industry sector and the definition of an employee, such as 
contracted or casual staff or outsourcing staff. It is also considered not suitable to 
proxy the company size, because it is strongly influenced by industry and company 
operation strategy. There is no direct tax preference over company size and the past 
results were not unanimous. The size variable coefficient does not have expected 
signs. 
 
Leverage 
The leverage explanatory variable (Lev) is defined as long-term liability/total assets. 
The previous studies suggest that the ETRs may also have a negative relationship with 
company leverage. The interest expenses are tax deductible and as the leverage goes 
higher, it leads ETRs to go lower (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Derashid and Zhang 2003; 
Liu and Cao 2007). It follows the previous research expectation that leverage is 
negatively related to the ETR.    
 
Capital Intensity  
The capital intensity variable (CapInt) is a commonly used asset mix variable which is 
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defined as net property, plants and machinery/total assets. The capital intensity 
variable (CapInt) effect is expected to have a negative relationship with ETRs 
(Stickney and McGee 1982; Gupta and Newberry 1997). The assumption is that the 
tax benefits are associated with capital investment such as depreciation. Again, here it 
follows the previous research expectation that capital intensity is negatively associated 
with the ETR.    
 
Inventory Intensity  
The inventory intensity variable (InvInt) was a new asset mix variable which was 
proposed by Gupta and Newberry (1997). It is defined as the inventory/total assets. The 
inventory intensity is a substitute for a capital intensity variable and is expected to 
associate positively with the ETR. The inventory intensity is assumed to have a positive 
relationship with ETRs, because of the aggregated industry ETR level differences. For 
example, the manufacturing sector has a lower ETR than the wholesale and retail 
sectors (Zimmerman 1983).This positive relationship was also statistically observed in 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Richardson and Lanis (2007), but not in Derashid and 
Zhang (2003).  
 
Profitability 
The profitability variable was proposed by Gupta and Newberry (1997). The 
profitability variable is defined as total profit before tax over total assets. The 
relationship is derived from Wilkie (1988).  
RateTax 
Asset TotalAsseton Return 
sPreferenceTax 1ETR ×⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
×−=                   (5.11) 
From the equation and Gupta and Newberry’s (1997) assumptions, the ROA is 
positively related to the ETRs conditional on holding the value of tax preferences, tax 
rate and total asset constant. This is also empirically supported by Gupta and 
Newberry (1997), Harris and Feeny (2003), Janssen (2005), and Richardson and Lanis 
(2007). A different result was found by Derashid and Zhang (2003). Liu and Cao 
(2007) found a positive relationship in the PRC only in 1998-2000, and no significant 
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impact in 2002 -2004. Because there are conflicting results previous research, the sign 
for ROA coefficient is uncertain. 
 
Derashid and Zhang’s Model 
Derashid and Zhang’s (2003) model (Equation 5.12) is developed from previous studies, 
especially that of Gupta and Newberry (1997). They extended the model to include a 
government equity ownership variable, an industry dummy variable and a year dummy 
variable to apply to the Malaysian context.  
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     (5.12) 
The size, leverage, capital intensity, inventory intensity and ROA are the same as that of 
Gupta and Newberry (1997), except that leverage is defined as total liability/total 
assets.  
 
Market to Book Variable 
The market to book variable (MktBook) is defined as the market value of equity over 
the book value of equity (Kim and Limpaphayom 1998). It is used to proxy the future 
growth of the company. The original assumption is that the high MktBook company is 
expected to receive more government tax preference or benefit and implies high 
investment expenditure in the future, which results in a lower ETR. However, Kim and 
Limpaphayom (1998) did not find any significant relationship between MktBook and 
ETR. Derashid and Zhang (2003) found a significant positive relationship between 
MktBook and ETR. Due to the previous conflicting results, there is not expected to be 
any relationship between MktBook and ETR. 
 
Control Variables 
The government equity ownership variable and industry dummy variable are the same 
as the control variables which are defined above. The year dummy variable is used to 
control the possible time-variant effects such as economic growth and tax regulation 
change. It has the same purpose as the time period dummy variable.  
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Richardson and Lanis’s Model 
Richardson and Lanis’s (2007) model (Equation 5.13) examined the effects of the 
Ralph Review tax reform44 in Australia on the ETR determinants. Their study covered 
common ETR determinants, which are size, leverage, capital intensity, inventory 
intensity, R&D intensity, ROA and industry dummy variables. The variables’ 
definitions and expectations are the same as the above two studies used and will not be 
reiterated here.  
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(5.13) 
 
The reason for replicating Richardson and Lanis’s (2007) model is because of the 
interaction variables used in their model. An accounting system and tax policy change 
occurred in 2001 and the time dummy variable is used to control for the overall effect of 
the change. The interaction variables provide a test for slope shifts in each of the 
company-specific and control variables after the change. The company specific and 
control variables provide testing on their relationships with ETR before 2001, while the 
sum of these variables’ coefficients and the coefficients of their corresponding 
interaction variables with the time dummy variable provides evidence on their 
relationship with ETR after 2001.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
44 The Australian government accepted the Ralph Review’s key proposals and they were codified in the Income 
Tax Assessment Act (1997) in 1999. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of the Regression Variables 
Variable Name Description Expected sign
ETR Income tax expenses/Total profit before tax  
Tax rate preference  (TRP) Top statutory tax rate – Actual statutory tax rate Negative 
Non-operating expenses (NopExp) Non-operating expenses/Total profit before tax Positive 
Investment gain (InvGa) Investment gain/Total profit before tax Negative 
Provision for the impairment of asset (ProImp) Provision for the impairment of asset  
/ Total profit before tax Positive 
Regional dummy variable (Reg) 4 regions’ dummy variables    
Industry sector dummy variable (Indu)  11 industry sectors dummy variables  
Government ownership variable (Gov) Percentage of government equity ownership ? 
Time period dummy variable (Time) If a sample company is from 2002 to 2006, 
then, it equals 1. 0 otherwise (1998 to 2000). Positive 
Size Nature log of total assets ? 
Return on assets (ROA) Total profit before tax/Total assets ? 
Capital intensity (CapInt) Net property, plant and equipment/Total assets Negative 
Inventory intensity (InvInt) Inventory/Total assets Positive 
Leverage-(Lev_TL) Total liability/Total assets Negative 
Leverage-(Lev_LL) Long-term liability/Total assets Negative 
MktBook Market value of equity/Book value of equity ? 
Year dummy variable (Year) Annual dummy variable (1998-2005 and 
2006 is omitted)  
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5.3 Data 
The data sources are the same as Chapter 4.2.2’s ETR sample and data described 
which are from CSMAR and Wind. The final sample consists of 676 companies or 
3562 company years after excluding companies that fall into the following categories: 
 
1 Companies’ years before 1998. In 1998, there was an accounting system change 
for the listed companies in the PRC. The provision for the impairment of assets, 
which is from the cash flow statement, was only required to be disclosed from 
1998. There were only 1317 company years before 1998. The exclusion does not 
materially impact on the overall samples. It also helps to avoid the effects of the 
changes in the accounting system in 1998.  
2 Companies incurring any operating loss or negative total income before tax in any 
of the sample years. This is because the effect of operating losses may significantly 
understate the income tax burden and distort the relationships between the ETR and 
its explanatory variables after the losses are carried forward. On the other hand, the 
negative denominator results in a negative ETR, which would be difficult to 
interpret (Wang 1991). Effectively the step excludes sample companies with at least 
one single loss-making sample year. Around half of the sample companies are 
excluded from the population, because of this strict profitability condition. The 
exclusion of these loss-making companies is inevitable for ETR research. This 
approach is also consistent with previous studies (Omer et al. 1993; Porcano 1986; 
Zimmerman 1983; Wilkie and Limberg 1990; Derashid and Zhang 2003).    
3 Companies having negative tax payments in any of the sample years. The negative 
tax payments come from the government income tax refunds. This negative 
numerator would also result in interpretation difficulty. This approach is also 
consistent with previous studies (Omer et al. 1993; Porcano 1986; Zimmerman 
1983; Wilkie and Limberg 1990; Derashid and Zhang 2003).    
4 Companies’ ETRs exceeding one. This can cause model estimation problems. The 
elimination is consistent with previous studies (Stickney and McGee 1982; Gupta 
and Newberry 1997; Kim and Limpaphayom 1998; Derashid and Zhang 2003; 
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5 Companies with missing values from a merger of the two databases (CSMAR and 
WIND). Only company years containing complete data for calculating all ETR 
measures in a given year are included in the analysis. 
6 2001 company years. This is because 2001 was a transformation year for both 
accounting system and tax policy.45 This exclusion approach is also consistent with 
Gupta and Newberry (1997). 
Table 5.2 provides details about the sample selection procedure with the number of 
company years and company losses in each step. The initial population comprised the 
1447 companies (11374 company years) that were listed on the CSMAR from 1994 to 
2006. This final population was reduced to 676 companies (3562 company years) after 
eliminating companies falling into the above six categories.  
 
Table 5.2 Sample Selection Procedure 
 Number of Company Years Number of Companies 
All company-years on the 
2007 CSMAR General 
Industrial File from 1994 to 
2006 
11374 1447 
Less:   
Company years before 
1998 
1317 1 
Losses incurred in any 
company years ( both 
operating income loss and 
total income before tax） 
5722 726 
Negative tax payments 
incurred in any sample 
company years 
226 34 
Missing Value 84 10 
ETRs greater than 1  50  
2001 company years 413  
   
Final full sample from 
1998 to 2006 
3562 676 
                                                              
45 The 2001 company year sample exclusion does not change the regression results significantly. It creates an 
analysis difficulty because of the changing accounting system and tax policy at the same time. For simplicity, the 
sample data excludes the 2001 company year.    
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 Table 5.3 shows the number of sample companies per year from 1994 to 2006. The 
sample size in early years may be smaller because the number of listed companies in the 
PRC stock market has been increasing rapidly since the early 1990s. 
 
Table 5.3 Number of Sample Companies per Year a  
Year No. of companies Percentage of total sample 
1998 185 5.19% 
1999 250 7.02% 
2000 319 8.96% 
2001 Omitted  
2002 462 12.97% 
2003 508 14.26% 
2004 575 16.14% 
2005 603 16.93% 
2006 660 18.53% 
Total 3562 100.00% 
a The table shows the number of sample companies per year from 1998 to 2006. It includes the actual 
number of the companies and the percentage of the total sample every year from 1998 to 2006.  
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one 
and 2001 company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as the final 
sample. 
 
5.4 Results and Analysis 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics of means, median, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for all proxies of the dependent variable (ETR) and 
explanatory variables from 1998 to 2006. The average ETR is 0.216 and the average 
increased from 0.162 in Period 1 (1998 to 2000) to 0.231 in Period 2 (2002 to 2006). 
The increasing trend is consistent with the previous ETR analysis chapter’s results. 
Correspondingly, the tax rate preference (TRP) decreased from 0.178 in Period 1 (1998 
to 2000) to 0.089 in (2002 to 2006). In Period 2, the TRP’s median was 0 which means 
at least half of the TRP was zero. The provision for the impairment of asset (ProImp) 
increased significantly from 0.028 in Period 1 to 0.073 in Period 2 with an overall 
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average of 0.063. The significant increase is the result of the change in accounting 
system in 2001. From 2001, the provision for the impairment increased to eight 
provisions from the previous four provisions under the accounting system (detailed 
discussion is presented in section 2.5). The investment gain (InveGain), ROA and 
Government equity ownership (GovOwn) decreased from Period 1 to Period 2. The 
decrease in GovOwn was because of the increasing number of non-SOEs listed on the 
stock exchange and the government decreasing its holding in Period 2. The region 
dummy variable and industry dummy variable frequency table are shown in Table 5.5 
and Table 5.6. The distribution of the region dummy variable and industry dummy 
variable are very similar to the ETR analysis chapter distribution. The Eastern Region 
is the biggest sample company year region and the manufacturing sector contains over 
the half of the sample company years. 
 
Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Variables    a
Panel A b : All Samples  
 Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 
ETR 0.216 0.189 0.120 0.000 0.957 0.137 0.302 
TRP 0.108 0.180 0.096 0.000 0.330 0.000 0.180 
NOpExp 0.042 0.017 0.141 -0.776 5.512 0.006 0.040 
InveGain 0.043 0.005 0.190 -3.623 0.857 -0.003 0.072 
ProImp 0.063 0.022 0.183 -1.889 2.254 0.001 0.078 
Time 0.788 1.000 0.409 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
GovOwn 0.374 0.441 0.272 0.000 0.850 0.015 0.612 
   
Panel B: Period 1 (1998-2000)  
  Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 
ETR 0.162 0.150 0.091 0.000 0.835 0.114 0.195 
TRP 0.178 0.180 0.060 0.000 0.330 0.180 0.180 
NOpExp 0.029 0.012 0.070 0.000 0.882 0.004 0.026 
InveGain 0.071 0.031 0.229 -3.623 0.728 0.000 0.140 
ProImp 0.028 0.007 0.123 -0.892 2.066 0.000 0.030 
GovOwn 0.437 0.490 0.246 0.000 0.850 0.271 0.635 
        
Panel C: Period 2 (2002-2006) 
  Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 
ETR 0.231 0.212 0.122 0.000 0.957 0.145 0.319 
TRP 0.089 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.330 0.000 0.180 
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NOpExp 0.046 0.019 0.155 -0.776 5.512 0.007 0.044 
InvGa 0.035 0.002 0.177 -2.759 0.857 -0.007 0.055 
ProImp 0.073 0.029 0.195 -1.889 2.254 0.001 0.093 
Gov 0.357 0.418 0.276 0.000 0.850 0.000 0.605 
a The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (Std.dev.), minimum (Min), maximum (Max), 
first quartile (Q1), third quartile (Q3), for the ETR and determinant variables used in the regression 
analysis. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative 
operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR 
exceeding one and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 
1998 to 2006 as the final sample. 
b  Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the entire sample (total 3562 company years). Panel B 
shows the descriptive statistic of the Period 1 (from 1994 to 2000, with a total 754 company years). Panel 
C shows the descriptive statistic of the Period 2 (from 2002 to 2006, with a total 2808 company years).  
c  ETR = income tax expenses/total profit before tax; TRP = tax rate preference = top STR-actual STR; 
NOpExp = non-operating expenses = non-operating expenses/total profit before tax; InvGa = investment 
gain = investment gain/total profit before tax; ProImp = provision for the impairment of asset = provision 
for the impairment of asset/total profit before tax; Gov = government ownership = percentage of 
government equity ownership.  
 
 
 
Table 5.5 Relative Frequency of Region Dummy Variable a  
Region 1998-2000 2002-2006 Total 
Eastern Region 302 (40.05%) 1223 (43.55%) 1525 (42.81%) 
Middle Region 119 (15.78%) 462 (16.45%) 581 (16.31%) 
Western Region 85 (11.27%) 306 (10.90%) 391 (10.98%) 
SEZ 69 (9.15%) 177 (6.30%) 246 (6.91%) 
HTIDZ 179 (23.74%) 640 (22.79%) 819 (22.99%) 
Total 754 (100%) 2808 (100%) 3562 (100%) 
a The table shows the number of the company year falling into each region segments and the 
of each category to the total sample company years for 1998-2000 and 2002-2006 sample periods and 
total sample. SEZ = Special Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry Development Zone. 
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Table 5.6 Relative Frequency of Industry Sector Dummy Variables  a
Industry Sector 1998-2000 2002-2006 Pooled Sample 
Agriculture, forestry,  
animal husbandry  
and fishery 
9 (1.19%) 47 (1.67%) 56 (1.57%) 
Mining 5 (0.66%) 73 (2.60%) 78 (2.19%) 
Manufacturing 415 (55.04%) 1701 (60.58%) 2116 (59.40%)
Electricity, gas and  
water production and supply 45 (5.97%) 169 (6.02%) 214 (6.01%) 
Construction 12 (1.59%) 75 (2.67%) 87 (2.44%) 
Transportation and warehousing 49 (6.50%) 188 (6.70%) 237 (6.65%) 
Information technology 27 (3.58%) 121 (4.31%) 148 (4.15%) 
Wholesale and retail 80 (10.61%) 185 (6.59%) 265 (7.44%) 
Real estate industry 52 (6.90%) 121 (4.31%) 173 (4.86%) 
Public services 18 (2.39%) 54 (1.92%) 72 (2.02%) 
Broadcasting, media and culture 3 (0.40%) 5 (0.18%) 8 (0.22%) 
Miscellaneous 39 (5.17%) 69 (2.46%) 108 (3.03%) 
Total 754 (100%) 2808 (100%) 3562 (100%) 
a
                                                             
The table shows the number of the company year falling into each industry sector segments and the 
proportion of each category to the total sample company years for the 1998-2000 and 2002-2006 
sample period and the total sample. 
 
Table 5.7 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation of the regression variables. 
The low correlation between most independent variables suggests that 
multi-collinearity is not a serious problem in the sample. The highest Pearson 
correlation and Spearman correlation among the variables is the ETR and tax rate 
preferences (TRP) with a value of -0.526 (-0.569 for the Spearman correlation). The 
Durbin-Watson Test and Variance inflation factor (VIF) show no significant problems 
of autocorrelation and multi-collinearity.46  
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 The regression diagnostics results show that Durbin-Watson test statistic value ≈ 2 and Variance inflation factor 
(VIF) <10.  
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Table 5.7 Correlation of the Independent Variables  a
Pearson Correlation 
 ETR TRP NOpExp InveGain ProImp Gov 
ETR 1.000      
TRP -0.526** 1.000     
NOpExp 0.087** -0.020 1.000    
InveGain -0.283** 0.057** -0.098** 1.000   
ProImp 0.157** 0.027 0.169** -0.202** 1.000  
Gov 0.038* 0.062** 0.034* 0.000 0.010 1.000 
       
Spearman Correlation (Non-parametric correlation)  
 ETR TRP NOpExp InveGain ProImp Gov 
ETR 1.000      
TRP -0.569** 1.000     
NOpExp 0.131** -0.091** 1.000    
InveGain -0.225** 0.119** -0.036* 1.000   
ProImp 0.065** 0.009 0.214** -0.086** 1.000  
Gov 0.034* 0.046** 0.031* 0.045** -0.031* 1.000 
a
b
The table shows Pearson correlations and Spearman correlations of the independent variables from 
1998 to 2006 sample years (excluding 2001). The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding 
any sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative 
income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 
company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as the final sample. 
ETR = income tax expenses/total profit before tax; TRP = tax rate preference = top STR-actual STR; 
NOpExp = non-operating expenses = non-operating expenses/total profit before tax; InvGa = investment 
gain = investment gain/total profit before tax; ProImp = provision for the impairment of asset = provision 
for the impairment of asset/total profit before tax; Gov = government ownership = percentage of 
government equity ownership.  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
5.4.2 Regression Results  
5.4.2.1 Cross Sectional Data Analysis  
The OLS regression analyses results are carried out on separate data sets. They are 
pooled sample data, before and after the 2001 periods separately. The pooled sample 
(1998-2006) regression analyses use the time period dummy variable to control for the 
overall effect of the change in 2001. The two sample period regressions were carried 
out partly to ascertain whether a pooled sample regression is appropriate.  
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The OLS regression results presented in Table 5.8 indicate that between 0.32 and 0.367 
of the variation in the ETR can be explained by the independent variables. This 
explanatory power is much higher than the prior ETR determinant model, which will be 
presented in a later analysis. 
 
The tax rate preference (TRP) variable is significantly negatively associated with ETR 
for all the sample periods. The variable is also the biggest absolute value of the 
coefficient parameter. These results provide strong evidence that the tax rate preference 
is the most influential effect on the ETR variations. The previous Chinese ETR studies 
(Wang 2003a, b; Wu and Li 2007; Liu and Cao 2007) did not recognise the important 
role of tax rate preference in the ETR determinant analysis. Without the recognition of 
the tax rate preference effect, the companies’ tax burden comparison results may be 
potentially misleading. 
 
With respect to the accounting-tax differences’ variables, the coefficients are consistent 
with the expected signs. The non-operating expenses (NOpExp) and the provision for 
the impairment of assets (ProImp) are positively and significantly associated with ETR 
for all the sample periods. Because these two variables are proxies for non-taxable 
expenses, which cause the gap between taxable income and accounting income, the 
non-taxable expense variables do not change the taxable income but decrease the 
accounting income. This results in an increase in ETR. The ProImp increased its 
influences from 0.056 in Period 1 to 0.085 in Period 2. This may be because of the 
change in the accounting system in 2001. After 2002, the provision for the impairment 
of assets increased to eight provisions from four provisions. Conversely, the investment 
gain variable (InvGa) is negatively significantly associated with ETR for all the sample 
periods. The investment gain is assumed as a non-taxable income proxy. The result 
evidenced that the investment gain increased the accounting income without changing 
taxable income, and led to a decrease in the ETR.  
 
The pooled sample regression resulting from the regional dummy variables indicate 
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that the SEZ, HTIEDZ and Western Region’s ETRs are statistically significantly lower 
than Middle Region. The SEZ dummy variable is the highest region dummy coefficient 
parameter absolute value in all sample periods. This indicates that the SEZ is the lowest 
regional corporate tax burden. The Eastern Region is not statistically significantly 
different from the Middle Region, because both of them are not tax preference regions. 
These are consistent with expectations and the previous regional tax preference 
analysis (Chapter 4.3.3.5).  
 
The Period 1 (1998-2000) regression results show that the HTIEDZ, Western Region, 
Eastern Region, and Middle Region ETRs are not statistically significantly different 
from each other. Only SEZ’s ETR was statically significant lower than the Middle 
Region’s. The other regional dummy variables are not statistically different from 0. 
This is probably because the widespread tax rate preference made regional ETR 
undifferentiated in Period 1 (1998-2000). In Period 2 (2002-2006), SEZ, HTIEDZ and 
Western Region dummy variables are negatively and significantly related to the ETRs. 
This shows that government regional tax preference policies were effective after the 
government stopped the local government unauthorised tax refunds in 2002. 
 
The industry dummy variable coefficient results prove that the industry sectors’ ETRs 
are statistically different in the pooled sample. Most of the industry dummy variables 
are negatively significantly related to ETR. This indicates that most industry sectors’ 
ETR are lower than the miscellaneous sector’s ETR, especially the tax preferential 
industries, such as the agriculture industry and information technology. Like the region 
dummy variable, the industry sector dummy variable is generally not statistically 
significantly different from the miscellaneous sector’s ETR in the 1998-2000 period. 
This is probably because the widespread tax rate preference made the industrial ETR 
undifferentiated in Period 1 (1998-2000). In Period 2 (2002-2006), the industry 
differences are significant and most industries are significantly lower than the 
miscellaneous sector.   
The time period dummy variable (Time) evidenced that the company ETR in the 
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2002-2006 period was statistically higher than the company ETR in 1998-2000 period, 
about 1.4% overall. It also evidenced the effectiveness of the government stopping the 
local government unauthorised tax refunds in Period 2.  
 
The government equity ownership variable (Gov) is positively and significantly related 
to ETR for all the sample periods. However, the coefficient of Gov in Period 1 is higher 
than the coefficient in Period 2. This may be because of the decrease in the government 
equity in the listed companies from Period 1 to Period 2. The average government 
equity ownership decreases to 0.357 in Period 2 from 0.437 in Period 1 (Table 5.4).  
The results indicate that the government equity ownership had a positive influence on 
the ETR. The possible reasons could be that SOEs were not interested in tax planning as 
much as private companies or that SOEs were simply in different industry sectors 
compared with private companies. 
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Table 5.8  
OLS Regression Results of the ETR on Various Company Determinants  
Independent 
variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
(coefficient estimates with t-statistics ) 
  Pooled sample  1998-2000 2002-2006 
Intercept  0.309 
(28.39)*** 
0.241 
(13.82)*** 
0.344 
(26.76)*** 
TRP - -0.584 
(-30.02)*** 
-0.503 
(-10.98)*** 
-0.590 
(-26.80)*** 
NOpExp + 0.024 
(2.15)** 
0.115 
(2.43)** 
0.021 
(1.77)* 
InvGa - -0.154 
(-17.98)*** 
-0.137 
(-9.74)*** 
-0.152 
(-14.14)*** 
ProImp + 0.080 
(8.97)*** 
0.056 
(2.49)** 
0.085 
(8.66)*** 
     
Region     
SEZ - -0.028 
(-3.60)*** 
-0.042  
(-3.33)*** 
-0.023  
(-2.50)** 
HTIEDZ - -0.011 
(-2.17)** 
-0.004 
(-0.45) 
-0.013 
(-2.05)** 
West - -0.014 
(-2.19)** 
0.007 
(0.63) 
-0.019 
(-2.59)*** 
East ? -0.004 
(-0.97) 
0.008 
(1.00) 
-0.008 
(-1.48) 
     
Industry     
Agri  -0.136 
(-8.78)*** 
-0.044 
(-1.59) 
-0.164 
(-8.88)*** 
Mining  -0.033 
(-2.36)** 
0.013 
(0.35) 
-0.050 
(-3.01)*** 
Manu  -0.055 
(-5.86)*** 
-0.015 
(-1.16) 
-0.073 
(-6.10)*** 
EleGasWat  -0.044 
(-3.97)*** 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
-0.062 
(-4.46)*** 
Constru  -0.040 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.020 
(-0.80) 
-0.055 
(-3.38)*** 
Trans&Ware  -0.044 
(-3.93)*** 
-0.013 
(-0.80) 
-0.059 
(-4.24)*** 
IT  -0.048 
(-4.03)*** 
-0.020 
(-1.06) 
-0.065 
(-4.43)*** 
Whole&Ret  -0.007 
(-0.61) 
0.018 
(1.21) 
-0.019 
(-1.41) 
Real Estate  0.018 0.021 0.015 
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(1.52) (1.29) (1.01) 
PubSer  -0.039 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.059 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.038 
(-2.15)** 
BroadMed  -0.022 
(-0.65) 
-0.099 
(-2.18)** 
0.027 
(0.60) 
     
Time  + 0.014 
(3.30)*** 
  
Gov ? 0.032  
(5.28)*** 
0.058 
(5.11)*** 
0.025 
(3.60)*** 
     
Adj. 2R   0.397 0.339 0.375 
F-value  112.425*** 20.339*** 85.059*** 
a
RegionProImpInvGaNOpExpTRP
The table shows OLS regression results from the following regression model: 
itit22it21it2010
it95it4it3it2it10it
TimeGovIndustry               εβββ
ETR β β β ββα
++++
+ ++++= −
b
−
  
where ETR = income tax expenses/total profit before tax; TRP = Tax Rate Preference = top STR-actual 
STR; NOpExp = non-operating expenses = non-operating expenses/total profit before tax; 
InvGa = investment gain = investment gain/total profit before tax; ProImp = provision for the impairment 
of asset = provision for the impairment of asset/total profit before tax; Regional effect = regional dummy 
variables (SEZ; HTIEDZ; West; East and Middle is omitted); Industry = industry sector dummy (Agri = 
agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, Mining = mining, Manu = manufacturing, 
ElecGasWat = electricity, gas and water production and supply, Constru = construction, Trans&Ware = 
transportation and warehousing, IT = information technology, Whole&Ret = wholesale and retail, 
RealEstate = real estate industry, PubSer = public services, BroadMed = broadcasting, media and culture 
and miscellaneous is omitted); Time = time period dummy = If a sample company is from 2002 to 2006, 
then, it equals 1. 0 otherwise; Gov = government ownership = percentage of government equity 
ownership.  
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one 
and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as 
the final sample. 
* Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
 
5.4.2.2 Panel Data Analysis  
The panel data analyses were carried out on separate data sets as above. They are 
pooled sample data from before and after 2001 which are the same as above. The fixed 
effects regression results and random effects regression results are presented in Table 
5.9 and Table 5.10 respectively. The pooled sample (1998-2006) regression analysis 
uses the time period dummy variable to control for the overall effect of the change in 
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2001. The two sample period regressions are partly carried out to ascertain whether 
pooled sample regression is appropriate. For the fixed effects regression, the region 
dummy variable and industry dummy variable have been dropped, because they are 
perfectly collinear with the individual effect (consistent value). The Hausman test, 
which is used to choose between fixed effects model and random effects model, 
suggests the fixed effects are better in all three samples. This is also the same with 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) who found the fixed effects regression out-performed the 
random effects regression.   
  
The F-test and Wald test results prove that both of the regression models’ coefficients 
are significant overall. The 2R were relatively high compared with the prior model 
(this will be shown in the replication of prior ETR determinant studies section later). 
Both of the regression models’ results are generally consistent with OLS regression 
results and individual variables will not be discussed in detail. All the tax rate 
preference variables, accounting-tax differences variables and time period variables 
coefficients are statistically and significantly in line with expected signs. The random 
effects regression results also confirmed the above finding that the regional and 
industrial differences were not significant (Except SEZ) in Period 1 (1998-2000). This 
indicates that the listed companies widely benefited from tax preferences in Period 1 
(1998-2000). The regional and industrial differences were significant in the pooled 
sample in Period 2 (2002-2006).  
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Table 5.9   
Fixed Effects Regression Results of the ETR on Various Company Determinants  
Independent 
variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
(coefficient estimates with t-statistics ) 
  Pooled sample  1998-2000 2002-2006 
Intercept  0.231 
(31.61)*** 
0.140 
(4.41)*** 
0.252 
(43.02)*** 
TRP - -0.404 
(-14.61)*** 
-0.233 
(-3.91)*** 
-0.299 
(-6.93)*** 
NOpExp + 0.023 
(2.23)** 
0.196 
(2.96)*** 
0.019 
(1.85)* 
InvGa - -0.133 
(-15.27)*** 
-0.083 
(-4.44)*** 
-0.122 
(-11.27)*** 
ProImp + 0.106 
(12.45)*** 
0.078 
(3.27)*** 
0.116 
(12.40)*** 
Time  + 0.028 
(6.80)*** 
  
 
Gov ? 0.012 
(1.13) 
0.142 
(2.05)** 
0.002 
(0.15) 
     
2R (Within)  0.283 0.145 0.169 
2R (Between)  0.430 0.211 0.356 
2R (Overall)  0.335 0.206 0.271 
No. of Co.  676 325 676 
No. of Obs.  3562 754 2808 
F-value  189.67*** 14.40*** 86.19*** 
Hausman  
2χ  71.61*** 33.27*** 56.80*** 
a
ETR
The table shows fixed effects regression results from the following regression model: 
itit6it5it4it3it2it10it TimeGovProImpInvGaNOpExpTRP εββββββα ++++++++=
 
where ETR = income tax expenses/total profit before tax; TRP = tax rate preference = top STR-actual 
STR; NOpExp = non-operating expenses = non-operating expenses/total profit before tax; InvGa = 
investment gain = investment gain/total profit before tax; ProImp = provision for the impairment of asset 
= provision for the impairment of asset/total profit before tax; Gov = government ownership = 
percentage of government equity ownership; Time = time period dummy = If a sample company is from 
2002 to 2006, then, it equals 1; 0 otherwise;  No. of Co. = number of the company; No. of Obs. = number 
of the company years.  
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one 
and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as 
the final sample. 
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b * Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
 
Table 5.10 
Random Effects Regression Results of the ETR on Various Company Determinants 
Independent 
variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
(coefficient estimates with z-statistics ) 
  Pooled sample  1998-2000 2002-2006 
Intercept  0.300 
(17.86)*** 
 0.219 
(10.11)*** 
0.345 
(17.38)*** 
TRP - -0.514 
(-23.67)*** 
-0.414 
(-9.27)*** 
-0.506 
(-18.29)*** 
NOpExp + 0.024 
(2.35)** 
0.148 
(3.00)*** 
0.021 
(2.09)** 
InvGa - -0.142 
(-17.24)*** 
-0.117*** 
(-8.11) 
-0.135 
(-13.48)*** 
ProImp + 0.096 
(11.77)*** 
0.064 
(3.11)*** 
0.105 
(11.90)*** 
     
Region     
SEZ - -0.038 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.046 
(-2.84)*** 
-0.039 
(-2.72)*** 
HTIEDZ - -0.018 
(-2.26)** 
-0.007 
(-0.59) 
-0.019 
(-1.98)** 
West - -0.023 
(-2.37)** 
0.004 
(0.27) 
-0.029 
(-2.53)** 
East ? -0.004 
(-0.61) 
0.009 
(0.86) 
-0.009 
(-1.08) 
     
Industry     
Agri  -0.142 
(-6.13)*** 
-0.045 
(-1.26) 
-0.170 
(-6.22)*** 
Mining  -0.033 
(-1.57) 
0.011 
(0.28) 
-0.053 
(-2.09)** 
Manu  -0.055 
(-3.58)*** 
-0.008 
(-0.51) 
-0.077 
(-4.14)*** 
EleGasWat  -0.043 
(-2.39)** 
0.004 
(0.17) 
-0.063 
(-2.93)*** 
Constru  -0.034 
(-1.64)* 
-0.015 
(-0.49) 
-0.052 
(-2.12)** 
Trans&Ware  -0.040 
(-2.26)** 
-0.006 
(-0.26) 
-0.059 
(-2.77)*** 
IT  -0.057 -0.017 -0.078 
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(-3.05)*** (-0.71) (-3.45)*** 
Whole&Ret  -0.004 
(-0.20) 
0.020 
(1.02) 
-0.019 
(-0.89) 
Real Estate  0.020 
(1.05) 
0.026 
(1.20) 
0.013 
(0.56) 
PubSer  -0.036 
(-1.57) 
-0.044 
(-1.58) 
-0.041 
(-1.49) 
BroadMed  -0.010 
(-0.16) 
-0.087 
(-1.41) 
0.039 
(0.54) 
     
Time  + 0.020 
(5.16)*** 
  
Gov ? 0.026 
(3.53)*** 
0.060 
(4.20)*** 
0.017 
(2.08)** 
     
2R (Within)  0.279 0.130 0.160 
2R (Between)  0.533 0.415 0.496 
2R (Overall)  0.397 0.353 0.375 
No. of Co.  676 325 676 
No. of Obs.  3562 754 2808 
Wald Vaule 
2χ  1834.34*** 275.80*** 1033.68*** 
a
ETR
 The table shows random effects regression results from the following regression model: 
itit22it21it2010
it95it4it3it2it10it
TimeGovIndustry               
RegionProImpInvGaNOpExpTRP
εβββ
βββββα
++++
+++++=
−
−   
where ETR = income tax expenses/total profit before tax; TRP = tax rate preference = top STR-actual 
STR; NOpExp = non-operating expenses = non-operating expenses/total profit before tax; InvGa = 
investment gain = investment gain/total profit before tax; ProImp = provision for the impairment of asset 
= provision for the impairment of asset/total profit before tax; Regional effect = regional dummy 
variables (SEZ; HTIEDZ; West; East and Middle is omitted); Industry = industry sector dummy (Agri 
=agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, Mining = mining, Manu = manufacturing, 
ElecGasWat = electricity, gas and water production and supply, Constru = construction, Trans&Ware = 
transportation and warehousing, IT = information technology, Whole&Ret = wholesale and retail, 
RealEstate = real estate industry, PubSer = public services, BroadMed = broadcasting, media and culture 
and miscellaneous is omitted); Time = time period dummy = If a sample company is from 2002 to 2006, 
then, it equals 1. 0 otherwise; Gov = government ownership = percentage of government equity 
ownership; No. of Co. = number of the company; No. of Obs. = number of the company years. 
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one 
and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as 
the final sample. 
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b * Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
 
5.4.3 Replication of Prior ETR Determinant Studies 
5.4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.11 shows the descriptive statistics of means, median, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for all proxies of the dependent variable (ETR) and 
explanatory variables from 1998 to 2006. The sample companies are the same as the 
above model used, but there are different explanatory variables. The means of 
explanatory variables are increased from Period 1 (1998-200) to Period 2 (2002-2006), 
except ROA and MKtBook. This is probably because of the economic crisis in 2001, 
when company earnings and the market value went down. (The industry dummy 
variables are the same as above, and are not shown here again.) Table 5.12 presents 
the Pearson and Spearman correlation of the regression variables. The low correlation 
between the independent variables suggests that the multi-collinearity is not a serious 
problem in the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.11  Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Variables    a
Panel A b : All Samples  
 Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 
ETR 0.216 0.189 0.120 0.000 0.957 0.137 0.302
SIZE 21.352 21.220 0.982 19.212 27.111 20.663 21.914
LEV_LT 0.068 0.032 0.091 -0.043 0.580 0.003 0.098
LEV_TL 0.427 0.432 0.167 0.021 0.894 0.307 0.552
CAPINT 0.323 0.294 0.184 0.000 0.956 0.187 0.445
INVINT 0.153 0.126 0.130 -0.002 0.876 0.066 0.207
ROA 0.068 0.060 0.043 0.001 0.300 0.038 0.087
MKtBook 1.019 0.822 0.804 0.049 19.315 0.563 1.221
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Panel B: Period 1 (1998-2000)   
  Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 
ETR 0.162 0.150 0.091 0.000 0.835 0.114 0.195
SIZE 20.970 20.912 0.807 19.212 24.386 20.419 21.480
LEV_LT 0.057 0.024 0.079 -0.043 0.580 0.002 0.086
LEV_TL 0.380 0.372 0.150 0.035 0.764 0.269 0.488
CAPINT 0.290 0.271 0.168 0.001 0.876 0.173 0.380
INVINT 0.147 0.120 0.121 0.000 0.751 0.065 0.201
ROA 0.080 0.075 0.040 0.003 0.297 0.054 0.098
MKtBook 1.550 1.338 1.209 0.096 19.315 0.889 1.892
        
Panel C: Period 2 (2002-2006)   
  Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 
ETR 0.231 0.212 0.122 0.000 0.957 0.145 0.319
SIZE 21.455 21.331 1.000 19.215 27.111 20.761 22.005
LEV_LT 0.072 0.035 0.094 0.000 0.576 0.004 0.101
LEV_TL 0.439 0.448 0.168 0.021 0.894 0.319 0.567
CAPINT 0.331 0.303 0.187 0.000 0.956 0.192 0.456
INVINT 0.155 0.128 0.132 -0.002 0.876 0.066 0.209
ROA 0.064 0.055 0.043 0.001 0.300 0.034 0.083
MKtBook 0.876 0.741 0.576 0.049 5.038 0.532 1.036
a The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (Std.dev.), minimum (Min), maximum (Max), 
first quartile (Q1), third quartile (Q3), for the ETR and determinant variables used in the regression 
analysis. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative 
operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR 
exceeding one and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 
1998 to 2006 as the final sample. 
b  Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the entire sample (total 3562 company years). Panel B 
shows the descriptive statistics of Period 1 (from 1994 to 2000, with a total 754 company years). Panel C 
shows the descriptive statistic of the Period 2 (from 2002 to 2006, with a total 2808 company years).  
c Size = nature log of total assets; Lev_LT = leverage= long-term liability/total assets; Lev_TT = 
leverage = total liability/total assets; CAPINT = capital intensity = fixed asset/total assets; INVINT = 
inventory intensity = inventory/total assets; ROA = return on assets = total profit before tax/total assets; 
MKtBook = mark to book = market value of equity/book value of equity. 
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Table 5.12 Correlation of the Independent Variables  a
Pearson Correlation 
 ETR SIZE LEV_LT LEV_TL CAPINT INVINT ROA MKtBook 
ETR 1.000        
SIZE 0.057** 1.000       
LEV_LT 0.014 0.360** 1.000      
LEV_TL 0.129** 0.350** 0.385** 1.000     
CAPINT -0.026 0.049** 0.288** 0.019 1.000    
INVINT 0.088** 0.027 -0.158** 0.286** -0.298** 1.000   
ROA -0.084** 0.036* -0.101** -0.399** 0.130** -0.139** 1.000  
MKtBook -0.141** -0.298** -0.136** -0.034* -0.058** 0.052** 0.224** 1.000 
         
Spearman Correlation (Non-parametric correlation)    
 ETR SIZE LEV_LT LEV_TL CAPINT INVINT ROA MKtBook 
ETR 1.000        
SIZE 0.059** 1.000       
LEV_LT 0.015 0.337** 1.000      
LEV_TL 0.121** 0.388** 0.400** 1.000     
CAPINT -0.042** 0.016 0.252** -0.002 1.000    
INVINT 0.022 -0.028* -0.178** 0.277** -0.278** 1.000   
ROA -0.073** -0.047** -0.119** -0.430** 0.164** -0.162** 1.000  
MKtBook -0.153** -0.410** -0.148** -0.084** -0.023 0.081** 0.261** 1.000 
a The table shows Spearman’s correlations of the independent variables from the 1998 to 2006 sample years. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any 
sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one and 2001 sample company 
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ETR = income tax expenses/total profit before tax; Size = nature log of total assets; Lev_LT = leverage = long-term liability/total assets; Lev_TT = leverage = total liability/total 
assets; CAPINT = capital intensity = fixed asset/total assets; INVINT = inventory intensity = inventory/total assets; ROA = return on assets = total profit before tax/total assets; 
MKtBook = mark to book = market value of equity/book value of equity.  
b
years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as the final sample. 
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
5.4.3.2 Regression Results 
Table 5.13 and Table 5.14 show Gupta and Newberry’s (1997) cross sectional and 
panel data regression results. Table 5.15 and Table 5.16 present Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) and Richardson and Lanis’s (2007) ETR determinant model results respectively. 
The regression results are carried out on separate data sets as with the above regression 
analysis. They are pooled sample data, 1998-2000 and 2002-2006 period sample data. 
The Richardson and Lanis (2007) regression is only carried out on a pooled sample, 
because the model is designed to recognize the period effects on each explanatory 
variable coefficient. The adjusted 2R  is very low among the three regression models. 
It only ranges from 0.01 to 0.13, which indicates that only 1%-13% of the variation of 
the ETR can be explained by the three models. Compared with the above model, their 
explanatory powers are much lower. The F-test and Wald-test results suggest that the 
explanatory variables are jointly significant. The Gupta and Newberry (1997) model’s 
regressions results are very similar between cross sectional and panel data analysis. The 
Hausman test results suggest that the fixed effects regression was better in a pooled 
sample and in the 2002-2006 period (Table 5.14).  
 
Size 
The proxy for company size provides evidence that size does not relate to the ETR. In 
the Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Richardson and Lanis (2007) OLS regression 
model (Table 5.13 and Table 5.16), the size variable coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero. In Gupta and Newberry’s (1997) panel data analysis, the size 
variable coefficient is statistically positive associated with ETR, but only in pooled 
sample results (Table 5.14). The results suggest that larger companies have a higher 
ETR. However, in the Derashid and Zhang (2003) model (Table 5.15), the size 
coefficient is negatively and significantly related to ETR at 1% level for the pooled 
sample and the 2002-2006 period. These results suggest that larger companies have a 
lower ETR. The conflicting results suggest that the size effect result is sensitive to the 
model design and sample period.  
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Leverage 
The leverage is expected to be negatively related to the ETR. However, the results are 
mixed here. In Gupta and Newberry’s (1997) model (Table 5.13), the leverage variable 
is negatively and significantly related to the ETR as expected for the pool sample in the 
cross sectional analysis, but not for the two sub-periods. In the two sub-periods the 
regression results show that the leverage variable is not statistically different from 0. 
However, in the panel data analysis (Table 5.14), the leverage is significant negatively 
associated with the ETR in the 2002-2006 period. The same insignificant results were 
also found in Richardson and Lanis’s (2007) model (Table 5.16). The results suggest 
that the leverage effect is sensitive to the data and model design. However, in Derashid 
and Zhang’s (2003) model (Table 5.15), the leverage variable is positively and 
significantly related to the ETR in the pooled sample and the 2002-2006 period. 
Although Derashid and Zhang (2003) used a different leverage definition, they still 
expected a negative relationship between leverage and the ETR in the study.  
 
Capital Intensity  
The capital intensity variable (CAPINT) is found positively and significantly related 
to the ETR for all sample sets in Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) model’s (Table 5.13, Table 5.14 and Table 5.15). The CAPINT variable is not 
statistically different from 0 in Richardson and Lanis’s (2007) model (Table 5.16). This 
is an unexpected result as previous research assumed that there were tax benefits 
associated with capital investment. The results suggest that the capital intensive 
companies pay a higher ETR.  
 
Inventory Intensity  
The Inventory intensity variable (INVINT) is positively and significantly related to the 
ETR, as expected in all three model results and the results are consistent with previous 
research.  
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Profitability 
The profitability variable is unexpectedly negatively related to the ETR in the Gupta 
and Newberry (1997) model for the pooled sample and the 2002-2006 period in both 
the cross sectional and panel data analysis (Table 5.13 and Table 5.14) and also in 
Richardson and Lanis’s (2007) model for the 2002-2006 period (Table 5.16). These 
negative coefficient results were also found in the Derashid and Zhang (2003) study. 
However, Derashid and Zhang (2003) did not explain this particular result.  
 
The possible explanation for this negative relationship is given here. The profitability 
variable is defined as total profit before tax over total assets. The relationship is derived 
from Wilkie (1988) and is shown in Equation 5.11 above (see page 192). The positive 
relationship between the ETR and ROA implicitly assumed that there are positive tax 
preferences. This means that accounting income is greater than taxable income. 
However, the tax preference may be negative as taxable income may be greater than 
the accounting income. If the sign of the tax preferences is reversed, the ROA variable 
coefficient sign will be consequently reversed to negative, holding the positive tax 
preferences assumption.   
 
Market to Book and Government Equity 
The market to book (MKtBook) variable in Derashid and Zhang’s (2003) model 
(Table 5.15) is negatively and significantly related to the ETR for the pooled sample 
and the 2002-2006 period. This negative relationship goes against the positive 
expectation. The positive assumption is based on the market perception of the tax 
preferences or the investment expenditure. However, there was an economic crisis and 
financial market downturn after 2001. The share price also generally went down. 
Therefore, the original positive assumption does not hold in a volatile market.  
 
The government equity variable (Gov) in Derashid and Zhang’s (2003) model (Table 
5.15) is positively and significantly related to the ETR. The value of the coefficient 
also decreased from Period 1 to Period 2. This result is consistent with the above 
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model and indicates that the government equity ownership had a positive impact on 
the ETR.  
 
Industry Dummy, Year Dummy and Time Period Dummy 
The industry dummy variables results in Derashid and Zhang’s (2003) model (Table 
5.15) are the same as the above model. The tax preference industries have significant 
lower ETRs and different industries are significantly different in the pooled sample. 
The differences in Period 1 (1998-2000) were not as significant as in Period 2 
(2002-2006). This result is consistent with the Chapter Four ETR analysis. In Period 1, 
the companies widely benefited from the unauthorised tax preferences regardless of 
their industry or region they belonged to. In 2001, the government stopped the 
unauthorised tax preferences or tax rebates over listed companies. Therefore, the 
industrial tax preference differences in Period 1 (1998-2000) were not as significant 
as in Period 2 (2002-2006), which shows the effectiveness of the government tax 
policies.  
 
The year dummy variables results in Derashid and Zhang’s (2003) model (Table 5.15) 
provides evidence that the two sub-periods division is appropriate. For the pooled 
sample, the 1998-2000 dummy variables were significantly lower than the other year 
dummy variables which were insignificant at 1% significant level. In the two 
sub-sample periods, the year dummy variables were generally insignificant which 
suggest annual effects are not significantly different within both periods.  The time 
period dummy variable in Richardson and Lanis’s (2007) model (Table 5.16) is the 
same as the above model. It is positively and significantly related to the ETR. 
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Table 5.13 Gupta and Newberry’s Regression Model Results (Cross sectional data) 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient estimates ( t-statistics ) 
  Pooled sample 1998-2000 2002-2006 
Intercept  0.107 
(2.35)** 
0.057 
(0.64) 
0.247 
(4.70)*** 
Size ? 0.003 
(1.49) 
0.003 
(0.71) 
-0.003 
(-1.08) 
Lev - -0.055 
(-2.23)** 
-0.063 
(-1.36) 
-0.036 
(-1.30) 
CAPINT - 0.112 
(8.37)*** 
0.100 
(4.39)*** 
0.101 
(6.57)*** 
INVINT + 0.142 
(7.96)*** 
0.101 
(3.28)*** 
0.144 
(7.04)*** 
ROA + -0.227 
(-4.83)*** 
0.022 
(.259) 
-0.159 
(-2.93)*** 
     
Adj.
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2R   0.034 0.025 0.024 
F-value  26.03*** 4.80*** 14.53*** 
a
ETR
The table shows OLS results from the following regression model: 
itit5it4it3it2it10it ROA INVINTCAPINTLEVSIZE εβββββα ++++++=  
where: ETR = income tax expenses/total profit before tax; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; Lev = 
Leverage = long-term debt/total assets; CAPINT = capital intensity = net property plant and equipment/ 
total assets; NVINT = inventory intensity = inventory/total assets; ROA = return on assets = pre-tax 
income/total assets;  
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one 
and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as 
the final sample. 
b * Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level.
Table 5.14 Gupta and Newberry’s Regression Models’ Results (Panel data) 
  Fixed Effects Regression ( t-statistics ) Random Effects Regression ( z-statistics ) 
Variable Predicted sign Pooled 1998-2000 2002-2006 Pooled 1998-2000 2002-2006 
Intercept  -0.490 
(-5.60)*** 
0.178 
(0.67) 
0.099 
(0.73) 
-0.187 
(-3.10)*** 
0.021 
(0.19) 
0.131 
(1.76)* 
Size ? 0.033 
(8.06)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.22) 
0.008 
(1.17) 
0.019 
(6.45)*** 
0.005 
(0.95) 
0.005 
(1.28) 
Lev - -0.087 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.016 
(-0.23) 
-0.064 
(-1.93)* 
-0.075 
(-2.97)*** 
-0.033 
(-0.69) 
-0.049 
(-1.74)* 
CAPINT - 0.036 
(1.95)* 
0.029 
(0.75) 
-0.021 
(-0.93) 
0.068 
(4.510*** 
0.072 
(2.97)*** 
0.036 
(2.09)** 
INVINT + 0.091 
(3.33)*** 
0.206 
(3.15)*** 
0.044 
(1.23) 
0.107 
(4.98)*** 
0.112 
(3.13)*** 
0.074 
(2.97)*** 
ROA + -0.418 
(-7.59)*** 
0.054 
(0.44) 
-0.387 
(-5.45)*** 
-0.382 
(-7.95)*** 
0.073 
(0.85) 
-0.294 
(-4.99)*** 
        
2R (Within)  0.068 0.025 0.016 0.065 0.016 0.012 
2R (Between)  0.011 0.004 0.005 0.018 0.028 0.023 
2R (Overall)  0.016 0.008 0.004 0.025 0.028 0.015 
No. of Co.  676 325 676 676 325 676 
No. of Obs.  3562 754 2808 3562 754 2808 
F-value/  42.25*** 2.19* 6.91*** 186.26*** 16.73*** 40.60*** 
223 
 The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, 
missing values, ETR exceeding one and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as the final sample. 
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Wald  value 
2χ
Hausman  
2χ  52.76*** 5.30 23.42***   
a The table shows fixed effects and random effects results from the following regression model: 
 
itit5it4it3it2it10it ROA INVINTCAPINTLEVSIZEETR εβββββα ++++++=  
where: ETR = income tax expenses/total profit before tax; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; Lev = Leverage = long-term debt/total assets; CAPINT = capital intensity = 
net property plant and equipment/ total assets; NVINT = inventory intensity = inventory/total assets; ROA = return on assets = pre-tax income/total assets; No. of Co. = number 
of the company; No. of Obs. = number of the company years. 
b * Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
Table 5.15 Derashid and Zhang’s Regression Model Results 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient estimates ( t-statistics ) 
  Pooled sample 1998-2000 2002-2006 
Intercept  0.459 
(9.01)*** 
0.149 
(1.41) 
0.549 
(9.34)*** 
Size ? -0.012 
(-4.96)*** 
-0.002 
(-0.39) 
-0.015 
(-5.47)*** 
LEV - 0.054 
(3.62)*** 
-0.019 
(-0.70) 
0.071 
(4.16)*** 
CAPINT - 0.083 
(6.29)*** 
0.069 
(2.90)*** 
0.089 
(5.79)*** 
INVINT + 0.103 
(5.07)*** 
0.077 
(2.17)** 
0.108 
(4.45)*** 
ROA ? 0.005 
(0.09) 
0.042 
(0.44) 
-0.009 
(-0.15) 
MktBook ? -0.013 
(-4.24)*** 
-0.002 
(-0.50) 
-0.021 
(-4.56)*** 
Gequity  ? 0.027 
(3.64)*** 
0.058 
(4.11)*** 
0.019 
(2.18)** 
     
Industry effects     
Agri  -0.159 
(-8.56)*** 
-0.023 
(-0.69) 
-0.202 
(-9.14)*** 
Mining  0.014 
(0.83) 
0.027 
(0.63) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
Manu  -0.041 
(-3.69)*** 
0.009 
(0.62) 
-0.066 
(-4.54)*** 
EleGasWat  -0.036 
(-2.59)*** 
0.015 
(0.71) 
-0.060 
(-3.41)*** 
Constru  -0.036 
(-2.23)** 
0.007 
(0.22) 
-0.061 
(-3.12)*** 
Trans&Ware  -0.036 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.025 
(-1.21) 
-0.049 
(-2.77)*** 
IT  -0.049 
(-3.42)*** 
-0.013 
(-0.59) 
-0.069  
(-3.94)*** 
Whole&Ret  0.019 
(1.48) 
0.035 
(2.00)** 
0.011 
(0.65) 
Real Estate  0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.018 
(0.93) 
-0.011 
(-0.59) 
PubSer  -0.012 
(-0.70) 
-0.013 
(-0.49) 
-0.021 
(-0.95) 
BroadMed  0.050 
(1.21) 
-0.043 
(-0.81) 
0.117 
(2.15)** 
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Year effects     
1998  -0.084 
(-8.64)*** 
-0.011 
(-1.20) 
 
1999  -0.070 
(-8.11)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.43) 
 
2000  -0.058 
(-7.03)*** 
  
2002  -0.013 
(-1.79)* 
 -0.012 
(-1.70)* 
2003  -0.001 
(-0.15) 
 -0.002 
(-0.32) 
2004  -0.005 
(-0.78) 
 -0.008 
(-1.10) 
2005  0.001 
(0.17) 
 -0.003 
(-0.46) 
     
Adj.  2R  0.130 0.051 0.101 
F-value  22.164*** 3.025*** 15.267*** 
a The table shows OLS regression results from the following regression model: 
itit2519it188it7it6
it5it4it3it2it10it
YearIndustryGovMKtBook             
 ROAINVINTCAPINTLEVSIZEETR
εββββ
βββββα
+++++
+++++=
−−  
where ETR = Income tax expenses/Total profit before tax; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; 
Leverage = total debt/total assets; CAPINT = capital intensity = property plant and equipment/ total 
assets; INVINT = inventory intensity = inventory/total assets; ROA = return on assets = pre-tax 
income/total assets; MkBook = market to book = market value of the company/shareholder equity; 
Gequity = government equity ownership = percentage of government equity ownership; Industry = 
industry sector dummy (Agri = agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, Mining = mining, 
Manu = manufacturing, ElecGasWat = electricity, gas and water production and supply, Constru = 
construction, Trans&Ware = transportation and warehousing, IT = information technology, Whole&Ret 
= wholesale and retail, RealEstate = real estate industry, PubSer = public services, BroadMed = 
broadcasting, media and culture and miscellaneous is omitted); year effects = year dummy (1998-2005 
(excluding 2001 and 2006 is omitted). 
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one 
and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as the 
final sample. 
b * Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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Table 5.16 Richardson and Lanis’s Regression Model Results 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates ( t-statistics ) 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient estimates ( t-statistics ) 
   Pooled sample  
Intercept ?  0.057 
(0.51) 
 
SIZE -  0.003 
(0.48) 
 
LEV -  -0.054 
(-0.93) 
 
CAPINT +  0.087 
(2.93)*** 
 
INVINT ?  0.077 
(1.78)* 
 
ROA   0.039 
(0.36) 
 
     
TIME +  0.308 
(2.49)** 
 
T*SIZE ?  -0.008 
(-1.43) 
 
T*LEV -  0.007 
(0.11) 
 
T*CAPINT -  0.018 
(0.53) 
 
T*INVINT +  0.050 
(1.02) 
 
T*ROA + -0.248 
(-2.05)** 
 
    
Adj.  2R  0.131  
F-value   17.323***  
Panel B: t-statistics for hypotheses tests of significance of explanatory variables in the 
post 2001 period based on the coefficient estimates reported in Panel A  c
Variable Hypothesis t-statistics 
SIZE 0ββ 181 =+ 0.00 
LEV 0ββ 192 =+ -0.27 
CAPINT 0ββ 203 =+ 0.28 
INVINT 0ββ 214 =+ 0.51 
ROA -2.58** 0ββ 225 =+
a The table shows OLS regression results from the following regression model: 
  IndustryTimeβROATimeβINVINTTimeβ              
CAPINTTimeβLEVTimeβSIZETimeβTimeβ              
IndustryβROAβINVINTβCAPINTβLEVβSIZEβαETR
itit33-23it22it21
it20it19it18it17
it16-6it5it4it3it2it10it
ε+∗+∗+∗+
∗+∗+∗++
++++++=  
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where: ETR = Income tax expenses/Total profit before tax; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; LEV 
= leverage = long-term debt/total assets; CAPINT = capital intensity = net property plant and 
equipment/total assets; INVINT = inventory intensity = inventory/total assets; ROA = return on assets = 
pre-tax income/total assets; Industry = industry sector dummy (The industry dummy variables and the 
interaction terms of the industry dummy variables with time period dummy variable are not tabulated.); 
Time = time period dummy = If a sample company is from 2002 to 2006, then, it equals 1. 0 otherwise; 
T*SIZE, T*LEV, T*CAPINT, T*INVINT, T*ROA and T*Industry are the interaction term time period 
dummy variable with SZIE, LEV, CAPINT, INVINT, ROA and industry dummy variables. 
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one 
and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as 
the final sample. 
b * Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
c The t-statistics were calculated as follows: 21
jijiji )]b,COV(b2)Var(b)Var(b/[ββ ⋅+++ . 
 
5.4.4 ETR Determinants Comparison 
To compare the different ETR determinants at a coequal level, the OLS multivariate 
regressions of ETR on all the ETR determinant variables are conducted. The regression 
explanatory variables include tax rate preference, accounting-tax differences and 
control variables together (Equation 5.9), and previous commonly used company 
characteristic determinants which are used in the above section. The regression model 
is defined as follows: 
itit29it28it27it26it25
it24it23it22it21it2010
it95it4it3it2it10it
DepβIntExpβROAβINVINTβCAPINTβ               
LEVβSIZEβTimeGovIndustry               
RegionProImpInvGaNOpExpTRPETR
ε
βββ
βββββα
++++++
+++++
+++++=
−
−
 
(Equation 5.14) 
Table 5.17 provides indirect evidence on the ETR versus determinants by examining 
the incremental explanatory power of each ETR determinant. It calibrates the 
incremental importance of each determinant by decomposing the explanatory power of 
the full model into the portion explained by each determinant variable controlling for 
the others. The incremental adjusted 2R is reported and defined as the difference 
between the adjusted 2R  for the OLS regression containing all determinants and the 
adjusted 2R  for the OLS regression which excludes the determinant in the noted row. 
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For example, in Table 5.17, incremental OLS 2R  TRP is the difference between the 
adjusted 2R  of the full model and the adjusted 2R  for the regression excluding TRP.  
 
From the Table 5.17 results, the variable tax rate preference variable (TRP), the 
accounting-tax differences variables (NOnOP, InvGa, and ProImp), Time, Gov, SIZE, 
LEV_LT, LEV_TL, INVNT and MKtBook are significant. The most remarkable 
incremental OLS is the tax rate preference variable (TRP). This contributes 14.7% of 
the incremental OLS 2R . Followed by the the accounting-tax differences variables, the 
investment gain variable (InvGa) has an incremental OLS 2R  of about 5.2%. The 
provision for the impairment of asset variables (ProImp) contributes 1.2% of the 
incremental OLS 2R . The tax rate preference variable (TRP) and accounting-tax 
differences variables have much higher incremental OLS 2R than the other company 
specific character variables. This shows the model’s superiority over explainability of 
ETR variations.  
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2Table 5.17 The Incremental OLS R  
Variable  Coefficient estimates 
( t-statistics ) 
 
  Pooled sample Incremental OLS 2R  
Intercept  0.362 
(8.80)*** 
 
TRP  -0.579 
(-29.56 )*** 
0.147 
NonOp  0.023 
(2.06 )** 
0.001 
InvGa  -0.152 
(-17.54)*** 
0.052 
ProImp  0.075 
(8.37 )*** 
0.012 
Time  0.009 
(1.95 )* 
0.001 
Gov  0.031 
(5.01)*** 
0.004 
SIZE 
 
 -0.003 
(-1.68 )* 
0 
LEV_LT 
 
 -0.099 
(-4.52 )*** 
0.003 
LEV_TL 
 
 0.047 
(3.55)*** 
0.002 
CAPINT 
 
 0.010 
(0.87 ) 
0 
INVINT 
 
 0.061 
(3.55 )*** 
0.002 
ROA 
 
 -0.002 
(-0.05 ) 
0 
MKtBook 
 
 -0.006 
(-2.82 )*** 
0.001 
Adj. 2R    0.405  
F-value  87.412***  
a The table shows the incremental OLS 2 results from the following regression model: R
itit27it26it25
it24it23it22it21it2010
it95it4it3it2it10it
ROAβINVINTβCAPINTβ               
LEVβSIZEβTimeGovIndustry               
RegionProImpInvGaNOpExpTRPETR
ε
βββ
βββββα
++++
+++++
+++++=
−
−  
where: ETR = income tax expenses/total profit before tax; TRP = tax rate preference = top STR-actual 
STR; NOpExp = non-operating expenses = non-operating expenses/total profit before tax; InvGa = 
investment gain = investment gain/total profit before tax; ProImp = provision for the impairment of asset 
= provision for the impairment of asset/total profit before tax; Regional effect = regional dummy 
variables (The regional dummy variables are not tabulated); Industry = industry sector dummy (The 
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industry dummy variables are not tabulated); Time = time period dummy = If a sample company is from 
2002 to 2006, then, it equals 1. 0 otherwise; Gov = government ownership = percentage of government 
equity ownership. Size = nature log of total assets; Lev_LT = leverage = long-term liability/total assets; 
Lev_TT = leverage = total liability/total assets; CAPINT = capital intensity = fixed asset/total assets; 
INVINT = inventory intensity = inventory/total assets; ROA = return on assets = total profit before 
tax/total assets; MKtBook = mark to book = market value of equity/book value of equity;  
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, negative total income before tax and negative income tax, missing values, ETR exceeding one 
and 2001 sample company years, it leaves 3562 company years, or 676 companies from 1998 to 2006 as 
the final sample. 
b * Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
c Incremental OLS adjusted  is the difference between the adjusted of the OLS regression 
containing full explanatory variables and the adjusted  for the OLS regression, which excludes the 
explanatory variable in the noted row. 
2R 2R
2R
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5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the disadvantages of the prior ETR determinants models. The 
main problems are the confusion over accounting income and taxable income and the 
ETR determinants being chosen randomly from various assumptions. This chapter 
developed a new ETR determinant model to solve these problems. The new model 
incorporates book-tax conformity theory, which provides a theory and analysis 
framework for the ETR determinants’ research. It also recognises tax rate preferences, 
because of the non-uniform tax rate in the PRC. The variables are scaled by income to 
control income’s effect over the ETR variations. There are eight ETR determinants 
identified based on the model and Chinese corporate tax and accounting background. 
They are tax rate preference, non-operating expenses, investment gain, provision for 
impairment, time period, government equity ownership, industry and region. The tax 
rate preference variable is used to control the effects of tax rate deduction preference. 
The non-operating expenses, investment gain, and provision for impairment are the 
accounting-tax difference variables which cause the most accounting book income 
and taxable income differences. The time period, industry and region dummy 
variables are also based on Chinese corporate tax preference and practice and Chapter 
4 - ETR analysis results, which support the separate consideration of different 
industries and regions. The Central Government stopped the unauthorised tax rate 
preference and changed the accounting systems in 2001. Therefore, the time dummy 
variable is used to control the time variant effects. The government ownership 
variable is chosen to control the heterogeneous differences between SOEs and private 
companies. Each variable is hypothesized with expected signs and the hypotheses are 
tested using OLS regression, fixed effects regression and random effects regression. 
The results are all statistically significant consistent with expectations and are 
consistent with different regression models, which suggests the results are robust.  
 
To link with the existing ETR determinant literature, the replications of the prior ETR 
determinant models were performed to compare the new ETR determinant model with 
typical prior ETR determinant models. The results indicate that the prior ETR 
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determinant models have low explainability of the ETR variation. It also evidenced the 
problems of the prior ETR determinants models. The results are sensitive to the 
regression model and data. The determinants have conflicting results between models 
and contradictory signs with expectations.  
 
This chapter contributes to the corporate ETR determinants research in several ways. 
Firstly, the major contribution of the thesis is the proposition of the new ETR 
determinants’ model. It incorporates the book-tax conformity theory, which provides a 
theory and analysis framework for the ETR determinants’ research and provides 
another perspective on the ETR determinants. The accounting-tax differences can be 
treated as ETR determinants. Secondly, the thesis has identified the key determinants 
which influence the listed company ETR variations in the PRC. The determinants are 
based on the new ETR determinant model, Chinese corporate tax preferences and 
practices. The replications of the prior ETR determinant model evidenced the problems 
of the prior ETR determinants. Thirdly, the thesis also contributes new evidence to 
corporate ETR determinant literature.  
 
The next chapter is the implicit tax chapter. It discusses and proves the existence of 
implicit tax in the PRC.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
IMPLICIT TAX 
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6.1 Introduction 
After the explicit tax analysis (Chapter Four - ETR and MTR and Chapter Five - 
Determinants of ETR), the thesis proceeds to implicit tax. This chapter attempts to 
answer the third research question as to whether implicit tax exists at the corporate 
level in the PRC. The existence of implicit tax will be investigated in two empirical 
works. One is a statistical test of implicit tax existence at the industry level and the 
other is an implicit tax regression analysis at the individual company level to prove 
the existence of implicit tax. The structure of the chapter begins with the methodology 
of the research. In the methodology section, tax preference measurement problems in 
prior implicit tax research will be addressed. Based on the Chinese corporate tax rate 
preference, these problems can be easily solved. The statistical tests of implicit tax 
existence are then explained and the implicit tax regression analysis models are also 
discussed in the methodology section. Following this is the data section, which 
illustrates the sampling procedure, followed by the results and analysis sections to 
present the statistical test results and the regression results. The final section is the 
conclusion. 
 
6.2 Methodology  
In this implicit tax research methodology section, the research method of proving the 
existence of implicit taxes and examining relationships between Pre-Tax Return On 
Equity (PTROE) and tax preferences will be discussed.  
 
In theory, implicit tax is the reduction of the tax favoured assets pre-tax return to the 
equal risk adjusted after tax return in a perfectly competitive and frictionless market. 
The reduction of the tax favoured assets pre-tax return comes from bidding up the 
prices of the tax favoured assets in a perfectly competitive and frictionless market. For 
example, a tax favoured bond has a lower pre-tax rate of return and same after tax rate 
of return of the same risk level fully taxed bond. The assumption regarding implicit 
tax is the theoretical environment. Perfect competition means a market in which no 
participants have the market power to influence the price of a homogeneous product, 
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and everyone is a price taker. A frictionless market means that there are no costs and 
restraints associated with transactions. There are also other implicit assumptions 
underpinning implicit tax. The additional implicit assumptions are that all investors:  
 aim to maximize economic utilities 
 are rational and risk averse  
 assume all information is available at the same time to all investors  
 
The bond market is the closest in reality to the theoretical market. The bond market is 
very competitive and has relatively low transaction costs. The investors aim to gain a 
reasonable profit from the bond. The information spread in the market is very fast and 
the market reacts to information immediately. However, the market for companies’ 
operations has many obstacles in terms of realising implicit tax. The market is 
obviously not a perfectly competitive market. In reality, the location, brand, product 
differences and transaction costs all mean a company has a certain kind of market 
power. The transaction costs for a company, such as change of product or investment 
in a tax favoured industry or location, is very high if compared with a securities 
market. The company is often assumed to maximize shareholders’ wealth, but there 
are agency problems between the people who run the company and the people who 
own the company. The company is also assumed to be rational and risk averse, but 
companies sometimes do use high risk irrational move, such as entrepreneurship. The 
existence of implicit tax was found at the company level under a non-competitive 
market (Callihan and White 1999; Dunbar and Sansing 2002; Salbador and Vendrzyk 
2006). However, the implicit tax measure methods used in the prior research were 
doubtful and will be discussed in the next section. 
 
6.2.1 Statistical Tests of Implicit Tax Existence  
Prior implicit tax researcher reveal an important drawback in their research method in 
that they implicitly assume that the tax preferences result in accounting-tax 
differences (Wilkie 1992; Callihan and White 1999; Dunbar and Sansing 2002; 
Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006). The tax preferences are measured by the differences in 
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tax that would result if pre-tax income is the tax base and taxed at STR and the 
company’s actual tax liability (i.e., Tax preferences = (PTI*STR) -Tax Liability). 
Therefore, “the measure is really only capturing variations in a firm’s effective tax 
rates and thus is not directly estimating firms’ implicitly taxes.”, as pointed out by 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001, p. 374).   
 
In addition to the tax preference measure problem, the risk adjusted rate of return is 
another problem for implicit tax measurement. In theory, the implicit tax measure 
should use a risk adjusted rate of return. To obtain this rate of return, the asset 
valuation model has to be used, such as CAPM or the Fama-French three factor model 
(Fama and French 1993). They are very complicated to calculate and are used to 
measure the stock required rate of return rather than accounting return. There is no 
theoretical model to determine the risk adjusted accounting return.   
 
The above two measurement problems (tax preference, risk adjusted return) can be 
solved in the Chinese taxation context. The Chinese tax rate preference policy 
provides a possible opportunity to measure the tax preference directly. There are 
companies who enjoy a lower company tax rate, such as 15%, compared with the top 
Statutory Tax Rate (STR) 33% company tax rate. In one industry, there are two tax 
STR company groups possible, the fully taxed company group and the tax favoured 
group. The implicit tax will lower the PTROE of the tax favoured group compared 
with the fully taxed company group to reach equilibrium after tax rate return. The 
industry classification is used to adjust the company risk aggregately assuming the 
industry risk is the only risk which needs to be considered. By averaging the PTROE 
of the companies within an industry, the risk adjusted return problem can be mitigated. 
The companies’ returns fluctuate considerably across the companies because of 
factors such as market power, accounting policies and earning manipulations. The 
individual company characteristics can be mitigated using average industry return. 
The average company return within the industry company group could provide a more 
reliable measure of the PTROE.  
237 
The return comparisons between two company groups within an industry (by 
assuming they are the same risk overall industry risk) provide a possible way to test 
empirically the existence of implicit tax which is the third research question of this 
thesis. In each industry, using the simple average PTROE of a fully taxed company 
group (33% STR) minus the average PTROE of a tax favoured company group (15% 
STR), the differences can be tested as to whether it is statistically significant different 
from zero.  
This hypothesis, stated in the null form, is: 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: The difference between average PTROE of fully taxed and tax 
favoured company group is zero (H0: Fully tax PTROE - Tax favoured PTROE=0).47  
 
If implicit tax does exist at the industry level, then it should be significantly different 
from zero. Meanwhile, the differences of the simple average After Tax Return Of 
Equity (ATROE) between a fully taxed company group and a tax favoured company 
group should not be significantly different from zero, if implicit tax does exist at the 
industry level. 
This hypothesis, stated in the null form, is: 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: The difference between average ATROE of fully taxed and tax 
favoured company group is zero (H0: Fully tax ATROE-Tax favoured ATROE=0).  
 
The statistical test for the differences in the return will use a parametric t-test of mean 
and non-parametric Wilcoxon test of median. In the t-test, the differences of the 
returns are assumed to be normally distributed, whereas the Wilcoxon test requires 
only that differences in return are independent of each other. The Wilcoxon test is 
robust because it is not influenced by outliers. 
 
                                                              
47 To standardise the tax rate preferences of the industry company groups, the sample only uses the 15% and 33% 
STR companies which are also the majority sample company years (see Table 4.4). 
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The PTROE is measured in two ways for different purposes. In the first method, 
(PTROE_1) is the pre-tax income divided by shareholder equity,48 which is consistent 
with prior PTROE definitions (Wilkie 1992; Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006; Chen and 
Hung 2010). The pre-tax income takes the operating and non-operating income into 
account and is used to measure a company’s overall profitability before tax. The 
second method (PTROE_2) is defined as operating income divided by shareholder 
equity. The differences between pre-tax income and operating income are investment 
gain, non-operating income and expenses. The assumptions underpinning the 
PTROE_2 are that tax favoured companies only bid up the cost of sales and operating 
administration expense through their operating activities in the market and the 
investment gain, non-operating income and expenses are independent and irrelevant to 
the tax preferences. The after tax rate of return is ATROE and is defined as after tax 
income as a percentage of stockholders’ equity.  
 
6.2.2 Regression Analysis Model  
The second part of the implicit tax topic is the analysis of the relationship of PTROE 
with tax preferences and other influential factors. The empirical regression research 
model follows prior studies (Wilkie 1992; Callihan and White 1999; Salbador and 
Vendrzyk 2006; Chen and Hung 2010). The main contribution here is the test of new 
definitions of tax preference in the context of Chinese taxation. 
 
Regression model  
PTROEit= α0+β1·TPit+β2·EGRt+β3·CIGRt+β4·MCjt+β5·MSit+β6·Govit+εit  
                            (6.1) 
Where: the subscript i represents the individual company. j is the industry of company 
and t is the sample year.  i, 
 is the intercept of the regression ߙ଴
ߚ௜ is the coefficient of the independent variable 
                                                              
48 This research uses average shareholder equity as shareholder equity. The average shareholder equity=(beginning 
shareholder equity + ending shareholder equity)/2. 
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ߝ௜௧ is the error term of the regression 
PTROE = Pre-Tax Return On Equity 
TP = Tax Preferences 
EGR = Annual Economic Growth Rate 
CIGR = Capital Investment Growth Rate 
MC = Market Concentration Ratio  
MS = Market Share 
Gov = Government Ownership 
 
The dependent variables are the PTROE_1 and PTROE_2 which have been discussed 
above. The regression model does not have tax preference interaction variables, such 
as TPൈMC or TPൈMS. They were used in the prior regression models (Callihan and 
White 1999; Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006; Chen and Hung 2010). This is because the 
interaction variable does not fit the research model and causes a multi-collinearity 
problem in the regression. 
 
Independent Variables  
Tax Preference  
Tax preference is defined in three different ways to compare the impacts of the 
different measures of the tax preference and to compare the results with prior implicit 
tax studies. The existence of implicit tax can decrease the return of the tax favoured 
PTROE in a perfectly competitive market. Therefore, to prove the existence of the 
implicit tax, author hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 3.3: there is a negative relationship between company’s PTROE and tax 
preference. 
 
TRP 
The first tax preferences measure is Tax Rate Preference (TRP) and is measured as the 
top STR minus the company’s actual STR. This measure was also used by Chen and 
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Hung (2010) and it is a test to examine the relationship between PTROE and tax rate 
preference. As the implicit tax hypothesizes, ceteris paribus, the tax preferences may 
raise implicit taxes and as a result it reduces the PTROE (Scholes et al. 1990; Wilkie 
1992; Callihan and White 1999; Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006; Chen and Hung 2010). 
The TRP is expected to have a negative relationship with PTROE. 
 
PTTPE 
The second variable is the Pre-Tax Tax Preference on Equity (PTTPE). The following 
derivation explains how to obtain the tax preference variable and the theoretical 
relationship between tax preference and the PTROE.  
 
In a perfectly competitive and frictionless market, the after-tax equilibrium return on 
equity (ATROE*) of a fully taxed company is simply the after tax portion (1-ts) of the 
pre-tax return on equity (PTROEfull). 
 ATROE*=PTROEfull·(1-ts)                                    (6.2) 
assuming there is another company receiving tax rate preference. Under the perfectly 
competitive and frictionless market assumption, the Tax Preference on Equity (TPE) 
offsets the reduction in PTR he relationship can be demonstrated as: OE. T
ATROE*=PTROEpref·(1-ta)൅TPE                                    (6.3) 
The tax preference is defined as tax expense saved by tax rate preference. =actual 
STR and ts=Top STR 
at
Tax preference on equity = TPE = Tax expenses
ta
×(ts-ta) Shareholder equityൗ F
49 
Equation 6.3 minus equation 6.2 rearranged to get thePTROEpref. 
PTROEpref = 
PTROEfull·(1-ts)
1-ta
- TPE
1-ta
                               ( 6 . 4 ) 
Equation 6.4 demonstrates that the tax rate preferential company PTROE is negatively 
                                                              
49 Taxable income is defined as tax expenses divided by the actual tax rate. Callihan and White (1999) adopt the 
after tax income (pre-tax income- tax expenses) divided by the after tax portion (1-t) as the taxable income 
definition. Callihan and White’s (1999) definition may inflate the taxable income by including non-taxable 
investment gain income.  
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associated with tax preference in the perfectly competitive and frictionless market and 
the PTTPE variable is defined as tax preference on equity grossed by the factor ሺ1-taሻ. 
As the implicit tax hypothesizes, ceteris paribus, the tax preferences may raise 
implicit taxes and as a result, it reduces the PTROE (Wilkie 1992; Scholes et al. 2009; 
Callihan and White 1999; Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006; Chen and Hung 2010). The 
PTTPE is expected to have a negative relationship with PTROE. 
 
PTTSE 
The third tax preference definition adopts Wilkie’s (1992) Pre-Tax Tax Subsidy on 
Equity (PTTSE). His derivation is the same with the above Equations 6.2-6.4, 
assuming that all companies are taxed at the top STR (33%).  
t)-(1TSEPTROEPTROE fullpref −=                                 (6.5) 
The tax subsidy (TSE = Tax Subsidy on Equity) measure is the accounting-tax 
differences approach and is defined as the differences between pre-tax income taxed 
at the highest statutory rate and the actual tax liability due (i.e. TS = (PTI*33%) െ tax 
liability; TSE = TS/Shareholder equity). The PTTSE is then divided by shareholder 
equity and grossed up by the factor (1-t).  
 
The PTTSE does have a negative relationship with TSE according to Equation 6.5. 
However, in theory the TSE intends to be a tax subsidy or tax preferences on equity, 
not accounting-tax differences. The following illustration will demonstrate the 
relationship between PTROE and accounting-tax difference, assuming taxable income 
and accounting income are independent from each other and they have their own after 
tax equilibrium return on equity.  
 
Where superscript tax means taxable and acc means accounting  
Equityr Shareholde
PTIPTROE
tax
tax =                                      (6.6) 
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Equityr Shareholde
PTIPTROE
acc
acc =                                     (6.7) 
Equation 6.7 minus equation 6.6 
tax
taxacc
acc PTROE
Equityr Shareholde
PTIPTIPTROE +−=                            (6.8) 
taxacc PTROE
Equityr Shareholde
AccTaxDiffPTROE +=                              (6.9) 
The accounting income PTROE is the taxable income PTROE plus the accounting-tax 
difference scaled by shareholder equity. Equation 6.9 is put into Equation 6.5 to 
replace the  with the .  fullPTROE
acc
fullPTROE
t)-(1TSEPTROE
Equityr Shareholde
AccTaxDiffPTROE taxfull
acc
pref −+=
                 
(6.10) 
Equation 6.10 demonstrates there is a positive relationship between the accounting 
PTROE and the accounting-tax difference after holding the taxable income PTROE 
and tax subsidy. This demonstrates that Wilkie’s (1992) proposition concerning the 
negative relationship between PTROE and accounting-tax difference would be wrong. 
The accounting-tax difference is not equivalent to tax subsidy. The hypothesis here is 
that: 
Hypothesis 3.4: There is a positive relationship between company’s PTROE and 
PTTSE.50  
 
Control Variables 
The control variables are used to capture a company’s specific characteristics that 
might distort the tax preference variable parameter results. The control variables are 
based on prior studies (Wilkie 1992; Callihan and White 1999; Salbador and 
Vendrzyk 2006; Chen and Hung 2010). They are macroeconomic factors, market 
structure factors and government equity ownership.  
 
                                                              
50 In order to compare the results with Wilkie (1992), the definition use Wilkie’s (1992) tax subsidy definition, 
instead of the accounting-tax difference scaled by shareholder equity. Wilkie’s (1992) PTTSE definition is 
accounting-tax difference multiple top STR (t) scaled by shareholder equity, and grossed up by (1-t). The t/(1-t) is 
a constant value. It only affects the parameter value, but does not affect the parameter’s sign and significance level.    
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Macroeconomic Factors  
The economic growth rate and capital investment growth rate effects are proposed by 
Chen and Hung (2010) and are named as the macroeconomic factors. They argued 
that in a rapid economic growing country, for example, the PRC, there are more 
opportunities to earn an abnormal return than in a country where there is a lower 
economic growth rate or economic stagnation, assuming it is not a perfectly 
competitive and frictionless market. The company is less likely to have implicit tax in 
the PRC and the PTROE is expected to have a positive relationship with the economic 
growth rate. For the capital investment influences assumptions, increasing capital 
investment will bid up the capital asset price in the saturated economy, and result in 
decreasing company PTROE. The capital investment growth rate is expected to have a 
negative relationship with PTROE. Chen and Hung (2010) empirically proved that 
economic growth rate is positively associated with PTROE and capital investment 
growth rate is negatively associated with PTROE. This thesis has the same 
expectations of macroeconomic factors as Chen and Hung (2010).  
 
Market Structure  
The market structure influences in the implicit tax estimation were initially proposed 
by Callihan and White (1999) and followed by Salbador and Vendrzyk (2006) and 
Chen and Hung (2010). Implicit tax assumptions require a perfect competitive market; 
however, this does not exist in the real world. Market power and concentrated market 
structure are the obstacles to realising implicit tax. The market share and market 
concentration variable definitions are the same as those of Callihan and White (1999) 
and Chen and Hung (2010). The market share is measured as company sales over total 
sales of its industry.51 A high market share ratio suggests that the company has greater 
market power to influence the price and earn a higher rate of return. The market 
concentration ratio is defined as the sum of the market share of the top four companies 
within the industry. A high market concentration ratio implies that the industry is 
                                                              
51 The market share and market concentration variable calculation is based on the entire sample (population) 
available in the database. This method is closer to the reality.  
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operating in a less competitive market and the company is more likely to earn an 
abnormal return. As the implicit tax thesis hypothesizes, ceteris paribus, the market 
share and market concentration ratio may obstruct implicit tax realisation and as a 
result they increase the PTROE. Callihan and White (1999) empirically proved that 
market share and market concentration are positively associated with a company’s 
ability to retain the explicit tax benefits. Chen and Hung (2010) showed the positive 
relationships with company PTROE. Accordingly, market share and market 
concentration ratio are expected to have a positive relationship with PTROE. 
 
Government Equity Ownership  
The SOEs play an important role in the Chinese economy. The SOE is expected to 
promote the public interest rather than maximize profits. Xu and Wang (1999) found 
that listed SOEs are less efficient and less profitable than other listed companies in the 
PRC. Therefore, the expected relationship between government equity ownership and 
a company PTROE is negative. The government equity ownership (Gov) is defined as 
the percentage of government equity ownership of the company, which includes both 
the government’s direct equity ownership and the SOE’s equity ownership.52 Chen 
and Hung (2010) found that SOEs experience a weaker realization of implicit taxes 
and macroeconomic impacts than private enterprises. However, Chen and Hung (2010) 
use separate regressions for SOEs and private enterprises instead of including the 
Government equity ownership as the regression variable.  
 
Therefore, the set of hypotheses relating to the relation between the control variables 
and implicit tax is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3.5: There is a positive relationship between company’s PTROE and 
economic growth rate. 
Hypothesis 3.6: There is a negative relationship between company’s PTROE and 
capital investment growth rate. 
Hypothesis 3.7: There is a positive relationship between company’s PTROE and 
market share. 
Hypothesis 3.8: There is a positive relationship between company’s PTROE and 
                                                              
52 Many SOE listed companies developed from government owned SOEs. This is why many SOE listed 
companies are not owned directly by the government.  
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market concentration. 
Hypothesis 3.9: There is a negative relationship between company’s PTROE and 
government equity ownership. 
 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the definitions of regression variables with their 
expected signs (hypotheses).  
 
Table 6.1 Definition of Regression Variables with Expected Signs 
Variable Name Description Expected sign 
PTROE_1 Pre-tax income/Shareholder equity  
PTROE_2 Operating income/Shareholder equity  
ATROE After-tax income/Shareholder equity  
Tax Rate Preference 
 (TRP) 
33%-actual tax rate Negative
Pre-Tax Tax Preference on 
Equity (PTTPE) 
TPE/(1-actual tax rate) Negative
Pre-Tax Tax Subsidy on Equity 
(PTTSE) 
33%)-(1TSE  Positive 
Economic Growth Rate  
(EGR) 
GDP growth rate Positive 
Capital Investment Growth Rate 
(CIGR) 
Capital investment growth rate Negative
Market Share (MS) Company sale/Industry Sale Positive 
Market Concentration (MC) Sum of top 4 company market share  Positive 
Government equity ownership 
(Gov) 
Government equity ownership Negative
Tax Preference on Equity  ( ) SETRP
ratetax Actual
expensesTax ×
liabilitytax -)%33(PTI TS
(TPE) 
  
Tax Subsidy (TS) ⋅=   
Tax Subsidy on Equity (TSE) TS/Shareholder equity  
Average shareholder equity = 
(beginning shareholder equity + 
ending shareholder equity)/2 
 Shareholder equity 
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6.3 Data 
The final sample consists of 777 companies or 3334 company years after excluding 
companies that fall into the following categories: 
 
1 Sample companies before 2002. Until 2002, most listed companies had benefited 
from tax rate preferences, partly owing to the local governments’ unauthorised tax 
rebates. The State Council effectively stopped these rebates in 2002. In order to 
obtain sufficient comparisons between fully taxed and tax favoured companies, 
the samples are only taken from 2002.  
2 Companies with missing values from a merger of the two databases (CSMAR and 
WIND). Only company years containing complete data for calculating all ETR 
measures in a given year are included in the analysis. 
3 Companies with negative shareholder equity, because the negative shareholder 
equity creates difficult in PTROE and ATROE interpretations (Wilkie 1992 and 
Callihan and White 1999).  
4 Companies having negative tax payments in any of the sample years. The negative 
tax payments come from government income tax refunds or overpayment from 
previous tax expenses. This negative numerator would also result in interpretation 
difficulty, especially for ATROE. 
5 Companies incurring any operating loss or negative total income before tax in any 
of the sample years, because the effect of NOL may significantly understate the 
income tax burden after the possible NOL carried forward. On the other hand, the 
negative numerator results in a negative PTROEs and ATROE which would be 
uninterpretable. Also Wilkie (1992) evidenced that NOL provides a systematic 
bias in the estimation of tax burden. Therefore to obtain meaningful results, the 
companies incurring any losses in any of the sample years have to be excluded 
from sample. Effectively the step excludes sample companies with at least one 
single loss-making sample year. This approach is also consistent with previous 
studies (Wilkie 1992; Callihan and White 1999; Chen and Hung 2010). 
6 Companies’ PTROEs exceeding one. There are considered as outliers. 
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Table 6.2 provides details about the sample selection procedure with the number of 
company years and company losses in each step. The initial population comprised the 
1447 companies (11374 company years) that were listed on the CSMAR from 1994 to 
2006. This final population was reduced to 777 companies (3334 company years) 
after eliminating companies falling into the above six categories.  
 
Table 6.2 Sample Selection Procedure 
 Number of company years Number of companies 
All company-years on the 
2007 CSMAR General 
Industrial File from 1994 
to 2006 
11374 1447 
Less:   
Sample companies before 
2002 
 4883 12  
Missing from merged data 209 60 
Negative shareholder 
equity  
174 6 
Negative Tax payment 479 101 
Negative PTI 2292 491 
PTROEs greater than 1  3  
   
Final full sample from 
2002 to 2006 
3334 777 
Sub-Sample  3125 741 
(15% and 33%) 
 
Table 6.3 shows the number of sample companies per year from 2002 to 2006. The 
sample size in early years is smaller because the number of listed companies in the 
PRC stock market increased.  
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Table 6.3 Annual Sample Distribution  a
Year No. of company years Percentage of sample 
2002 565 16.95% 
2003 611 18.33% 
2004 680 20.40% 
2005 708 21.24% 
2006 770 23.10% 
Total 3334 100.00% 
a The table shows the number of sample companies per year from 2002 to 2006. It includes the actual 
number of the companies and the percentage of the total sample every year from 2002 to 2006.  
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with 
missing values, negative shareholder equity, negative tax payment, negative operating income and PTI 
and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 company years, or 777 companies from 2002 to 2006 as the 
final full sample. 
 
To standardise the tax rate preferences on the industry company groups in the 
empirical test section, the sample selection only included the 15% and 33% STR 
companies, which includes the majority of sample company years. Table 6.4 shows 
the number of the 15% STR and 33% STR sample companies for each industry. The 
industry classification is according to the CSRC classification. In order to obtain the 
maximum possible number of the industry pairs, the manufacturing industry sector is 
replaced by the 10 sub-manufacturing sectors. There are 21 industries from 2002 to 
2006 but there is only one company in wood and the furniture industry for five sample 
years and one company in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery 
industry for two sample years. Therefore, seven industry sample years out of a 
maximum possible 105 (21 industries; 5 sample years) have to be omitted, and it 
leaves 98 sample company industry pairs.  
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Table 6.4 Sample Distribution by Industry  a
Industry No. of company years 
15% STR 33% STR Total  
Mining 22 56 78 
Broadcasting and media 8 7 15 
Electricity, gas and water production and supply 87 89 176 
Electronics 66 23 89 
Real estate industry 94 97 191 
Textiles, apparel 20 87 107 
Machinery, equipment, and instruments 283 209 492 
Construction 36 40 76 
Transportation and warehousing 97 109 206 
Metal, non-metal 114 187 301 
Wood, furniture  5 5 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal husbandry, Fishery 3 21 24 
Wholesale and retail 54 193 247 
Other manufacturing 21 14 35 
Social services 22 42 64 
Petroleum, chemical, and materials 137 214 351 
Food, beverages 40 82 122 
Information technology 106 29 135 
Medicine, biological products 133 120 253 
Paper, printing 9 40 49 
Miscellaneous 53 56 109 
Total 1405 1720 3125 
a The table shows the number of the 15% STR and 33% STR sample companies for each industry. The 
industry classification is according to the CSRC classification.  
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Statistical Tests of Implicit Tax Existence 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.5 presents descriptive statistics on the PTROE_1, PTROE_2 and ATROE for 
individual company years. The average PTROE _1 is 0.136 and is higher than the 
average PTROE_2 0.127, because the investment gain and net operating income are 
positive most of the time. The pre-tax income is generally greater than the operating 
income. The average ATROE is 0.105, which is the lowest, because it is after tax 
expense deduction. Table 6.6 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations between 
PTROE_1, PTROE_2 and ATROE. The correlations between these three variables are 
250 
very high from 0.855 to 0.953. Table 6.7 presents the average industry PTROE_1 and 
PTROE_2 and ATROE for the 15% and 33% STR companies.53 It can be seen that the 
15% STR industry companies and 33% STR industry companies’ PTROE_1 and 
PTROE_2 are considerably different.  
 
Table 6.8 presents the descriptive statistics on the industry PTROEs and ATROE.54 
The average PTROE_1 is higher than the average PTROE_2 and the average 
PTROE_2 is higher than the average ATROE for both 15% STR and 33% STR 
companies. The mean and median of 33% STR companies’ PTROEs is higher than 
that of the 15% STR companies. As was predicted, the tax favoured companies 
experienced the lower rate of return due to the implicit tax. Table 6.9 shows the 
correlations between the paired PTROEs and ATROE by company groups within an 
industry (15% STR companies v.s. 33% STR companies within one industry). The 
correlations between paired company groups are quite low (0.208-0.374).  
 
The paired sample test results are shown in Table 6.10. The average PTROE_1 
differences between 15% STR and 33% STR companies within an industry is 0.019, 
and the average PTROE_2 difference is 0.028. The average differences are bigger for 
PTROE_2. The average ATROE difference between 15% STR and 33% STR 
companies is -0.002, which is very small and the test results support the implicit tax 
hypothesis. The hypothesis, that the average PTROE_1 and PTROE_2 differences 
between 33% STR and 15% STR company groups within an industry are zero, is 
rejected for t-test at 1% significant level. The PTROE_2’s test significance level 
(P-value) is lower than PTROE_1’s and the test results for PTROE_2 are more 
powerful than PTROE_1.  
 
The test results indicate the PTROE_1 and PTROE_2 differences between 33% STR 
and 15% STR company group are statistically significant. This proves the existence of 
                                                              
53 The annual mean results are shown in Appendix 19.  
54 The sample consists of the annual industry mean of the PTROEs and ATROEs as the sample data, and is called 
an industry year sample. 
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implicit tax in the PRC at industry level. The hypothesis that the difference between 
33% STR and 15% STR companies’ ATROE is zero failed to reject for t-test at 1% (or 
10%) significant level. This means that the average ATROE differences between 33% 
STR and 15% STR company groups are not statistically significant from zero and 
suggest there is an after tax equilibrium ATROE between two company groups within 
one industry.  
 
The Wilcoxon test reaffirms the test results. The results suggest that the average 
PTROEs are different between 15% STR and 33% STR company groups. However, 
the test result for ATROE is not as expected. The ATROE differences between 15% 
STR and 33% STR company groups are statistically significant at 10% significant 
level. This is probably because the market is not a perfectly competitive and 
frictionless market and companies have the power to retain tax preferences within 
company generally or simply because of the test model specification. 
 
In summary, the test results prove the existence of implicit tax at the industry level. 
Implicit tax reduction of a company’s PTROE is statistically significant at the industry 
level for both overall PTROE and operating PTROE. The effect of implicit tax on 
operating PTROE is stronger than the overall income PTROE. This may be caused by 
non-taxable income or non-tax deductible expenses in investment gain and 
non-operating income, which distorts the realisation of implicit tax.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 Descriptive Statistics of PTROEs and ATROE  α
 Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
PTROE_1 0.136 0.114 0.097 0.001 1.074 0.072 0.174 1.970 7.329 
PTROE_2 0.127 0.107 0.097 0.001 1.081 0.062 0.164 2.055 7.789 
ATROE 0.105 0.088 0.077 -0.027 0.973 0.056 0.134 2.165 10.181 
α The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (Std.dev.), minimum (Min.), maximum (Max.), first 
quartile (Q1), third quartile (Q3), skewness and kurtosis for the PTROEs and ATROE. The initial data are from 
CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with missing values, negative shareholder 
equity, negative tax payment, negative operating income and PTI and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 
ars, or 777 compa 002 to 2006 as the ll sample. company ye nies from 2  final fu
PTROE_1ൌ Pre tax income
Shareholder equity
; PTROE_2ൌ Operating income
Shareholder equity
; ATROEൌ After tax income
Shareholder equity
. 
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 Table 6.6 Correlations of PTROEs and ATROE  a b
Pearson Correlation Spearman Correlation  
 PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE  PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE
PTROE_1 1.000  PTROE_1 1.000
PTROE_2 0.953** 1.000 PTROE_2 0.932** 1.000
ATROE 0.971** 0.909** 1.000 0.973** 0.889**ATROE 1.000
a The table shows the Pearson correlation and Spearman correlation of the PTROEs and ATROE. The initial data are from 
CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with missing value, negative shareholder equity, 
negative tax payment, negative operating income and PTI and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 company years, or 777 
rom 2002 to 2006 full sample. companies f  as the final 
PTROE_1ൌ Pre tax income
Shareholder equity
; PTROE_2ൌ Operating income
Shareholder equity
; ATROEൌ After tax income
Shareholder equity
. 
b ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Table 6.7 The Average Industry PTROEs and ATROE for the 15% and 33% STR Companies  a
 15% STR companies  33% STR companies 
Industry name PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery 0.083 0.061 0.081 0.102 0.100 0.087 
Mining 0.189 0.196 0.154 0.240 0.246 0.166 
Food, beverages 0.139 0.135 0.108 0.139 0.137 0.095 
Textiles, apparel 0.104 0.092 0.083 0.114 0.105 0.086 
Wood, furniture    0.151 0.144 0.109 
Paper, printing 0.063 0.063 0.056 0.102 0.101 0.080 
Petroleum, chemical, and materials 0.151 0.147 0.127 0.126 0.125 0.092 
Electronics 0.079 0.074 0.068 0.114 0.110 0.090 
Metal, non-metal 0.162 0.158 0.140 0.164 0.163 0.120 
Machinery, equipment, and instruments 0.132 0.120 0.112 0.130 0.114 0.100 
Medicine, biological products 0.126 0.114 0.104 0.119 0.118 0.083 
Other manufacturing 0.131 0.115 0.111 0.090 0.088 0.060 
Electricity, gas and water production and supply 0.156 0.147 0.131 0.134 0.122 0.095 
Construction 0.085 0.072 0.068 0.105 0.100 0.076 
Transportation and warehousing 0.159 0.137 0.137 0.152 0.139 0.108 
Information technology 0.100 0.082 0.084 0.200 0.203 0.139 
Real estate industry 0.126 0.117 0.096 0.158 0.149 0.107 
Wholesale and retail 0.172 0.136 0.140 0.127 0.122 0.086 
Social services 0.141 0.090 0.120 0.135 0.126 0.094 
Broadcasting and media 0.067 0.080 0.059 0.270 0.302 0.181 
Miscellaneous 0.121 0.096 0.095 0.160 0.147 0.106 
Total 0.133 0.121 0.111 0.139 0.133 0.100 
a The table shows the industry PTROEs and ATROE mean for the 15% and 33% STR company. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After 
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excluding any sample company before 2002 and with missing value, negative shareholder equity, negative tax payment, negative operating income 
 PTROE exceedin ves 3334 compan r 777 companies from 2002 to 2006 as the final full sample. and PTI and g one, it lea y years, o
PTROE_1ൌ Pre tax income
Shareholder equity
; PTROE_2ൌ Operating income
Shareholder equity
; ATROEൌ After tax income
Shareholder equity
. 
 
 
Table 6.8  Descriptive Statistics of the Industrial PTROEs and ATROE for 15% and 33% STR Companies  a
Panel A: 15% STR company      
 Mean Median Std. dev. Mini. Max. Q1 Q3 
PTROE_1 0.124 0.121 0.043 0.025 0.314 0.095 0.146 
PTROE_2 0.112 0.108 0.043 0.027 0.317 0.081 0.129 
ATROE 0.104 0.099 0.035 0.018 0.264 0.079 0.121 
Panel B: 33% STR company      
 Mean Median Std. dev. Mini. Max. Q1 Q3 
PTROE_1 0.143 0.131 0.055 0.031 0.322 0.112 0.158 
PTROE_2 0.139 0.123 0.060 0.021 0.346 0.106 0.152 
ATROE 0.102 0.094 0.036 0.019 0.210 0.082 0.109 
a The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (Std.dev.), maximum, first quartile (Q1), and third quartile (Q3) of the industry PTROEs and ATROE for 15% and 33% 
anies. There are 98 ompany industry 105 33% STR company industry years.  STR comp  15% STR c years and 
PTROE_1ൌ Pre tax income
Shareholder equity
; PTROE_2ൌ Operating income
Shareholder equity
; ATROEൌ After tax income
Shareholder equity
. 
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Table 6.9 Paired Samples Correlations Between 15% and 33% STR Company Industry Years  
 Pair Pearson Correlation Spearman Correlation 
 PTROE_1 :15% STR and 33% STR  0.208* 0.359** 
 PTROE_2 :15% STR and 33% STR 0.263** 0.374** 
 ATROE : 15% STR and 33% STR 0.189* 0.274** 
a The table shows the Pearson correlation and Spearman correlation between the 15% and 33% industry company years for PTROEs and ATROE. There are 98 15% STR 
industry company years and 33% STR industry company years. PTROE_1ൌ Pre tax income
Shareholder equity
; PTROE_2ൌ Operating income
Shareholder equity
; ATROEൌ After tax income
Shareholder equity
. 
b ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
 
Table 6.10  PTROEs and ATROE Paired Samples Test  a
                        T-test Wilcoxon test 
 Hypothesis Mean Std. Dev. t df       Sig.  Z Sig.  
 PTROE_1 : 33% STR-15% STR=0   0.019 0.063 3.009 97   0.003 -2.309 0.021 
 PTROE_2 : 33% STR-15% STR=0 0.028 0.065 
a
4.222 97 0.000 -4.176 0.000 
 ATROE : 33% STR-15% STR=0 -0.002 0.045 0.056 -0.478 97 0.634 -1.908 
 The table mple t-test and n test results 
 PTROE_1ൌ Pre tax income
Shareholder equity
shows the paired sa  Wilcoxo (2-tailed). There are 98 15% STR industry company years and 33% STR industry company years.  
; PTROE_2ൌ Operating income
Shareholder equity
; ATROEൌ After tax income
Shareholder equity
. 
6.4.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
Additional tests are conducted to examine whether the empirical results are affected 
by an alternative measure for the rate of return. The return on assets is an alternative 
measure of the rate of return to capture the impact of the implicit tax. The return on 
assets (ROA) is defined as income over the total assets, which is the average total 
assets at the beginning and ending of the financial year. The income is the same as the 
above definitions. PTROA_1=Pre-tax income over the total assets. 
PTROA_2=Operating income over the total assets. ATROA=After tax income over 
the total assets.    
 
Table 6.11 presents the descriptive statistics of the PTROAs and ATROA. The 
PTROAs and ATROA are smaller than the PTROEs and ATROE, because the 
denominator assets are the sum of shareholder equity and liability. The PTROA and 
ATROA correlation and descriptive statistics for 15% STR and 33% STR are shown 
in Appendix 20-22. Because the results are consistent with the PTROEs and ATROE 
results, they will not be shown separately here. Table 6.12 presents the PTROA and 
ATROA paired samples test results. The test results are consistent with the PTROE 
and ATROE test results for both the t-test and Wilcoxon test. This provides further 
evidence of the existence of implicit tax at the industry level in the PRC.  
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Table 6.11 Descriptive Statistics of the PTROAs and ATROA  α
3334 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
PTROA_1 0.067 0.057 0.048 0.001 0.347 0.033 0.087 1.674 4.246 
PTROA_2 0.063 0.052 0.048 0.000 0.353 0.029 0.082 1.756 4.630 
ATROA 0.052 0.044 0.038 -0.021 0.300 0.026 0.068 1.603 4.111 
α  The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (Std.dev.), minimum (Min.), maximum (Max.), first quartile (Q1), third quartile (Q3), skewness and kurtosis for the 
PTROAs and ATROA. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with missing values, negative shareholder equity, negative 
, negative ope e and PTI and P ding one, it leaves 3334 company years, or 777 companies from 2002 to 2006 as the final full sample. tax payment rating incom TROE excee
PTROA_1ൌ Pre tax income
Total assets
; PTROA_2ൌ Operating income
Total assets
; ATROAൌ After tax income
Total assets
. 
Table 6.12 PTROA and ATROA Paired Samples Test  a
                    T-test Wilcoxon Test 
 Hypothesis Mean Std. Dev. t df Sig. Z Sig.  
 PTROA_1 : 33% STR-15% STR=0   0.012 0.033 3.585 97 0.001 -3.255 0.001 
 PTROA_2 : 33% STR-15% STR=0 0.017 0.034 4.952 97 0.000 -5.062 0.000 
 ATROA : 33% STR-15% STR=0 0.000 0.024 0.102 97 0.919 -0.891 0.373 
a  The table shows the paired sample T-test and Wilcoxon test results (2-tailed). There are 98 15% STR industry company years and 33% STR industry company years.   
 
PTROA_1ൌ Pre tax income
Total assets
; PTROA_2ൌ Operating income
Total assets
; ATROAൌ After tax income
Total assets
. 
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6.4.2 Regression Analysis  
 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.13 presents the descriptive statistics of mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, first quartile, third quartile, skewness and kurtosis for the 
dependent variables and explanatory variables from 2002 to 2006. The average 
PTROE_1 is at 0.136 and is higher than PTROE_2, which is at 0.127. The PTROEs 
are also higher than Chen and Hung’s (2010) sample PTROE, which is 9.65%. This is 
probably because of the sample selection differences. The average TRP is 0.086. 
Table 6.14 shows the STR categories for the sample company years. The majority of 
the sample company years (93%) fall into the 15% tax rate category and the 33% tax 
rate category, at 42% and 52% respectively. The average PTTPE and PTTSE are 
much smaller than the TRP, 0.006 and 0.021 respectively. The average economic 
growth rate is at 10.8% and ranges from 9% to 13%. The average capital investment 
growth rate is 24.5% and ranges from 17% to 28% (see Table 6.15 for the annual 
economic data). The average Government equity ownership is 35% with the median at 
40% and maximum at 85%. This shows the strong government equity influences on 
the SOEs. 
 
Table 6.13 Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Variables 
 
Mean Median
Std. 
Dev. Mini. Max. Q1 Q3 Skewness Kurtosis
PTROE_1 0.136 0.114 0.097 0.001 1.074 0.072 0.174 1.970 7.329
PTROE_2 0.127 0.107 0.097 0.001 1.081 0.062 0.164 2.055 7.789
TRP 0.089 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.330 0.000 0.180 0.283 -1.494
PTTPE 0.014 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.022 2.837 11.533
PTTSE  0.021 0.016 0.032 -0.092 0.378 0.001 0.033 1.957 10.742
EGR 0.108 0.101 0.013 0.091 0.127 0.100 0.113 0.383 -1.166
CIGR 0.245 0.260 0.037 0.169 0.277 0.239 0.268 -1.294 0.259
MS  0.012 0.002 0.045 0.000 0.939 0.001 0.008 14.117 261.761
MC  0.193 0.005 0.250 0.002 0.974 0.003 0.381 1.007 0.085
Gov 0.350 0.401 0.273 0.000 0.850 0.000 0.600 -0.131 -1.524
a The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (Std.dev.), minimum (Min), maximum (Max), 
first quartile (Q1), third quartile (Q3), skewness and kurtosis for the dependent variables and 
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explanatory variables used in the regression analysis. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After 
excluding any sample company before 2002 and with missing value, negative shareholder equity, 
negative tax payment, negative operating income and PTI and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 
company years, or 777 companies from 2002 to 2006 as the final full sample. 
b  PTROE_1 = pre-tax income/shareholder equity; PTROE_2 = operating income/shareholder equity; 
TPR = tax rate preference = 33%-actual tax rate; PTTPE=pre-tax tax preference on equity = Tax 
preference on equity/(1-actual tax rate); PTTSE = pre-tax tax subsidy on equity = tax subsidy on 
equity/ (1-33%); EGR = economic growth rate; CIGR = capital investment growth rate; MS = Market 
share; MC = market concentration; Gov = government equity ownership.  
 
Table 6.14 STR Distribution Category  a
Tax rate category No. of sample company years Percentage 
0% 49 1.47% 
0%-15% 103 3.09% 
15% 1405 42.14% 
15%-33% 57 1.71% 
33% 1720 51.59% 
Total 3334 100.00% 
a The table presents the distribution of STR in the different STR categories. STR=Statutory Tax Rate. 
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with 
missing value, negative shareholder equity, negative tax payment, negative operating income and PTI 
and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 company years, or 777 companies from 2002 to 2006 as the 
final full sample. 
 
 
Table 6.15 Annual Economic Data  a
Year GDP Growth Rate Capital Investment Growth Rate 
2002 0.09 0.17 
2003 0.10 0.28 
2004 0.10 0.27 
2005 0.11 0.26 
2006 0.13 0.24 
Total 0.11 0.24 
a The table presents the PRC GDP growth rate and the capital investment growth rate. The data source 
is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Statistical Yearbook).  
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Table 6.16 shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations of the regression variables. 
There is very a high correlation between PTROE_1 and PTROE_2, above 0.90. The 
correlations between TPR and PTTSE are also high at 0.645 for the Pearson 
correlation and 0.928 for the Spearman correlation. This is because the PTTSE 
measures the tax expenses saving from the tax rate preference. The high correlations 
are expected but the correlations between the dependent variable and explanatory 
variables are very low, suggesting that there is not a multi-collinearity problem. 
Table 6.16 Correlations of the Regression Variables  a
Pearson Correlation 
 PTROE_1 PTROE_2 TRP PTTPE PTTSE EGR CIGR MS MC Gov 
PTROE_1 1.000          
PTROE_2 0.953** 1.000         
TRP -0.043** -0.071** 1.000        
PTTPE 0.359** 0.329** 0.645** 1.000       
PTTSE 0.488** 0.407** 0.381** 0.357** 1.000      
EGR 0.106** 0.083** -0.009 0.037* 0.038* 1.000     
CIGR 0.058** 0.065** -0.016 0.019 0.009 0.276** 1.000    
MS 0.109** 0.104** -0.018 0.022 -0.015 -0.017 -0.009 1.000   
MC 0.079** 0.061** -0.007 0.008 -0.055** 0.022 0.014 0.296** 1.000  
Gov -0.067** -0.061** 0.036* -0.023 -0.056** -0.226** -0.059** 0.097** 0.103** 1.000 
Spearman Correlation   
 PTROE_1 PTROE_2 TRP PTTPE PTTSE EGR CIGR MS MC Gov 
PTROE_1 1.000          
PTROE_2 0.932** 1.000         
TRP -0.042** -0.079** 1.000        
PTTPE 0.144** 0.104** 0.928** 1.000       
PTTSE 0.388** 0.292** 0.472** 0.480** 1.000      
EGR 0.091** 0.066** -0.016 0.003 0.011 1.000     
CIGR 0.017 0.030* -0.008 -0.001 -0.011 -0.119** 1.000    
MS 0.233** 0.200** -0.013 0.048** -0.012 -0.090** 0.000 1.000   
MC 0.043** 0.017 -0.001 0.003 -0.064** -0.082** -0.050** 0.615** 1.000  
Gov -0.081** -0.070** 0.027 0.012 -0.062** -0.230** 0.057** 0.118** 0.108** 1.000 
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a The table shows Pearson correlations and Spearman correlations of the regression variables from 2002 to 2006 sample years. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After 
excluding any sample company before 2002 and with missing value, negative shareholder equity, negative tax payment, negative operating income and PTI and PTROE 
exceeding one, it leaves 3334 company years, or 777 companies from 2002 to 2006 as the final full sample. 
PTROE_1 = pre-tax income/shareholder equity; PTROE_2 = operating income/shareholder equity; TPR = tax rate preference = 33%-actual tax rate; PTTPE = pre-tax tax 
preference on equity = tax preference on equity/(1-actual STR); PTTSE = pre-tax tax subsidy on equity = tax subsidy on equity/(1-33%); EGR = economic growth rate; CIGR 
= capital investment growth rate; MS = market share; MC = market concentration; Gov = government equity ownership.  
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b * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
Results 
Table 6.17 presents the three empirical regression results of the PTROE_1 as 
dependent variables and each with one of the three different tax preference variables 
(TRP, PTTPE and PTTSE) as the explanatory variable. The adjusted 2R are 3%, 15.3% 
and 26.6% respectively for the TRP, PTTPE and PTTSE regressions. The P values of 
the F-stats are less than 1% and reject the null hypothesis that regression parameters 
are jointly zero at 1% significance level. This indicates that the parameters are jointly 
statistically significant at a significance level of 1% and that the regression models 
have significant explanatory power overall. 
 
Tax Preference  
The impacts of tax preference variables on the PTROE_1 are different. The TRP is 
significantly negatively associated with PTROE_1, which is as expected. This is also 
consistent with the results of Chen and Hung (2010). However, the PTTPE is 
significantly positively associated with PTROE_1. This is against the negative 
relationship hypothesis. These contradictory results raise an interesting question as to 
how to the conflicting results can be explained. The PTTSE is as expected and has a 
positive relationship with PTROE_1. Although this finding contradicts Wilkie’s (1992) 
results, the positive relationship result proves the theoretical relationship which is 
demonstrated in Equation 6.10.    
 
TRP 
The TRP is significantly negatlyive related to the PTROE_1 and indicates that a 
company with a greater tax rate preference experiences greater implicit tax. This 
result provides evidence of the existence of the implicit tax in Chinese listed 
companies. The TRP is the direct measure of the actual tax rate deductions. It is used 
to analyse the companies with different STRs aggregately, instead of individual 
company tax preferences received. Another fact is that absolute majority of the sample 
company (93%, see Table 6.14) is within the 15% and 33% STR company category. 
The regression results are more likely to compare the PTROE differences between 15% 
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STR and 33% STR companies overall, after controlling for the macroeconomic, 
market structure and government equity ownership influences. The interpretation of 
the coefficient would be that 1% increase on the TRP tends to decrease the PTROE_1 
0.038%, ceteris paribus. The differences in PTROE_1 for the 15% and 33% STR 
companies overall would be 0.684% (18*0.038%).  
 
The estimated TRP coefficient also shows that the tax rate preference is not fully 
offset by the decrease in PTROE. For the 1% increase in TRP, only 0.038% of the 
PTROE_1 is offset, suggesting that the market is not a perfectly competitive and 
frictionless market. This result is also consistent with the above existence of implicit 
tax, which can be found at the industry level. In other words, it can be proved by 
considering companies aggregately. The limitation of the TRP variable is that it does 
not consider the effect of individual company tax savings from the tax preference 
because the TRP only measures the tax rate deduction. 
 
PTTPE 
The PTTPE is the estimate of taxable income taxed at the highest tax rate minus the 
actual tax expenses and grossed up to the pre-tax value. The PTTPE measures the 
direct company income tax expenses savings due to the tax rate deduction. The 
PTTPE is found to be positively related to the PTROE. This is contrary to the 
theoretical negative hypotheses (Equation 6.4). The possible reason would be that the 
market is not perfectly competitive and frictionless. The company has the ability to 
retain its tax preferences and abnormal profit. Another reason would be the positive 
relationship between the income and the return. The PTTPE is an estimated tax saving 
based on taxable income. The taxable income is estimated from tax expenses. The tax 
expenses are positively related to the pre-tax income (PTIכ t = tax expenses). 
Therefore, in the absence of implicit tax, the PTTPE is positively associated with 
PTROE and the company is able to retain the tax preference within the company. 
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PTTSE 
The PTTSE is the pre-tax accounting income taxed at the highest tax rate minus the 
actual tax expenses and grossed up to the pre-tax value. This definition is from Wilkie 
(1992). The measure is based on the accounting-tax differences and the tax subsidy 
was questioned as to whether or not it truly measures the tax preference (Shackelford 
and Shevlin 2001). However, the result contradicts Wilkie (1992). In Wilkie’s (1992) 
study, the PTTSE is significantly negatively associated with PTROE. However, the 
PTTSE, here, is significantly positively associated with PTROE. The positive 
relationship is supported by the theoretical Equation 6.10. 
 
Control Variables 
The EGR and CIGR are significantly positively related to the PTROE_1 in all three 
regressions. The positive coefficient on EGR supports the positive relationship 
hypothesis that companies are more likely to have greater profitability in a high 
growth economy. It is also consistent with Chen and Hung’s (2010) results. However, 
the positive coefficient on CIGR contradicts the negative relationship hypothesis and 
Chen and Hung’s (2010) results. The hypothesis asserts that the intensified market 
competition due to the increase in capital investment may decrease a company’s 
profitability. The unexpected results indicate an opposite argument that increasing 
capital investment increases company’s profitability. This may be because the Chinese 
economy is not saturated and has not reached its potential maximum supply or 
potential capital investment leading to an increase in economic growth.  
 
The market share and market concentration are significantly positively related to the 
PTROE_1 in all three regressions. This suggests that companies with greater market 
power and operating within a more concentrated industry would increase their 
profitability. These positive relationships are also consistent with Callihan and White 
(1999), Salbador and Vendrzyk (2006) and Chen and Hung’s (2010) findings.  
 
The government equity ownership is significantly negatively related to the PTROE_1 
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in all three regressions. This is consistent with positive relationship expectations and 
indicates that SOEs are likely to divert from profit maximization objective as the 
government equity ownership increases in the company’s share capital.  
 
Table 6.17 OLS Regression Results of PTROE_1 
Independent variable Predicted sign 
Coefficient 
(coefficient estimates with t-statistics ) 
  TRP PTTPE PTTSE 
Intercept  0.051 (2.982)*** 
0.037 
(2.320)** 
0.023 
(1.545) 
- -0.038 (-2.191)** 
  TRP 
-  1.425 (21.873)*** 
 PTTPE 
PTTSE  +   1.499 (32.841)*** 
EGR + 0.644 (4.615)*** 
0.551 
(4.184)*** 
0.531 
(4.371)*** 
CIGR - 0.082 (1.736)* 
0.080 
(1.815)* 
0.085 
(2.069)** 
MS  + 0.214 (5.567)*** 
0.202 
(5.602)*** 
0.210 
(6.271)*** 
MC  + 0.021 (2.952)*** 
0.022 
(3.286)*** 
0.031 
(5.054)*** 
Gov - -0.021 (-3.392)*** 
-0.020 
(-3.437)*** 
-0.014 
(-2.573)*** 
     
Adj. 2R   0.030 0.153 0.266 
F-value 17.921*** 99.782*** 202.388***  
a The table shows OLS results from the following regression model:  
itit6it5jt4t3t2it1it εGovβMSβMCβCIGRβEGRβ TPβαPTROE +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=   
where PTROE_1 = pre-tax income/Shareholder equity; TPR = tax rate preference = 33%-actual tax rate; 
PTTPE = pre-tax tax preference on equity = Tax preference on equity/(1-actual STR); PTTSE = pre-tax 
tax subsidy on equity = tax subsidy on equity/(1-33%); EGR = economic growth rate; CIGR = capital 
investment growth rate; MS = market share; MC = market concentration; Gov = government equity 
ownership.  
b The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with 
missing value, negative shareholder equity, negative tax payment, negative operating income and PTI 
and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 company years, or 777 companies from 2002 to 2006 as the 
final full sample. 
c * Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
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** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
 
Table 6.18 OLS Regression Results of PTROE_2 
Independent variable Predicted sign 
Coefficient 
(coefficient estimates with t-statistics ) 
  TRP PTTPE PTTSE 
Intercept  0.057 (3.337)*** 
0.040 
(2.486)** 
0.030 
(1.954)* 
- -0.068 (-3.860)*** 
  TRP 
-  1.315 (19.764)*** 
 PTTPE 
PTTSE  +   1.256 (26.004)*** 
EGR + 0.450 (3.198)*** 
0.369 
(2.742)*** 
0.354 
(2.751)*** 
CIGR - 0.120 (2.535)** 
0.121 
(2.681)*** 
0.124 
(2.864)*** 
MS  + 0.214 (5.527)*** 
0.204 
(5.545)*** 
0.212 
(5.990)*** 
MC  + 0.014 (1.949)* 
0.015 
(2.205)** 
0.022 
(3.459)*** 
Gov - -0.020 (-3.149)*** 
-0.019 
(-3.214)*** 
-0.014 
(-2.478)** 
     
Adj. 2R   0.027 0.127 0.187 
F-value 16.154*** 80.869*** 129.075***  
a The table shows OLS results from the following regression model:  
itit6it5jt4t3t2it1it εGovβMSβMCβCIGRβEGRβ TPβαPTROE +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=   
where PTROE_2 = operating income/shareholder equity; TPR = tax rate preference = 33%-actual tax 
rate; PTTPE = pre-tax tax preference on equity = tax preference on equity/(1-actual STR); PTTSE = 
pre-tax tax subsidy on equity = tax subsidy on equity/(1-33%); EGR = economic growth rate; CIGR = 
capital investment growth rate; MS = market share; MC = market concentration; Gov = government 
equity ownership.  
b The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with 
missing value, negative shareholder equity, negative tax payment, negative operating income and PTI 
and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 company years, or 777 companies from 2002 to 2006 as the 
final full sample. 
c * Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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Table 6.18 presents the three empirical regression results of the PTROE_2 as the 
dependent variable and each with one of the three different tax preference variables 
(TRP, PTTPE and PTTSE) as the explanatory variable. The results are not different 
from the results of the PTROE_1 as the dependent variable. This will not be described 
in detail here. 
 
6.4.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
The additional fixed effects and random effects regressions are conducted to examine 
whether the empirical results are affected by the alternative regression models. The 
differences between the cross sectional analysis and panel data analysis are discussed 
in the 5.2.3.3 Regression model section. Table 6.19 presents the results of the fixed 
effects regression. The Hausman test results suggest the fixed effects regression 
coefficients are efficient and the model is better than the random effects’ regression 
model. The random effects’ regression results are also consistent with the fixed effects 
regression results. Therefore, only the fixed effects regression results are presented 
here and the random effects regression results are shown in Appendix 23. This is the 
first panel data based implicit tax regression analysis. The prior implicit tax studies 
are all cross sectional based OLS regression analyses (see Table 3.6 for the summary 
of prior implicit tax studies). All six regressions’ F-tests are statistically significant, 
which suggests that the coefficients are jointly significant and the model provides 
significant overall explainability. The 2R also show that the PTTSE as the implicit 
tax variable regression model has the highest explainability and is followed by PTTPE 
model as the second highest, and the TRP model has the lowest 2R . This is also the 
same as the above cross sectional analysis results. The coefficient results are generally 
consistent with the above cross sectional analysis results, but with two exceptions. 
They are the TRP and MC variables. Since all other variables results are the same as 
the above analysis, the analysis will not be repeated here. The TRP coefficient is 
significantly positively associated with PTROEs in the fixed effects regression, which 
is contrary to the negative relationship expectation. However, the overall results are 
still consistent with the above findings.  
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The panel data contains a sample of a cross section of companies over the time 
periods. The regression result accounts for individual companies’ heterogeneity. 
Therefore, the interpretation of the results would be that the tax rate preference (TRP) 
provides statistical positive effects on a company’s pre-tax rate of return on equity 
(PTROE) if we look at companies individually across the sample periods. This result 
is consistent with the above finding that the market is not perfectly competitive and 
frictionless and companies have the ability to retain tax preferences and an abnormal 
profit. The implicit tax effects can only be observed at the corporate level aggregately, 
not in terms of the individual company, because the market conditions impede the 
realization of implicit tax. Another possible reason for this contradictive result is the 
variable specification. The panel data analysis is suitable for the time variant data, but 
TRP does not vary much across the time because the tax rate is relatively stable for 
years, especially between 2002 and 2006. Therefore, the data specification would be 
another reason.  
 
Market concentration (MC) has a significant negative relationship with PTROEs in 
the fixed effects regression results (Table 6.19), which contradicts the positive 
relationship expectation. However, the MC has a significant positive relationship with 
PTROEs in the random effects regression results (Appendix 23). The possible reason 
for this is be that the data specification does not fit the model. Again, the MC does not 
vary much across the time, because the sum of the top four companies’ market share 
is also relatively stable. Another reason is that the variable specification does not 
properly represent the market concentration.         
Table 6.19  Fixed Effects Regression Results 
Independent variable Predicted sign 
PTROE_1 as Dependent Variable 
 (coefficient estimates with t-statistics ) 
PTROE_2 as Dependent Variable 
 (coefficient estimates with t-statistics ) 
  TRP PTTPE PTTSE TRP PTTPE PTTSE 
Intercept  0.017 (0.99) 
0.031 
(2.06)** 
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.028 
(1.67)* 
0.042 
(2.74)*** 
0.016 
(1.18) 
TRP - 0.062 (1.89)* 
  
0.069 
(2.10)** 
 
 
 
PTTPE -  1.732 (22.44)*** 
  
1.700 
(21.94)*** 
 
PTTSE  +   1.800 (39.92)*** 
 
 
 
1.560 
(32.34)*** 
EGR + 0.894 (9.02)*** 
0.658 
(7.19)*** 
0.676 
(8.67)*** 
0.648 
(6.56)*** 
0.426 
(4.64)*** 
0.458 
(5.49)*** 
CIGR - 0.089 (3.00)*** 
0.072 
(2.64)*** 
0.079 
(3.40)*** 
0.126 
(4.28)*** 
0.110 
(4.04)*** 
0.117 
(4.73)*** 
MS  + 1.902 (7.60)*** 
1.29 
(5.49)*** 
1.590 
(8.09)*** 
2.077 
(8.33)*** 
1.491 
(6.32)*** 
1.809 
(8.61)*** 
MC  + -0.119 (-1.66)* 
-0.100 
(-1.51) 
-0.049 
(-0.86) 
-0.139 
(-1.94)* 
-0.122 
(-1.84)* 
-0.079 
(-1.30) 
Gov - -0.012 (-1.24) 
-0.013 
(-1.52) 
-0.015 
(-1.98)** 
-0.016 
(-1.66)* 
-0.016 
(-1.87)* 
-0.018 
(-2.29)** 
        
R
Rଶ between) 
ଶ(within)  0.069 0.222 0.426 0.061 0.210 0.333 
(
Rଶ(overall) 
 0.007 0.058 0.111 0.006 0.041 0.061 
 0.010 0.084 0.160 0.009 0.063 0.094 
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No. of Obs.  3334 3285 3334 3334 3285 3334 
No. of Company  777 766 777 777 766 777 
F-value  31.26*** 119.38 315.37*** 27.40*** 111.09 211.81*** 
Hausman χଶ  97.88*** 38.70*** 37.27*** 23.88*** 49.32*** 66.65*** 
itit6it5jt4t3t2it1it
where PTROE_1 = pre-tax income/shareholder equity; PTROE_2 = operating income/shareholder equity; TPR = tax rate preference = 33%-actual tax rate; PTTPE = 
pre-tax tax preference on equity = tax preference on equity/(1-actual STR); PTTSE = pre-tax tax subsidy on equity = tax subsidy on equity/(1-33%); EGR = 
e
tive tax payment, negative 
o ng one, it leaves 3334 company years, or 777 companies from 2002 to 2006 as the final full sample. 
. 
** Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
 
conomic growth rate; CIGR = capital investment growth rate; MS = market share; MC = market concentration; Gov = government equity ownership.  
b The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with missing value, negative shareholder equity, nega
εGovβMSβMCβCIGRβEGRβ TPβαPTROE +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=   
a The table shows fixed effects regression results from the following regression model:  
perating income and PTI and PTROE exceedi
c * Significant at the 10% confidence level
** Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
*
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the implicit tax research methodology, sampling procedure 
and presents the research results. It begins with the discussion of the tax preferences 
measurement problem in the prior research and it proposes a tax rate based tax 
preference measure based on the Chinese corporate tax preferences practice. The tax 
rate preference measure is a direct and objective measure of corporate tax preferences. 
The statistical tests of implicit tax existence is based the industry average PTROE. 
The existence of implicit tax is proved by testing whether the PTROE differences 
between the tax favoured group of companies and the fully taxed group of companies 
within one industry is equal to zero. This test hypothesis is supported by the implicit 
tax theory that implicit tax lowers the tax favoured investment return. The existence 
of implicit tax statistic tests’ results show that the PTROEs are significantly different 
between tax favoured companies and fully taxed companies within one industry. The 
results indicate the existence of implicit tax among the companies aggregately at the 
industry level.  
 
The additional implicit tax regression analysis presents a more detailed picture of 
implicit tax realization in the PRC. Three different implicit tax variables are used to 
examine the implicit tax effects on the PTROE. The results show that there is a 
negative relationship between PTROE and tax rate preference when considering the 
companies aggregately, but there is a positive relationship between PTROE and 
income related tax preference when considering the company individually. This 
indicates that the imperfect market condition in reality impedes the realisation of 
implicit tax at the individual company in the PRC. The regression analysis also tests 
the Wilkie (1992) tax preference measure and demonstrates that the prior 
hypothesized relationship between tax preference and accounting-tax differences was 
incorrect. The theoretical equation and the empirical results also evidences that the 
relationship between the PTROE and Wilkie’s (1992) tax preference measure should 
be a positive instead of negative relationship.      
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In the regression analysis, the effects of macro economic factors, market structure and 
the government ownership on the realisation of implicit tax are also examined. They 
are economic growth rate, capital investment growth rate, market share, market 
concentration and government equity ownership. The explanatory variables’ results 
are all statistically significant consistent with the signs expected for capital investment 
growth rate. The economic growth rate, capital investment growth rate, market share, 
market concentration are all positively related to the company PTROEs which impede 
the realisation of implicit tax. The negative relationship between government equity 
ownership and PTROEs indicates the government equity ownership impacts on a 
company’s profitability and the realisation of implicit tax.  
 
The overall implicit tax results have very important implications for policy makers 
regarding tax preference considerations. Because the existence of implicit tax 
decreases a tax favoured company’s PTROE, the tax preference may not benefit the 
targeted company, especially in a targeted industry. The tax preferences or the tax 
expenses saved may be taken by the supplier or employees depending on their market 
power or the elasticity of supply. When the government wants to grant a tax 
preference or an investment to an industry, the government needs to consider the 
effect of implicit tax by considering the market structure and macro economic 
structure. The implicit tax may lower the tax favoured industry or companies’ rate of 
return which is not the same as was originally thought. Companies also need to 
consider implicit tax. If a company wants to turn an investment into a tax favoured 
investment, it also needs to consider the possible effects of the implicit tax.  
 
This chapter contributes to the corporate implicit tax research in several ways. Firstly, it 
evidences the existence of corporate implicit tax in the PRC from both the statistical 
tests and the regression analysis. As shown in the literature review (Chapter 3.4), 
there are few papers on corporate implicit tax, particularly in developing countries 
and this is the first statistical test evidence on the existence of corporate implicit tax in 
the literature. Secondly, this research has extended the tax preference variables by 
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considering three different tax preference measures. It demonstrated that the 
accounting-tax differences tax preference measure is not an appropriate measure for 
tax preferences. This thesis takes advantage of Chinese tax rate preferences to 
measure tax preferences directly. The results show that there is an implicit tax effect 
on the companies aggregately, but not on individual companies because imperfect 
market conditions impede the realisation of implicit tax. Thirdly, the thesis provides 
evidence on the macro economic factors, market structure factors and government 
ownership’s influences on the companies’ PTROE and the realisation of implicit tax.   
 
The next chapter is the conclusion chapter. It concludes all the findings, summarises the 
contributions and discusses the limitations of the research and gives recommendations 
for further research.  
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7.1 Introduction  
The overall aim of the study has been to investigate Chinese explicit and implicit 
corporate tax burdens and the research has focused on the listed companies in the 
PRC due to the sample availability. The thesis has three main research questions and 
is divided into three topics corresponding with the three questions. The three research 
questions are: 
4. What have been the patterns of ETRs and MTRs from 1994 to 2006? 
5. What are the main determinants of the ETR in the PRC? 
6. Does implicit tax exist at the corporate level? 
Each of them is discussed sequentially in Chapter Four – ETR and MTR, Chapter 
Five - Determinants of ETR and Chapter Six - Implicit Tax. The research 
methodology and results analysis are presented within each of the above chapters. 
Consequently, the purpose of this concluding chapter is to provide a reflective 
overview of these findings within the particular Chinese corporate tax context. It 
seeks to highlight the contribution made by the study whilst also drawing attention to 
its limitations thereof and the potential for future research.  
 
7.2 Conclusion 
The research questions and objectives are set out in Chapter One. Chapter Two 
provides background information about Chinese corporate tax developments, 
corporate tax regulations and its incentives and the Chinese stock market and the 
accounting system for listed companies to support the rest of the thesis. Chapter Two 
begins with the Chinese corporate tax developments from 1949 to the present and 
moves to the research focusing on the Enterprise Income Tax (PRC. State Council 
1993) regulation period, which provides detailed corporate tax regulations and 
incentives. The regulations started in 1994 and finished in 2007. During this period, 
the most significant corporate tax preference featured in the PRC was the direct tax 
rate deduction incentive to tax favoured cities or regions and the encouraged 
industries. The top Statutory Tax Rate (STR) was 33% for the companies without any 
tax preferences, but the tax favoured companies may have lower STRs, such as 15% 
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or even 0%. The companies have different corporate income tax rates, therefore it is 
unfair and unreasonable to compare them with each other without the consideration of 
the STR variations. This non-uniform STR situation creates difficulties in the ETR 
and MTR analysis, but also provides opportunities in corporate tax research 
development. The thesis takes advantage of the non-uniform STR to improve the ETR 
determinant and implicit tax analysis model. The stock market and listed company 
accounting systems are also introduced in Chapter Two to help the reader to 
understand the sample companies and the accounting information, especially the tax 
accounting method. The illustrations of the listed company accounting systems 
demonstrate the differences in the Chinese accounting system and the International 
Accounting Standards. It is important to recognise the accounting differences in the 
ETR analysis. Sometimes the Western countries’ ETR and MTR research 
methodology is not suitable for developing countries, especially when the tax 
regulations or the accounting system are developed with their own characteristics.   
 
Chapter Three is the literature review and it provides a summary of relevant studies 
for all three topics. The ETR and MTR section reviews the development of the ETR 
and MTR research and discusses the measurements and definitions of the ETRs and 
MTRs. The determinants of ETR section reviews the recent ETR determinants’ 
studies and provides a summary of the ETR determinants, which were used in the past. 
It demonstrates the problems of current ETR determinant studies, which are the lack 
of theory and analysis framework. The implicit tax section discusses the recent 
corporate implicit tax studies and provides a summary of the research methodology. 
This chapter introduces the theories and the relevant existing literature to the reader 
and links with later chapters’ methodologies and results’ analysis sections.  
 
Chapter Four is the ETR and MTR analysis. It provides a comprehensive analysis to 
date of the corporate ETRs and MTRs from 1994 to 2006 in the PRC. It begins with a 
discussion of main computation methods of ETRs and MTRs based on the Chinese 
corporate accounting and tax regulations. The thesis examines the main ETR and 
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MTR definitions, which are used in the existing literature, in order to select the most 
suitable definitions of ETRs and MTRs. The definitions are developed from prior 
ETR and MTR computation ideas, but they are positioned in the Chinese tax and 
accounting context after the discussion of the Chinese accounting and tax practices 
and data availability. The ETR and MTR methodology section’s discussion recognises 
the importance of the country’s characteristics.  Most ETR studies emphasize the 
compatibility of the ETRs definitions by adopting similar or the same definitions from 
prior studies. This study recognises the importance of the accounting and tax practices 
in the ETR estimation and also suggests that future ETR and MTR research should 
adopt the accounting and tax practices to choose the suitable ETR and MTR 
definitions for research.  
 
The ETR and STR results show that the listed companies generally benefited from tax 
rate deduction incentives before 2002, regardless of their industry or region. However, 
after the Central Government changed the corporate tax revenue from local revenue to 
shared revenue and stopped unauthorised corporate tax rebates, the ETRs and STRs 
increased significantly, especially regarding corporate tax for unfavoured companies. 
After 2002, the industrial and regional differences were much more significant than 
before. The tax favoured companies remained in the lower ETR and STR range, and 
the tax unfavoured companies increased significantly in 2002. This evidenced the 
effectiveness of the government tax policies in 2002 and also of the tax preference on 
tax favoured industries and regions. Overall, the listed company ETRs and STRs were 
generally very low from 1994 to 2002. After 2002, the ETRs and STRs jumped to a 
higher range and remained at this level. The industrial and regional ETR and STR 
differences also became significant after 2002. The results generally confirmed the 
existing Chinese ETR studies’ findings.  
 
The MTR estimations’ section is the first Chinese corporate MTR research in the 
literature. The corporate MTR definitions take Chinese corporate tax and accounting 
regulations into consideration and develop new MTR definitions in the Chinese 
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context. The MTRs are jointly determined by taxable income, NOL, and STR. 
Because the sample companies are from listed companies, they are influenced by the 
stock market requirements, which may have a positive profitability bias. Therefore, 
the MTR estimation results are just below its STR, because of a small chance of 
negative taxable income or NOL occurrences. Since the STR dominates the MTRs, 
the MTR estimation results are generally consistent with the ETR estimation results. 
The tax favoured industries and regions have lower MTRs due to the lower STRs. The 
results reveal that the STR is the key factor on the ETR and MTR variations.  
 
Chapter Four - ETR and MTR contributes the new Chinese ETR and MTR research 
evidence to the literature.  Compared with existing ETR literature, the ETR analysis 
is the most comprehensive in terms of both the ETR measures and the sample data 
aspects. The ETR analysis section uses various ETR measures, which were selected 
carefully based on the Chinese accounting and tax regulations and practices to 
demonstrate the robustness of the results. The analysis adopts all listed companies as 
the sample population and covers most of the Enterprise Income Tax (PRC. State 
Council 1993) regulation period. The ETR analysis is also associated with corporate 
tax policies by considering the STR in the analysis. The result demonstrated the 
effectiveness of the government’s implementation of corporate tax policies.  
 
Another contribution to the literature is the proposed new regional division analysis in 
the PRC. Instead of the economic regional division or administrative regional division, 
the ETR and MTR analysis adopts a mixed economic and administrative regional 
division with a consideration of regional corporate tax preferences. Under the 
proposed new regional division, the result reveals that tax favoured regions benefited 
from the preferences, but to different extents, and the ordinary taxed regions have 
little difference. In the prior Chinese ETR research, the Eastern Region or the coastal 
region, which is the relatively developed region in the PRC, had a lower ETR and 
enjoyed a lower corporate income tax burden. However, this research demonstrates 
that the Eastern Region is no different to the Middle Region, which is the same 
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ordinary taxed region, after exclusion of the tax favoured cities or places in the 
Eastern Region.        
 
Another significant contribution to the literature is the estimation of the MTRs in the 
context of Chinese accounting and tax regulations and practices. This is the first 
attempt to estimate the MTRs in the PRC and the results expand the Chinese MTR 
research. However, Chinese corporate tax is much simpler than that in the USA. The 
NOL can only carry-forward and maximum time is five years, compared with the 
USA corporate tax rules that allow carry-forward and backward and a longer 
maximum time period. The MTR simulation is simpler in the PRC but the taxable 
income estimation is much harder, because most companies did not adopt deferred tax 
accounting. Therefore, this thesis has developed an alternative method of estimating 
the taxable income, which is also a new academic contribution on the MTR 
estimation.  
 
Chapter Five investigates the Determinants of ETR. The chapter criticizes the prior 
ETR determinant research models and develops a new model which provides an 
alternative view on ETR determinants. The new model incorporates book-tax 
conformity theory, which recognises accounting-tax reconciliation, and also recognises 
tax rate preferences due to the non-uniform tax rate in the PRC. The determinant 
variables are scaled by income to control income effects over the ETR variations. The 
book-tax conformity theory provides a theory and analysis framework for the ETR 
determinants research. It is assumed that the ETR variations are caused by the 
accounting-tax differences. The ETR determinants are factors which estimate 
accounting-tax differences. This is a completely different ETR determinants analysis 
approach compared with prior ETR determinant studies.  
 
The ETR determinants analysis model identified eight ETR determinants based on the 
Chinese corporate tax and accounting background. They are tax rate preference, 
non-operating expenses, investment gain, provision for impairment, time period, 
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government equity ownership, industry and region. The tax rate preference variable is 
used to control the effects of tax rate deduction preference. The regression results 
indicate that it is also the key determinant in explaining the ETR variations.  The 
non-operating expenses, investment gain, and provision for impairment are the 
accounting-tax difference variables which cause the most accounting book income 
and taxable income differences. The time period, industry and region dummy 
variables are also based on Chinese corporate tax preference and practice and Chapter 
4 - ETR analysis results. There are tax preference policies to support the separate 
consideration of different industries and regions. In addition, the Central Government 
stopped the unauthorised tax rate preference and changed the accounting systems in 
2001. Therefore, the time dummy variable is used to control the time variant effects. 
The government ownership variable is chosen to control the heterogeneous 
differences between SOEs and private enterprises. Each variable is hypothesized with 
expected sign. The hypotheses are tested using OLS regression, fixed effects 
regression and random effects regression. The results are all statistically significant 
consistent with expectations and are consistent with different regression models which 
suggest the results are robust.  
 
To link with the existing ETR determinant literature, in the second part of the 
Determinants of ETR chapter, the replications of the prior ETR determinant models 
were performed to compare the new ETR determinant model with typical prior ETR 
determinant models. The results suggest that the new model has better explainability of 
ETR variations. It also evidenced the problems of the prior ETR determinants models. 
The determinants have conflicting results between models and are contradictory to 
expectations. For example, the size effect demonstrated that it has conflicting results in 
the replication models. It indicates the size effect is sensitive to the model design and 
there is no direct tax preference regarding the company size. Therefore, political cost 
theory and the political power theory is irrelevant in the ETR determinant analysis.  
 
Overall, this chapter’s biggest contribution is the development of the new ETR 
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determinants model and the identification of the Chinese corporate ETR determinants. 
The replication results prove that the proposed new model out-performed the 
explainability of ETR variations. The implications from the new ETR determinant 
model are that the ETR variations are mainly caused by corporate tax incentives, 
which are tax rate deduction, regional and industrial tax preferences and accounting 
and tax rule differences. The traditional ETR determinants, such as size, may not 
influence the ETR at all because there is no direct cause and effect relationship 
between company size and tax preferences. Therefore, the ETR variations are driven 
by corporate tax preference policies and the accounting and tax reconciliations.  
 
Chapter Six is the implicit tax analysis. It critically assesses the prior tax preferences 
measurement problem and proposes a new tax preferences measure based on the tax 
rate deduction incentives in Chinese corporate tax regulations. The tax rate preference 
measure is a direct and objective measure of corporate tax preferences. The statistic 
tests of implicit tax existence is based on the implicit tax definition using the industry 
average PTROE. The hypothesis tests whether the PTROE differences between the 
tax favoured company group and the fully taxed company group within one industry 
equal zero. This hypothesis is supported by the implicit tax theory. The results show 
that the PTROEs are significantly different between tax favoured companies and fully 
taxed companies within one industry. The results indicate the existence of implicit tax 
among the companies aggregately at industry level.  
 
The second part of the implicit tax chapter is the regression analysis of the implicit tax. 
The regression analysis adopts three different tax preference measures to examine the 
implicit tax effects on the PTROE. The results show that there is a negative 
relationship between PTROE and tax rate preference when considering the companies 
aggregately. However, there is a positive relationship between the PTROE and income 
related tax preference when considering the company individually. This indicates that 
the imperfect market condition in reality impedes the realisation of implicit tax in 
individual companies in the PRC. The regression analysis also tests the Wilkie (1992) 
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tax preference measure. The result proves the prior expected relationship between tax 
preference and accounting-tax differences was incorrect. 
In the regression analysis, the effects of macro economic factors, market structure and 
the government ownership on the realisation of implicit tax are also examined. They 
are economic growth rate, capital investment growth rate, market share, market 
concentration, and government equity ownership. The explanatory variables’ results 
are all statistically significant consistent with the expected sign and also consistent 
with prior implicit tax studies, with the exception of the capital investment growth 
rate. The economic growth rate, capital investment growth rate, market share and 
market concentration are all positively related to the company PTROEs, which 
impede the realisation of implicit tax. The negative relationship between government 
equity ownership and PTROEs indicates the government equity ownership impacts on 
the company’s profitability and the realisation of the implicit tax.  
 
The biggest contribution of the implicit tax chapter is the demonstration of the 
implicit tax’s existence in the PRC. The results were further evidence of the effects of 
an imperfect market on implicit tax realisation as the statistical tests of implicit tax 
existence and the regression analysis of implicit tax proxies benefited from the 
Chinese non-uniform STR corporate tax environment. Therefore, the PRC has the tax 
preference estimation advantage compared with prior company specific implicit tax 
studies. The overall implicit tax findings have very important implications for policy 
makers regarding tax preference consideration. The existence of implicit tax decreases 
a tax favoured company’s PTROE and therefore, the tax preference may not benefit 
the targeted company, especially the targeted industry. When the government wants to 
implement tax incentives in an industry, it needs to consider the effect of implicit tax, 
which may bring a lower rate of return and assess which party will be the ultimate 
beneficiary from the tax incentives.  
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7.3 Limitations and Further Research 
The thesis will be concluded by highlighting the limitations of this thesis as well as to 
suggest some recommendations for future research. In common with all research 
endeavours, there are inevitably a number of limitations to this study. One limitation 
of this thesis is that the data are based on listed companies only and do not include 
non-listed companies. This is because only the public listed companies are required to 
disclose their financial statements to the public. Therefore, the data and the findings 
may be biased in the sample selection and are influenced by the security market 
requirements which have been discussed in Chapter Two. The security market has 
strict profitability requirements and has an upward bias on the sample data. Another 
feature is that the market is dominated by SOEs. Therefore, if readers want to 
generalise the results and findings from this research to outside the listed companies, 
they need to be aware of the sample differences.  
 
Another limitation is that the ETR determinants model and the implicit tax model 
might not be complete. Although the thesis has identified a number of explanatory 
variables to explain the ETR and PTROE variations, there may be other factors that 
also influence the ETR and implicit tax, such as corporate tax strategy and 
management attitude toward the corporate tax. They are non-quantified factors and 
are open for further research.  
 
This study has provided insights into explicit and implicit corporate tax in the PRC. 
The analytical models provide strong empirical evidence to support the hypotheses. 
However, a number of suggestions for further research are made which may produce a 
more complete picture of corporate tax and refine future research methods.  
 
In the future, as with the change in the accounting system in 2007, the influence of 
deferred tax could be explored further, because it has became compulsory for the 
listed companies from 2007. This study has ignored deferred tax in the computation, 
because it was the option for listed companies and not many companies chose this 
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method. The mimic taxable income ETR results are affected mostly by the deferred 
tax. Other results and findings should not be influenced by the change.    
 
Another change is the implementation of the new Enterprise Income Tax Law 2008, 
which unified all companies’ STRs to 25%. However, from 2008, only the previous 
33% or 25% above STR companies pay corporate tax at 25%, whereas other STR tax 
favoured companies take an annual 2% gradual increase approach. This gradual 
increase approach is perfect for time series analysis, because the time series can 
capture the time variant effects of the changes in STRs. It extends the ETR 
determinants and implicit tax research and provides another contribution to the 
research.  
 
Finally, as more data and research methods become available, additional factors could 
be explored and identified. As mentioned in the limitations above, the corporate tax 
strategy and management attitude torward corporate tax could be identified to control 
the ETR variations in the ETR determinant studies. The corporate monopoly power or 
competitive advantages, which help a company to retain profit away from the 
realisation of implicit tax, need to be explored and identified for future studies.  
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Appendices:  
 
Appendix 1  
 
Total Industrial Output Classified by Ownership   (billion yuan) 
Year Total Output SOEs COEs Private Others 
% From 
SOEs 
1952 34.9 14.5 1.1 7.2 12.1 42% 
1957 70.4 37.8 13.4 0.6 18.6 54% 
1962 92.0 80.8 11.2   88% 
1965 140.2 126.3 13.9   90% 
1970 211.7 185.5 26.2   88% 
1975 320.7 260.1 60.6   81% 
1978 423.7 328.9 94.8   78% 
1980 515.4 391.6 121.3 0.1 2.4 76% 
1985 971.6 630.2 311.7 18.0 11.7 65% 
1990 2392.4 1306.4 852.3 129.0 104.7 55% 
1991 2662.5 1495.5 878.3 128.7 160.0 56% 
1992 3459.9 1782.4 1213.5 200.6 263.4 52% 
1993 4840.2 2272.5 1646.4 386.1 535.2 47% 
1994 7017.6 2620.1 2647.2 708.2 1042.1 37% 
1995 9189.4 3122.0 3362.3 1182.1 1523.1 34% 
1996 9959.5 3617.3 3923.2 1542.0 1658.2 36% 
1997 11373.3 3596.8 4334.7 2037.6 2098.2 32% 
1998 11904.8 3362.1 4573.0 2037.2 2727.0 28% 
1999 12611.1 3557.1 4460.7 2292.8 3296.2 28% 
Note: 1949–1957 Others = Joint State and Private Ownership Enterprises. 
From 1980, Others = FDI enterprises and joint stock enterprises. 
           Sources: China Statistics 2000. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2  
 
Annual GDP and Government Revenue (billion yuan) 
Year GDP  
Total 
Government 
Revenue 
Tax Revenue 
SOE 
Revenue
 
Subsidies to 
Loss-making 
Enterprises 
 
Tax Revenue/Total 
Revenue (%) 
Tax 
Revenue/GDP 
(%) 
1950 57.55 6.22 4.90 0.87  78.78% 8.51% 
1951 68.35 12.50 8.11 3.05  64.92% 11.87% 
1952 67.90 17.39 9.77 5.73  56.16% 14.39% 
1953 82.40 21.32 11.97 7.67  56.12% 14.52% 
1954 85.90 24.52 13.22 9.96  53.91% 15.39% 
1955 91.00 24.93 12.75 11.19  51.13% 14.01% 
1956 102.80 28.02 14.09 13.43  50.28% 13.70% 
1957 106.80 30.32 15.49 14.42  51.09% 14.50% 
1958 130.70 37.96 18.74 18.92  49.35% 14.34% 
1959 143.90 48.71 20.47 27.91  42.02% 14.23% 
1960 145.70 57.23 20.37 36.58  35.59% 13.98% 
1961 122.00 35.61 15.88 19.13  44.59% 13.01% 
1962 114.93 31.36 16.21 14.62  51.69% 14.10% 
1963 123.33 34.23 16.43 17.27  48.01% 13.32% 
1964 145.40 39.95 18.20 21.29  45.55% 12.52% 
1965 171.61 47.33 20.43 26.43  43.16% 11.90% 
1966 186.80 55.87 22.20 33.33  39.73% 11.88% 
1967 177.39 41.94 19.66 21.85  46.89% 11.08% 
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1968 172.31 36.13 19.16 16.67  53.03% 11.12% 
1969 193.79 52.68 23.54 28.67  44.70% 12.15% 
1970 225.27 66.29 28.12 37.90  42.42% 12.48% 
1971 242.64 74.47 31.26 42.84  41.97% 12.88% 
1972 251.81 76.66 31.70 44.57  41.36% 12.59% 
1973 272.09 80.97 34.90 45.70  43.10% 12.82% 
1974 278.99 78.31 36.04 40.73  46.02% 12.92% 
1975 299.73 81.56 40.28 40.02  49.38% 13.44% 
1976 294.37 77.66 40.80 33.81  52.53% 13.86% 
1977 320.19 87.45 46.83 40.24  53.55% 14.62% 
1978 364.52 113.23 51.93 57.20  45.86% 14.25% 
1979 406.26 114.64 53.78 49.29  46.91% 13.24% 
1980 454.56 115.99 57.17 43.52  49.29% 12.58% 
1981 489.16 117.58 62.99 35.37  53.57% 12.88% 
1982 532.34 121.23 70.00 29.65  57.74% 13.15% 
1983 596.27 136.70 77.56 24.05  56.74% 13.01% 
1984 720.81 164.29 94.74 27.68  57.66% 13.14% 
1985 901.60 200.48 204.08 4.38 -50.70 101.79% 22.64% 
1986 1027.52 212.20 209.07 4.20 -32.48 98.53% 20.35% 
1987 1205.86 219.94 214.04 4.29 -37.64 97.32% 17.75% 
1988 1504.28 235.72 239.05 5.11 -44.65 101.41% 15.89% 
1989 1699.23 266.49 272.74 6.36 -59.89 102.35% 16.05% 
1990 1866.78 293.71 282.19 7.83 -57.89 96.08% 15.12% 
1991 2178.15 314.95 299.02 7.47 -51.02 94.94% 13.73% 
1992 2692.35 348.34 329.69 6.00 -44.50 94.65% 12.25% 
1993 3533.40 434.90 425.53 4.95 -41.13 97.85% 12.04% 
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1994 4819.80 521.81 512.69  -36.62 98.25% 10.64% 
1995 6079.40 624.22 603.80  -32.78 96.73% 9.93% 
1996 7117.70 740.80 690.98  -33.74 93.28% 9.71% 
1997 7897.30 865.11 823.40  -36.85 95.18% 10.43% 
1998 8440.20 987.60 926.28  -33.35 93.79% 10.97% 
1999 8967.70 1144.41 1068.26  -29.00 93.35% 11.91% 
2000 9921.50 1339.52 1258.15  -27.88 93.93% 12.68% 
2001 10965.50 1638.60 1530.14  -30.00 93.38% 13.95% 
2002 12033.30 1890.36 1763.65  -25.96 93.30% 14.66% 
2003 13582.30 2171.53 2001.73  -22.64 92.18% 14.74% 
2004 15987.83 2639.65 2416.57  -21.79 91.55% 15.12% 
2005 18321.74 3164.93 2877.85  -19.33 90.93% 15.71% 
2006 21192.35 3876.02 3480.97  -18.02 89.81% 16.43% 
2007 24952.99 5132.18 4562.20   88.89% 17.73% 
Sources: PRC. National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008) and Liu 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Accounting Standard Promulgated by MoF from 1997 to 2001 
Accounting Standards Effective 
Date 
Applicability 
Related Party Relationships and  
Transaction Disclosures  
01/01/1997 Listed companies 
Events Occurring after the Balance Sheet Date 
(Revised 2003) 
01/01/1998
 
Listed companies 
Revenue  01/01/1999 Listed companies 
Investments (Revised 2001) 01/01/1999 Listed companies; 
Joint stock companies 
since 2001 
Construction Contracts  01/01/1999 Listed companies 
Changes in Accounting Policies and 
Accounting Estimates, and Errors (Revised 
2001) 
01/01/1999 Listed companies; 
All enterprises since 
2001 
Cash Flow Statements (Revised 2001) 01/01/1998 All enterprises 
Debt Restructuring (Revised 2001) 01/01/1999 All enterprises 
Non-monetary Transactions (Revised 2001) 01/01/2000 All enterprises 
Contingencies  01/07/2000 All enterprises 
Intangible Assets  01/01/2001 Joint stock companies
Borrowing Costs  01/01/2001 All enterprises 
Leases 01/01/2001 All enterprises 
Interim Financial Reporting  01/01/2002 Listed companies 
Inventories 01/01/2002 Joint stock companies
Fixed Assets  01/01/2002 Joint stock companies
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
308 
Appendix 4  
Basic Format of Balance Sheet 
 
Assets Liabilities: 
Current assets  Current liabilities 
  Cash    Short-term loans 
   Short-term investments    Notes payable 
   Notes receivable    Accounts payable 
   Accounts receivable    Advances on sale 
   Less allowance for bad debts    Wages payable 
     Net book value     Taxes payable 
   Prepayments on purchase     Profits payable 
   Other receivables     Other payables 
   Deferred charges     Accrued expenses 
   Stocks     Long-term liabilities due within one 
year 
   Long-term bonds due within one year  
 Subtotal Subtotal 
  
Long-term investment Long-term liabilities 
  Shares   Long-term loans 
  Bonds     Bonds payable 
  Others   Accounts payable 
   Other payables 
Subtotal Subtotal 
  
Fixed assets Owner’s equities 
  Original cost   Paid-in capital 
   Less: depreciation   Capital surpluses 
  Net book value   Surplus reserves 
 Undistributed profit  
Subtotal Subtotal 
  
Intangible and deferred assets  
  Intangible assets  
    Patent  
    Goodwill   
  Deferred assets  
   Organizational expenses  
 Subtotal  
Other assets  
 Other long-term assets  
  
TOTAL TOTAL 
309 
 
Basic Format of Cash flow Statement 
Cash flows generated from operating activity 
Cash received from the sale of goods or rendering of services 
Refunds of taxes 
Other cash receipts relating to operating activities 
Sub-total of cash inflows 
Cash paid for goods and services 
Cash paid to and on behalf of employees 
Payments of all types of taxes 
Other cash payments relating to operating activities 
Sub-total of cash outflows     
Net  cash  flows  from  operating  activities     
 
Cash  flows  from  investing  activities 
Cash  received  from  return  on investments 
Cash  received  from  return  on  investment  
Net  cash  received  from  the  sale  of  fixed  assets,  
intangible  assets  and  other  long-term  assets 
Net  cash  received  from  disposal  of  subsidiaries  and  other  business 
Other  cash  receipts  relating  to  investing  activities  
Sub-total  of  cash  inflows 
Cash paid to acquire fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term 
Cash  paid  to  acquire  investments 
Other  cash  payments  relating  to  investing  activities 
Sub-total  of  cash  outflows  
Net  cash  flows  from  investing  activities 
 
Cash  flows  from  financing  activities： 
Cash  received  from  investments  by  others  
Cash  received  from  borrowings 
Other  cash  receipts  relating  to  financing  activities 
Sub-total  of  cash  inflows   
Cash  repayments  of  amounts  borrowed  
Cash  paid  for  distribution  of  dividends  or  
 profits  and  for  interest  expenses  
Other  cash  payments  relating  to  financing  activities  
Sub-total  of  cash  outflows 
Net  cash  flows  from  financing  activities  
Effect  of  changes  in  foreign  exchange  rate  on  cash  
Net  increase  in  cash  and  cash  equivalents 
Source: PRC MoF 1998. 
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Appendix 5 
 
The comparison between Accounting Standards for Business Enterprise (ASBE) and 
IAS and IFRS  
ASBE basic standards  IAS Conceptual Framework 
ASBE No.1 Inventories  IAS 2 Inventories 
ASBE No.2 Long-term Stock Investment IAS 27 IAS 28 IAS 31 IAS 39 
ASBE No.3 Real Estate Investment IAS 40 Investment Property 
ASBE No.4 Fixed Assets IAS 16 Property , Plant and Equipment 
ASBE No.5 Live Assets IAS 41 Agriculture 
ASBE No.6 Intangible Assets IAS 38 Intangible Assets 
ASBE No.7 Non- monetary Transactions N/A 
ASBE No.8 Impairment of Assets IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 
ASBE No.9 Employee Salary IAS 19 Employee Benefits 
ASBE No.10 Enterprise Annuity Fund  IAS 26 Accounting and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefit Plans 
ASBE No.11 Share-based Payments IFRS 2 Share-based Payments 
ASBE No.12 Debt Restructuring  
ASBE No.13 Contingencies IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities 
and Contingent Assets 
ASBE No.14 Revenue IAS 18 Revenue 
ASBE No.15 Construction Contracts IAS 11 Construction Contracts 
ASBE No.16 Government Grants IAS 20 Accounting for Government 
Grants and Disclosure of Government 
Assistance 
ASBE No.17 Borrowing Costs IAS 23 Borrowing Costs 
ASBE No.18 Income Taxes IAS 12 Income Taxes 
ASBE No.19 Foreign Currency 
Translation 
IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in 
Foreign Exchange Rates 
ASBE No.20 Business Combinations IFRS 3 Business Combinations 
ASBE No.21 Leases IAS 17 Leases 
ASBE No.22 Recognition and 
Measurement of Financial Instruments 
IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement 
ASBE No.23 Transfer of Financial Assets IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement 
ASBE No.24 Hedging IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement 
ASBE No.25 Direct Insurance Contracts IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts 
ASBE No.26 Re-insurance Contracts IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts 
ASBE No.27 Extraction of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of 
Mineral Resources 
ASBE No.28 Changes in Accounting 
Policies and Estimates, and Correction of 
Errors 
IAS 8 Profit or Loss for the Period, 
Fundamental Errors and Changes in 
Accounting Policies 
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ASBE No.29 Events Occurring after the 
Balance Sheet Date 
IAS 10 Events After the Balance Sheet 
Date 
ASBE No.30 Presentation of Financial 
Statements 
IAS 1Presentation of Financial 
Statements 
ASBE No.31 Cash Flow Statements IAS 7 Cash Flow Statements 
ASBE No.32 Interim Financial Reporting IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting 
ASBE No.33 Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
IAS 27 Consolidated Financial 
Statements and Accounting for 
Investments in Subsidiaries 
ASBE No.34 Earnings per Share IAS 33 Earnings Per Share 
ASBE No.35 Segment Reporting IAS 14 Segment Reporting 
ASBE No.36 Related Party Disclosure IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures 
ASBE No.37 Presentation of Financial 
Instruments 
IAS 32 Financial Instruments: 
Presentation 
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures 
ASBE No.38 First Time Adoption of 
Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises 
IFRS 1 First Time Adoption of 
International Financial Reporting 
Standards 
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Appendix 6 
 
Relative Frequency of Sample Companies in Each STR Category a
STR Frequency Percentage 
0.00% 90 2.15% 
3.30% 1 0.02% 
6.00% 2 0.05% 
7.50% 63 1.50% 
9.75% 1 0.02% 
9.90% 3 0.07% 
10.00% 41 0.98% 
11.00% 1 0.02% 
12.00% 24 0.57% 
13.00% 9 0.21% 
13.50% 3 0.07% 
14.85% 34 0.81% 
15.00% 2318 55.35% 
15.45% 1 0.02% 
16.50% 5 0.12% 
17.49% 1 0.02% 
20.13% 2 0.05% 
22.20% 1 0.02% 
24.00% 15 0.36% 
25.26% 4 0.10% 
26.40% 9 0.21% 
27.00% 10 0.24% 
27.50% 1 0.02% 
29.70% 1 0.02% 
30.00% 12 0.29% 
33.00% 1536 36.68% 
Total 4188 100% 
a The table shows the number of company years falling into each of the five STR 
categories (0%, 1%-14%, 15%, 16-32% and 33%) and the proportion of each 
category to the total sample company years. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. 
After excluding any sample company with negative operating income, total income 
before tax and income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 
company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR 
data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample 
companies. 
b  SRT=Statutory Tax Rate. 
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Appendix 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Industry Sector ETRs and STR a  
Industry 
Sector 
       
        
Panel A   Agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry, and fishery 
    
      
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.099 0.088 0.077 0.000 0.314 0.927 0.574
ETR2 0.109 0.092 0.087 0.000 0.406 1.312 2.210
ETR3 0.053 0.032 0.060 0.000 0.254 1.842 3.314
ETR4 0.095 0.088 0.074 0.000 0.312 0.981 0.830
STR 0.169 0.150 0.135 0.000 0.330 0.010 -1.567
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.120 0.100 0.078 0.015 0.307 1.392 1.853
ETR2 0.159 0.135 0.106 0.016 0.406 1.365 1.652
ETR3 0.097 0.070 0.076 0.011 0.240 0.844 -0.430
ETR4 0.123 0.100 0.078 0.015 0.306 1.226 1.323
STR 0.138 0.150 0.032 0.060 0.150 -2.403 4.345
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.092 0.082 0.076 0.000 0.314 0.861 0.318
ETR2 0.092 0.080 0.074 0.000 0.313 0.976 0.750
ETR3 0.040 0.025 0.047 0.000 0.254 2.528 8.944
ETR4 0.086 0.077 0.072 0.000 0.312 0.968 0.799
STR 17.863 15.000 15.337 0.000 33.000 -0.176 -1.886
        
Panel B   Mining     
        
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.268 0.291 0.080 0.065 0.424 -0.523 -0.519
ETR2 0.263 0.282 0.081 0.065 0.414 -0.454 -0.686
ETR3 0.141 0.131 0.058 0.032 0.309 0.574 0.156
ETR4 0.258 0.279 0.078 0.064 0.412 -0.471 -0.656
STR 0.262 0.330 0.088 0.110 0.330 -0.516 -1.740
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.210 0.191 0.084 0.082 0.328 0.045 -1.596
ETR2 0.218 0.203 0.087 0.085 0.356 0.050 -1.290
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ETR3 0.112 0.115 0.049 0.032 0.203 0.304 -0.358
ETR4 0.208 0.200 0.083 0.085 0.320 0.000 -1.597
STR 0.183 0.150 0.069 0.110 0.330 1.696 1.891
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.278 0.299 0.076 0.065 0.424 -0.605 -0.182
ETR2 0.271 0.290 0.077 0.065 0.414 -0.525 -0.475
ETR3 0.147 0.133 0.058 0.042 0.309 0.581 0.101
ETR4 0.267 0.287 0.075 0.064 0.412 -0.532 -0.425
STR 27.575 33.000 8.317 15.000 33.000 -0.884 -1.254
        
Panel C   Manufacturing      
        
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.203 0.174 0.117 0.000 0.835 1.066 2.275
ETR2 0.221 0.190 0.128 0.000 0.903 1.269 3.238
ETR3 0.087 0.074 0.058 0.000 0.374 1.005 0.811
ETR4 0.202 0.175 0.112 0.000 0.979 1.024 2.494
STR 0.214 0.150 0.093 0.000 0.330 0.216 -1.315
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.161 0.150 0.095 0.000 0.835 1.683 7.045
ETR2 0.183 0.163 0.104 0.000 0.902 1.619 6.669
ETR3 0.087 0.077 0.057 0.000 0.374 1.025 1.372
ETR4 0.166 0.152 0.090 0.000 0.690 1.168 3.577
STR 0.155 0.150 0.058 0.000 0.330 1.120 5.366
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.221 0.200 0.121 0.000 0.811 0.864 1.585
ETR2 0.238 0.213 0.134 0.000 0.903 1.122 2.546
ETR3 0.087 0.073 0.059 0.000 0.296 0.998 0.585
ETR4 0.218 0.199 0.118 0.000 0.979 0.898 2.157
STR 24.042 33.000 9.441 0.000 33.000 -0.253 -1.540
        
Panel D   Electricity, gas and water 
production and supply 
    
      
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.206 0.177 0.100 0.000 0.548 0.690 0.389
ETR2 0.234 0.197 0.126 0.000 0.928 1.438 4.107
ETR3 0.148 0.139 0.083 0.000 0.491 0.979 1.352
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ETR4 0.219 0.193 0.108 0.000 0.633 0.896 1.281
STR 0.214 0.150 0.086 0.075 0.330 0.568 -1.607
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.168 0.152 0.073 0.000 0.366 0.340 0.187
ETR2 0.193 0.173 0.085 0.000 0.389 0.344 -0.064
ETR3 0.135 0.144 0.064 0.000 0.297 0.014 -0.521
ETR4 0.178 0.168 0.078 0.000 0.373 0.173 -0.087
STR 0.159 0.150 0.041 0.075 0.330 2.882 9.727
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.228 0.199 0.107 0.007 0.548 0.521 -0.080
ETR2 0.258 0.206 0.139 0.007 0.928 1.329 3.197
ETR3 0.156 0.132 0.091 0.005 0.491 1.036 0.945
ETR4 0.242 0.198 0.117 0.007 0.633 0.792 0.718
STR 24.494 33.000 8.986 15.000 33.000 -0.111 -2.006
        
Panel E   Construction      
        
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.212 0.178 0.100 0.000 0.521 0.644 0.171
ETR2 0.256 0.229 0.150 0.000 0.984 1.822 5.674
ETR3 0.086 0.076 0.056 0.000 0.231 1.064 0.577
ETR4 0.229 0.188 0.128 0.000 0.915 1.929 7.611
STR 0.225 0.150 0.089 0.150 0.330 0.336 -1.927
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.146 0.150 0.056 0.000 0.313 0.378 4.705
ETR2 0.165 0.156 0.064 0.000 0.308 -0.222 1.954
ETR3 0.075 0.066 0.043 0.000 0.225 1.900 6.153
ETR4 0.152 0.152 0.055 0.000 0.294 -0.394 3.562
STR 0.166 0.150 0.052 0.150 0.330 3.140 8.605
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.232 0.225 0.102 0.040 0.521 0.422 -0.151
ETR2 0.284 0.253 0.158 0.039 0.984 1.662 4.789
ETR3 0.090 0.077 0.059 0.008 0.231 0.897 0.020
ETR4 0.252 0.226 0.135 0.038 0.915 1.780 6.747
STR 24.360 33.000 9.053 15.000 33.000 -0.082 -2.049
   
Panel F    Transportation and warehousing  
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 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples    
ETR1 0.197 0.167 0.104 0.000 0.474 0.447 -0.550
ETR2 0.224 0.198 0.115 0.000 0.882 0.914 2.871
ETR3 0.156 0.131 0.091 0.000 0.449 0.922 0.397
ETR4 0.207 0.182 0.097 0.000 0.423 0.165 -0.889
STR 0.213 0.150 0.096 0.000 0.330 0.195 -1.389
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.138 0.139 0.077 0.000 0.394 0.856 1.628
ETR2 0.166 0.161 0.098 0.000 0.471 1.087 1.587
ETR3 0.124 0.105 0.095 0.000 0.449 1.896 3.771
ETR4 0.151 0.153 0.080 0.000 0.378 0.564 0.611
STR 0.147 0.150 0.069 0.000 0.330 0.818 2.413
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.226 0.212 0.103 0.020 0.474 0.201 -0.816
ETR2 0.252 0.258 0.112 0.036 0.882 0.993 4.131
ETR3 0.171 0.145 0.085 0.007 0.426 0.589 -0.460
ETR4 0.234 0.234 0.093 0.036 0.423 -0.041 -1.106
STR 24.399 33.000 9.128 7.500 33.000 -0.134 -1.948
        
Panel G   Information technology     
      
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.179 0.151 0.134 0.001 0.957 2.698 10.218
ETR2 0.219 0.175 0.145 0.002 0.875 1.855 4.650
ETR3 0.065 0.054 0.056 0.001 0.418 3.200 14.808
ETR4 0.180 0.147 0.127 0.002 0.740 2.180 5.772
STR 0.160 0.150 0.082 0.000 0.330 0.957 0.738
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.140 0.117 0.098 0.001 0.521 1.949 5.428
ETR2 0.202 0.156 0.164 0.002 0.875 2.048 5.461
ETR3 0.083 0.064 0.084 0.001 0.418 2.504 6.981
ETR4 0.173 0.146 0.140 0.002 0.674 1.811 3.594
STR 0.130 0.150 0.078 0.000 0.330 0.905 1.974
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.195 0.155 0.144 0.036 0.957 2.688 9.497
ETR2 0.225 0.179 0.136 0.034 0.852 1.817 4.434
ETR3 0.057 0.044 0.037 0.006 0.205 1.577 3.307
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ETR4 0.183 0.147 0.122 0.036 0.740 2.443 7.416
STR 17.260 15.000 8.019 0.000 33.000 1.088 0.353
        
Panel H   Wholesale and retail      
      
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.241 0.223 0.115 0.000 0.660 0.675 0.513
ETR2 0.275 0.261 0.134 0.000 0.984 1.198 3.110
ETR3 0.088 0.079 0.050 0.000 0.284 0.863 0.767
ETR4 0.253 0.237 0.121 0.000 0.985 1.394 4.964
STR 0.228 0.150 0.093 0.000 0.330 0.086 -1.643
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.180 0.155 0.085 0.000 0.527 1.244 2.643
ETR2 0.223 0.182 0.122 0.000 0.984 2.222 9.313
ETR3 0.079 0.066 0.048 0.000 0.252 1.012 0.944
ETR4 0.201 0.173 0.096 0.000 0.761 1.759 6.958
STR 0.166 0.150 0.059 0.000 0.330 1.813 4.468
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.296 0.304 0.110 0.000 0.660 0.344 0.905
ETR2 0.323 0.321 0.126 0.000 0.792 0.844 2.080
ETR3 0.096 0.092 0.051 0.000 0.284 0.765 0.793
ETR4 0.301 0.309 0.123 0.000 0.985 1.387 5.969
STR 28.614 33.000 7.928 0.000 33.000 -1.339 0.120
        
Panel I   Real estate      
        
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.231 0.197 0.116 0.004 0.853 1.141 3.122
ETR2 0.267 0.233 0.133 0.005 0.945 1.207 2.940
ETR3 0.134 0.118 0.076 0.003 0.400 0.890 0.289
ETR4 0.245 0.223 0.112 0.005 0.685 0.686 0.569
STR 0.196 0.150 0.084 0.000 0.330 0.854 -0.869
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.169 0.154 0.076 0.004 0.365 0.756 0.501
ETR2 0.211 0.175 0.108 0.005 0.615 1.262 1.970
ETR3 0.114 0.103 0.070 0.003 0.324 1.320 1.561
ETR4 0.189 0.162 0.086 0.005 0.475 0.922 0.777
STR 0.152 0.150 0.046 0.000 0.330 2.128 9.928
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Period 2        
ETR1 0.288 0.296 0.118 0.042 0.853 1.093 3.774
ETR2 0.318 0.317 0.133 0.053 0.945 1.339 3.984
ETR3 0.152 0.139 0.078 0.013 0.400 0.628 -0.068
ETR4 0.297 0.307 0.108 0.059 0.685 0.542 0.981
STR 23.690 15.000 9.034 15.000 33.000 0.070 -2.030
        
Panel J  Public services      
       
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.213 0.193 0.118 0.000 0.606 0.544 0.303
ETR2 0.244 0.217 0.136 0.000 0.709 0.873 1.722
ETR3 0.114 0.085 0.092 0.000 0.335 1.087 -0.019
ETR4 0.221 0.205 0.114 0.000 0.651 0.509 1.004
STR 0.226 0.150 0.092 0.099 0.330 0.229 -1.913
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.139 0.147 0.076 0.013 0.331 0.854 0.985
ETR2 0.156 0.154 0.086 0.017 0.386 1.043 1.295
ETR3 0.078 0.073 0.063 0.004 0.289 2.021 5.137
ETR4 0.146 0.146 0.082 0.017 0.346 1.171 1.466
STR 0.161 0.150 0.054 0.099 0.330 2.700 6.963
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.262 0.257 0.116 0.000 0.606 0.175 0.754
ETR2 0.303 0.302 0.131 0.000 0.709 0.763 2.621
ETR3 0.138 0.097 0.100 0.000 0.335 0.664 -0.994
ETR4 0.271 0.274 0.104 0.000 0.651 0.320 3.136
STR 26.907 33.000 8.723 10.000 33.000 -0.750 -1.451
        
Panel K  Broadcasting, media and culture     
      
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.240 0.359 0.169 0.003 0.420 -0.478 -1.888
ETR2 0.225 0.300 0.142 0.003 0.357 -0.794 -1.204
ETR3 0.144 0.188 0.100 0.001 0.281 -0.367 -1.312
ETR4 0.219 0.300 0.144 0.003 0.356 -0.675 -1.532
STR 0.290 0.330 0.079 0.150 0.330 -1.620 0.735
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.069 0.053 0.076 0.003 0.169 0.830 -1.188
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ETR2 0.091 0.070 0.101 0.003 0.221 0.735 -1.751
ETR3 0.048 0.038 0.054 0.001 0.114 0.514 -3.040
ETR4 0.079 0.056 0.091 0.003 0.203 1.076 0.017
STR 0.240 0.240 0.104 0.150 0.330 0.000 -6.000
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.377 0.365 0.025 0.359 0.420 2.042 4.292
ETR2 0.332 0.335 0.020 0.300 0.357 -0.819 2.272
ETR3 0.221 0.208 0.036 0.188 0.281 1.493 2.403
ETR4 0.330 0.331 0.020 0.300 0.356 -0.534 1.891
STR 33.000 33.000 0.000 33.000 33.000 . .
        
Panel L  Miscellaneous      
        
 Mean Median Std.  Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.213 0.159 0.132 0.000 0.816 1.917 5.060
ETR2 0.278 0.215 0.169 0.000 0.914 1.433 1.899
ETR3 0.118 0.103 0.063 0.000 0.472 1.686 6.221
ETR4 0.249 0.191 0.144 0.000 0.748 1.486 2.225
STR 0.196 0.150 0.088 0.000 0.330 0.668 -0.842
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.141 0.144 0.058 0.000 0.437 2.335 10.768
ETR2 0.211 0.167 0.146 0.000 0.914 2.789 9.035
ETR3 0.109 0.099 0.062 0.000 0.472 3.121 16.582
ETR4 0.189 0.158 0.109 0.000 0.605 2.297 5.780
STR 0.142 0.150 0.026 0.000 0.150 -3.702 14.435
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.290 0.276 0.146 0.072 0.816 1.494 3.294
ETR2 0.349 0.321 0.164 0.084 0.794 0.933 0.625
ETR3 0.128 0.119 0.064 0.015 0.263 0.410 -0.901
ETR4 0.312 0.302 0.150 0.067 0.748 1.216 1.590
STR 25.292 33.000 9.397 0.000 33.000 -0.527 -1.308
a The table shows the manufacturing sub-sectors’ mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, skewness and kurtosis for the ETRs and STRs. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. d 
after excluding any sample company with negative operating income, total income before tax and 
income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years or 668 companies 
from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information 
Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1 = ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
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Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; 
Std. = Standard deviation; Min. = minimum; Max. = maximum. Period 1 = 1994-2001; Period 2 = 
2002-2006. 
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Appendix 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Manufacturing Sub-sector ETRs and STR a  
Manufacturing 
Sub-Sector 
       
Panel A   Food, Beverages     
      
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.237 0.211 0.141 0 0.811 0.817 0.994
ETR2 0.262 0.225 0.166 0 0.902 1.281 2.201
ETR3 0.088 0.073 0.061 0 0.296 1.104 0.916
ETR4 0.235 0.204 0.135 0 0.735 0.834 0.859
STR 0.214 0.15 0.1 0 0.33 -0.024 -1.177
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.194 0.162 0.103 0.002 0.589 0.999 1.998
ETR2 0.23 0.182 0.153 0.001 0.902 2.29 7.508
ETR3 0.095 0.075 0.062 0 0.262 1.09 0.534
ETR4 0.199 0.168 0.102 0.001 0.595 0.981 2.112
STR 0.154 0.15 0.061 0 0.33 0.92 4.896
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.264 0.254 0.154 0 0.811 0.546 0.443
ETR2 0.282 0.267 0.17 0 0.798 0.828 0.656
ETR3 0.084 0.069 0.06 0 0.296 1.139 1.279
ETR4 0.257 0.256 0.148 0 0.735 0.6 0.252
STR 0.253 0.33 0.101 0 0.33 -0.816 -0.674
        
Panel B   Textiles, Apparel     
        
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.213 0.207 0.103 0 0.432 -0.145 -0.702
ETR2 0.229 0.228 0.11 0 0.531 -0.015 -0.336
ETR3 0.108 0.098 0.06 0 0.253 0.249 -0.644
ETR4 0.21 0.203 0.101 0 0.419 -0.19 -0.762
STR 0.261 0.33 0.1 0 0.33 -1.031 -0.262
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.161 0.166 0.095 0 0.373 0.226 -0.393
ETR2 0.181 0.17 0.102 0 0.379 0.18 -0.693
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ETR3 0.096 0.088 0.064 0 0.235 0.417 -0.583
ETR4 0.164 0.168 0.095 0 0.368 0.121 -0.571
STR 0.171 0.15 0.091 0 0.33 0.513 0.356
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.23 0.225 0.099 0 0.432 -0.286 -0.562
ETR2 0.245 0.244 0.109 0 0.531 -0.101 -0.114
ETR3 0.113 0.103 0.059 0 0.253 0.232 -0.61
ETR4 0.225 0.226 0.099 0 0.419 -0.314 -0.66
STR 0.29 0.33 0.085 0 0.33 -1.978 2.787
        
Panel C Wood, furniture      
        
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.2 0.175 0.09 0.075 0.408 0.81 -0.114
ETR2 0.218 0.192 0.096 0.087 0.412 0.664 -0.595
ETR3 0.092 0.076 0.062 0.019 0.281 1.737 3.771
ETR4 0.196 0.17 0.089 0.073 0.405 0.87 0.058
STR 0.187 0.149 0.097 0.1 0.33 0.678 -1.429
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.175 0.165 0.096 0.075 0.33 1.212 1.993
ETR2 0.185 0.162 0.098 0.087 0.348 1.503 3.049
ETR3 0.124 0.11 0.093 0.043 0.281 1.702 3.324
ETR4 0.171 0.159 0.095 0.073 0.325 1.266 2.252
STR 0.14 0.15 0.022 0.1 0.15 -2.231 4.983
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.208 0.175 0.09 0.094 0.408 0.863 0.044
ETR2 0.229 0.218 0.096 0.108 0.412 0.587 -0.603
ETR3 0.082 0.074 0.047 0.019 0.186 1.036 0.956
ETR4 0.204 0.171 0.089 0.09 0.405 0.929 0.249
STR 0.203 0.12 0.108 0.1 0.33 0.248 -2.091
        
Panel D  Paper, printing      
      
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.2 0.166 0.142 0 0.635 0.757 0.74
ETR2 0.202 0.184 0.135 0 0.735 0.716 2.04
ETR3 0.078 0.074 0.053 0 0.172 0.084 -1.072
ETR4 0.188 0.172 0.122 0 0.585 0.319 0.157
STR 0.244 0.33 0.1 0 0.33 -0.67 -0.713
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Period 1        
ETR1 0.118 0.111 0.087 0 0.324 0.7 0.493
ETR2 0.134 0.132 0.092 0 0.321 0.269 -0.292
ETR3 0.077 0.07 0.053 0 0.168 0.005 -0.996
ETR4 0.125 0.128 0.085 0 0.32 0.309 0.118
STR 0.133 0.15 0.073 0 0.33 0.12 3.108
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.232 0.233 0.147 0 0.635 0.53 0.525
ETR2 0.228 0.251 0.141 0 0.735 0.568 2.081
ETR3 0.079 0.075 0.053 0 0.172 0.112 -1.084
ETR4 0.213 0.238 0.126 0 0.585 0.083 0.191
STR 0.288 0.33 0.071 0.15 0.33 -1.279 -0.127
        
Panel E   Petroleum, chemical,      
materials 
        
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.225 0.184 0.123 0 0.777 1.324 2.796
ETR2 0.235 0.196 0.129 0 0.88 1.447 3.568
ETR3 0.101 0.092 0.056 0 0.288 0.714 0.261
ETR4 0.218 0.185 0.116 0 0.979 1.605 5.966
STR 0.222 0.15 0.09 0 0.33 0.246 -1.604
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.175 0.151 0.084 0 0.564 1.238 2.851
ETR2 0.2 0.167 0.103 0 0.626 1.353 2.669
ETR3 0.103 0.098 0.053 0 0.288 0.839 1.503
ETR4 0.179 0.153 0.08 0 0.43 0.888 0.872
STR 0.152 0.15 0.041 0 0.33 1.79 14.281
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.248 0.23 0.132 0 0.777 1.151 2.159
ETR2 0.251 0.23 0.137 0 0.88 1.373 3.271
ETR3 0.1 0.089 0.058 0 0.272 0.681 -0.124
ETR4 0.236 0.217 0.126 0 0.979 1.511 5.385
STR 0.254 0.33 0.089 0 0.33 -0.379 -1.707
   
Panel F   Electronics  
 
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples    
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ETR1 0.141 0.123 0.087 0 0.469 1.142 1.526
ETR2 0.156 0.138 0.097 0 0.579 1.666 4.673
ETR3 0.055 0.047 0.035 0 0.193 1.46 2.72
ETR4 0.147 0.125 0.109 0 0.741 2.626 10.612
STR 0.172 0.15 0.078 0 0.33 1.119 0.76
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.096 0.076 0.062 0.023 0.253 0.968 0.564
ETR2 0.114 0.105 0.068 0.023 0.251 0.446 -0.682
ETR3 0.054 0.055 0.027 0.019 0.106 0.511 -0.615
ETR4 0.096 0.08 0.057 0.023 0.212 0.578 -0.705
STR 0.129 0.15 0.046 0 0.15 -2.319 4.609
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.153 0.132 0.089 0 0.469 1.097 1.322
ETR2 0.167 0.141 0.101 0 0.579 1.692 4.407
ETR3 0.056 0.046 0.037 0 0.193 1.52 2.677
ETR4 0.161 0.131 0.116 0 0.741 2.542 9.424
STR 0.183 0.15 0.081 0.075 0.33 1.126 -0.233
        
Panel G  Metal, non-metal     
      
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.199 0.173 0.106 0 0.579 0.245 -0.53
ETR2 0.21 0.186 0.114 0 0.622 0.59 0.722
ETR3 0.105 0.089 0.072 0 0.296 0.631 -0.49
ETR4 0.195 0.169 0.105 0 0.574 0.398 -0.001
STR 0.231 0.15 0.097 0 0.33 -0.157 -1.416
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.159 0.149 0.094 0 0.422 0.597 0.175
ETR2 0.171 0.159 0.092 0 0.403 0.346 -0.137
ETR3 0.093 0.086 0.068 0 0.285 0.724 -0.054
ETR4 0.159 0.146 0.09 0 0.402 0.534 0.177
STR 0.166 0.15 0.075 0 0.33 0.888 1.756
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.216 0.21 0.107 0 0.579 0.088 -0.565
ETR2 0.227 0.222 0.118 0 0.622 0.529 0.638
ETR3 0.11 0.091 0.074 0 0.296 0.585 -0.641
ETR4 0.21 0.206 0.107 0 0.574 0.288 -0.04
STR 0.258 0.33 0.092 0 0.33 -0.628 -1.242
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Panel H   Machinery, 
equipment, instruments 
     
      
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.178 0.155 0.108 0 0.835 1.525 4.865
ETR2 0.201 0.174 0.114 0 0.693 1.025 1.709
ETR3 0.075 0.068 0.05 0 0.374 1.215 2.486
ETR4 0.184 0.16 0.106 0 0.714 1.218 2.878
STR 0.194 0.15 0.087 0 0.33 0.634 -0.671
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.147 0.142 0.1 0 0.835 3.283 18.399
ETR2 0.164 0.157 0.083 0 0.557 0.807 2.485
ETR3 0.077 0.069 0.053 0 0.374 1.352 4.195
ETR4 0.153 0.15 0.084 0 0.69 1.932 10.074
STR 0.151 0.15 0.048 0 0.33 1.014 9.544
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.193 0.174 0.108 0 0.689 0.941 1.641
ETR2 0.218 0.194 0.122 0 0.693 0.883 1.089
ETR3 0.074 0.066 0.049 0 0.26 1.125 1.345
ETR4 0.199 0.173 0.112 0 0.714 0.972 1.704
STR 0.215 0.15 0.094 0 0.33 0.23 -1.404
        
Panel I  Medicine, biological products      
        
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.221 0.193 0.11 0.002 0.811 1.088 2.502
ETR2 0.248 0.222 0.131 0.002 0.855 1.338 3.2
ETR3 0.073 0.063 0.048 0.001 0.254 1.511 2.504
ETR4 0.222 0.197 0.104 0.002 0.604 0.713 0.57
STR 0.213 0.15 0.087 0 0.33 0.58 -1.538
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.175 0.155 0.084 0.011 0.58 1.309 4.263
ETR2 0.206 0.181 0.104 0.011 0.6 1.119 2.123
ETR3 0.08 0.064 0.053 0.002 0.245 1.252 1.318
ETR4 0.186 0.162 0.095 0.007 0.604 1.558 4.607
STR 0.164 0.15 0.053 0 0.33 2.36 6.483
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.242 0.221 0.115 0.002 0.811 0.947 2.201
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ETR2 0.268 0.247 0.138 0.002 0.855 1.299 2.988
ETR3 0.07 0.061 0.046 0.001 0.254 1.654 3.392
ETR4 0.239 0.226 0.104 0.002 0.557 0.436 -0.086
STR 0.235 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.33 0.099 -2.005
        
Panel J   Other manufacturing sectors     
       
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
All Samples         
ETR1 0.178 0.144 0.129 0.016 0.648 1.469 2.27
ETR2 0.209 0.162 0.173 0.018 0.903 2.379 7.14
ETR3 0.075 0.07 0.04 0.011 0.196 0.665 0.443
ETR4 0.175 0.152 0.113 0.018 0.591 1.23 1.822
STR 0.194 0.15 0.089 0 0.33 0.243 -0.489
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.119 0.096 0.086 0.046 0.423 2.868 9.82
ETR2 0.132 0.127 0.061 0.051 0.306 1.225 2.777
ETR3 0.072 0.071 0.035 0.013 0.153 0.443 0.512
ETR4 0.122 0.108 0.06 0.048 0.308 1.784 4.905
STR 0.136 0.15 0.058 0 0.264 -1.025 3.668
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.203 0.163 0.137 0.016 0.648 1.194 1.6
ETR2 0.241 0.193 0.195 0.018 0.903 1.968 4.727
ETR3 0.075 0.069 0.043 0.011 0.196 0.694 0.365
ETR4 0.198 0.173 0.123 0.018 0.591 0.896 0.998
STR 0.218 0.15 0.09 0 0.33 0.033 -1.128
a The table shows the regional mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and 
kurtosis for the ETRs and STRs. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample 
company with negative operating income, total income before tax and income tax, missing values, and 
ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final 
sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample 
companies.  
Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1 = ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; 
Std. = Standard deviation; Min.= minimum; Max. = maximum. Period 1 = 1994-2001; Period 2 = 
2002-2006. 
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Appendix 9 
Manufacturing Industry Sub-sector Mean ETRs and STR in Two Periods  a
 1994-2001  2002-2006 
Manufacturing 
Sub-sector ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR  ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Food and beverages 0.194 0.230 0.095 0.199 0.154  0.264 0.282 0.084 0.257 0.253 
Textiles and apparel 0.161 0.181 0.096 0.164 0.171  0.230 0.245 0.113 0.225 0.290 
Wood and furniture 0.175 0.185 0.124 0.171 0.140  0.208 0.229 0.082 0.204 0.203 
Paper and printing 0.118 0.134 0.077 0.125 0.133  0.232 0.228 0.079 0.213 0.288 
Petroleum, chemical, and materials 0.175 0.200 0.103 0.179 0.152  0.248 0.251 0.100 0.236 0.254 
Electronics 0.096 0.114 0.054 0.096 0.129  0.153 0.167 0.056 0.161 0.183 
Metal and non-metal 0.159 0.171 0.093 0.159 0.166  0.216 0.227 0.110 0.210 0.258 
Machinery, equipment and instruments 0.147 0.164 0.077 0.153 0.151  0.193 0.218 0.074 0.199 0.215 
Medicine and biological products 0.175 0.206 0.080 0.186 0.164  0.242 0.268 0.070 0.239 0.235 
Other manufacturing 
otal
0.119 0.132 0.072 0.122 0.136  0.203 0.241 0.075 0.198 0.218 
T             
a  The table shows the mean of ETRs and STRs for each manufacturing industry sub-sector in two periods (1994-2001 and 2002-2006). The initial data are from CSMAR 
V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating income, total income before tax and income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 
company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample 
companies. 
Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1 = ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; 
STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
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Appendix 10 
Manufacturing Industry Sub-sector Median ETRs and STR in Two Periods  a
 1994-2001  2002-2006 
Manufacturing 
Sub-sector ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR  ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Food and beverages 0.162 0.182 0.075 0.168 0.150  0.254 0.267 0.069 0.256 0.330 
Textiles and apparel 0.166 0.170 0.088 0.168 0.150  0.225 0.244 0.103 0.226 0.330 
Wood and furniture 0.165 0.162 0.110 0.159 0.150  0.175 0.218 0.074 0.171 0.120 
Paper and printing 0.111 0.132 0.070 0.128 0.150  0.233 0.251 0.075 0.238 0.330 
Petroleum, chemical, and materials 0.151 0.167 0.098 0.153 0.150  0.230 0.230 0.089 0.217 0.330 
Electronics 0.076 0.105 0.055 0.080 0.150  0.132 0.141 0.046 0.131 0.150 
Metal and non-metal 0.149 0.159 0.086 0.146 0.150  0.210 0.222 0.091 0.206 0.330 
Machinery, equipment and instruments 0.142 0.157 0.069 0.150 0.150  0.174 0.194 0.066 0.173 0.150 
Medicine and biological products 0.155 0.181 0.064 0.162 0.150  0.221 0.247 0.061 0.226 0.150 
Other manufacturing 
otal
0.096 0.127 0.071 0.108 0.150  0.163 0.193 0.069 0.173 0.150 
T             
a  The table shows the median of ETRs and STR for each manufacturing industry sub-sector in two periods (1994-2001 and 2002-2006). The initial data are from CSMAR 
V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating income, total income before tax and income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 
company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample 
companies. 
Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1 = ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; 
STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
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Appendix 11                            Statistic of Tests Results for Manufacturing Sub-sector ETRs and STR Differences a
Single factor analysis of variance 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Year F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
1994 0.429 0.813 0.271 0.911 1.708 0.286 0.411 0.824 0.000 1.000 
1995 1.742 0.206 2.517 0.094 0.759 0.591 0.557 0.731 0.000 1.000 
1996 2.274 0.030 1.027 0.437 0.625 0.730 1.295 0.293 0.921 0.507 
1997 0.954 0.484 0.585 0.784 0.249 0.979 0.685 0.702 0.730 0.665 
1998 1.567 0.148 1.851 0.079 1.096 0.374 2.066 0.049 0.596 0.778 
1999 3.356 0.001 4.074 0.000 3.652 0.000 4.937 0.000 1.373 0.207 
2000 1.411 0.187 2.226 0.023 2.159 0.027 1.862 0.061 2.657 0.007 
2001 0.477 0.889 0.572 0.820 1.836 0.063 0.453 0.905 0.572 0.820 
2002 1.953 0.045 1.621 0.109 3.790 0.000 1.981 0.042 2.566 0.008 
2003 2.781 0.004 1.913 0.050 4.604 0.000 1.776 0.072 2.823 0.003 
2004 1.637 0.104 1.094 0.366 2.776 0.004 1.050 0.400 2.614 0.006 
2005 2.009 0.037 2.266 0.018 4.719 0.000 1.815 0.064 4.129 0.000 
2006 3.232 0.001 2.394 0.012 4.113 0.000 2.606 0.006 3.377 0.001 
Period 1 4.433 0.000 6.112 0.000 3.813 0.000 5.343 0.000 2.286 0.016 
Period 2 10.280 0.000 7.088 0.000 17.696 0.000 6.898 0.000 14.971 0.000 
Total 11.906 0.000 10.235 0.000 19.469 0.000 9.540 0.000 13.121 0.000 
Kruskal-Wallis test results 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR4 STR 
Year 2χ 2χ 2χ 2χ 2χ Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
1994 6.250 0.283 1.659 0.894 7.864 0.164 3.045 0.693 0.000 1.000 
1995 9.089 0.106 6.763 0.239 5.325 0.378 4.468 0.484 0.000 1.000 
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1996 9.189 0.239 7.315 0.397 4.953 0.666 7.303 0.398 11.550 0.116 
1997 8.857 0.354 6.502 0.591 6.818 0.556 6.443 0.598 6.797 0.559 
1998 16.426 0.037 14.914 0.061 10.189 0.252 17.413 0.026 5.400 0.714 
1999 36.687 0.000 32.270 0.000 21.091 0.012 35.593 0.000 10.978 0.277 
2000 20.152 0.017 21.469 0.011 22.260 0.008 21.854 0.009 24.442 0.004 
2001 6.147 0.725 6.409 0.698 21.561 0.010 5.518 0.787 5.939 0.746 
2002 17.793 0.038 14.874 0.094 30.141 0.000 17.095 0.047 18.387 0.031 
2003 26.939 0.001 19.543 0.021 33.025 0.000 19.175 0.024 22.442 0.008 
2004 12.780 0.173 7.577 0.577 21.188 0.012 10.184 0.336 22.918 0.006 
2005 20.481 0.015 19.098 0.024 37.888 0.000 16.487 0.057 34.331 0.000 
2006 29.614 0.001 24.742 0.003 33.591 0.000 28.022 0.001 31.544 0.000 
Period 1 56.884 0.000 48.956 0.000 38.806 0.000 51.642 0.000 26.048 0.000 
Period 2 93.116 0.000 67.653 0.000 134.614 0.000 72.101 0.000 122.943 0.000 
Total 120.822 0.000 98.372 0.000 161.319 0.000 103.010 0.000 111.858 0.000 
a The table shows the manufacturing sub-sector ETRs and STRs single factor analysis of variance (One-Way ANOVA) results and Kruskal-Wallis test (Non-parametric test) 
results annually from 1994 to 2006, Period 1 (1994-2001), Period 2 (2002-2006), and the entire sample years’ pool (total). The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After 
excluding any sample company with negative operating income, total income before tax and income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company 
years, or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
Period 1 is from 1994 to 2001 with a total 1421 company years. Period 2 is from 2002 to 2006 with a total 2767 company years. 
b
Tax BeforeProfit Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1 = ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ; 
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; 
 STR = Statutory Tax Rate. Sig. = significant level.  
c The hypothesis is : Manufacturing sub-sector’s ETR and STR equals each other.  0H
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Appendix 12 
Sample Companies’ Manufacturing Sub-sector Distribution for Each Region   
 E.Region M.Region W.Region SEZ HTIDZ 
Manufacturing Sub-sector Obs. Pct Obs. Pct Obs. Pct Obs. Pct Obs. Pct 
Food and beverages 74 7.54% 26 6.19% 64 17.93% 7 6.42% 41 7.24% 
Textiles and apparel 116 11.81% 13 3.10% 6 1.68% 0 0.00% 7 1.24% 
Wood and furniture 2 0.20% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 3 2.75% 15 2.65% 
Paper and printing 48 4.89% 8 1.90% 8 2.24% 0 0.00% 4 0.71% 
Petroleum, chemical, and materials 169 17.21% 91 21.67% 79 22.13% 11 10.09% 98 17.31% 
Electronics 42 4.28% 0 0.00% 13 3.64% 8 7.34% 35 6.18% 
Metal and non-metal 147 14.97% 111 26.43% 69 19.33% 30 27.52% 39 6.89% 
Machinery, equipment and instruments 235 23.93% 93 22.14% 79 22.13% 36 33.03% 208 36.75% 
Medicine and biological products 110 11.20% 78 18.57% 39 10.92% 6 5.50% 106 18.73% 
Other manufacturing 39 3.97% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 8 7.34% 13 2.30% 
Total 982 100.00% 420 100.00% 357 100.00% 109 100.00% 566 100.00% 
a  The table shows the sample companies manufacturing sub-sectors distribution for each region. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample 
company with negative operating income, total income before tax and income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years or 668 companies 
from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies.  
E.Region = Eastern Region; M.Region = Middle Region; W.Region = Western Region; SEZ = Special Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry Development Zone; 
Obs. = observations (number of the sample company observations); Pct = percentage.     
 
 
 
Appendix 13 
Descriptive Statistics for Regional ETRs and STR  a
Industry 
Sector        
        
Panel A   Eastern Region     
      
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
All 
Samples        
ETR1 0.225 0.210 0.116 0.000 0.839 0.575 0.778 
ETR2 0.253 0.240 0.132 0.000 0.984 0.914 2.212 
ETR3 0.111 0.096 0.072 0.000 0.418 0.949 0.758 
ETR4 0.232 0.218 0.118 0.000 0.985 0.752 1.843 
STR 0.240 0.330 0.096 0.000 0.330 -0.325 -1.383 
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.187 0.162 0.101 0.000 0.564 0.622 0.254 
ETR2 0.216 0.189 0.118 0.000 0.984 1.299 4.690 
ETR3 0.104 0.092 0.066 0.000 0.418 0.986 1.242 
ETR4 0.197 0.177 0.102 0.000 0.761 0.802 1.899 
STR 0.192 0.150 0.085 0.000 0.330 0.675 -0.542 
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.254 0.256 0.119 0.000 0.839 0.466 1.030 
ETR2 0.281 0.282 0.135 0.000 0.928 0.701 1.581 
ETR3 0.116 0.099 0.076 0.000 0.400 0.890 0.416 
ETR4 0.258 0.263 0.122 0.000 0.985 0.642 1.874 
STR 0.276 0.330 0.088 0.000 0.330 -1.236 0.109 
        
Panel B   Middle Region     
        
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
All 
Samples        
ETR1 0.235 0.232 0.115 0.000 0.777 0.528 0.679 
ETR2 0.250 0.246 0.124 0.000 0.902 0.858 2.165 
ETR3 0.111 0.095 0.074 0.000 0.491 1.211 2.315 
ETR4 0.234 0.227 0.112 0.000 0.763 0.605 1.240 
STR 0.244 0.330 0.095 0.000 0.330 -0.377 -1.372 
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.190 0.155 0.094 0.000 0.610 1.015 1.901 
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ETR2 0.211 0.178 0.108 0.000 0.902 1.593 6.384 
ETR3 0.107 0.093 0.072 0.000 0.453 1.606 4.442 
ETR4 0.195 0.164 0.094 0.000 0.595 1.013 2.079 
STR 0.187 0.150 0.081 0.000 0.330 0.829 -0.124 
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.268 0.289 0.118 0.000 0.777 0.178 0.817 
ETR2 0.279 0.297 0.126 0.000 0.792 0.489 1.395 
ETR3 0.115 0.096 0.075 0.000 0.491 0.953 1.118 
ETR4 0.263 0.284 0.116 0.000 0.763 0.315 1.410 
STR 0.287 0.330 0.081 0.000 0.330 -1.553 1.090 
        
Panel C   Western Region      
        
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
All 
Samples        
ETR1 0.183 0.159 0.113 0.000 0.835 1.809 5.735 
ETR2 0.199 0.172 0.125 0.000 0.817 1.858 5.456 
ETR3 0.077 0.066 0.055 0.000 0.297 1.346 2.192 
ETR4 0.180 0.160 0.107 0.000 0.979 2.053 9.522 
STR 0.177 0.150 0.072 0.000 0.330 1.266 1.205 
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.176 0.152 0.109 0.000 0.835 2.253 9.408 
ETR2 0.192 0.171 0.104 0.000 0.652 1.236 3.157 
ETR3 0.086 0.076 0.057 0.000 0.297 1.076 1.321 
ETR4 0.173 0.159 0.090 0.000 0.578 0.951 2.153 
STR 0.165 0.150 0.063 0.000 0.330 1.490 3.540 
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.190 0.169 0.115 0.000 0.669 1.493 3.452 
ETR2 0.206 0.175 0.140 0.000 0.817 1.955 5.091 
ETR3 0.070 0.060 0.051 0.000 0.296 1.649 3.584 
ETR4 0.186 0.162 0.119 0.000 0.979 2.327 10.196 
STR 0.186 0.150 0.078 0.000 0.330 1.072 0.081 
        
Panel D   Special Economic Zone     
      
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
All 
Samples        
ETR1 0.147 0.142 0.088 0.000 0.811 2.527 13.609 
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ETR2 0.172 0.159 0.100 0.000 0.903 2.212 10.414 
ETR3 0.079 0.069 0.052 0.000 0.327 1.397 3.578 
ETR4 0.153 0.146 0.081 0.000 0.490 1.214 2.395 
STR 0.147 0.150 0.042 0.000 0.330 1.924 10.797 
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.125 0.127 0.064 0.000 0.354 0.619 1.395 
ETR2 0.154 0.147 0.085 0.000 0.538 1.101 2.582 
ETR3 0.072 0.065 0.047 0.000 0.324 1.484 4.827 
ETR4 0.137 0.133 0.077 0.000 0.475 1.174 2.888 
STR 0.140 0.150 0.040 0.000 0.330 0.773 9.378 
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.173 0.152 0.104 0.034 0.811 2.741 12.066 
ETR2 0.195 0.163 0.113 0.056 0.903 2.661 11.775 
ETR3 0.087 0.078 0.056 0.011 0.327 1.265 2.633 
ETR4 0.172 0.157 0.082 0.055 0.490 1.348 2.092 
STR 0.156 0.150 0.043 0.075 0.330 3.181 11.729 
        
Panel E  High-Tech Industry Development Zone    
        
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
All 
Samples        
ETR1 0.187 0.156 0.116 0.000 0.957 1.792 6.148 
ETR2 0.215 0.177 0.137 0.000 0.984 1.855 5.549 
ETR3 0.089 0.075 0.065 0.000 0.472 1.775 4.796 
ETR4 0.194 0.165 0.115 0.000 0.915 1.552 4.548 
STR 0.182 0.150 0.083 0.000 0.330 0.793 0.024 
        
Period 1        
ETR1 0.165 0.149 0.100 0.000 0.816 1.993 8.037 
ETR2 0.197 0.166 0.128 0.000 0.914 1.993 6.462 
ETR3 0.095 0.080 0.070 0.000 0.472 1.969 5.916 
ETR4 0.177 0.157 0.107 0.000 0.735 1.735 5.323 
STR 0.157 0.150 0.065 0.000 0.330 1.033 3.471 
        
Period 2        
ETR1 0.205 0.175 0.124 0.000 0.957 1.636 5.202 
ETR2 0.230 0.196 0.143 0.000 0.984 1.767 5.065 
ETR3 0.084 0.072 0.061 0.000 0.332 1.460 2.468 
ETR4 0.208 0.179 0.120 0.000 0.915 1.434 4.208 
STR 0.203 0.150 0.090 0.000 0.330 0.481 -1.088 
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a The table shows the regional mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness 
and kurtosis of the ETRs and STRs for all samples, Period 1(1994-2001) and Period 2 (2002-2006). 
The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, total income before tax and income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 
4188 company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were 
collected from theWind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies.  
Tax BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1 = ;
Income Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR2 = ;
FlowCash  Operating
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR3 = ;
Gain  Investment-Impairment for the ΔProvision  +
Expenses Operating-Non +Tax   BeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  Income
=ETR4 ; STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
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 Appendix 14 
Annual Regional Sample Distribution   a
Region 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
E. Region 11 22 34 52 68 93 121 160 190 209 238 255 289 
M. Region 3 4 9 13 24 37 46 63 70 79 90 94 99 
W. Region 1 2 7 12 20 31 39 55 58 61 66 66 70 
SEZ 9 9 12 17 19 21 24 27 30 30 33 35 39 
HTIDZ 6 10 20 32 48 61 80 99 106 121 139 145 155 
a The table shows the regional annual sample distribution of the sample from 1994 to 2006. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company 
with negative operating income, total income before tax and income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 668 companies from 1994 
to 2006 as the final sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. E.Region = Eastern Region; M.Region 
= Middle Region; W.Region = Western Region; SEZ = Special Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry Development Zone. 
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Appendix 15 
                                         Annual Regional STR Mean  a
Region 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
E. Region 0.166 0.166 0.169 0.151 0.148 0.155 0.18 0.174 0.27 0.28 0.279 0.277 0.27 
M. Region 0.15 0.15 0.146 0.135 0.146 0.149 0.163 0.166 0.276 0.289 0.286 0.284 0.29 
W. Region 0.15 0.15 0.176 0.15 0.168 0.151 0.159 0.163 0.181 0.186 0.191 0.18 0.188 
SEZ 0.133 0.142 0.137 0.132 0.13 0.129 0.137 0.136 0.168 0.159 0.155 0.157 0.152 
HTIDZ 0.15 0.135 0.146 0.141 0.132 0.14 0.152 0.142 0.205 0.2 0.204 0.206 0.201 
a  The table shows the regional annual STR mean from 1994 to 2006. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative operating 
income, total income before tax and income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the final 
sample. The STR data were collected from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. E.Region = Eastern Region; M.Region = Middle Region; 
W.Region = Western Region; SEZ = Special Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry Development Zone; STR = Statutory Tax Rate. 
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Appendix 16 
Annual Regional ETR1 Mean  
Region 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
E. Region 0.144 0.146 0.131 0.157 0.163 0.171 0.18 0.186 0.234 0.258 0.253 0.259 0.249 
M. Region 0.151 0.147 0.138 0.123 0.177 0.177 0.165 0.17 0.259 0.273 0.264 0.275 0.261 
W. Region 0.157 0.233 0.181 0.144 0.182 0.187 0.166 0.162 0.191 0.183 0.195 0.202 0.179 
SEZ 0.095 0.102 0.121 0.117 0.112 0.107 0.126 0.134 0.16 0.178 0.182 0.16 0.174 
HTIDZ 0.121 0.119 0.134 0.144 0.143 0.158 0.211 0.154 0.162 0.209 0.207 0.197 0.206 
a  The table shows the regional annual ETR1 mean from 1994 to 2006. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company with negative 
operating income, total income before tax and income tax, missing values, and ETR exceeding one, it leaves 4188 company years, or 668 companies from 1994 to 2006 as the 
final sample. E.Region = Eastern Region; M.Region = Middle Region; W.Region = Western Region; SEZ = Special Economic Zone; HTIDZ = High-Tech Industry 
Development Zone;
 TaxBeforeProfit  Total
ExpenseTax  IncomeETR1 =
.
 
 
 
Appendix 17 
The One Year Borrowing Interest Rate 
Date Interest Rate 
1991.04.21 8.64 
1993.05.15 9.36 
1993.07.11 10.98 
1995.01.01 10.98 
1995.07.01 12.06 
1996.05.01 10.98 
1996.08.23 10.08 
1997.10.23 8.64 
1998.03.25 7.92 
1998.07.01 6.93 
1998.12.07 6.39 
1999.06.10 5.85 
2002.02.21 5.31 
2004.10.29 5.58 
2006.04.28 5.85 
2006.08.19 6.12 
2007.03.18 6.39 
2007.05.19 6.57 
2007.07.21 6.84 
2007.08.22 7.02 
2007.09.15 7.29 
2007.12.21 7.47 
2008.09.16 7.2 
2008.10.09 6.93 
2008.10.30 6.66 
2008.11.27 5.58 
2008.12.23 5.31 
2010.10.20 5.56 
Source: The People’s Bank of China (2011). 
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Appendix 18          Distributions of MTRs and STR 
Tax rate segment Binary1 Binary2 Trichotomous Simulated Manzon STR
0 508 719 303 122 104 104
0.05 1 1 7 199 11 2 
0.1 81 77 376 242 114 85 
0.15 2084 1928 1931 2198 2336 2364
0.2 11 9 117 32 17 12 
0.25 11 11 11 14 24 12 
0.3 10 9 9 8 41 11 
0.33 408 360 360 299 467 524
Total 3114 3114 3114 3114 3114 3114
The Table shows the MTR estimates and STR’s relative frequency of sample companies in each tax 
rate segment. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company listed after 
2002, adopting the deferred tax method, negative tax payments and missing values, it leaves 3114 
company years, 769 companies from 1995 to 2002 as the final sample. The STR data were collected 
from the Wind Information Terminal to match the final sample companies. 
 
Binary1, Binary2 and Trichotomous represent the static MTR proxy. Simulated represents the 
simulated marginal tax rate using mimic taxable income. Manzon represents the dynamic marginal tax 
rate, which was developed by Manzon (1994). The detailed calculation methods are described in the 
methodology. STR is Statutory Tax Rate. 
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Appendix 19 
The Annual Average Industry PTROEs and ATROE 
for the 15% and 33% STR Companies 
Panel A: Year 2002 
Industry 
15% 33% 
PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal husbandry, 
Fishery 
0.089 0.063 0.085 0.077 0.078 0.066 
Mining 0.097 0.097 0.079 0.142 0.146 0.098 
Food, beverages 0.137 0.093 0.108 0.113 0.116 0.077 
Textiles, apparel 0.091 0.075 0.069 0.131 0.122 0.100 
Wood, furniture    0.110 0.107 0.073 
Paper, printing 0.070 0.069 0.070 0.093 0.088 0.072 
Petroleum, chemical, 
and materials 
0.106 0.103 0.090 0.095 0.095 0.068 
Electronics 0.062 0.053 0.055 0.099 0.092 0.085 
Metal, non-metal 0.106 0.103 0.092 0.125 0.126 0.090 
Machinery, equipment, 
and instruments 
0.123 0.113 0.103 0.119 0.100 0.092 
Medicine, biological 
products 
0.123 0.115 0.101 0.106 0.106 0.077 
Other manufacturing 0.123 0.112 0.111 0.031 0.024 0.019 
Electricity, gas and 
water production and 
supply 
0.142 0.135 0.120 0.130 0.128 0.093 
Construction 0.085 0.079 0.071 0.054 0.055 0.038 
Transportation and 
warehousing 
0.125 0.106 0.110 0.122 0.105 0.091 
Information technology 0.085 0.071 0.072 0.290 0.295 0.210 
Real estate industry 0.114 0.109 0.087 0.133 0.118 0.097 
Wholesale and retail 0.132 0.096 0.114 0.106 0.104 0.074 
Social services 0.154 0.103 0.134 0.128 0.128 0.094 
Broadcasting and 
media 
0.080 0.098 0.075 0.242 0.273 0.165 
Miscellaneous 0.110 0.092 0.086 0.125 0.099 0.088 
Total 0.114 0.102 0.096 0.118 0.112 0.086 
Panel B: Year 2003   
 15% 33% 
Industry PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal husbandry, 
Fishery 
0.080 0.058 0.079 0.050 0.047 0.045 
Mining 0.115 0.117 0.093 0.149 0.158 0.104 
342 
Food, beverages 0.132 0.124 0.099 0.120 0.116 0.083 
Textiles, apparel 0.118 0.100 0.094 0.123 0.111 0.090 
Wood, furniture    0.144 0.142 0.085 
Paper, printing 0.072 0.073 0.065 0.091 0.094 0.073 
Petroleum, chemical, 
and materials 
0.117 0.117 0.096 0.110 0.110 0.081 
Electronics 0.068 0.065 0.059 0.117 0.113 0.091 
Metal, non-metal 0.127 0.124 0.113 0.173 0.176 0.125 
Machinery, equipment, 
and instruments 
0.137 0.126 0.116 0.117 0.100 0.089 
Medicine, biological 
products 
0.119 0.104 0.097 0.135 0.140 0.095 
Other manufacturing 0.106 0.096 0.091 0.032 0.021 0.021 
Electricity, gas and 
water production and 
supply 
0.180 0.172 0.149 0.138 0.128 0.103 
Construction 0.065 0.060 0.054 0.076 0.068 0.061 
Transportation and 
warehousing 
0.151 0.132 0.129 0.136 0.112 0.097 
Information technology 0.084 0.078 0.072 0.228 0.228 0.158 
Real estate industry 0.116 0.112 0.086 0.154 0.147 0.105 
Wholesale and retail 0.164 0.129 0.135 0.107 0.104 0.075 
Social services 0.119 0.058 0.103 0.127 0.118 0.089 
Broadcasting and 
media 
0.087 0.109 0.079 0.237 0.277 0.172 
Miscellaneous 0.115 0.092 0.095 0.150 0.137 0.097 
Total 0.125 0.114 0.104 0.130 0.125 0.093 
Panel C: Year 2004   
 15% 33% 
Industry PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal husbandry, 
Fishery 
0.082 0.062 0.078 0.095 0.095 0.076 
Mining 0.156 0.172 0.124 0.251 0.258 0.174 
Food, beverages 0.150 0.206 0.116 0.135 0.134 0.089 
Textiles, apparel 0.111 0.108 0.084 0.105 0.099 0.082 
Wood, furniture    0.140 0.141 0.101 
Paper, printing 0.073 0.077 0.065 0.103 0.104 0.078 
Petroleum, chemical, 
and materials 
0.166 0.170 0.139 0.129 0.131 0.097 
Electronics 0.070 0.068 0.060 0.099 0.092 0.075 
Metal, non-metal 0.180 0.181 0.157 0.192 0.190 0.141 
Machinery, equipment, 
and instruments 
0.135 0.126 0.116 0.135 0.123 0.103 
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Medicine, biological 
products 
0.119 0.114 0.099 0.119 0.118 0.081 
Other manufacturing 0.127 0.123 0.106 0.090 0.096 0.058 
Electricity, gas and 
water production and 
supply 
0.158 0.154 0.130 0.129 0.117 0.096 
Construction 0.077 0.068 0.063 0.107 0.102 0.079 
Transportation and 
warehousing 
0.165 0.153 0.143 0.158 0.156 0.111 
Information technology 0.105 0.078 0.089 0.173 0.176 0.117 
Real estate industry 0.131 0.123 0.100 0.177 0.174 0.122 
Wholesale and retail 0.192 0.159 0.157 0.129 0.124 0.089 
Social services 0.155 0.102 0.131 0.147 0.140 0.100 
Broadcasting and 
media 
0.096 0.111 0.089 0.322 0.346 0.206 
Miscellaneous 0.111 0.089 0.089 0.164 0.147 0.104 
Total 0.137 0.130 0.115 0.144 0.140 0.103 
Panel D: Year 2005   
 15% 33% 
Industry PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal husbandry, 
Fishery 
   0.108 0.108 0.093 
Mining 0.224 0.234 0.176 0.296 0.301 0.203 
Food, beverages 0.136 0.130 0.102 0.141 0.143 0.091 
Textiles, apparel 0.113 0.106 0.097 0.101 0.098 0.076 
Wood, furniture    0.124 0.130 0.088 
Paper, printing 0.059 0.060 0.053 0.114 0.115 0.089 
Petroleum, chemical, 
and materials 
0.160 0.155 0.136 0.142 0.141 0.104 
Electronics 0.084 0.081 0.073 0.103 0.101 0.079 
Metal, non-metal 0.164 0.158 0.141 0.148 0.147 0.110 
Machinery, equipment, 
and instruments 
0.119 0.112 0.100 0.131 0.124 0.102 
Medicine, biological 
products 
0.126 0.118 0.104 0.119 0.117 0.082 
Other manufacturing 0.110 0.097 0.095 0.112 0.111 0.079 
Electricity, gas and 
water production and 
supply 
0.138 0.128 0.117 0.130 0.120 0.087 
Construction 0.084 0.069 0.065 0.124 0.121 0.089 
Transportation and 
warehousing 
0.184 0.159 0.159 0.167 0.155 0.117 
Information technology 0.101 0.087 0.085 0.158 0.160 0.107 
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Real estate industry 0.129 0.116 0.098 0.172 0.168 0.111 
Wholesale and retail 0.182 0.151 0.145 0.138 0.132 0.091 
Social services 0.138 0.093 0.119 0.128 0.123 0.087 
Broadcasting and 
media 
0.065 0.077 0.052 0.300 0.330 0.191 
Miscellaneous 0.126 0.102 0.098 0.158 0.155 0.099 
Total 0.133 0.122 0.111 0.143 0.139 0.101 
Panel E: Year 2006  
 15% 33% 
Industry PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE PTROE_1 PTROE_2 ATROE
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal husbandry, 
Fishery 
   0.112 0.106 0.098 
Mining 0.314 0.317 0.264 0.285 0.291 0.197 
Food, beverages 0.142 0.131 0.115 0.176 0.167 0.125 
Textiles, apparel 0.086 0.072 0.073 0.120 0.104 0.089 
Wood, furniture    0.240 0.201 0.196 
Paper, printing 0.042 0.040 0.036 0.104 0.099 0.082 
Petroleum, chemical, 
and materials 
0.197 0.183 0.167 0.139 0.135 0.100 
Electronics 0.098 0.089 0.082 0.142 0.138 0.111 
Metal, non-metal 0.219 0.213 0.187 0.177 0.172 0.130 
Machinery, equipment, 
and instruments 
0.142 0.123 0.122 0.142 0.120 0.108 
Medicine, biological 
products 
0.138 0.113 0.113 0.114 0.107 0.080 
Other manufacturing 0.179 0.143 0.148 0.167 0.165 0.111 
Electricity, gas and 
water production and 
supply 
0.161 0.147 0.137 0.141 0.121 0.099 
Construction 0.102 0.081 0.078 0.127 0.123 0.088 
Transportation and 
warehousing 
0.167 0.136 0.144 0.163 0.149 0.119 
Information technology 0.112 0.091 0.095 0.195 0.199 0.136 
Real estate industry 0.143 0.126 0.112 0.157 0.140 0.102 
Wholesale and retail 0.190 0.147 0.149 0.152 0.142 0.100 
Social services 0.135 0.090 0.113 0.144 0.120 0.100 
Broadcasting and 
media 
0.025 0.027 0.018 0.312 0.340 0.198 
Miscellaneous 0.144 0.108 0.109 0.199 0.193 0.139 
Total 0.152 0.133 0.127 0.154 0.144 0.110 
a The table shows the industry PTROEs and ATROE annual mean for the 15% and 33% STR company 
from 2002 to 2006. The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company 
before 2002 and with missing value, negative shareholder equity, negative tax payment, negative 
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operating income and PTI and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 company years, 777 companies 
 2 inalfrom 2002 to 006 as the f  full sample. 
PTROE_1ൌ Pre tax income
Shareholder equity
; PTROE_2ൌ Operating income
Shareholder equity
; ATROEൌ After tax income
Shareholder equity
. 
 
 Appendix 20  Correlations of the PTROAs and ATROA  a b
Pearson Correlation Spearman Correlation (Non-parametric correlation)
 PTROA_1 PTROA_2 ATROA  PTROA_1 PTROA_2 ATROA
PTROA_1 1.000   PTROA_1 1.000   
PTROA_2 0.955** 1.000  PTROA_2 0.936** 1.000  
ATROA 0.972** 0.907** 0.977** 0.898** 1.000 ATROA 1.000 
a The table shows the Pearson correlation and Spearman correlation of the PTROAs and ATROA. The initial data are from 
CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with missing value, negative shareholder equity, 
negative tax payment, negative operating income and PTI and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 company years or 777 
rom 2002 to 2 nal full sample. companies f 006 as the fi
PTROA_1ൌ Pre tax income
Total assets
; PTROA_2ൌ Operating income
Total assets
; ATROAൌ After tax income
Total assets
. 
b ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Appendix 21 
 Industry PTROAs and ATROA Mean for the 15% and 33% STR Company a  
Panel A: 15% STR       
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 
PTROA_1 0.061 0.059 0.023 0.014 0.157 0.047 0.074
PTROA_2 0.055 0.051 0.022 0.014 0.158 0.041 0.068
ATROA 0.051 0.051 0.020 0.012 0.131 0.038 0.063
Panel B: 33% STR       
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Q1 Q3 
PTROA_1 0.072 0.064 0.032 0.016 0.180 0.055 0.082
PTROA_2 0.071 0.061 0.036 0.014 0.193 0.052 0.079
ATROA 0.051 0.046 0.021 0.009 0.115 0.040 0.058
a The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (Std.dev.), maximum, first quartile (Q1), and 
third quartile (Q3) of the PTROAs and ATROAs for 15% and 33% STR company by the industry 
classification. There are 98 15% STR company industry years and 105 33% STR company industry 
years.  
PTROA_1ൌ Pre tax income
Total assets
; PTROA_2ൌ Operating income
Total assets
; ATROAൌ After tax income
Total assets
. 
. 
 
 
Appendix 22 
Paired Sample Correlations Between 15% and 33% STR 
Company Industry Years  a
  Pearson Correlation Spearman Correlations 
 PTROA_1 :15% STR and 33% STR 0.320** 0.399** 
 PTROA_2 :15% STR and 33% STR 0.408** 0.468** 
0.324** 0.395**  ATROA : 15% STR and 33% STR
a The table shows the Pearson correlation and Spearman correlation between the 15% and 33% 
industry company years for PTROAs and ATROA.  
There are 98 15% STR industry company years and 3  STR industry compan
PTROA_1ൌ Pre tax income
Total assets
3% y years.  
; PTROA_2ൌ Operating income
Total assets
; ATROAൌ After tax income
Total assets
. 
b ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).  
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Appendix 23  Random Effects Regression Results 
Independent variable Predicted sign 
PTROE_1 as Dependent Variable 
 (coefficient estimates with z-statistics )
PTROE_2 as Dependent Variable 
 (coefficient estimates with z-statistics )
  TRP PTTPE PTTSE TRP PTTPE PTTSE 
Intercept  0.033 (2.70)*** 
0.032 
(2.89)*** 
0.010 
(1.05) 
0.045 
(3.65)*** 
0.042 
(3.73)*** 
0.025 
(2.36)** 
TRP - -0.002 (-0.08) 
 
 
 
-0.013 
(-0.56) 
 
 
 
PTTPE -  1.643 (24.64)***
  
1.597 
(23.69)***
 
PTTSE  +  
 
 
1.725 
(41.61)*** 
 
 
 
1.486 
(33.58)*** 
EGR + 0.744 (7.99)*** 
0.571 
(6.67)*** 
0.596 
(8.08)*** 
0.504 
(5.42)*** 
0.343 
(3.98)*** 
0.374 
(4.74)*** 
CIGR + 0.085 (2.85)*** 
0.071 
(2.60)*** 
0.079 
(3.39)*** 
0.121 
(4.09)*** 
0.109 
(3.97)*** 
0.117 
(4.67)*** 
MS  + 0.322 (4.89)*** 
0.278 
(4.41)*** 
0.333 
(5.59)*** 
0.331 
(4.96)*** 
0.290 
(4.48)*** 
0.342 
(5.44)*** 
MC  + 0.015 (1.32) 
0.018 
(1.67)* 
0.026 
(2.53)** 
0.009 
(0.75) 
0.012 
(1.02) 
0.018 
(1.68)* 
Gov - -0.017 (-2.30)** 
-0.017 
(-2.53)** 
-0.014 
(-2.23)** 
-0.019 
(-2.60)***
-0.019 
(-2.76)***
-0.017 
(-2.56)** 
        
R
Rଶ(between) 
ଶ(within)  0.052 0.215 0.417 0.039 0.201 0.320 
 0.020 0.123 0.195 0.019 0.098 0.132 
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Rଶ(overall)  0.029 0.154 0.266 0.024 0.128 0.188 
No. of Obs.  3334 3285 3334 3334 3285 3334 
No. of Company  777 766 777 777 766 777 
Wald χଶ  150.48*** 783.77*** 1970.47*** 114.88*** 695.06*** 1285.95***
 The table shows random effects regression results from the following regression model:  a
itit6it5jt4t3t2it1it εGovβMSβMCβCIGRβEGRβ TPβαPTROE +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=   
where PTROE_1 = pre-tax income/shareholder equity; PTROE_2 = operating income/shareholder equity; TPR = tax rate preference 
= 33%-actual tax rate; PTTPE = pre-tax tax preference on equity = tax preference on equity/(1-actual STR); PTTSE = pre-tax tax 
subsidy on equity = tax subsidy on equity/(1-33%); EGR = economic growth rate; CIGR = capital investment growth rate; MS = 
m
ome and PTI and PTROE exceeding one, it leaves 3334 company years, or 777 
c  sample. 
l 
arket share; MC = market concentration; Gov = government equity ownership.  
b The initial data are from CSMAR V3.1. After excluding any sample company before 2002 and with missing value, negative shareholder 
equity, negative tax payment, negative operating inc
ompanies from 2002 to 2006 as the final full
c * Significant at the 10% confidence leve
** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
** Significant at the 1% confidence level. *
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